                 1 Are "anarcho"-capitalists really anarchists?

   In a word, no. While "anarcho"-capitalists obviously try to associate
   themselves with the anarchist tradition by using the word "anarcho" or
   by calling themselves "anarchists", their ideas are distinctly at odds
   with those associated with anarchism. As a result, any claims that
   their ideas are anarchist or that they are part of the anarchist
   tradition or movement are false.

   "Anarcho"-capitalists claim to be anarchists because they say that they
   oppose government. As such, as noted in the [1]last section, they use a
   dictionary definition of anarchism. However, this fails to appreciate
   that anarchism is a political theory, not a dictionary definition. As
   dictionaries are rarely politically sophisticated things, this means
   that they fail to recognise that anarchism is more than just opposition
   to government, it is also marked a opposition to capitalism (i.e.
   exploitation and private property). Thus, opposition to government is a
   necessary but not sufficient condition for being an anarchist -- you
   also need to be opposed to exploitation and capitalist private
   property. As "anarcho"-capitalists do not consider interest, rent and
   profits (i.e. capitalism) to be exploitative nor oppose capitalist
   property rights, they are not anarchists.

   Moreover, "anarcho"-capitalism is inherently self-refuting. This can be
   seen from leading "anarcho"-capitalist Murray Rothbard. he thundered
   against the evil of the state, arguing that it "arrogates to itself a
   monopoly of force, of ultimate decision-making power, over a given area
   territorial area." In and of itself, this definition is unremarkable.
   That a few people (an elite of rulers) claim the right to rule others
   must be part of any sensible definition of the state or government.
   However, the problems begin for Rothbard when he notes that
   "[o]bviously, in a free society, Smith has the ultimate decision-making
   power over his own just property, Jones over his, etc." [The Ethics of
   Liberty, p. 170 and p. 173] The logical contradiction in this position
   should be obvious, but not to Rothbard. It shows the power of ideology,
   the ability of means words (the expression "private property") to turn
   the bad ("ultimate decision-making power over a given area") into the
   good ("ultimate decision-making power over a given area").

   Now, this contradiction can be solved in only one way -- the owners of
   the "given area" are also its users. In other words, a system of
   possession (or "occupancy and use") as favoured by anarchists. However,
   Rothbard is a capitalist and supports private property. In other words,
   wage labour and landlords. This means that he supports a divergence
   between ownership and use and this means that this "ultimate
   decision-making power" extends to those who use, but do not own, such
   property (i.e. tenants and workers). The statist nature of private
   property is clearly indicated by Rothbard's words -- the property owner
   in an "anarcho"-capitalist society possesses the "ultimate
   decision-making power" over a given area, which is also what the state
   has currently. Rothbard has, ironically, proved by his own definition
   that "anarcho"-capitalism is not anarchist.

   Rothbard does try to solve this obvious contradiction, but utterly
   fails. He simply ignores the crux of the matter, that capitalism is
   based on hierarchy and, therefore, cannot be anarchist. He does this by
   arguing that the hierarchy associated with capitalism is fine as long
   as the private property that produced it was acquired in a "just"
   manner. In so doing he yet again draws attention to the identical
   authority structures and social relationships of the state and
   property. As he puts it:

     "If the State may be said too properly own its territory, then it is
     proper for it to make rules for everyone who presumes to live in
     that area. It can legitimately seize or control private property
     because there is no private property in its area, because it really
     owns the entire land surface. So long as the State permits its
     subjects to leave its territory, then, it can be said to act as does
     any other owner who sets down rules for people living on his
     property." [Op. Cit., p. 170]

   Obviously Rothbard argues that the state does not "justly" own its
   territory -- but given that the current distribution of property is
   just as much the result of violence and coercion as the state, his
   argument is seriously flawed. It amounts, as we note in [2]section 4,
   to little more than an "immaculate conception of property" unrelated to
   reality. Even assuming that private property was produced by the means
   Rothbard assumes, it does not justify the hierarchy associated with it
   as the current and future generations of humanity have, effectively,
   been excommunicated from liberty by previous ones. If, as Rothbard
   argues, property is a natural right and the basis of liberty then why
   should the many be excluded from their birthright by a minority? In
   other words, Rothbard denies that liberty should be universal. He
   chooses property over liberty while anarchists choose liberty over
   property.

   Even worse, the possibility that private property can result in worse
   violations of individual freedom (at least of workers) than the state
   of its citizens was implicitly acknowledged by Rothbard. He uses as a
   hypothetical example a country whose King is threatened by a rising
   "libertarian" movement. The King responses by "employ[ing] a cunning
   stratagem," namely he "proclaims his government to be dissolved, but
   just before doing so he arbitrarily parcels out the entire land area of
   his kingdom to the 'ownership' of himself and his relatives." Rather
   than taxes, his subjects now pay rent and he can "regulate to regulate
   the lives of all the people who presume to live on" his property as he
   sees fit. Rothbard then asks:

     "Now what should be the reply of the libertarian rebels to this pert
     challenge? If they are consistent utilitarians, they must bow to
     this subterfuge, and resign themselves to living under a regime no
     less despotic than the one they had been battling for so long.
     Perhaps, indeed, more despotic, for now the king and his relatives
     can claim for themselves the libertarians' very principle of the
     absolute right of private property, an absoluteness which they might
     not have dared to claim before." [Op. Cit., pp. 54-5]

   So not only does the property owner have the same monopoly of power
   over a given area as the state, it is more despotic as it is based on
   the "absolute right of private property"! And remember, Rothbard is
   arguing in favour of "anarcho"-capitalismAnd remember, Rothbard is
   arguing in favour of "anarcho"-capitalism ("if you have unbridled
   capitalism, you will have all kinds of authority: you will have extreme
   authority." [Chomksy, Understanding Power, p. 200]). So in practice,
   private property is a major source of oppression and authoritarianism
   within society -- there is little or no freedom within capitalist
   production (as Bakunin noted, "the worker sells his person and his
   liberty for a given time"). So, in stark contrast to anarchists,
   "anarcho"-capitalists have no problem with factory fascism (i.e. wage
   labour), a position which seems highly illogical for a theory calling
   itself libertarian. If it were truly libertarian, it would oppose all
   forms of domination, not just statism. This position flows from the
   "anarcho"-capitalist definition of freedom as the absence of coercion
   and will be discussed in [3]section 2 in more detail.

   Of course, Rothbard has yet another means to escape the obvious, namely
   that the market will limit the abuses of the property owners. If
   workers do not like their ruler then they can seek another. However,
   this reply completely ignores the reality of economic and social power.
   Thus the "consent" argument fails because it ignores the social
   circumstances of capitalism which limit the choice of the many.
   Anarchists have long argued that, as a class, workers have little
   choice but to "consent" to capitalist hierarchy. The alternative is
   either dire poverty or starvation.

   "Anarcho"-capitalists dismiss such claims by denying that there is such
   a thing as economic power. Rather, it is simply freedom of contract.
   Anarchists consider such claims as a joke. To show why, we need only
   quote (yet again) Rothbard on the abolition of slavery and serfdom in
   the 19th century. He argued, correctly, that the "bodies of the
   oppressed were freed, but the property which they had worked and
   eminently deserved to own, remained in the hands of their former
   oppressors. With economic power thus remaining in their hands, the
   former lords soon found themselves virtual masters once more of what
   were now free tenants or farm labourers. The serfs and slaves had
   tasted freedom, but had been cruelly derived of its fruits." [Op. Cit.,
   p. 74]

   To say the least, anarchists fail to see the logic in this position.
   Contrast this with the standard "anarcho"-capitalist claim that if
   market forces ("voluntary exchanges") result in the creation of "free
   tenants or farm labourers" then they are free. Yet labourers
   dispossessed by market forces are in exactly the same social and
   economic situation as the ex-serfs and ex-slaves. If the latter do not
   have the fruits of freedom, neither do the former. Rothbard sees the
   obvious "economic power" in the latter case, but denies it in the
   former. It is only Rothbard's ideology that stops him from drawing the
   obvious conclusion -- identical economic conditions produce identical
   social relationships and so capitalism is marked by "economic power"
   and "virtual masters." The only solution is for "anarcho"-capitalists
   to simply say the ex-serfs and ex-slaves were actually free to choose
   and, consequently, Rothbard was wrong. It might be inhuman, but at
   least it would be consistent!

   Rothbard's perspective is alien to anarchism. For example, as
   individualist anarchist William Bailie noted, under capitalism there is
   a class system marked by "a dependent industrial class of wage-workers"
   and "a privileged class of wealth-monopolisers, each becoming more and
   more distinct from the other as capitalism advances." This has turned
   property into "a social power, an economic force destructive of rights,
   a fertile source of injustice, a means of enslaving the dispossessed."
   He concludes: "Under this system equal liberty cannot obtain." Bailie
   notes that the modern "industrial world under capitalistic conditions"
   have "arisen under the regime of status" (and so "law-made privileges")
   however, it seems unlikely that he would have concluded that such a
   class system would be fine if it had developed naturally or the current
   state was abolished while leaving the class structure intact (as we
   note in [4]section G.4, Tucker recognised that even the "freest
   competition" was powerless against the "enormous concentration of
   wealth" associated with modern capitalism). [The Individualist
   Anarchists, p. 121]

   Therefore anarchists recognise that "free exchange" or "consent" in
   unequal circumstances will reduce freedom as well as increasing
   inequality between individuals and classes. In other words, as we
   discuss in [5]section 3, inequality will produce social relationships
   which are based on hierarchy and domination, not freedom. As Noam
   Chomsky put it:

     "Anarcho-capitalism, in my opinion, is a doctrinal system which, if
     ever implemented, would lead to forms of tyranny and oppression that
     have few counterparts in human history. There isn't the slightest
     possibility that its (in my view, horrendous) ideas would be
     implemented, because they would quickly destroy any society that
     made this colossal error. The idea of 'free contract' between the
     potentate and his starving subject is a sick joke, perhaps worth
     some moments in an academic seminar exploring the consequences of
     (in my view, absurd) ideas, but nowhere else." [Noam Chomsky on
     Anarchism, interview with Tom Lane, December 23, 1996]

   Clearly, then, by its own arguments "anarcho"-capitalism is not
   anarchist. This should come as no surprise to anarchists. Anarchism, as
   a political theory, was born when Proudhon wrote What is Property?
   specifically to refute the notion that workers are free when capitalist
   property forces them to seek employment by landlords and capitalists.
   He was well aware that in such circumstances property "violates
   equality by the rights of exclusion and increase, and freedom by
   despotism . . . [and has] perfect identity with robbery." He,
   unsurprisingly, talks of the "proprietor, to whom [the worker] has sold
   and surrendered his liberty." For Proudhon, anarchy was "the absence of
   a master, of a sovereign" while "proprietor" was "synonymous" with
   "sovereign" for he "imposes his will as law, and suffers neither
   contradiction nor control." This meant that "property engenders
   despotism," as "each proprietor is sovereign lord within the sphere of
   his property." [What is Property, p. 251, p. 130, p. 264 and pp. 266-7]
   It must also be stressed that Proudhon's classic work is a lengthy
   critique of the kind of apologetics for private property Rothbard
   espouses to salvage his ideology from its obvious contradictions.

   Ironically, Rothbard repeats the same analysis as Proudhon but draws
   the opposite conclusions and expects to be considered an anarchist!
   Moreover, it seems equally ironic that "anarcho"-capitalism calls
   itself "anarchist" while basing itself on the arguments that anarchism
   was created in opposition to. As shown, "anarcho"-capitalism makes as
   much sense as "anarcho-statism" -- an oxymoron, a contradiction in
   terms. The idea that "anarcho"-capitalism warrants the name "anarchist"
   is simply false. Only someone ignorant of anarchism could maintain such
   a thing. While you expect anarchist theory to show this to be the case,
   the wonderful thing is that "anarcho"-capitalism itself does the same.

   Little wonder Bob Black argues that "[t]o demonise state
   authoritarianism while ignoring identical albeit contract-consecrated
   subservient arrangements in the large-scale corporations which control
   the world economy is fetishism at its worst." [Libertarian as
   Conservative] The similarities between capitalism and statism are clear
   -- and so why "anarcho"-capitalism cannot be anarchist. To reject the
   authority (the "ultimate decision-making power") of the state and
   embrace that of the property owner indicates not only a highly
   illogical stance but one at odds with the basic principles of
   anarchism. This whole-hearted support for wage labour and capitalist
   property rights indicates that "anarcho"-capitalists are not anarchists
   because they do not reject all forms of archy. They obviously support
   the hierarchy between boss and worker (wage labour) and landlord and
   tenant. Anarchism, by definition, is against all forms of archy,
   including the hierarchy generated by capitalist property. To ignore the
   obvious archy associated with capitalist property is highly illogical.

   In addition, we must note that such inequalities in power and wealth
   will need "defending" from those subject to them ("anarcho"-capitalists
   recognise the need for private police and courts to defend property
   from theft -- and, anarchists add, to defend the theft and despotism
   associated with property!). Due to its support of private property (and
   thus authority), "anarcho"-capitalism ends up retaining a state in its
   "anarchy"; namely a private state whose existence its proponents
   attempt to deny simply by refusing to call it a state, like an ostrich
   hiding its head in the sand (see [6]section 6 for more on this and why
   "anarcho"-capitalism is better described as "private state"
   capitalism). As Albert Meltzer put it:

     "Common-sense shows that any capitalist society might dispense with
     a 'State' . . . but it could not dispense with organised government,
     or a privatised form of it, if there were people amassing money and
     others working to amass it for them. The philosophy of
     'anarcho-capitalism' dreamed up by the 'libertarian' New Right, has
     nothing to do with Anarchism as known by the Anarchist movement
     proper. It is a lie . . . Patently unbridled capitalism . . . needs
     some force at its disposal to maintain class privileges, either form
     the State itself or from private armies. What they believe in is in
     fact a limited State -- that us, one in which the State has one
     function, to protect the ruling class, does not interfere with
     exploitation, and comes as cheap as possible for the ruling class.
     The idea also serves another purpose . . . a moral justification for
     bourgeois consciences in avoiding taxes without feeling guilty about
     it." [Anarchism: Arguments For and Against, p. 50]

   For anarchists, this need of capitalism for some kind of state is
   unsurprising. For "Anarchy without socialism seems equally as
   impossible to us [as socialism without anarchy], for in such a case it
   could not be other than the domination of the strongest, and would
   therefore set in motion right away the organisation and consolidation
   of this domination; that is to the constitution of government." [Errico
   Malatesta, Life and Ideas, p. 148] Because of this, the
   "anarcho"-capitalist rejection of anarchist ideas on capitalist
   property economics and the need for equality, they cannot be considered
   anarchists or part of the anarchist tradition.

   Thus anarchism is far more than the common dictionary definition of "no
   government" -- it also entails being against all forms of archy,
   including those generated by capitalist property. This is clear from
   the roots of the word "anarchy." As we noted in [7]section A.1, the
   word anarchy means "no rulers" or "contrary to authority." As Rothbard
   himself acknowledges, the property owner is the ruler of their property
   and, therefore, those who use it. For this reason "anarcho"-capitalism
   cannot be considered as a form of anarchism -- a real anarchist must
   logically oppose the authority of the property owner along with that of
   the state. As "anarcho"-capitalism does not explicitly (or implicitly,
   for that matter) call for economic arrangements that will end wage
   labour and usury it cannot be considered anarchist or part of the
   anarchist tradition.

   Political theories should be identified by their actual features and
   history rather than labels. Once we recognise that, we soon find out
   that "anarcho"-capitalism is an oxymoron. Anarchists and
   "anarcho"-capitalists are not part of the same movement or tradition.
   Their ideas and aims are in direct opposition to those of all kinds of
   anarchists.

   While anarchists have always opposed capitalism, "anarcho"-capitalists
   have embraced it. And due to this embrace their "anarchy" will be
   marked by extensive differences in wealth and power, differences that
   will show themselves up in relationships based upon subordination and
   hierarchy (such as wage labour), not freedom (little wonder that
   Proudhon argued that "property is despotism" -- it creates
   authoritarian and hierarchical relationships between people in a
   similar way to statism).

   Their support for "free market" capitalism ignores the impact of wealth
   and power on the nature and outcome of individual decisions within the
   market (see sections [8]2 and [9]3 for further discussion). For
   example, as we indicate in sections [10]J.5.10, [11]J.5.11 and
   [12]J.5.12, wage labour is less efficient than self-management in
   production but due to the structure and dynamics of the capitalist
   market, "market forces" will actively discourage self-management due to
   its empowering nature for workers. In other words, a developed
   capitalist market will promote hierarchy and unfreedom in production in
   spite of its effects on individual workers and their wants (see also
   [13]section 10.2). Thus "free market" capitalism tends to re-enforce
   inequalities of wealth and power, not eliminate them.

   Furthermore, any such system of (economic and social) power will
   require extensive force to maintain it and the "anarcho"-capitalist
   system of competing "defence firms" will simply be a new state,
   enforcing capitalist power, property rights and law.

   Overall, the lack of concern for meaningful freedom within production
   and the effects of vast differences in power and wealth within society
   as a whole makes "anarcho"-capitalism little better than "anarchism for
   the rich." Emma Goldman recognised this when she argued that "'Rugged
   individualism' has meant all the 'individualism' for the masters . . .
   in whose name political tyranny and social oppression are defended and
   held up as virtues while every aspiration and attempt of man to gain
   freedom . . . is denounced as . . . evil in the name of that same
   individualism." [Red Emma Speaks, p. 112] And, as such, is no anarchism
   at all.

   So, unlike anarchists, "anarcho"-capitalists do not seek the "abolition
   of the proletariat" (to use Proudhon's expression) via changing
   capitalist property rights and institutions. Thus the
   "anarcho"-capitalist and the anarchist have different starting
   positions and opposite ends in mind and so they cannot be considered
   part of the same (anarchist) tradition. As we discuss further in later
   sections, the "anarcho"-capitalist claims to being anarchists are bogus
   simply because they reject so much of the anarchist tradition as to
   make what they do accept non-anarchist in theory and practice. Little
   wonder Peter Marshall said that "few anarchists would accept the
   'anarcho-capitalists' into the anarchist camp since they do not share a
   concern for economic equality and social justice." [Demanding the
   Impossible, p. 565]

1.1 Why is the failure to renounce hierarchy the Achilles Heel of right-wing
libertarianism

   Any capitalist system will produce vast differences in economic (and
   social) wealth and power. As we argue in [14]section 3.1, such
   differences will reflect themselves in the market and any "free"
   contracts agreed there will create hierarchical relationships. Thus
   capitalism is marked by hierarchy (see [15]section B.1.2) and,
   unsurprisingly, right-libertarians and "anarcho"-capitalists fail to
   oppose such "free market" generated hierarchy.

   Both groups approve of it in the capitalist workplace or rented
   accommodation and the right-Libertarians also approve of it in a
   'minimal' state to protect private property ("anarcho"-capitalists, in
   contrast, approve of the use of private defence firms to protect
   property). But the failure of these two movements to renounce hierarchy
   is their weakest point. For anti-authoritarianism has sunk deep roots
   into the modern psyche, as a legacy of the sixties.

   Many people who do not even know what anarchism is have been profoundly
   affected by the personal liberation and counterculture movements of the
   past thirty years, epitomised by the popular bumper sticker, "Question
   Authority." As a result, society now tolerates much more choice than
   ever before in matters of religion, sexuality, art, music, clothing,
   and other components of lifestyle. We need only recall the conservatism
   that reigned in such areas during the fifties to see that the idea of
   liberty has made tremendous advances in just a few decades.

   Although this liberatory impulse has so far been confined almost
   entirely to the personal and cultural realms, it may yet be capable of
   spilling over and affecting economic and political institutions,
   provided it continues to grow. The Right is well aware of this, as seen
   in its ongoing campaigns for "family values," school prayer,
   suppression of women's rights, fundamentalist Christianity, sexual
   abstinence before marriage, and other attempts to revive the
   Ozzie-and-Harriet mindset of the Good Old Days. This is where the
   efforts of "cultural anarchists" -- artists, musicians, poets, and
   others -- are important in keeping alive the ideal of personal freedom
   and resistance to authority as a necessary foundation for economic and
   political restructuring.

   Indeed, the libertarian right (as a whole) support restrictions on
   freedom as long as its not the state that is doing it! Their support
   for capitalism means that they have no problem with bosses dictating
   what workers do during working hours (nor outside working hours, if the
   job requires employees to take drug tests or not be gay in order to
   keep it). If a private landlord or company decrees a mandatory rule or
   mode of living, workers/tenets must "love it or leave it!" Of course,
   that the same argument also applies to state laws is one hotly denied
   by right-Libertarians -- a definite case of not seeing the wood for the
   trees (see [16]section 2.3).

   Of course, the "anarcho"-capitalist will argue, workers and tenants can
   find a more liberal boss or landlord. This, however, ignores two key
   facts. Firstly, being able to move to a more liberal state hardly makes
   state laws less offensive (as they themselves will be the first to
   point out). Secondly, looking for a new job or home is not that easy.
   Just a moving to a new state can involve drastic upheavals, so change
   changing jobs and homes. Moreover, the job market is usually a buyers
   market (it has to be in capitalism, otherwise profits are squeezed --
   see sections [17]C.7 and [18]10.2) and this means that workers are not
   usually in a position (unless they organise) to demand increased
   liberties at work.

   It seems somewhat ironic, to say the least, that right-libertarians
   place rights of property over the rights of self-ownership, even though
   (according to their ideology) self-ownership is the foundational right
   from which property rights are derived. Thus in right-libertarianism
   the rights of property owners to discriminate and govern the
   property-less are more important than the freedom from discrimination
   (i.e. to be yourself) or the freedom to govern oneself at all times.

   So, when it boils down to it, right-libertarians are not really
   bothered about restrictions on liberty and, indeed, they will defend
   private restrictions on liberty with all their might. This may seem a
   strange position for self-proclaimed "libertarians" to take, but it
   flows naturally from their definition of freedom (see [19]section 2 for
   a full discussion of this). but by not attacking hierarchy beyond
   certain forms of statism, the 'libertarian' right fundamentally
   undermines its claim to be libertarian. Freedom cannot be
   compartmentalised, but is holistic. The denial of liberty in, say, the
   workplace, quickly results in its being denied elsewhere in society
   (due to the impact of the inequalities it would produce) , just as the
   degrading effects of wage labour and the hierarchies with which is it
   bound up are felt by the worker outside work.

   Neither the Libertarian Party nor so-called "anarcho"-capitalism is
   genuinely anti-authoritarian, as those who are truly dedicated to
   liberty must be.

1.2 How libertarian is right-Libertarian theory?

   The short answer is, not very. Liberty not only implies but also
   requires independent, critical thought (indeed, anarchists would argue
   that critical thought requires free development and evolution and that
   it is precisely this which capitalist hierarchy crushes). For
   anarchists a libertarian theory, if it is to be worthy of the name,
   must be based upon critical thought and reflect the key aspect that
   characterises life - change and the ability to evolve. To hold up dogma
   and base "theory" upon assumptions (as opposed to facts) is the
   opposite of a libertarian frame of mind. A libertarian theory must be
   based upon reality and recognise the need for change and the existence
   of change. Unfortunately, right-Libertarianism is marked more by
   ideology than critical analysis.

   Right-Libertarianism is characterised by a strong tendency of creating
   theories based upon assumptions and deductions from these axioms (for a
   discussion on the pre-scientific nature of this methodology and of its
   dangers, see the [20]next section). Robert Nozick, for example, in
   Anarchy, State, and Utopia makes no attempt to provide a justification
   of the property rights his whole theory is based upon. His main
   assumption is that "[i]ndividuals have rights, and there are certain
   things no person or group may do to them (without violating their
   rights)." [Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. ix] While this does have its
   intuitive appeal, it is not much to base a political ideology upon.
   After all, what rights people consider as valid can be pretty
   subjective and have constantly evolved during history. To say that
   "individuals have rights" is to open up the question "what rights?"
   Indeed, as we argue in greater length in [21]section 2, such a rights
   based system as Nozick desires can and does lead to situations
   developing in which people "consent" to be exploited and oppressed and
   that, intuitively, many people consider supporting the "violation" of
   these "certain rights" (by creating other ones) simply because of their
   evil consequences.

   In other words, starting from the assumption "people have [certain]
   rights" Nozick constructs a theory which, when faced with the reality
   of unfreedom and domination it would create for the many, justifies
   this unfreedom as an expression of liberty. In other words, regardless
   of the outcome, the initial assumptions are what matter. Nozick's
   intuitive rights system can lead to some very non-intuitive outcomes.

   And does Nozick prove the theory of property rights he assumes? He
   states that "we shall not formulate [it] here." [Op. Cit., p. 150]
   Moreover, it is not formulated anywhere else in his book. And if it is
   not formulated, what is there to defend? Surely this means that his
   Libertarianism is without foundations? As Jonathan Wolff notes,
   Nozick's "Libertarian property rights remain substantially undefended."
   [Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State, p. 117] Given
   that the right to acquire property is critical to his whole theory you
   would think it important enough to go into in some detail (or at least
   document). After all, unless he provides us with a firm basis for
   property rights then his entitlement theory is nonsense as no one has
   the right to (private) property.

   It could be argued that Nozick does present enough information to allow
   us to piece together a possible argument in favour of property rights
   based on his modification of the "Lockean Proviso" (although he does
   not point us to these arguments). However, assuming this is the case,
   such a defence actually fails (see [22]section B.3.4 for more on this).
   If individuals do have rights, these rights do not include property
   rights in the form Nozick assumes (but does not prove). Nozick appears
   initially convincing because what he assumes with regards to property
   is a normal feature of the society we are in (we would be forgiven when
   we note here that feeble arguments pass for convincing when they are on
   the same side as the prevailing sentiment).

   Similarly, both Murray Rothbard and Ayn Rand (who is infamous for
   repeating "A is A" ad infinitum) do the same - base their ideologies on
   assumptions (see [23]section 11 for more on this).

   Therefore, we see that most of the leading right-Libertarian ideologues
   base themselves on assumptions about what "Man" is or the rights they
   should have (usually in the form that people have (certain) rights
   because they are people). From these theorems and assumptions they
   build their respective ideologies, using logic to deduce the
   conclusions that their assumptions imply. Such a methodology is
   unscientific and, indeed, a relic of religious (pre-scientific) society
   (see [24]next section) but, more importantly, can have negative effects
   on maximising liberty. This is because this "methodology" has distinct
   problems. Murray Bookchin argues:

     "Conventional reason rests on identity, not change; its fundamental
     principle is that A equals A, the famous 'principle of identity,'
     which means that any given phenomenon can be only itself and cannot
     be other than what we immediately perceive it to be at a given
     moment in time. It does not address the problem of change. A human
     being is an infant at one time, a child at another, an adolescent at
     still another, and finally a youth and an adult. When we analyse an
     infant by means of conventional reason, we are not exploring what it
     is becoming in the process of developing into a child." ["A
     Philosophical Naturalism", Society and Nature No.2, p. 64]

   In other words, right-Libertarian theory is based upon ignoring the
   fundamental aspect of life - namely change and evolution. Perhaps it
   will be argued that identity also accounts for change by including
   potentiality -- which means, that we have the strange situation that A
   can potentially be A! If A is not actually A, but only has the
   potential to be A, then A is not A. Thus to include change is to
   acknowledge that A does not equal A -- that individuals and humanity
   evolves and so what constitutes A also changes. To maintain identity
   and then to deny it seems strange.

   That change is far from the "A is A" mentality can be seen from Murray
   Rothbard who goes so far as to state that "one of the notable
   attributes of natural law" is "its applicability to all men [sic!],
   regardless of time or place. Thus ethical law takes its place alongside
   physical or 'scientific' natural laws." [The Ethics of Liberty, p. 42]
   Apparently the "nature of man" is the only living thing in nature that
   does not evolve or change! Of course, it could be argued that by
   "natural law" Rothbard is only referring to his method of deducing his
   (and, we stress, they are just his -- not natural) "ethical laws" --
   but his methodology starts by assuming certain things about "man."
   Whether these assumptions seem far or not is besides the point, by
   using the term "natural law" Rothbard is arguing that any actions that
   violate his ethical laws are somehow "against nature" (but if they were
   against nature, they could not occur -- see [25]section 11 for more on
   this). Deductions from assumptions is a Procrustean bed for humanity
   (as Rothbard's ideology shows).

   So, as can be seen, many leading right-Libertarians place great store
   by the axiom "A is A" or that "man" has certain rights simply because
   "he" is a "man". And as Bookchin points out, such conventional reason
   "doubtless plays an indispensable role in mathematical thinking and
   mathematical sciences . . . and in the nuts-and-bolts of dealing with
   everyday life" and so is essential to "understand or design mechanical
   entities." [Ibid., p.67] But the question arises, is such reason useful
   when considering people and other forms of life?

   Mechanical entities are but one (small) aspect of human life.
   Unfortunately for right-Libertarians (and fortunately for the rest of
   humanity), human beings are not mechanical entities but instead are
   living, breathing, feeling, hoping, dreaming, changing living
   organisms. They are not mechanical entities and any theory that uses
   reason based on such (non-living) entities will flounder when faced
   with living ones. In other words, right-Libertarian theory treats
   people as the capitalist system tries to -- namely as commodities, as
   things. Instead of human beings, whose ideas, ideals and ethics change,
   develop and grow, capitalism and capitalist ideologues try to reduce
   human life to the level of corn or iron (by emphasising the unchanging
   "nature" of man and their starting assumptions/rights).

   This can be seen from their support for wage labour, the reduction of
   human activity to a commodity on the market. While paying lip service
   to liberty and life, right-libertarianism justifies the commodification
   of labour and life, which within a system of capitalist property rights
   can result in the treating of people as means to an end as opposed to
   an end in themselves (see sections [26]2 and [27]3.1).

   And as Bookchin points out, "in an age of sharply conflicting values
   and emotionally charges ideals, such a way of reasoning is often
   repellent. Dogmatism, authoritarianism, and fear seem all-pervasive."
   [Ibid., p. 68] Right-Libertarianism provides more than enough evidence
   for Bookchin's summary with its support for authoritarian social
   relationships, hierarchy and even slavery (see [28]section 2).

   This mechanical viewpoint is also reflected in their lack of
   appreciation that social institutions and relationships evolve over
   time and, sometimes, fundamentally change. This can best be seen from
   property. Right-libertarians fail to see that over time (in the words
   of Proudhon) property "changed its nature." Originally, "the word
   property was synonymous with . . . individual possession" but it became
   more "complex" and turned into private property -- "the right to use it
   by his neighbour's labour." The changing of use-rights to (capitalist)
   property rights created relations of domination and exploitation
   between people absent before. For the right-Libertarian, both the tools
   of the self-employed artisan and the capital of a transnational
   corporation are both forms of "property" and (so) basically identical.
   In practice, of course, the social relations they create and the impact
   they have on society are totally different. Thus the mechanical
   mind-set of right-Libertarianism fails to understand how institutions,
   like property, evolve and come to replace whatever freedom enhancing
   features they had with oppression (indeed, von Mises argued that
   "[t]here may possibly be a difference of opinion about whether a
   particular institution is socially beneficial or harmful. But once it
   has been judged [by whom, we ask] beneficial, one can no longer contend
   that, for some inexplicable reason, it must be condemned as immoral"
   [Liberalism, p. 34] So much for evolution and change!).

   Anarchism, in contrast, is based upon the importance of critical
   thought informed by an awareness that life is in a constant process of
   change. This means that our ideas on human society must be informed by
   the facts, not by what we wish was true. For Bookchin, an evaluation of
   conventional wisdom (as expressed in "the law of identity") is
   essential and its conclusions have "enormous importance for how we
   behave as ethical beings, the nature of nature, and our place in the
   natural world. Moreover. . . these issues directly affect the kind of
   society, sensibility, and lifeways we wish to foster." [Bookchin, Op.
   Cit., p. 69-70]

   Bookchin is correct. While anarchists oppose hierarchy in the name of
   liberty, right-libertarians support authority and hierarchy, all of
   which deny freedom and restrict individual development. This is
   unsurprising because the right-libertarian ideology rejects change and
   critical thought based upon the scientific method and so is
   fundamentally anti-life in its assumptions and anti-human in its
   method. Far from being a libertarian set of ideas, right-Libertarianism
   is a mechanical set of dogmas that deny the fundamental nature of life
   (namely change) and of individuality (namely critical thought and
   freedom). Moreover, in practice their system of (capitalist) rights
   would soon result in extensive restrictions on liberty and
   authoritarian social relationships (see sections [29]2 and [30]3) -- a
   strange result of a theory proclaiming itself "libertarian" but one
   consistent with its methodology.

   From a wider viewpoint, such a rejection of liberty by
   right-libertarians is unsurprising. They do, after all, support
   capitalism. Capitalism produces an inverted set of ethics, one in which
   capital (dead labour) is more important that people (living labour).
   After all, workers are usually easier to replace than investments in
   capital and the person who owns capital commands the person who "only"
   owns his life and productive abilities. And as Oscar Wilde once noted,
   crimes against property "are the crimes that the English law, valuing
   what a man has more than what a man is, punishes with the harshest and
   most horrible severity." [The Soul of Man Under Socialism]

   This mentality is reflected in right-libertarianism when it claims that
   stealing food is a crime while starving to death (due to the action of
   market forces/power and property rights) is no infringement of your
   rights (see [31]section 4.2 for a similar argument with regards to
   water). It can also be seen when right-libertarian's claim that the
   taxation "of earnings from labour" (e.g. of one dollar from a
   millionaire) is "on a par with forced labour" [Nozick, Op. Cit., p.
   169] while working in a sweatshop for 14 hours a day (enriching said
   millionaire) does not affect your liberty as you "consent" to it due to
   market forces (although, of course, many rich people have earned their
   money without labouring themselves -- their earnings derive from the
   wage labour of others so would taxing those, non-labour, earnings be
   "forced labour"?) Interestingly, the Individualist Anarchist Ben Tucker
   argued that an income tax was "a recognition of the fact that
   industrial freedom and equality of opportunity no longer exist here [in
   the USA in the 1890s] even in the imperfect state in which they once
   did exist" [quoted by James Martin, Men Against the State, p. 263]
   which suggests a somewhat different viewpoint on this matter than
   Nozick or Rothbard.

   That capitalism produces an inverted set of ethics can be seen when the
   Ford produced the Pinto. The Pinto had a flaw in it which meant that if
   it was hit in a certain way in a crash the fuel tank exploded. The Ford
   company decided it was more "economically viable" to produce that car
   and pay damages to those who were injured or the relatives of those who
   died than pay to change the invested capital. The needs for the owners
   of capital to make a profit came before the needs of the living.
   Similarly, bosses often hire people to perform unsafe work in dangerous
   conditions and fire them if they protest. Right-libertarian ideology is
   the philosophical equivalent. Its dogma is "capital" and it comes
   before life (i.e. "labour").

   As Bakunin once put it, "you will always find the idealists in the very
   act of practical materialism, while you will see the materialists
   pursuing and realising the most grandly ideal aspirations and
   thoughts." [God and the State, p. 49] Hence we see right "libertarians"
   supporting sweat shops and opposing taxation -- for, in the end, money
   (and the power that goes with it) counts far more in that ideology than
   ideals such as liberty, individual dignity, empowering, creative and
   productive work and so forth for all. The central flaw of
   right-libertarianism is that it does not recognise that the workings of
   the capitalist market can easily ensure that the majority end up
   becoming a resource for others in ways far worse than that associated
   with taxation. The legal rights of self-ownership supported by
   right-libertarians does not mean that people have the ability to avoid
   what is in effect enslavement to another (see sections [32]2 and
   [33]3).

   Right-Libertarian theory is not based upon a libertarian methodology or
   perspective and so it is hardly surprising it results in support for
   authoritarian social relationships and, indeed, slavery (see
   [34]section 2.6).

1.3 Is right-Libertarian theory scientific in nature?

   Usually, no. The scientific approach is inductive, much of the
   right-libertarian approach is deductive. The first draws
   generalisations from the data, the second applies preconceived
   generalisations to the data. A completely deductive approach is
   pre-scientific, however, which is why many right-Libertarians cannot
   legitimately claim to use a scientific method. Deduction does occur in
   science, but the generalisations are primarily based on other data, not
   a priori assumptions, and are checked against data to see if they are
   accurate. Anarchists tend to fall into the inductive camp, as Kropotkin
   put it:

     "Precisely this natural-scientific method applied to economic facts,
     enables us to prove that the so-called 'laws' of middle-class
     sociology, including also their political economy, are not laws at
     all, but simply guesses, or mere assertions which have never been
     verified at all." [Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets, p. 153]

   The idea that natural-scientific methods can be applied to economic and
   social life is one that many right-libertarians reject. Instead they
   favour the deductive (pre-scientific) approach (this we must note is
   not limited purely to Austrian economists, many more mainstream
   capitalist economists also embrace deduction over induction).

   The tendency for right-Libertarianism to fall into dogmatism (or a
   priori theorems, as they call it) and its implications can best be seen
   from the work of Ludwig von Mises and other economists from the
   right-Libertarian "Austrian school." Of course, not all
   right-libertarians necessarily subscribe to this approach (Murray
   Rothbard for one did) but its use by so many leading lights of both
   schools of thought is significant and worthy of comment. And as we are
   concentrating on methodology it is not essential to discuss the
   starting assumptions. The assumptions (such as, to use Rothbard's
   words, the Austrian's "fundamental axiom that individual human beings
   act") may be correct, incorrect or incomplete -- but the method of
   using them advocated by von Mises ensures that such considerations are
   irrelevant.

   Von Mises (a leading member of the Austrian school of economics) begins
   by noting that social and economic theory "is not derived from
   experience; it is prior to experience..." Which is back to front. It is
   obvious that experience of capitalism is necessary in order to develop
   a viable theory about how it works. Without the experience, any theory
   is just a flight of fantasy. The actual specific theory we develop is
   therefore derived from experience, informed by it and will have to get
   checked against reality to see if it is viable. This is the scientific
   method - any theory must be checked against the facts. However, von
   Mises goes on to argue at length that "no kind of experience can ever
   force us to discard or modify a priori theorems; they are logically
   prior to it and cannot be either proved by corroborative experience or
   disproved by experience to the contrary . . ."

   And if this does not do justice to a full exposition of the
   phantasmagoria of von Mises' a priorism, the reader may take some joy
   (or horror) from the following statement:

     "If a contradiction appears between a theory and experience, we must
     always assume that a condition pre-supposed by the theory was not
     present, or else there is some error in our observation. The
     disagreement between the theory and the facts of experience
     frequently forces us to think through the problems of the theory
     again. But so long as a rethinking of the theory uncovers no errors
     in our thinking, we are not entitled to doubt its truth" [emphasis
     added -- the quotes presented here are cited in Ideology and Method
     in Economics by Homa Katouzian, pp. 39-40]

   In other words, if reality is in conflict with your ideas, do not
   adjust your views because reality must be at fault! The scientific
   method would be to revise the theory in light of the facts. It is not
   scientific to reject the facts in light of the theory! This
   anti-scientific perspective is at the heart of his economics as
   experience "can never . . . prove or disprove any particular theorem":

     "What assigns economics to its peculiar and unique position in the
     orbit of pure knowledge and of the practical utilisation of
     knowledge is the fact that its particular theorems are not open to
     any verification or falsification on the grounds of experience . .
     .. . . The ultimate yardstick of an economic theorem's correctness
     or incorrectness is solely reason unaided by experience." [Human
     Action, p. 858]

   Von Mises rejects the scientific approach as do all Austrian
   Economists. Murray Rothbard states approvingly that "Mises indeed held
   not only that economic theory does not need to be 'tested' by
   historical fact but also that it cannot be so tested." ["Praxeology:
   The Methodology of Austrian Economics" in The Foundation of Modern
   Austrian Economics, p. 32] Similarly, von Hayek wrote that economic
   theories can "never be verified or falsified by reference to facts. All
   that we can and must verify is the presence of our assumptions in the
   particular case." [Individualism and Economic Order, p. 73]

   This may seen somewhat strange to non-Austrians. How can we ignore
   reality when deciding whether a theory is a good one or not? If we
   cannot evaluate our ideas, how can we consider them anything bar dogma?
   The Austrian's maintain that we cannot use historical evidence because
   every historical situation is unique. Thus we cannot use "complex
   heterogeneous historical facts as if they were repeatable homogeneous
   facts" like those in a scientist's experiment [Rothbard, Op. Cit., p.
   33]. While such a position does have an element of truth about it, the
   extreme a priorism that is drawn from this element is radically false
   (just as extreme empiricism is also false, but for different reasons).

   Those who hold such a position ensure that their ideas cannot be
   evaluated beyond logical analysis. As Rothbard makes clear, "since
   praxeology begins with a true axiom, A, all that can be deduced from
   this axiom must also be true. For if A implies be, and A is true, then
   B must also be true." [Op. Cit., pp. 19-20] But such an approach makes
   the search for truth a game without rules. The Austrian economists (and
   other right-libertarians) who use this method are free to theorise
   anything they want, without such irritating constrictions as facts,
   statistics, data, history or experimental confirmation. Their only
   guide is logic. But this is no different from what religions do when
   they assert the logical existence of God. Theories ungrounded in facts
   and data are easily spun into any belief a person wants. Starting
   assumptions and trains of logic may contain inaccuracies so small as to
   be undetectable, yet will yield entirely false conclusions.

   In addition, trains of logic may miss things which are only brought to
   light by actual experiences (after all, the human mind is not all
   knowing or all seeing). To ignore actual experience is to loose that
   input when evaluating a theory. Hence our comments on the irrelevance
   of the assumptions used -- the methodology is such that incomplete or
   incorrect assumptions or steps cannot be identified in light of
   experience. This is because one way of discovering if a given chain of
   logic requires checking is to test its conclusions against available
   evidence (although von Mises did argue that the "ultimate yardstick"
   was "solely reason unaided by experience"). If we do take experience
   into account and rethink a given theory in the light of contradictory
   evidence, the problem remains that a given logical chain may be
   correct, but incomplete or concentrate on or stress inappropriate
   factors. In other words, our logical deductions may be correct but our
   starting place or steps wrong and as the facts are to be rejected in
   the light of the deductive method, we cannot revise our ideas.

   Indeed, this approach could result in discarding (certain forms of)
   human behaviour as irrelevant (which the Austrian system claims using
   empirical evidence does). For there are too many variables that can
   have an influence upon individual acts to yield conclusive results
   explaining human behaviour. Indeed, the deductive approach may ignore
   as irrelevant certain human motivations which have a decisive impact on
   an outcome. There could be a strong tendency to project
   "right-libertarian person" onto the rest of society and history, for
   example, and draw inappropriate insights into the way human society
   works or has worked. This can be seen, for example, in attempts to
   claim pre-capitalist societies as examples of "anarcho"-capitalism in
   action.

   Moreover, deductive reasoning cannot indicate the relative significance
   of assumptions or theoretical factors. That requires empirical study.
   It could be that a factor considered important in the theory actually
   turns out to have little effect in practice and so the derived axioms
   are so weak as to be seriously misleading.

   In such a purely ideal realm, observation and experience are distrusted
   (when not ignored) and instead theory is the lodestone. Given the bias
   of most theorists in this tradition, it is unsurprising that this style
   of economics can always be trusted to produce results proving free
   markets to be the finest principle of social organisation. And, as an
   added bonus, reality can be ignored as it is never "pure" enough
   according to the assumptions required by the theory. It could be
   argued, because of this, that many right-libertarians insulate their
   theories from criticism by refusing to test them or acknowledge the
   results of such testing (indeed, it could also be argued that much of
   right-libertarianism is more a religion than a political theory as it
   is set-up in such a way that it is either true or false, with this
   being determined not by evaluating facts but by whether you accept the
   assumptions and logical chains presented with them).

   Strangely enough, while dismissing the "testability" of theories many
   right-Libertarians (including Murray Rothbard) do investigate
   historical situations and claim them as examples of how well their
   ideas work in practice. But why does historical fact suddenly become
   useful when it can be used to bolster the right-Libertarian argument?
   Any such example is just as "complex" as any other and the good results
   indicated may not be accountable to the assumptions and steps of the
   theory but to other factors totally ignored by it. If economic (or
   other) theory is untestable then no conclusions can be drawn from
   history, including claims for the superiority of laissez-faire
   capitalism. You cannot have it both ways -- although we doubt that
   right-libertarians will stop using history as evidence that their ideas
   work.

   Perhaps the Austrian desire to investigate history is not so strange
   after all. Clashes with reality make a-priori deductive systems implode
   as the falsifications run back up the deductive changes to shatter the
   structure built upon the original axioms. Thus the desire to find some
   example which proves their ideology must be tremendous. However, the
   deductive a-priori methodology makes them unwilling to admit to being
   mistaken -- hence their attempts to downplay examples which refute
   their dogmas. Thus we have the desire for historical examples while at
   the same time they have extensive ideological justifications that
   ensure reality only enters their world-view when it agrees with them.
   In practice, the latter wins as real-life refuses to be boxed into
   their dogmas and deductions.

   Of course it is sometimes argued that it is complex data that is the
   problem. Let use assume that this is the case. It is argued that when
   dealing with complex information it is impossible to use aggregate data
   without first having more simple assumptions (i.e. that "humans act").
   Due to the complexity of the situation, it is argued, it is impossible
   to aggregate data because this hides the individual activities that
   creates it. Thus "complex" data cannot be used to invalidate
   assumptions or theories. Hence, according to Austrians, the axioms
   derived from the "simple fact" that "humans act" are the only basis for
   thinking about the economy.

   Such a position is false in two ways.

   Firstly, the aggregation of data does allow us to understand complex
   systems. If we look at a chair, we cannot find out whether it is
   comfortable, its colour, whether it is soft or hard by looking at the
   atoms that make it up. To suggest that you can is to imply the
   existence of green, soft, comfortable atoms. Similarly with gases. They
   are composed to countless individual atoms but scientists do not study
   them by looking at those atoms and their actions. Within limits, this
   is also valid for human action. For example, it would be crazy to
   maintain from historical data that interest rates will be a certain
   percentage a week but it is valid to maintain that interest rates are
   known to be related to certain variables in certain ways. Or that
   certain experiences will tend to result in certain forms of
   psychological damage. General tendencies and "rules of thumb" can be
   evolved from such study and these can be used to guide current practice
   and theory. By aggregating data you can produce valid information,
   rules of thumb, theories and evidence which would be lost if you
   concentrated on "simple data" (such as "humans act"). Therefore,
   empirical study produces facts which vary across time and place, and
   yet underlying and important patterns can be generated (patterns which
   can be evaluated against new data and improved upon).

   Secondly, the simple actions themselves influence and are influenced in
   turn by overall (complex) facts. People act in different ways in
   different circumstances (something we can agree with Austrians about,
   although we refuse to take it to their extreme position of rejecting
   empirical evidence as such). To use simple acts to understand complex
   systems means to miss the fact that these acts are not independent of
   their circumstances. For example, to claim that the capitalist market
   is "just" the resultant of bilateral exchanges ignores the fact that
   the market activity shapes the nature and form of these bilateral
   exchanges. The "simple" data is dependent on the "complex" system --
   and so the complex system cannot be understood by looking at the simple
   actions in isolation. To do so would be to draw incomplete and
   misleading conclusions (and it is due to these interrelations that we
   argue that aggregate data should be used critically). This is
   particularly important when looking at capitalism, where the "simple"
   acts of exchange in the labour market are dependent upon and shaped by
   circumstances outside these acts.

   So to claim that (complex) data cannot be used to evaluate a theory is
   false. Data can be useful when seeing whether a theory is confirmed by
   reality. This is the nature of the scientific method -- you compare the
   results expected by your theory to the facts and if they do not match
   you check your facts and check your theory. This may involve revising
   the assumptions, methodology and theories you use if the evidence is
   such as to bring them into question. For example, if you claim that
   capitalism is based on freedom but that the net result of capitalism is
   to produce relations of domination between people then it would be
   valid to revise, for example, your definition of freedom rather than
   deny that domination restricts freedom (see [35]section 2 on this). But
   if actual experience is to be distrusted when evaluating theory, we
   effectively place ideology above people -- after all, how the ideology
   affects people in practice is irrelevant as experiences cannot be used
   to evaluate the (logically sound but actually deeply flawed) theory.

   Moreover, there is a slight arrogance in the "Austrian" dismissal of
   empirical evidence. If, as they argue, the economy is just too complex
   to allow us to generalise from experience then how can one person
   comprehend it sufficiently to create an economic ideology as the
   Austrian's suggest? Surely no one mind (or series of minds) can produce
   a model which accurately reflects such a complex system? To suggest
   that one can deduce a theory for an exceedingly complex social system
   from the theoretical work based on an analysis technique which
   deliberately ignores that reality as being unreliable seems to require
   a deliberate suspension of one's reasoning faculties. Of course, it may
   be argued that such a task is possible, given a small enough subset of
   economic activity. However, such a process is sure to lead its
   practitioners astray as the subset is not independent of the whole and,
   consequently, can be influenced in ways the ideologist does not
   (indeed, cannot) take into account. Simply put, even the greatest mind
   cannot comprehend the complexities of real life and so empirical
   evidence needs to inform any theory seeking to describe and explain it.
   To reject it is simply to retreat into dogmatism and ideology, which is
   precisely what right-wing libertarians generally do.

   Ultimately, this dismissal of empirical evidence seems little more than
   self-serving. It's utility to the ideologist is obvious. It allows them
   to speculate to their hearts content, building models of the economy
   with no bearing to reality. Their models and the conclusions it
   generates need never be bothered with reality -- nor the effects of
   their dogma. Which shows its utility to the powerful. It allows them to
   spout comments like "the free market benefits all" while the rich get
   richer and allows them to brush aside any one who points out such
   troublesome facts.

   That this position is self-serving can be seen from the fact that most
   right libertarians are very selective about applying von Mises'
   argument. As a rule of thumb, it is only applied when the empirical
   evidence goes against capitalism. In such circumstances the fact that
   the current system is not a free market will also be mentioned.
   However, if the evidence seems to bolster the case for propertarianism
   then empirical evidence becomes all the rage. Needless to say, the fact
   that we do not have a free market will be conveniently forgotten.
   Depending on the needs of the moment, fundamental facts are dropped and
   retrieved to bolster the ideology.

   As we indicated above (in [36]section 1.2) and will discuss in more
   depth later (in [37]section 11) most of the leading right-Libertarian
   theorists base themselves on such deductive methodologies, starting
   from assumptions and "logically" drawing conclusions from them. The
   religious undertones of such methodology can best be seen from the
   roots of right-Libertarian "Natural law" theory.

   Carole Pateman, in her analysis of Liberal contract theory, indicates
   the religious nature of the "Natural Law" argument so loved by the
   theorists of the "Radical Right." She notes that for Locke (the main
   source of the Libertarian Right's Natural Law cult) "natural law" was
   equivalent of "God's Law" and that "God's law exists externally to and
   independently of individuals." [The Problem of Political Obligation, p.
   154] No role for critical thought there, only obedience. Most modern
   day "Natural Law" supporters forget to mention this religious
   undercurrent and instead talk of about "Nature" (or "the market") as
   the deity that creates Law, not God, in order to appear "rational." So
   much for science.

   Such a basis in dogma and religion can hardly be a firm foundation for
   liberty and indeed "Natural Law" is marked by a deep authoritarianism:

     "Locke's traditional view of natural law provided individual's with
     an external standard which they could recognise, but which they did
     not voluntarily choose to order their political life." [Pateman, Op.
     Cit., p. 79]

   In [38]section 11 we discuss the authoritarian nature of "Natural Law"
   and will not do so here. However, here we must point out the political
   conclusions Locke draws from his ideas. In Pateman's words, Locke
   believed that "obedience lasts only as long as protection. His
   individuals are able to take action themselves to remedy their
   political lot. . . but this does not mean, as is often assumed, that
   Locke's theory gives direct support to present-day arguments for a
   right of civil disobedience. . . His theory allows for two alternatives
   only: either people go peacefully about their daily affairs under the
   protection of a liberal, constitutional government, or they are in
   revolt against a government which has ceased to be 'liberal' and has
   become arbitrary and tyrannical, so forfeiting its right to obedience."
   [Op. Cit., p. 77]

   Locke's "rebellion" exists purely to reform a new 'liberal' government,
   not to change the existing socio-economic structure which the 'liberal'
   government exists to protect. His theory, therefore, indicates the
   results of a priorism, namely a denial of any form of social dissent
   which may change the "natural law" as defined by Locke. This
   perspective can be found in Rothbard who lambasted the individualist
   anarchists for arguing that juries should judge the law as well as the
   facts. For Rothbard, the law would be drawn up by jurists and lawyers,
   not ordinary people (see [39]section 1.4 for details). The idea that
   those subject to laws should have a say in forming them is rejected in
   favour of elite rule. As von Mises put it:

     "The flowering of human society depends on two factors: the
     intellectual power of outstanding men to conceive sound social and
     economic theories, and the ability of these or other men to make
     these ideologies palatable to the majority." [Human Action, p. 864]

   Yet such a task would require massive propaganda work and would only,
   ultimately, succeed by removing the majority from any say in the
   running of society. Once that is done then we have to believe that the
   ruling elite will be altruistic in the extreme and not abuse their
   position to create laws and processes which defended what they thought
   was "legitimate" property, property rights and what constitutes
   "aggression." Which, ironically, contradicts the key capitalist notion
   that people are driven by self-gain. The obvious conclusion from such
   argument is that any right-libertarian regime would have to exclude
   change. If people can change the regime they are under they may change
   it in ways that right libertarian's do not support. The provision for
   ending amendments to the regime or the law would effectively ban most
   opposition groups or parties as, by definition, they could do nothing
   once in office (for minimal state "libertarians") or in the market for
   "defence" agencies (for "anarcho"-capitalists). How this differs from a
   dictatorship is hard to say -- after all, most dictatorships have
   parliamentary bodies which have no power but which can talk a lot.
   Perhaps the knowledge that it is private police enforcing private power
   will make those subject to the regime maximise their utility by keeping
   quiet and not protesting. Given this, von Mises' praise for fascism in
   the 1920s may be less contradictory than it first appears (see
   [40]section 6.5) as it successfully "deterred democracy" by crushing
   the labour, socialist and anarchist movements across the world.

   So, von Mises, von Hayek and most right-libertarians reject the
   scientific method in favour of ideological correctness -- if the facts
   contradict your theory then they can be dismissed as too "complex" or
   "unique". Facts, however, should inform theory and any theory's
   methodology should take this into account. To dismiss facts out of hand
   is to promote dogma. This is not to suggest that a theory should be
   modified very time new data comes along -- that would be crazy as
   unique situations do exist, data can be wrong and so forth -- but it
   does suggest that if your theory continually comes into conflict with
   reality, its time to rethink the theory and not assume that facts
   cannot invalidate it. A true libertarian would approach a contradiction
   between reality and theory by evaluating the facts available and
   changing the theory is this is required, not by ignoring reality or
   dismissing it as "complex".

   Thus, much of right-Libertarian theory is neither libertarian nor
   scientific. Much of right-libertarian thought is highly axiomatic,
   being logically deduced from such starting axioms as "self-ownership"
   or "no one should initiate force against another". Hence the importance
   of our discussion of von Mises as this indicates the dangers of this
   approach, namely the tendency to ignore/dismiss the consequences of
   these logical chains and, indeed, to justify them in terms of these
   axioms rather than from the facts. In addition, the methodology used is
   such as that it would be fair to argue that right-libertarians get to
   critique reality but reality can never be used to critique
   right-libertarianism -- for any empirical data presented as evidence as
   be dismissed as "too complex" or "unique" and so irrelevant (unless it
   can be used to support their claims, of course).

   Hence W. Duncan Reekie's argument (quoting leading Austrian economist
   Israel Kirzner) that "empirical work 'has the function of establishing
   the applicability of particular theorems, and thus illustrating their
   operation' . . . Confirmation of theory is not possible because there
   is no constants in human action, nor is it necessary because theorems
   themselves describe relationships logically developed from hypothesised
   conditions. Failure of a logically derived axiom to fit the facts does
   not render it invalid, rather it 'might merely indicate
   inapplicability' to the circumstances of the case.'" [Markets,
   Entrepreneurs and Liberty, p. 31]

   So, if facts confirm your theory, your theory is right. If facts do not
   confirm your theory, it is still right but just not applicable in this
   case! Which has the handy side effect of ensuring that facts can only
   be used to support the ideology, never to refute it (which is,
   according to this perspective, impossible anyway). As Karl Popper
   argued, a "theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is
   non-scientific." [Conjectures and Refutations, p. 36] In other words
   (as we noted above), if reality contradicts your theory, ignore
   reality!

   Kropotkin hoped "that those who believe in [current economic doctrines]
   will themselves become convinced of their error as soon as they come to
   see the necessity of verifying their quantitative deductions by
   quantitative investigation." [Op. Cit., p. 178] However, the Austrian
   approach builds so many barriers to this that it is doubtful that this
   will occur. Indeed, right-libertarianism, with its focus on exchange
   rather than its consequences, seems to be based upon justifying
   domination in terms of their deductions than analysing what freedom
   actually means in terms of human existence (see [41]section 2 for a
   fuller discussion).

   The real question is why are such theories taken seriously and arouse
   such interest. Why are they not simply dismissed out of hand, given
   their methodology and the authoritarian conclusions they produce? The
   answer is, in part, that feeble arguments can easily pass for
   convincing when they are on the same side as the prevailing sentiment
   and social system. And, of course, there is the utility of such
   theories for ruling elites - "[a]n ideological defence of privileges,
   exploitation, and private power will be welcomed, regardless of its
   merits." [Noam Chomsky, The Chomsky Reader, p. 188]

1.4 Is "anarcho"-capitalism a new form of individualist anarchism?

   Some "anarcho"-capitalists shy away from the term, preferring such
   expressions as "market anarchist" or "individualist anarchist." This
   suggests that there is some link between their ideology and that of
   Tucker. However, the founder of "anarcho"-capitalism, Murray Rothbard,
   refused that label for, while "strongly tempted," he could not do so
   because "Spooner and Tucker have in a sense pre-empted that name for
   their doctrine and that from that doctrine I have certain differences."
   Somewhat incredibly Rothbard argued that on the whole politically
   "these differences are minor," economically "the differences are
   substantial, and this means that my view of the consequences of putting
   our more of less common system into practice is very far from theirs."
   ["The Spooner-Tucker Doctrine: An Economist's View", Journal of
   Libertarian Studies, vol. 20, no. 1, p. 7]

   What an understatement! Individualist anarchists advocated an economic
   system in which there would have been very little inequality of wealth
   and so of power (and the accumulation of capital would have been
   minimal without profit, interest and rent). Removing this social and
   economic basis would result in substantially different political
   regimes. This can be seen from the fate of Viking Iceland, where a
   substantially communal and anarchistic system was destroyed from within
   by increasing inequality and the rise of tenant farming (see
   [42]section 9 for details). In other words, politics is not isolated
   from economics. As David Wieck put it, Rothbard "writes of society as
   though some part of it (government) can be extracted and replaced by
   another arrangement while other things go on before, and he constructs
   a system of police and judicial power without any consideration of the
   influence of historical and economic context." ["Anarchist Justice," in
   Nomos XIX, Pennock and Chapman, eds., p. 227]

   Unsurprisingly, the political differences he highlights are
   significant, namely "the role of law and the jury system" and "the land
   question." The former difference relates to the fact that the
   individualist anarchists "allow[ed] each individual free-market court,
   and more specifically, each free-market jury, totally free rein over
   judicial decision." This horrified Rothbard. The reason is obvious, as
   it allows real people to judge the law as well as the facts, modifying
   the former as society changes and evolves. For Rothbard, the idea that
   ordinary people should have a say in the law is dismissed. Rather, "it
   would not be a very difficult task for Libertarian lawyers and jurists
   to arrive at a rational and objective code of libertarian legal
   principles and procedures." [Op. Cit., p. 7-8] Of course, the fact that
   "lawyers" and "jurists" may have a radically different idea of what is
   just than those subject to their laws is not raised by Rothbard, never
   mind answered. While Rothbard notes that juries may defend the people
   against the state, the notion that they may defend the people against
   the authority and power of the rich is not even raised. That is why the
   rich have tended to oppose juries as well as popular assemblies.

   Unsurprisingly, the few individualist anarchists that remained pointed
   this out. Laurance Labadie, the son of Tucker associate Joseph Labadie,
   argued in response to Rothbard as follows:

     "Mere common sense would suggest that any court would be influenced
     by experience; and any free-market court or judge would in the very
     nature of things have some precedents guiding them in their
     instructions to a jury. But since no case is exactly the same, a
     jury would have considerable say about the heinousness of the
     offence in each case, realising that circumstances alter cases, and
     prescribing penalty accordingly. This appeared to Spooner and Tucker
     to be a more flexible and equitable administration of justice
     possible or feasible, human beings being what they are.. . .

     "But when Mr. Rothbard quibbles about the jurisprudential ideas of
     Spooner and Tucker, and at the same time upholds presumably in his
     courts the very economic evils which are at bottom the very reason
     for human contention and conflict, he would seem to be a man who
     chokes at a gnat while swallowing a camel."
     [quoted by Mildred J. Loomis and Mark A. Sullivan, "Laurance
     Labadie: Keeper Of The Flame", pp. 116-30, Benjamin R. Tucker and
     the Champions of Liberty, Coughlin, Hamilton and Sullivan (eds.), p.
     124]

   In other words, to exclude the general population from any say in the
   law and how it changes is hardly a "minor" difference! Particularly if
   you are proposing an economic system which is based on inequalities of
   wealth, power and influence and the means of accumulating more. It is
   like a supporter of the state saying that it is a "minor" difference if
   you favour a dictatorship rather than a democratically elected
   government. As Tucker argued, "it is precisely in the tempering of the
   rigidity of enforcement that one of the chief excellences of Anarchism
   consists . . . under Anarchism all rules and laws will be little more
   than suggestions for the guidance of juries, and that all disputes . .
   . will be submitted to juries which will judge not only the facts but
   the law, the justice of the law, its applicability to the given
   circumstances, and the penalty or damage to be inflicted because of its
   infraction . . . under Anarchism the law . . . will be regarded as just
   in proportion to its flexibility, instead of now in proportion to its
   rigidity." [The Individualist Anarchists, pp. 160-1] In others, the law
   will evolve to take into account changing social circumstances and, as
   a consequence, public opinion on specific events and rights. Tucker's
   position is fundamentally democratic and evolutionary while Rothbard's
   is autocratic and fossilised.

   On the land question, Rothbard opposed the individualist position of
   "occupancy and use" as it "would automatically abolish all rent
   payments for land." Which was precisely why the individualist
   anarchists advocated it! In a predominantly rural economy, this would
   result in a significant levelling of income and social power as well as
   bolstering the bargaining position of non-land workers by reducing
   unemployment. He bemoans that landlords cannot charge rent on their
   "justly-acquired private property" without noticing that is begging the
   question as anarchists deny that this is "justly-acquired" land.
   Unsurprising, Rothbard considers "the property theory" of land
   ownership as John Locke's, ignoring the fact that the first
   self-proclaimed anarchist book was written to refute that kind of
   theory. His argument simply shows how far from anarchism his ideology
   is. For Rothbard, it goes without saying that the landlord's "freedom
   of contract" tops the worker's freedom to control their own work and
   live and, of course, their right to life. [Op. Cit., p. 8 and p. 9]
   However, for anarchists, "the land is indispensable to our existence,
   consequently a common thing, consequently insusceptible of
   appropriation." [Proudhon, What is Property?, p. 107]

   The reason question is why Rothbard considers this a political
   difference rather than an economic one. Unfortunately, he does not
   explain. Perhaps because of the underlying socialist perspective behind
   the anarchist position? Or perhaps the fact that feudalism and
   monarchism was based on the owner of the land being its ruler suggests
   a political aspect to the ideology best left unexplored? Given that the
   idea of grounding rulership on land ownership receded during the Middle
   Ages, it may be unwise to note that under "anarcho"-capitalism the
   landlord and capitalist would, likewise, be sovereign over the land and
   those who used it? As we noted in [43]section 1, this is the conclusion
   that Rothbard does draw. As such, there is a political aspect to this
   difference.

   Moreover. "the expropriation of the mass of the people from the soil
   forms the basis of the capitalist mode of production." [Marx, Capital,
   vol. 1, p. 934] For there are "two ways of oppressing men: either
   directly by brute force, by physical violence; or indirectly by denying
   them the means of life and this reducing them to a state of surrender."
   In the second case, government is "an organised instrument to ensure
   that dominion and privilege will be in the hands of those who . . .
   have cornered all the means of life, first and foremost the land, which
   they make use of to keep the people in bondage and to make them work
   for their benefit." [Malatesta, Anarchy, p. 21] Privatising the
   coercive functions of said government hardly makes much difference.

   Of course, Rothbard is simply skimming the surface. There are two main
   ways "anarcho"-capitalists differ from individualist anarchists. The
   first one is the fact that the individualist anarchists are socialists.
   The second is on whether equality is essential or not to anarchism.
   Each will be discussed in turn.

   Unlike both Individualist (and social) anarchists,
   "anarcho"-capitalists support capitalism (a "pure" free market type,
   which has never existed although it has been approximated
   occasionally). This means that they reject totally the ideas of
   anarchists with regards to property and economic analysis. For example,
   like all supporters of capitalists they consider rent, profit and
   interest as valid incomes. In contrast, all Anarchists consider these
   as exploitation and agree with the Individualist Anarchist Benjamin
   Tucker when he argued that "[w]hoever contributes to production is
   alone entitled. What has no rights that who is bound to respect. What
   is a thing. Who is a person. Things have no claims; they exist only to
   be claimed. The possession of a right cannot be predicted of dead
   material, but only a living person."[quoted by Wm. Gary Kline, The
   Individualist Anarchists, p. 73]

   This, we must note, is the fundamental critique of the capitalist
   theory that capital is productive. In and of themselves, fixed costs do
   not create value. Rather value is creation depends on how investments
   are developed and used once in place. Because of this the Individualist
   Anarchists, like other anarchists, considered non-labour derived income
   as usury, unlike "anarcho"-capitalists. Similarly, anarchists reject
   the notion of capitalist property rights in favour of possession
   (including the full fruits of one's labour). For example, anarchists
   reject private ownership of land in favour of a "occupancy and use"
   regime. In this we follow Proudhon's What is Property? and argue that
   "property is theft". Rothbard, as noted, rejected this perspective.

   As these ideas are an essential part of anarchist politics, they cannot
   be removed without seriously damaging the rest of the theory. This can
   be seen from Tucker's comments that "Liberty insists. . . [on] the
   abolition of the State and the abolition of usury; on no more
   government of man by man, and no more exploitation of man by man."
   [cited by Eunice Schuster in Native American Anarchism, p. 140]. He
   indicates that anarchism has specific economic and political ideas,
   that it opposes capitalism along with the state. Therefore anarchism
   was never purely a "political" concept, but always combined an
   opposition to oppression with an opposition to exploitation. The social
   anarchists made exactly the same point. Which means that when Tucker
   argued that "Liberty insists on Socialism. . . - true Socialism,
   Anarchistic Socialism: the prevalence on earth of Liberty, Equality,
   and Solidarity" he knew exactly what he was saying and meant it
   wholeheartedly. [Instead of a Book, p. 363]

   So because "anarcho"-capitalists embrace capitalism and reject
   socialism, they cannot be considered anarchists or part of the
   anarchist tradition.

   Which brings us nicely to the second point, namely a lack of concern
   for equality. In stark contrast to anarchists of all schools,
   inequality is not seen to be a problem with "anarcho"-capitalists (see
   [44]section 3). However, it is a truism that not all "traders" are
   equally subject to the market (i.e. have the same market power). In
   many cases, a few have sufficient control of resources to influence or
   determine price and in such cases, all others must submit to those
   terms or not buy the commodity. When the commodity is labour power,
   even this option is lacking -- workers have to accept a job in order to
   live. As we argue in [45]section 10.2, workers are usually at a
   disadvantage on the labour market when compared to capitalists, and
   this forces them to sell their liberty in return for making profits for
   others. These profits increase inequality in society as the property
   owners receive the surplus value their workers produce. This increases
   inequality further, consolidating market power and so weakens the
   bargaining position of workers further, ensuring that even the freest
   competition possible could not eliminate class power and society
   (something B. Tucker recognised as occurring with the development of
   trusts within capitalism -- see [46]section G.4).

   By removing the underlying commitment to abolish non-labour income, any
   "anarchist" capitalist society would have vast differences in wealth
   and so power. Instead of a government imposed monopolies in land, money
   and so on, the economic power flowing from private property and capital
   would ensure that the majority remained in (to use Spooner's words)
   "the condition of servants" (see sections [47]2 and [48]3.1 for more on
   this). The Individualist Anarchists were aware of this danger and so
   supported economic ideas that opposed usury (i.e. rent, profit and
   interest) and ensured the worker the full value of her labour. While
   not all of them called these ideas "socialist" it is clear that these
   ideas are socialist in nature and in aim (similarly, not all the
   Individualist Anarchists called themselves anarchists but their ideas
   are clearly anarchist in nature and in aim).

   This combination of the political and economic is essential as they
   mutually reinforce each other. Without the economic ideas, the
   political ideas would be meaningless as inequality would make a mockery
   of them. As Kline notes, the Individualist Anarchists' "proposals were
   designed to establish true equality of opportunity . . . and they
   expected this would result in a society without great wealth or
   poverty. In the absence of monopolistic factors which would distort
   competition, they expected a society largely of self-employed workmen
   with no significant disparity of wealth between any of them since all
   would be required to live at their own expense and not at the expense
   of exploited fellow human beings." [Op. Cit., pp. 103-4]

   Because of the evil effects of inequality on freedom, both social and
   individualist anarchists desired to create an environment in which
   circumstances would not drive people to sell their liberty to others at
   a disadvantage. In other words, they desired an equalisation of market
   power by opposing interest, rent and profit and capitalist definitions
   of private property. Kline summarises this by saying "the American
   [individualist] anarchists exposed the tension existing in liberal
   thought between private property and the ideal of equal access. The
   Individual Anarchists were, at least, aware that existing conditions
   were far from ideal, that the system itself working against the
   majority of individuals in their efforts to attain its promises. Lack
   of capital, the means to creation and accumulation of wealth, usually
   doomed a labourer to a life of exploitation. This the anarchists knew
   and they abhorred such a system." [Op. Cit., p. 102]

   And this desire for bargaining equality is reflected in their economic
   ideas and by removing these underlying economic ideas of the
   individualist anarchists, "anarcho"-capitalism makes a mockery of any
   ideas they do appropriate. Essentially, the Individualist Anarchists
   agreed with Rousseau that in order to prevent extreme inequality of
   fortunes you deprive people of the means to accumulate in the first
   place and not take away wealth from the rich. An important point which
   "anarcho"-capitalism fails to understand or appreciate.

   There are, of course, overlaps between individualist anarchism and
   "anarcho"-capitalism, just as there are overlaps between it and Marxism
   (and social anarchism, of course). However, just as a similar analysis
   of capitalism does not make individualist anarchists Marxists, so
   apparent similarities between individualist anarchism does not make it
   a forerunner of "anarcho"-capitalism. For example, both schools support
   the idea of "free markets." Yet the question of markets is
   fundamentally second to the issue of property rights for what is
   exchanged on the market is dependent on what is considered legitimate
   property. In this, as Rothbard notes, individualist anarchists and
   "anarcho"-capitalists differ and different property rights produce
   different market structures and dynamics. This means that capitalism is
   not the only economy with markets and so support for markets cannot be
   equated with support for capitalism. Equally, opposition to markets is
   not the defining characteristic of socialism (as we note in [49]section
   G.2.1). As such, it is possible to be a market socialist (and many
   socialist are). This is because "markets" and "property" do not equate
   to capitalism:

     "Political economy confuses, on principle, two very different kinds
     of private property, one of which rests on the labour of the
     producers himself, and the other on the exploitation of the labour
     of others. It forgets that the latter is not only the direct
     antithesis of the former, but grows on the former's tomb and nowhere
     else.

     "In Western Europe, the homeland of political economy, the process
     of primitive accumulation is more of less accomplished. . . .

     "It is otherwise in the colonies. There the capitalist regime
     constantly comes up against the obstacle presented by the producer,
     who, as owner of his own conditions of labour, employs that labour
     to enrich himself instead of the capitalist. The contradiction of
     these two diametrically opposed economic systems has its practical
     manifestation here in the struggle between them."
     [Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, p. 931]

   Individualist anarchism is obviously an aspect of this struggle between
   the system of peasant and artisan production of early America and the
   state encouraged system of private property and wage labour.
   "Anarcho"-capitalists, in contrast, assume that generalised wage labour
   would remain under their system (while paying lip-service to the
   possibilities of co-operatives -- and if an "anarcho"-capitalist thinks
   that co-operative will become the dominant form of workplace
   organisation, then they are some kind of market socialist, not a
   capitalist). It is clear that their end point (a pure capitalism, i.e.
   generalised wage labour) is directly the opposite of that desired by
   anarchists. This was the case of the Individualist Anarchists who
   embraced the ideal of (non-capitalist) laissez faire competition --
   they did so, as noted, to end exploitation, not to maintain it. Indeed,
   their analysis of the change in American society from one of mainly
   independent producers into one based mainly upon wage labour has many
   parallels with, of all people, Karl Marx's presented in chapter 33 of
   Capital. Marx, correctly, argues that "the capitalist mode of
   production and accumulation, and therefore capitalist private property,
   have for their fundamental condition the annihilation of that private
   property which rests on the labour of the individual himself; in other
   words, the expropriation of the worker." [Op. Cit., p. 940] He notes
   that to achieve this, the state is used:

     "How then can the anti-capitalistic cancer of the colonies be
     healed? . . . Let the Government set an artificial price on the
     virgin soil, a price independent of the law of supply and demand, a
     price that compels the immigrant to work a long time for wages
     before he can earn enough money to buy land, and turn himself into
     an independent farmer." [Op. Cit., p. 938]

   Moreover, tariffs are introduced with "the objective of manufacturing
   capitalists artificially" for the "system of protection was an
   artificial means of manufacturing manufacturers, or expropriating
   independent workers, of capitalising the national means of production
   and subsistence, and of forcibly cutting short the transition . . . to
   the modern mode of production," to capitalism [Op. Cit., p. 932 and pp.
   921-2]

   It is this process which Individualist Anarchism protested against, the
   use of the state to favour the rising capitalist class. However, unlike
   social anarchists, many individualist anarchists were not consistently
   against wage labour. This is the other significant overlap between
   "anarcho"-capitalism and individualist anarchism. However, they were
   opposed to exploitation and argued (unlike "anarcho"-capitalism) that
   in their system workers bargaining powers would be raised to such a
   level that their wages would equal the full product of their labour.
   However, as we discuss in [50]section G.1.1 the social context the
   individualist anarchists lived in must be remembered. America at the
   times was a predominantly rural society and industry was not as
   developed as it is now wage labour would have been minimised (Spooner,
   for example, explicitly envisioned a society made up mostly entirely of
   self-employed workers). As Kline argues:

     "Committed as they were to equality in the pursuit of property, the
     objective for the anarchist became the construction of a society
     providing equal access to those things necessary for creating
     wealth. The goal of the anarchists who extolled mutualism and the
     abolition of all monopolies was, then, a society where everyone
     willing to work would have the tools and raw materials necessary for
     production in a non-exploitative system . . . the dominant vision of
     the future society . . . [was] underpinned by individual,
     self-employed workers." [Op. Cit., p. 95]

   As such, a limited amount of wage labour within a predominantly
   self-employed economy does not make a given society capitalist any more
   than a small amount of governmental communities within an predominantly
   anarchist world would make it statist. As Marx argued. when "the
   separation of the worker from the conditions of labour and from the
   soil . . . does not yet exist, or only sporadically, or on too limited
   a scale . . . Where, amongst such curious characters, is the 'field of
   abstinence' for the capitalists? . . . Today's wage-labourer is
   tomorrow's independent peasant or artisan, working for himself. He
   vanishes from the labour-market -- but not into the workhouse." There
   is a "constant transformation of wage-labourers into independent
   producers, who work for themselves instead of for capital" and so "the
   degree of exploitation of the wage-labourer remain[s] indecently low."
   In addition, the "wage-labourer also loses, along with the relation of
   dependence, the feeling of dependence on the abstemious capitalist."
   [Op. Cit., pp. 935-6]

   Saying that, as we discuss in [51]section G.4, individualist anarchist
   support for wage labour is at odds with the ideas of Proudhon and, far
   more importantly, in contradiction to many of the stated principles of
   the individualist anarchists themselves. In particular, wage labour
   violates "occupancy and use" as well as having more than a passing
   similarity to the state. However, these problems can be solved by
   consistently applying the principles of individualist anarchism, unlike
   "anarcho"-capitalism, and that is why it is a real school of anarchism.
   In other words, a system of generalised wage labour would not be
   anarchist nor would it be non-exploitative. Moreover, the social
   context these ideas were developed in and would have been applied
   ensure that these contradictions would have been minimised. If they had
   been applied, a genuine anarchist society of self-employed workers
   would, in all likelihood, have been created (at least at first, whether
   the market would increase inequalities is a moot point -- see
   [52]section G.4).

   We must stress that the social situation is important as it shows how
   apparently superficially similar arguments can have radically different
   aims and results depending on who suggests them and in what
   circumstances. As noted, during the rise of capitalism the bourgeoisie
   were not shy in urging state intervention against the masses.
   Unsurprisingly, working class people generally took an anti-state
   position during this period. The individualist anarchists were part of
   that tradition, opposing what Marx termed "primitive accumulation" in
   favour of the pre-capitalist forms of property and society it was
   destroying.

   However, when capitalism found its feet and could do without such
   obvious intervention, the possibility of an "anti-state" capitalism
   could arise. Such a possibility became a definite once the state
   started to intervene in ways which, while benefiting the system as a
   whole, came into conflict with the property and power of individual
   members of the capitalist and landlord class. Thus social legislation
   which attempted to restrict the negative effects of unbridled
   exploitation and oppression on workers and the environment were having
   on the economy were the source of much outrage in certain bourgeois
   circles:

     "Quite independently of these tendencies [of individualist
     anarchism] . . . the anti-state bourgeoisie (which is also
     anti-statist, being hostile to any social intervention on the part
     of the State to protect the victims of exploitation -- in the matter
     of working hours, hygienic working conditions and so on), and the
     greed of unlimited exploitation, had stirred up in England a certain
     agitation in favour of pseudo-individualism, an unrestrained
     exploitation. To this end, they enlisted the services of a mercenary
     pseudo-literature . . . which played with doctrinaire and fanatical
     ideas in order to project a species of 'individualism' that was
     absolutely sterile, and a species of 'non-interventionism' that
     would let a man die of hunger rather than offend his dignity." [Max
     Nettlau, A Short History of Anarchism, p. 39]

   This perspective can be seen when Tucker denounced Herbert Spencer as a
   champion of the capitalistic class for his vocal attacks on social
   legislation which claimed to benefit working class people but stays
   strangely silent on the laws passed to benefit (usually indirectly)
   capital and the rich. "Anarcho"-capitalism is part of that tradition,
   the tradition associated with a capitalism which no longer needs
   obvious state intervention as enough wealth as been accumulated to keep
   workers under control by means of market power.

   As with the original nineteenth century British "anti-state"
   capitalists like Spencer and Herbert, Rothbard "completely overlooks
   the role of the state in building and maintaining a capitalist economy
   in the West. Privileged to live in the twentieth century, long after
   the battles to establish capitalism have been fought and won, Rothbard
   sees the state solely as a burden on the market and a vehicle for
   imposing the still greater burden of socialism. He manifests a kind of
   historical nearsightedness that allows him to collapse many centuries
   of human experience into one long night of tyranny that ended only with
   the invention of the free market and its 'spontaneous' triumph over the
   past. It is pointless to argue, as Rothbard seems ready to do, that
   capitalism would have succeeded without the bourgeois state; the fact
   is that all capitalist nations have relied on the machinery of
   government to create and preserve the political and legal environments
   required by their economic system." That, of course, has not stopped
   him "critis[ing] others for being unhistorical." [Stephen L Newman,
   Liberalism at Wit's End, pp. 77-8 and p. 79]

   In other words, there is substantial differences between the victims of
   a thief trying to stop being robbed and be left alone to enjoy their
   property and the successful thief doing the same! Individualist
   Anarchist's were aware of this. For example, Victor Yarros stressed
   this key difference between individualist anarchism and the
   proto-"libertarian" capitalists of "voluntaryism":

     "[Auberon Herbert] believes in allowing people to retain all their
     possessions, no matter how unjustly and basely acquired, while
     getting them, so to speak, to swear off stealing and usurping and to
     promise to behave well in the future. We, on the other hand, while
     insisting on the principle of private property, in wealth honestly
     obtained under the reign of liberty, do not think it either unjust
     or unwise to dispossess the landlords who have monopolised natural
     wealth by force and fraud. We hold that the poor and disinherited
     toilers would be justified in expropriating, not alone the
     landlords, who notoriously have no equitable titles to their lands,
     but all the financial lords and rulers, all the millionaires and
     very wealthy individuals. . . . Almost all possessors of great
     wealth enjoy neither what they nor their ancestors rightfully
     acquired (and if Mr. Herbert wishes to challenge the correctness of
     this statement, we are ready to go with him into a full discussion
     of the subject). . . .

     "If he holds that the landlords are justly entitled to their lands,
     let him make a defence of the landlords or an attack on our unjust
     proposal."
     [quoted by Carl Watner, "The English Individualists As They Appear
     In Liberty," pp. 191-211, Benjamin R. Tucker and the Champions of
     Liberty, Coughlin, Hamilton and Sullivan (eds.), pp. 199-200]

   Significantly, Tucker and other individualist anarchists saw state
   intervention has a result of capital manipulating legislation to gain
   an advantage on the so-called free market which allowed them to exploit
   labour and, as such, it benefited the whole capitalist class. Rothbard,
   at best, acknowledges that some sections of big business benefit from
   the current system and so fails to have the comprehensive understanding
   of the dynamics of capitalism as a system (rather as an ideology). This
   lack of understanding of capitalism as a historic and dynamic system
   rooted in class rule and economic power is important in evaluating
   "anarcho"-capitalist claims to anarchism. Marxists are not considered
   anarchists as they support the state as a means of transition to an
   anarchist society. Much the same logic can be applied to right-wing
   libertarians (even if they do call themselves "anarcho"-capitalists).
   This is because they do not seek to correct the inequalities produced
   by previous state action before ending it nor do they seek to change
   the definitions of "private property" imposed by the state. In effect,
   they argue that the "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie" should "wither
   away" and be limited to defending the property accumulated in a few
   hands. Needless to say, starting from the current (coercively produced)
   distribution of property and then eliminating "force" simply means
   defending the power and privilege of ruling minorities:

     "The modern Individualism initiated by Herbert Spencer is, like the
     critical theory of Proudhon, a powerful indictment against the
     dangers and wrongs of government, but its practical solution of the
     social problem is miserable -- so miserable as to lead us to inquire
     if the talk of 'No force' be merely an excuse for supporting
     landlord and capitalist domination." [Act For Yourselves, p. 98]

References

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