               2 What do "anarcho"-capitalists mean by "freedom"?

   For "anarcho"-capitalists, the concept of freedom is limited to the
   idea of "freedom from." For them, freedom means simply freedom from the
   "initiation of force," or the "non-aggression against anyone's person
   and property." [Murray Rothbard, For a New Liberty, p. 23] The notion
   that real freedom must combine both freedom "to" and freedom "from" is
   missing in their ideology, as is the social context of the so-called
   freedom they defend.

   Before starting, it is useful to quote Alan Haworth when he notes that
   "[i]n fact, it is surprising how little close attention the concept of
   freedom receives from libertarian writers. Once again Anarchy, State,
   and Utopia is a case in point. The word 'freedom' doesn't even appear
   in the index. The word 'liberty' appears, but only to refer the reader
   to the 'Wilt Chamberlain' passage. In a supposedly 'libertarian' work,
   this is more than surprising. It is truly remarkable."
   [Anti-Libertarianism, p. 95]

   Why this is the case can be seen from how the "anarcho"-capitalist
   defines freedom.

   In a right-libertarian or "anarcho"-capitalist society, freedom is
   considered to be a product of property. As Murray Rothbard puts it,
   "the libertarian defines the concept of 'freedom' or 'liberty'. . .[as
   a] condition in which a person's ownership rights in his body and his
   legitimate material property rights are not invaded, are not aggressed
   against. . . . Freedom and unrestricted property rights go hand in
   hand." [Op. Cit., p.41]

   This definition has some problems, however. In such a society, one
   cannot (legitimately) do anything with or on another's property if the
   owner prohibits it. This means that an individual's only guaranteed
   freedom is determined by the amount of property that he or she owns.
   This has the consequence that someone with no property has no
   guaranteed freedom at all (beyond, of course, the freedom not to be
   murdered or otherwise harmed by the deliberate acts of others). In
   other words, a distribution of property is a distribution of freedom,
   as the right-libertarians themselves define it. It strikes anarchists
   as strange that an ideology that claims to be committed to promoting
   freedom entails the conclusion that some people should be more free
   than others. However, this is the logical implication of their view,
   which raises a serious doubt as to whether "anarcho"-capitalists are
   actually interested in freedom.

   Looking at Rothbard's definition of "liberty" quoted above, we can see
   that freedom is actually no longer considered to be a fundamental,
   independent concept. Instead, freedom is a derivative of something more
   fundamental, namely the "legitimate rights" of an individual, which are
   identified as property rights. In other words, given that
   "anarcho"-capitalists and right libertarians in general consider the
   right to property as "absolute," it follows that freedom and property
   become one and the same. This suggests an alternative name for the
   right Libertarian, namely "Propertarian." And, needless to say, if we
   do not accept the right-libertarians' view of what constitutes
   "legitimate" "rights," then their claim to be defenders of liberty is
   weak.

   Another important implication of this "liberty as property" concept is
   that it produces a strangely alienated concept of freedom. Liberty, as
   we noted, is no longer considered absolute, but a derivative of
   property -- which has the important consequence that you can "sell"
   your liberty and still be considered free by the ideology. This concept
   of liberty (namely "liberty as property") is usually termed
   "self-ownership." But, to state the obvious, I do not "own" myself, as
   if were an object somehow separable from my subjectivity -- I am
   myself. However, the concept of "self-ownership" is handy for
   justifying various forms of domination and oppression -- for by
   agreeing (usually under the force of circumstances, we must note) to
   certain contracts, an individual can "sell" (or rent out) themselves to
   others (for example, when workers sell their labour power to
   capitalists on the "free market"). In effect, "self-ownership" becomes
   the means of justifying treating people as objects -- ironically, the
   very thing the concept was created to stop! As L. Susan Brown notes,
   "[a]t the moment an individual 'sells' labour power to another, he/she
   loses self-determination and instead is treated as a subjectless
   instrument for the fulfilment of another's will." [The Politics of
   Individualism, p. 4]

   Given that workers are paid to obey, you really have to wonder which
   planet Murray Rothbard is on when he argues that a person's "labour
   service is alienable, but his will is not" and that he [sic!] "cannot
   alienate his will, more particularly his control over his own mind and
   body." [The Ethics of Liberty, p. 40, p. 135] He contrasts private
   property and self-ownership by arguing that "[a]ll physical property
   owned by a person is alienable . . . I can give away or sell to another
   person my shoes, my house, my car, my money, etc. But there are certain
   vital things which, in natural fact and in the nature of man, are
   inalienable . . . [his] will and control over his own person are
   inalienable." [Op. Cit., pp. 134-5]

   But "labour services" are unlike the private possessions Rothbard lists
   as being alienable. As we argued in section B.1 ([1]"Why do anarchists
   oppose hierarchy") a person's "labour services" and "will" cannot be
   divided -- if you sell your labour services, you also have to give
   control of your body and mind to another person! If a worker does not
   obey the commands of her employer, she is fired. That Rothbard denies
   this indicates a total lack of common-sense. Perhaps Rothbard will
   argue that as the worker can quit at any time she does not alienate
   their will (this seems to be his case against slave contracts -- see
   [2]section 2.6). But this ignores the fact that between the signing and
   breaking of the contract and during work hours (and perhaps outside
   work hours, if the boss has mandatory drug testing or will fire workers
   who attend union or anarchist meetings or those who have an "unnatural"
   sexuality and so on) the worker does alienate his will and body. In the
   words of Rudolf Rocker, "under the realities of the capitalist economic
   form . . . there can be no talk of a 'right over one's own person,' for
   that ends when one is compelled to submit to the economic dictation of
   another if he does not want to starve." [Anarcho-Syndicalism, p. 17]

   Ironically, the rights of property (which are said to flow from an
   individual's self-ownership of themselves) becomes the means, under
   capitalism, by which self-ownership of non-property owners is denied.
   The foundational right (self-ownership) becomes denied by the
   derivative right (ownership of things). Under capitalism, a lack of
   property can be just as oppressive as a lack of legal rights because of
   the relationships of domination and subjection this situation creates.

   So Rothbard's argument (as well as being contradictory) misses the
   point (and the reality of capitalism). Yes, if we define freedom as
   "the absence of coercion" then the idea that wage labour does not
   restrict liberty is unavoidable, but such a definition is useless. This
   is because it hides structures of power and relations of domination and
   subordination. As Carole Pateman argues, "the contract in which the
   worker allegedly sells his labour power is a contract in which, since
   he cannot be separated from his capacities, he sells command over the
   use of his body and himself. . . To sell command over the use of
   oneself for a specified period . . . is to be an unfree labourer." [The
   Sexual Contract, p. 151]

   In other words, contracts about property in the person inevitably
   create subordination. "Anarcho"-capitalism defines this source of
   unfreedom away, but it still exists and has a major impact on people's
   liberty. Therefore freedom is better described as "self-government" or
   "self-management" -- to be able to govern ones own actions (if alone)
   or to participate in the determination of join activity (if part of a
   group). Freedom, to put it another way, is not an abstract legal
   concept, but the vital concrete possibility for every human being to
   bring to full development all their powers, capacities, and talents
   which nature has endowed them. A key aspect of this is to govern one
   own actions when within associations (self-management). If we look at
   freedom this way, we see that coercion is condemned but so is hierarchy
   (and so is capitalism for during working hours, people are not free to
   make their own plans and have a say in what affects them. They are
   order takers, not free individuals).

   It is because anarchists have recognised the authoritarian nature of
   capitalist firms that they have opposed wage labour and capitalist
   property rights along with the state. They have desired to replace
   institutions structured by subordination with institutions constituted
   by free relationships (based, in other words, on self-management) in
   all areas of life, including economic organisations. Hence Proudhon's
   argument that the "workmen's associations . . . are full of hope both
   as a protest against the wage system, and as an affirmation of
   reciprocity" and that their importance lies "in their denial of the
   rule of capitalists, money lenders and governments." [The General Idea
   of the Revolution, pp. 98-99]

   Unlike anarchists, the "anarcho"-capitalist account of freedom allows
   an individual's freedom to be rented out to another while maintaining
   that the person is still free. It may seem strange that an ideology
   proclaiming its support for liberty sees nothing wrong with the
   alienation and denial of liberty but, in actual fact, it is
   unsurprising. After all, contract theory is a "theoretical strategy
   that justifies subjection by presenting it as freedom" and nothing
   more. Little wonder, then, that contract "creates a relation of
   subordination" and not of freedom [Carole Pateman, Op. Cit., p. 39, p.
   59]

   Any attempt to build an ethical framework starting from the abstract
   individual (as Rothbard does with his "legitimate rights" method) will
   result in domination and oppression between people, not freedom.
   Indeed, Rothbard provides an example of the dangers of idealist
   philosophy that Bakunin warned about when he argued that while
   "[m]aterialism denies free will and ends in the establishment of
   liberty; idealism, in the name of human dignity, proclaims free will,
   and on the ruins of every liberty founds authority." [God and the
   State, p. 48] This is the case with "anarcho"-capitalism can be seen
   from Rothbard's wholehearted support for wage labour and the rules
   imposed by property owners on those who use, but do not own, their
   property. Rothbard, basing himself on abstract individualism, cannot
   help but justify authority over liberty.

   Overall, we can see that the logic of the right-libertarian definition
   of "freedom" ends up negating itself, because it results in the
   creation and encouragement of authority, which is an opposite of
   freedom. For example, as Ayn Rand points out, "man has to sustain his
   life by his own effort, the man who has no right to the product of his
   effort has no means to sustain his life. The man who produces while
   others dispose of his product, is a slave." [The Ayn Rand Lexicon:
   Objectivism from A to Z, pp. 388-9] But, as was shown in [3]section C,
   capitalism is based on, as Proudhon put it, workers working "for an
   entrepreneur who pays them and keeps their products," and so is a form
   of theft. Thus, by "libertarian" capitalism's own logic, capitalism is
   based not on freedom, but on (wage) slavery; for interest, profit and
   rent are derived from a worker's unpaid labour, i.e. "others dispose of
   his [sic] product."

   And if a society is run on the wage- and profit-based system suggested
   by the "anarcho" and "libertarian" capitalists, freedom becomes a
   commodity. The more money you have, the more freedom you get. Then,
   since money is only available to those who earn it, Libertarianism is
   based on that classic saying "work makes one free!" (Arbeit macht
   frei!), which the Nazis placed on the gates of their concentration
   camps. Of course, since it is capitalism, this motto is somewhat
   different for those at the top. In this case it is "other people's work
   makes one free!" -- a truism in any society based on private property
   and the authority that stems from it.

   Thus it is debatable that a libertarian or "anarcho" capitalist society
   would have less unfreedom or coercion in it than "actually existing
   capitalism." In contrast to anarchism, "anarcho"-capitalism, with its
   narrow definitions, restricts freedom to only a few aspects of social
   life and ignores domination and authority beyond those aspects. As
   Peter Marshall points out, the right-libertarian's "definition of
   freedom is entirely negative. It calls for the absence of coercion but
   cannot guarantee the positive freedom of individual autonomy and
   independence." [Demanding the Impossible, p. 564] By confining freedom
   to such a narrow range of human action, "anarcho"-capitalism is clearly
   not a form of anarchism. Real anarchists support freedom in every
   aspect of an individual's life.

2.1 What are the implications of defining liberty in terms of (property) rights?

   The change from defending liberty to defending (property) rights has
   important implications. For one thing, it allows right libertarians to
   imply that private property is similar to a "fact of nature," and so to
   conclude that the restrictions on freedom produced by it can be
   ignored. This can be seen in Robert Nozick's argument that decisions
   are voluntary if the limitations on one's actions are not caused by
   human action which infringe the rights of others. Thus, in a "pure"
   capitalist society the restrictions on freedom caused by wage slavery
   are not really restrictions because the worker voluntarily consents to
   the contract. The circumstances that drive a worker to make the
   contract are irrelevant because they are created by people exercising
   their rights and not violating other peoples' ones (see the section on
   "Voluntary Exchange" in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 262-265).

   This means that within a society "[w]hether a person's actions are
   voluntary depends on what limits his alternatives. If facts of nature
   do so, the actions are voluntary. (I may voluntarily walk to someplace
   I would prefer to fly to unaided)." [Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p.
   262] Similarly, the results of voluntary actions and the transference
   of property can be considered alongside the "facts of nature" (they
   are, after all, the resultants of "natural rights"). This means that
   the circumstances created by the existence and use of property can be
   considered, in essence, as a "natural" fact and so the actions we take
   in response to these circumstances are therefore "voluntary" and we are
   "free" (Nozick presents the example [p. 263] of someone who marries the
   only available person -- all the more attractive people having already
   chosen others -- as a case of an action that is voluntary despite
   removal of all but the least attractive alternative through the
   legitimate actions of others. Needless to say, the example can be --
   and is -- extended to workers on the labour market -- although, of
   course, you do not starve to death if you decide not to marry).

   However, such an argument fails to notice that property is different
   from gravity or biology. Of course not being able to fly does not
   restrict freedom. Neither does not being able to jump 10 feet into the
   air. But unlike gravity (for example), private property has to be
   protected by laws and the police. No one stops you from flying, but
   laws and police forces must exist to ensure that capitalist property
   (and the owners' authority over it) is respected. The claim, therefore,
   that private property in general, and capitalism in particular, can be
   considered as "facts of nature," like gravity, ignores an important
   fact: namely that the people involved in an economy must accept the
   rules of its operation -- rules that, for example, allow contracts to
   be enforced; forbid using another's property without his or her consent
   ("theft," trespass, copyright infringement, etc.); prohibit
   "conspiracy," unlawful assembly, rioting, and so on; and create
   monopolies through regulation, licensing, charters, patents, etc. This
   means that capitalism has to include the mechanisms for deterring
   property crimes as well as mechanisms for compensation and punishment
   should such crimes be committed. In other words, capitalism is in fact
   far more than "voluntary bilateral exchange," because it must include
   the policing, arbitration, and legislating mechanisms required to
   ensure its operation. Hence, like the state, the capitalist market is a
   social institution, and the distributions of goods that result from its
   operation are therefore the distributions sanctioned by a capitalist
   society. As Benjamin Franklin pointed out, "Private property . . . is a
   Creature of Society, and is subject to the Calls of that Society."

   Thus, to claim with Sir Isaiah Berlin (the main, modern, source of the
   concepts of "negative" and "positive" freedom -- although we must add
   that Berlin was not a right-Libertarian), that "[i]f my poverty were a
   kind of disease, which prevented me from buying bread . . . as lameness
   prevents me from running, this inability would not naturally be
   described as a lack of freedom" totally misses the point ["Two Concepts
   of Liberty", in Four Essays on Liberty, p. 123]. If you are lame,
   police officers do not come round to stop you running. They do not have
   to. However, they are required to protect property against the
   dispossessed and those who reject capitalist property rights.

   This means that by using such concepts as "negative" liberty and
   ignoring the social nature of private property, right-libertarians are
   trying to turn the discussion away from liberty toward "biology" and
   other facts of nature. And conveniently, by placing property rights
   alongside gravity and other natural laws, they also succeed in reducing
   debate even about rights.

   Of course, coercion and restriction of liberty can be resisted, unlike
   "natural forces" like gravity. So if, as Berlin argues, "negative"
   freedom means that you "lack political freedom only if you are
   prevented from attaining a goal by human beings," then capitalism is
   indeed based on such a lack, since property rights need to be enforced
   by human beings ("I am prevented by others from doing what I could
   otherwise do"). After all, as Proudhon long ago noted, the market is
   manmade, hence any constraint it imposes is the coercion of man by man
   and so economic laws are not as inevitable as natural ones [see Alan
   Ritter's The Political Thought of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, p. 122]. Or,
   to put it slightly differently, capitalism requires coercion in order
   to work, and hence, is not similar to a "fact of nature," regardless of
   Nozick's claims (i.e. property rights have to be defined and enforced
   by human beings, although the nature of the labour market resulting
   from capitalist property definitions is such that direct coercion is
   usually not needed). This implication is actually recognised by
   right-libertarians, because they argue that the rights-framework of
   society should be set up in one way rather than another. In other
   words, they recognise that society is not independent of human
   interaction, and so can be changed.

   Perhaps, as seems the case, the "anarcho"-capitalist or
   right-Libertarian will claim that it is only deliberate acts which
   violate your (libertarian defined) rights by other humans beings that
   cause unfreedom ("we define freedom . . . as the absence of invasion by
   another man of an man's person or property" [Rothbard, The Ethics of
   Liberty, p. 41]) and so if no-one deliberately coerces you then you are
   free. In this way the workings of the capitalist market can be placed
   alongside the "facts of nature" and ignored as a source of unfreedom.
   However, a moments thought shows that this is not the case. Both
   deliberate and non-deliberate acts can leave individuals lacking
   freedom.

   Let us assume (in an example paraphrased from Alan Haworth's excellent
   book Anti-Libertarianism, p. 49) that someone kidnaps you and places
   you down a deep (naturally formed) pit, miles from anyway, which is
   impossible to climb up. No one would deny that you are unfree. Let us
   further assume that another person walks by and accidentally falls into
   the pit with you.

   According to right-libertarianism, while you are unfree (i.e. subject
   to deliberate coercion) your fellow pit-dweller is perfectly free for
   they have subject to the "facts of nature" and not human action
   (deliberate or otherwise). Or, perhaps, they "voluntarily choose" to
   stay in the pit, after all, it is "only" the "facts of nature" limiting
   their actions. But, obviously, both of you are in exactly the same
   position, have exactly the same choices and so are equally unfree! Thus
   a definition of "liberty" that maintains that only deliberate acts of
   others -- for example, coercion -- reduces freedom misses the point
   totally.

   Why is this example important? Let us consider Murray Rothbard's
   analysis of the situation after the abolition of serfdom in Russia and
   slavery in America. He writes:

     "The bodies of the oppressed were freed, but the property which they
     had worked and eminently deserved to own, remained in the hands of
     their former oppressors. With economic power thus remaining in their
     hands, the former lords soon found themselves virtual masters once
     more of what were now free tenants or farm labourers. The serfs and
     slaves had tasted freedom, but had been cruelly derived of its
     fruits." [The Ethics of Liberty, p. 74]

   However, contrast this with Rothbard's claims that if market forces
   ("voluntary exchanges") result in the creation of free tenants or
   labourers then these labourers and tenants are free (see, for example,
   The Ethics of Liberty, pp. 221-2 on why "economic power" within
   capitalism does not exist). But the labourers dispossessed by market
   forces are in exactly the same situation as the former serfs and
   slaves. Rothbard sees the obvious "economic power" in the later case,
   but denies it in the former. But the conditions of the people in
   question are identical and it is these conditions that horrify us. It
   is only his ideology that stops Rothbard drawing the obvious conclusion
   -- identical conditions produce identical social relationships and so
   if the formally "free" ex-serfs are subject to "economic power" and
   "masters" then so are the formally "free" labourers within capitalism!
   Both sets of workers may be formally free, but their circumstances are
   such that they are "free" to "consent" to sell their freedom to others
   (i.e. economic power produces relationships of domination and unfreedom
   between formally free individuals).

   Thus Rothbard's definition of liberty in terms of rights fails to
   provide us with a realistic and viable understanding of freedom.
   Someone can be a virtual slave while still having her rights
   non-violated (conversely, someone can have their property rights
   violated and still be free; for example, the child who enters your
   backyard without your permission to get her ball hardly violates your
   liberty -- indeed, you would never know that she has entered your
   property unless you happened to see her do it). So the idea that
   freedom means non-aggression against person and their legitimate
   material property justifies extensive non-freedom for the working
   class. The non-violation of property rights does not imply freedom, as
   Rothbard's discussion of the former slaves shows. Anyone who, along
   with Rothbard, defines freedom "as the absence of invasion by another
   man of any man's person or property" in a deeply inequality society is
   supporting, and justifying, capitalist and landlord domination. As
   anarchists have long realised, in an unequal society, a contractarian
   starting point implies an absolutist conclusion.

   Why is this? Simply because freedom is a result of social interaction,
   not the product of some isolated, abstract individual (Rothbard uses
   the model of Robinson Crusoe to construct his ideology). But as Bakunin
   argued, "the freedom of the individual is a function of men in society,
   a necessary consequence of the collective development of mankind." He
   goes on to argue that "man in isolation can have no awareness of his
   liberty . . . Liberty is therefore a feature not of isolation but of
   interaction, not of exclusion but rather of connection." [Selected
   Writings, p. 146, p. 147] Right Libertarians, by building their
   definition of freedom from the isolated person, end up by supporting
   restrictions of liberty due to a neglect of an adequate recognition of
   the actual interdependence of human beings, of the fact what each
   person does is effected by and affects others. People become aware of
   their humanity (liberty) in society, not outside it. It is the social
   relationships we take part in which determine how free we are and any
   definition of freedom which builds upon an individual without social
   ties is doomed to create relations of domination, not freedom, between
   individuals -- as Rothbard's theory does (to put it another way,
   voluntary association is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for
   freedom. Which is why anarchists have always stressed the importance of
   equality -- see [4]section 3 for details).

   So while facts of nature can restrict your options and freedom, it is
   the circumstances within which they act and the options they limit that
   are important (a person trapped at the bottom of a pit is unfree as the
   options available are so few; the lame person is free because their
   available options are extensive). In the same manner, the facts of
   society can and do restrict your freedom because they are the products
   of human action and are defined and protected by human institutions, it
   is the circumstances within which individuals make their decisions and
   the social relationships these decisions produce that are important
   (the worker driven by poverty to accept a slave contract in a sweat
   shop is unfree because the circumstances he faces have limited his
   options and the relations he accepts are based upon hierarchy; the
   person who decides to join an anarchist commune is free because the
   commune is non-hierarchical and she has the option of joining another
   commune, working alone and so forth).

   All in all, the right-Libertarian concept of freedom is lacking. For an
   ideology that takes the name "Libertarianism" it is seems happy to
   ignore actual liberty and instead concentrate on an abstract form of
   liberty which ignores so many sources of unfreedom as to narrow the
   concept until it becomes little more than a justification for
   authoritarianism. This can be seen from right-Libertarian attitudes
   about private property and its effects on liberty (as discussed in the
   [5]next section).

2.2 How does private property affect freedom?

   The right-libertarian does not address or even acknowledge that the
   (absolute) right of private property may lead to extensive control by
   property owners over those who use, but do not own, property (such as
   workers and tenants). Thus a free-market capitalist system leads to a
   very selective and class-based protection of "rights" and "freedoms."
   For example, under capitalism, the "freedom" of employers inevitably
   conflicts with the "freedom" of employees. When stockholders or their
   managers exercise their "freedom of enterprise" to decide how their
   company will operate, they violate their employee's right to decide how
   their labouring capacities will be utilised. In other words, under
   capitalism, the "property rights" of employers will conflict with and
   restrict the "human right" of employees to manage themselves.
   Capitalism allows the right of self-management only to the few, not to
   all. Or, alternatively, capitalism does not recognise certain human
   rights as universal which anarchism does.

   This can be seen from Austrian Economist W. Duncan Reekie's defence of
   wage labour. While referring to "intra-firm labour markets" as
   "hierarchies", Reekie (in his best ex cathedra tone) states that
   "[t]here is nothing authoritarian, dictatorial or exploitative in the
   relationship. Employees order employers to pay them amounts specified
   in the hiring contract just as much as employers order employees to
   abide by the terms of the contract." [Markets, Entrepreneurs and
   Liberty, p. 136, p. 137]. Given that "the terms of contract" involve
   the worker agreeing to obey the employers orders and that they will be
   fired if they do not, its pretty clear that the ordering that goes on
   in the "intra-firm labour market" is decidedly one way. Bosses have the
   power, workers are paid to obey. And this begs the question, if the
   employment contract creates a free worker, why must she abandon her
   liberty during work hours?

   Reekie actually recognises this lack of freedom in a "round about" way
   when he notes that "employees in a firm at any level in the hierarchy
   can exercise an entrepreneurial role. The area within which that role
   can be carried out increases the more authority the employee has." [Op.
   Cit., p. 142] Which means workers are subject to control from above
   which restricts the activities they are allowed to do and so they are
   not free to act, make decisions, participate in the plans of the
   organisation, to create the future and so forth within working hours.
   And it is strange that while recognising the firm as a hierarchy,
   Reekie tries to deny that it is authoritarian or dictatorial -- as if
   you could have a hierarchy without authoritarian structures or an
   unelected person in authority who is not a dictator. His confusion is
   shared by Austrian guru Ludwig von Mises, who asserts that the
   "entrepreneur and capitalist are not irresponsible autocrats" because
   they are "unconditionally subject to the sovereignty of the consumer"
   while, on the next page, admitting there is a "managerial hierarchy"
   which contains "the average subordinate employee." [Human Action, p.
   809 and p. 810] It does not enter his mind that the capitalist may be
   subject to some consumer control while being an autocrat to their
   subordinated employees. Again, we find the right-"libertarian"
   acknowledging that the capitalist managerial structure is a hierarchy
   and workers are subordinated while denying it is autocratic to the
   workers! Thus we have "free" workers within a relationship distinctly
   lacking freedom (in the sense of self-government) -- a strange paradox.
   Indeed, if your personal life were as closely monitored and regulated
   as the work life of millions of people across the world, you would
   rightly consider it oppression.

   Perhaps Reekie (like most right-libertarians) will maintain that
   workers voluntarily agree ("consent") to be subject to the bosses
   dictatorship (he writes that "each will only enter into the contractual
   agreement known as a firm if each believes he will be better off
   thereby. The firm is simply another example of mutually beneficial
   exchange" [Op. Cit., p. 137]). However, this does not stop the
   relationship being authoritarian or dictatorial (and so exploitative as
   it is highly unlikely that those at the top will not abuse their
   power). And as we argue further in the [6]next section (and also see
   sections [7]B.4, [8]3.1 and [9]10.2), in a capitalist society workers
   have the option of finding a job or facing abject poverty and/or
   starvation.

   Little wonder, then, that people "voluntarily" sell their labour and
   "consent" to authoritarian structures! They have little option to do
   otherwise. So, within the labour market, workers can and do seek out
   the best working conditions possible, but that does not mean that the
   final contract agreed is "freely" accepted and not due to the force of
   circumstances, that both parties have equal bargaining power when
   drawing up the contract or that the freedom of both parties is ensured.
   Which means to argue (as many right-libertarians do) that freedom
   cannot be restricted by wage labour because people enter into
   relationships they consider will lead to improvements over their
   initial situation totally misses the points. As the initial situation
   is not considered relevant, their argument fails. After all, agreeing
   to work in a sweatshop 14 hours a day is an improvement over starving
   to death -- but it does not mean that those who so agree are free when
   working there or actually want to be there. They are not and it is the
   circumstances, created and enforced by the law, that have ensured that
   they "consent" to such a regime (given the chance, they would desire to
   change that regime but cannot as this would violate their bosses
   property rights and they would be repressed for trying).

   So the right-wing "libertarian" right is interested only in a narrow
   concept of freedom (rather than in "freedom" or "liberty" as such).
   This can be seen in the argument of Ayn Rand (a leading ideologue of
   "libertarian" capitalism) that "Freedom, in a political context, means
   freedom from government coercion. It does not mean freedom from the
   landlord, or freedom from the employer, or freedom from the laws of
   nature which do not provide men with automatic prosperity. It means
   freedom from the coercive power of the state -- and nothing else!"
   [Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, p. 192] By arguing in this way, right
   libertarians ignore the vast number of authoritarian social
   relationships that exist in capitalist society and, as Rand does here,
   imply that these social relationships are like "the laws of nature."
   However, if one looks at the world without prejudice but with an eye to
   maximising freedom, the major coercive institution is seen to be not
   the state but capitalist social relationships (as indicated in
   [10]section B.4).

   The right "libertarian," then, far from being a defender of freedom, is
   in fact a keen defender of certain forms of authority and domination.
   As Peter Kropotkin noted, the "modern Individualism initiated by
   Herbert Spencer is, like the critical theory of Proudhon, a powerful
   indictment against the dangers and wrongs of government, but its
   practical solution of the social problem is miserable -- so miserable
   as to lead us to inquire if the talk of 'No force' be merely an excuse
   for supporting landlord and capitalist domination." [Act For
   Yourselves, p. 98]

   To defend the "freedom" of property owners is to defend authority and
   privilege -- in other words, statism. So, in considering the concept of
   liberty as "freedom from," it is clear that by defending private
   property (as opposed to possession) the "anarcho"-capitalist is
   defending the power and authority of property owners to govern those
   who use "their" property. And also, we must note, defending all the
   petty tyrannies that make the work lives of so many people frustrating,
   stressful and unrewarding.

   However, anarchism, by definition, is in favour of organisations and
   social relationships which are non-hierarchical and non-authoritarian.
   Otherwise, some people are more free than others. Failing to attack
   hierarchy leads to massive contradiction. For example, since the
   British Army is a volunteer one, it is an "anarchist" organisation!
   (see [11]next section for a discussion on why the "anarcho"-capitalism
   concept of freedom also allows the state to appear "libertarian").

   In other words, "full capitalist property rights" do not protect
   freedom, in fact they actively deny it. But this lack of freedom is
   only inevitable if we accept capitalist private property rights. If we
   reject them, we can try and create a world based on freedom in all
   aspects of life, rather than just in a few.

2.3 Can "anarcho"-capitalist theory justify the state?

   Ironically enough, "anarcho"-capitalist ideology actually allows the
   state to be justified along with capitalist hierarchy. This is because
   the reason why capitalist authority is acceptable to the
   "anarcho"-capitalist is because it is "voluntary" -- no one forces the
   worker to join or remain within a specific company (force of
   circumstances are irrelevant in this viewpoint). Thus capitalist
   domination is not really domination at all. But the same can be said of
   all democratic states as well. Few such states bar exit for its
   citizens -- they are free to leave at any time and join any other state
   that will have them (exactly as employees can with companies). Of
   course there are differences between the two kinds of authority --
   anarchists do not deny that -- but the similarities are all too clear.

   The "anarcho"-capitalist could argue that changing jobs is easier than
   changing states and, sometimes, this is correct -- but not always. Yes,
   changing states does require the moving of home and possessions over
   great distances but so can changing job (indeed, if a worker has to
   move half-way across a country or even the world to get a job
   "anarcho"-capitalists would celebrate this as an example of the
   benefits of a "flexible" labour market). Yes, states often conscript
   citizens and send them into dangerous situations but bosses often force
   their employees to accept dangerous working environments on pain of
   firing. Yes, many states do restrict freedom of association and speech,
   but so do bosses. Yes, states tax their citizens but landlords and
   companies only let others use their property if they get money in
   return (i.e. rent or profits). Indeed, if the employee or tenant does
   not provide the employer or landlord with enough profits, they will
   quickly be shown the door. Of course employees can start their own
   companies but citizens can start their own state if they convince an
   existing state (the owner of a set of resources) to sell/give land to
   them. Setting up a company also requires existing owners to sell/give
   resources to those who need them. Of course, in a democratic state
   citizens can influence the nature of laws and orders they obey. In a
   capitalist company, this is not the case.

   This means that, logically, "anarcho"-capitalism must consider a series
   of freely exitable states as "anarchist" and not a source of
   domination. If consent (not leaving) is what is required to make
   capitalist domination not domination then the same can be said of
   statist domination. Stephen L. Newman makes the same point:

     "The emphasis [right-wing] libertarians place on the opposition of
     liberty and political power tends to obscure the role of authority
     in their worldview . . . the authority exercised in private
     relationships, however -- in the relationship between employer and
     employee, for instance -- meets with no objection. . . . [This]
     reveals a curious insensitivity to the use of private authority as a
     means of social control. Comparing public and private authority, we
     might well ask of the [right-wing] libertarians: When the price of
     exercising one's freedom is terribly high, what practical difference
     is there between the commands of the state and those issued by one's
     employer? . . . Though admittedly the circumstances are not
     identical, telling disgruntled empowers that they are always free to
     leave their jobs seems no different in principle from telling
     political dissidents that they are free to emigrate." [Liberalism at
     Wit's End, pp. 45-46]

   Murray Rothbard, in his own way, agrees:

     "If the State may be said too properly own its territory, then it is
     proper for it to make rules for everyone who presumes to live in
     that area. It can legitimately seize or control private property
     because there is no private property in its area, because it really
     owns the entire land surface. So long as the State permits its
     subjects to leave its territory, then, it can be said to act as does
     any other owner who sets down rules for people living on his
     property." [The Ethics of Liberty, p. 170]

   Rothbard's argues that this is not the case simply because the state
   did not acquire its property in a "just" manner and that it claims
   rights over virgin land (both of which violates Rothbard's
   "homesteading" theory of property -- see [12]section 4.1 for details
   and a critique). Rothbard argues that this defence of statism (the
   state as property owner) is unrealistic and ahistoric, but his account
   of the origins of property is equally unrealistic and ahistoric and
   that does not stop him supporting capitalism. People in glass houses
   should not throw stones!

   Thus he claims that the state is evil and its claims to authority/power
   false simply because it acquired the resources it claims to own
   "unjustly" -- for example, by violence and coercion (see The Ethics of
   Liberty, pp. 170-1, for Rothbard's attempt to explain why the state
   should not be considered as the owner of land). And even if the state
   was the owner of its territory, it cannot appropriate virgin land
   (although, as he notes elsewhere, the "vast" US frontier no longer
   exists "and there is no point crying over the fact" [Op. Cit., p.
   240]).

   So what makes hierarchy legitimate for Rothbard is whether the property
   it derives from was acquired justly or unjustly. Which leads us to a
   few very important points.

   Firstly, Rothbard is explicitly acknowledging the similarities between
   statism and capitalism. He is arguing that if the state had developed
   in a "just" way, then it is perfectly justifiable in governing
   ("set[ting] down rules") those who "consent" to live on its territory
   in exactly the same why a property owner does. In other words, private
   property can be considered as a "justly" created state! These
   similarities between property and statism have long been recognised by
   anarchists and that is why we reject private property along with the
   state (Proudhon did, after all, note that "property is despotism" and
   well as "theft"). But, according to Rothbard, something can look like a
   state (i.e. be a monopoly of decision making over an area) and act like
   a state (i.e. set down rules for people, govern them, impose a monopoly
   of force) but not be a state. But if it looks like a duck and sounds
   like a duck, it is a duck. Claiming that the origins of the thing are
   what counts is irrelevant -- for example, a cloned duck is just as much
   a duck as a naturally born one. A statist organisation is authoritarian
   whether it comes from "just" or "unjust" origins. Does transforming the
   ownership of the land from states to capitalists really make the
   relations of domination created by the dispossession of the many less
   authoritarian and unfree? Of course not.

   Secondly, much property in "actually existing" capitalism is the
   product (directly or indirectly) of state laws and violence ("the
   emergence of both agrarian and industrial capitalism in Britain [and
   elsewhere, we must add] . . . could not have got off the ground without
   resources to state violence -- legal or otherwise" [Brian Morris,
   Ecology & Anarchism, p. 190]). If state claims of ownership are invalid
   due to their history, then so are many others (particularly those which
   claim to own land). As the initial creation was illegitimate, so are
   the transactions which have sprung from it. Thus if state claims of
   property rights are invalid, so are most (if not all) capitalist
   claims. If the laws of the state are illegitimate, so are the rules of
   the capitalist. If taxation is illegitimate, then so are rent, interest
   and profit. Rothbard's "historical" argument against the state can also
   be applied to private property and if the one is unjustified, then so
   is the other.

   Thirdly, if the state had evolved "justly" then Rothbard would actually
   have nothing against it! A strange position for an anarchist to take.
   Logically this means that if a system of corporate states evolved from
   the workings of the capitalist market then the "anarcho"-capitalist
   would have nothing against it. This can be seen from
   "anarcho"-capitalist support for company towns even though they have
   correctly been described as "industrial feudalism" (see [13]section 6
   for more on this).

   Fourthly, Rothbard's argument implies that similar circumstances
   producing similar relationships of domination and unfreedom are somehow
   different if they are created by "just" and "unjust" means. Rothbard
   claims that because the property is "justly" acquired it means the
   authority a capitalist over his employees is totally different from
   that of a state over its subject. But such a claim is false -- both the
   subject/citizen and the employee are in a similar relationship of
   domination and authoritarianism. As we argued in [14]section 2.2, how a
   person got into a situation is irrelevant when considering how free
   they are. Thus, the person who "consents" to be governed by another
   because all available resources are privately owned is in exactly the
   same situation as a person who has to join a state because all
   available resources are owned by one state or another. Both are unfree
   and are part of authoritarian relationships based upon domination.

   And, lastly, while "anarcho"-capitalism may be a "just" society, it is
   definitely not a free one. It will be marked by extensive hierarchy,
   unfreedom and government, but these restrictions of freedom will be of
   a private nature. As Rothbard indicates, the property owner and the
   state create/share the same authoritarian relationships. If statism is
   unfree, then so is capitalism. And, we must add, how "just" is a system
   which undermines liberty. Can "justice" ever be met in a society in
   which one class has more power and freedom than another. If one party
   is in an inferior position, then they have little choice but to agree
   to the disadvantageous terms offered by the superior party (see
   [15]section 3.1). In such a situation, a "just" outcome will be
   unlikely as any contract agreed will be skewed to favour one side over
   the other.

   The implications of these points are important. We can easily imagine a
   situation within "anarcho"-capitalism where a few companies/people
   start to buy up land and form company regions and towns. After all,
   this has happened continually throughout capitalism. Thus a "natural"
   process may develop where a few owners start to accumulate larger and
   larger tracks of land "justly". Such a process does not need to result
   in one company owning the world. It is likely that a few hundred,
   perhaps a few thousand, could do so. But this is not a cause for
   rejoicing -- after all the current "market" in "unjust" states also has
   a few hundred competitors in it. And even if there is a large multitude
   of property owners, the situation for the working class is exactly the
   same as the citizen under current statism! Does the fact that it is
   "justly" acquired property that faces the worker really change the fact
   she must submit to the government and rules of another to gain access
   to the means of life?

   When faced with anarchist criticisms that circumstances force workers
   to accept wage slavery the "anarcho"-capitalist claims that these are
   to be considered as objective facts of nature and so wage labour is not
   domination. However, the same can be said of states -- we are born into
   a world where states claim to own all the available land. If states are
   replaced by individuals or groups of individuals does this change the
   essential nature of our dispossession? Of course not.

   Rothbard argues that "[o]bviously, in a free society, Smith has the
   ultimate decision-making power over his own just property, Jones over
   his, etc." [Op. Cit., p. 173] and, equally obviously, this
   ultimate-decision making power extends to those who use, but do not
   own, such property. But how "free" is a free society where the majority
   have to sell their liberty to another in order to live? Rothbard
   (correctly) argues that the State "uses its monopoly of force . . . to
   control, regulate, and coerce its hapless subjects. Often it pushes its
   way into controlling the morality and the very lives of its subjects."
   [Op. Cit., p. 171] However he fails to note that employers do exactly
   the same thing to their employees. This, from an anarchist perspective,
   is unsurprising, for (after all) the employer is "the ultimate
   decision-making power over his just property" just as the state is over
   its "unjust" property. That similar forms of control and regulation
   develop is not a surprise given the similar hierarchical relations in
   both structures.

   That there is a choice in available states does not make statism any
   less unjust and unfree. Similarly, just because we have a choice
   between employers does not make wage labour any less unjust or unfree.
   But trying to dismiss one form of domination as flowing from "just"
   property while attacking the other because it flows from "unjust"
   property is not seeing the wood for the trees. If one reduces liberty,
   so does the other. Whether the situation we are in resulted from "just"
   or "unjust" steps is irrelevant to the restrictions of freedom we face
   because of them (and as we argue in [16]section 2.5, "unjust"
   situations can easily flow from "just" steps).

   The "anarcho"-capitalist insistence that the voluntary nature of an
   association determines whether it is anarchistic is deeply flawed -- so
   flawed in fact that states and state-like structures (such as
   capitalist firms) can be considered anarchistic! In contrast,
   anarchists think that the hierarchical nature of the associations we
   join is equally as important as its voluntary nature when determining
   whether it is anarchistic or statist. However this option is not
   available to the "anarcho"-capitalist as it logically entails that
   capitalist companies are to be opposed along with the state as sources
   of domination, oppression and exploitation.

2.4 But surely transactions on the market are voluntary?

   Of course, it is usually maintained by "anarcho"-capitalists that
   no-one puts a gun to a worker's head to join a specific company. Yes,
   indeed, this is true -- workers can apply for any job they like. But
   the point is that the vast majority cannot avoid having to sell their
   liberty to others (self-employment and co-operatives are an option, but
   they account for less than 10% of the working population and are
   unlikely to spread due to the nature of capitalist market forces -- see
   sections [17]J.5.11 and [18]J.5.12 for details). And as Bob Black
   pointed out, right libertarians argue that "'one can at least change
   jobs.' but you can't avoid having a job -- just as under statism one
   can at least change nationalities but you can't avoid subjection to one
   nation-state or another. But freedom means more than the right to
   change masters." [The Libertarian as Conservative]

   So why do workers agree to join a company? Because circumstances force
   them to do so - circumstances created, we must note, by human actions
   and institutions and not some abstract "fact of nature." And if the
   world that humans create by their activity is detrimental to what we
   should value most (individual liberty and individuality) then we should
   consider how to change that world for the better. Thus "circumstances"
   (current "objective reality") is a valid source of unfreedom and for
   human investigation and creative activity -- regardless of the claims
   of right-Libertarians.

   Let us look at the circumstances created by capitalism. Capitalism is
   marked by a class of dispossessed labourers who have nothing to sell by
   their labour. They are legally barred from access to the means of life
   and so have little option but to take part in the labour market. As
   Alexander Berkman put it:

     "The law says your employer does not sell anything from you, because
     it is done with your consent. You have agreed to work for your boss
     for certain pay, he to have all that you produce . . .

     "But did you really consent?

     "When the highway man holds his gun to your head, you turn your
     valuables over to him. You 'consent' all right, but you do so
     because you cannot help yourself, because you are compelled by his
     gun.

     "Are you not compelled to work for an employer? Your need compels
     you just as the highwayman's gun. You must live. . . You can't work
     for yourself . . .The factories, machinery, and tools belong to the
     employing class, so you must hire yourself out to that class in
     order to work and live. Whatever you work at, whoever your employer
     may be, it is always comes to the same: you must work for him. You
     can't help yourself. You are compelled."
     [What is Communist Anarchism?, p. 9]

   Due to this class monopoly over the means of life, workers (usually)
   are at a disadvantage in terms of bargaining power -- there are more
   workers than jobs (see sections [19]B.4.3 and [20]10.2 for a discussion
   why this is the normal situation on the labour market).

   As was indicated in section B.4 ([21]How does capitalism affect
   liberty?), within capitalism there is no equality between owners and
   the dispossessed, and so property is a source of power. To claim that
   this power should be "left alone" or is "fair" is "to the anarchists. .
   . preposterous. Once a State has been established, and most of the
   country's capital privatised, the threat of physical force is no longer
   necessary to coerce workers into accepting jobs, even with low pay and
   poor conditions. To use Ayn Rand's term, 'initial force' has already
   taken place, by those who now have capital against those who do not. .
   . . In other words, if a thief died and willed his 'ill-gotten gain' to
   his children, would the children have a right to the stolen property?
   Not legally. So if 'property is theft,' to borrow Proudhon's quip, and
   the fruit of exploited labour is simply legal theft, then the only
   factor giving the children of a deceased capitalist a right to inherit
   the 'booty' is the law, the State. As Bakunin wrote, 'Ghosts should not
   rule and oppress this world, which belongs only to the living'" [Jeff
   Draughn, Between Anarchism and Libertarianism].

   Or, in other words, right-Libertarianism fails to "meet the charge that
   normal operations of the market systematically places an entire class
   of persons (wage earners) in circumstances that compel them to accept
   the terms and conditions of labour dictated by those who offer work.
   While it is true that individuals are formally free to seek better jobs
   or withhold their labour in the hope of receiving higher wages, in the
   end their position in the market works against them; they cannot live
   if they do not find employment. When circumstances regularly bestow a
   relative disadvantage on one class of persons in their dealings with
   another class, members of the advantaged class have little need of
   coercive measures to get what they want." [Stephen L. Newman,
   Liberalism at Wit's End, p. 130]

   To ignore the circumstances which drive people to seek out the most
   "beneficial exchange" is to blind yourself to the power relationships
   inherent within capitalism -- power relationships created by the
   unequal bargaining power of the parties involved (also see [22]section
   3.1). And to argue that "consent" ensures freedom is false; if you are
   "consenting" to be join a dictatorial organisation, you "consent" not
   to be free (and to paraphrase Rousseau, a person who renounces freedom
   renounces being human).

   Which is why circumstances are important -- if someone truly wants to
   join an authoritarian organisation, then so be it. It is their life.
   But if circumstances ensure their "consent" then they are not free. The
   danger is, of course, that people become accustomed to authoritarian
   relationships and end up viewing them as forms of freedom. This can be
   seen from the state, which the vast majority support and "consent" to.
   And this also applies to wage labour, which many workers today accept
   as a "necessary evil" (like the state) but, as we indicate in
   [23]section 8.6, the first wave of workers viewed with horror as a form
   of (wage) slavery and did all that they could to avoid. In such
   situations all we can do is argue with them and convince them that
   certain forms of organisations (such as the state and capitalist firms)
   are an evil and urge them to change society to ensure their extinction.

   So due to this lack of appreciation of circumstances (and the fact that
   people become accustomed to certain ways of life) "anarcho"-capitalism
   actively supports structures that restrict freedom for the many. And
   how is "anarcho"-capitalism anarchist if it generates extensive amounts
   of archy? It is for this reason that all anarchists support
   self-management within free association -- that way we maximise freedom
   both inside and outside organisations. But only stressing freedom
   outside organisations, "anarcho"-capitalism ends up denying freedom as
   such (after all, we spend most of our waking hours at work). If
   "anarcho"-capitalists really desired freedom, they would reject
   capitalism and become anarchists -- only in a libertarian socialist
   society would agreements to become a wage worker be truly voluntary as
   they would not be driven by circumstances to sell their liberty.

   This means that while right-Libertarianism appears to make "choice" an
   ideal (which sounds good, liberating and positive) in practice it has
   become a "dismal politics," a politics of choice where most of the
   choices are bad. And, to state the obvious, the choices we are "free"
   to make are shaped by the differences in wealth and power in society
   (see [24]section 3.1) as well as such things as "isolation paradoxes"
   (see [25]section B.6) and the laws and other human institutions that
   exist. If we ignore the context within which people make their choices
   then we glorify abstract processes at the expense of real people. And,
   as importantly, we must add that many of the choices we make under
   capitalism (shaped as they are by the circumstances within which they
   are made), such as employment contracts, result in our "choice" being
   narrowed to "love it or leave it" in the organisations we create/join
   as a result of these "free" choices.

   This ideological blind spot flows from the "anarcho"-capitalist
   definition of "freedom" as "absence of coercion" -- as workers "freely
   consent" to joining a specific workplace, their freedom is
   unrestricted. But to defend only "freedom from" in a capitalist society
   means to defend the power and authority of the few against the attempts
   of the many to claim their freedom and rights. To requote Emma Goldman,
   "'Rugged individualism' has meant all the 'individualism' for the
   masters . . . , in whose name political tyranny and social oppression
   are defended and held up as virtues' while every aspiration and attempt
   of man to gain freedom . . . is denounced as . . . evil in the name of
   that same individualism." [Red Emma Speaks, p. 112]

   In other words, its all fine and well saying (as right-libertarians do)
   that you aim to abolish force from human relationships but if you
   support an economic system which creates hierarchy (and so domination
   and oppression) by its very workings, "defensive" force will always be
   required to maintain and enforce that domination. Moreover, if one
   class has extensive power over another due to the systematic (and
   normal) workings of the market, any force used to defend that power is
   automatically "defensive". Thus to argue against the use of force and
   ignore the power relationships that exist within and shape a society
   (and so also shape the individuals within it) is to defend and justify
   capitalist and landlord domination and denounce any attempts to resist
   that domination as "initiation of force."

   Anarchists, in contrast, oppose hierarchy (and so domination within
   relationships -- bar S&M personal relationships, which are a totally
   different thing altogether; they are truly voluntary and they also do
   not attempt to hide the power relationships involved by using economic
   jargon). This opposition, while also including opposition to the use of
   force against equals (for example, anarchists are opposed to forcing
   workers and peasants to join a self-managed commune or syndicate), also
   includes support for the attempts of those subject to domination to end
   it (for example, workers striking for union recognition are not
   "initiating force", they are fighting for their freedom).

   In other words, apparently "voluntary" agreements can and do limit
   freedom and so the circumstances that drive people into them must be
   considered when deciding whether any such limitation is valid. By
   ignoring circumstances, "anarcho"-capitalism ends up by failing to
   deliver what it promises -- a society of free individuals -- and
   instead presents us with a society of masters and servants. The
   question is, what do we feel moved to insist that people enjoy? Formal,
   abstract (bourgeois) self-ownership ("freedom") or a more substantive
   control over one's life (i.e. autonomy)?

2.5 But surely circumstances are the result of liberty and so cannot be objected
to?

   It is often argued by right-libertarians that the circumstances we face
   within capitalism are the result of individual decisions (i.e.
   individual liberty) and so we must accept them as the expressions of
   these acts (the most famous example of this argument is in Nozick's
   Anarchy, State, and Utopia pp. 161-163 where he maintains that "liberty
   upsets patterns"). This is because whatever situation evolves from a
   just situation by just (i.e. non-coercive steps) is also (by
   definition) just.

   However, it is not apparent that adding just steps to a just situation
   will result in a just society. We will illustrate with a couple of
   banal examples. If you add chemicals which are non-combustible together
   you can create a new, combustible, chemical (i.e. X becomes not-X by
   adding new X to it). Similarly, if you have an odd number and add
   another odd number to it, it becomes even (again, X becomes not-X by
   adding a new X to it). So it is very possible to go from an just state
   to an unjust state by just step (and it is possible to remain in an
   unjust state by just acts; for example if we tried to implement
   "anarcho"-capitalism on the existing -- unjustly created -- situation
   of "actually existing" capitalism it would be like having an odd number
   and adding even numbers to it). In other words, the outcome of "just"
   steps can increase inequality within society and so ensure that some
   acquire an unacceptable amount of power over others, via their control
   over resources. Such an inequality of power would create an "unjust"
   situation where the major are free to sell their liberty to others due
   to inequality in power and resources on the "free" market.

   Ignoring this objection, we could argue (as many "anarcho"-capitalists
   and right-libertarians do) that the unforeseen results of human action
   are fine unless we assume that these human actions are in themselves
   bad (i.e. that individual choice is evil).

   Such an argument is false for three reasons.

   First, when we make our choices the aggregate impact of these choices
   are unknown to us -- and not on offer when we make our choices. Thus we
   cannot be said to "choose" these outcomes, outcomes which we may
   consider deeply undesirable, and so the fact that these outcomes are
   the result of individual choices is besides the point (if we knew the
   outcome we could refrain from doing them). The choices themselves,
   therefore, do not validate the outcome as the outcome was not part of
   the choices when they where made (i.e. the means do not justify the
   ends). In other words, private acts often have important public
   consequences (and "bilateral exchanges" often involve externalities for
   third parties). Secondly, if the outcome of individual choices is to
   deny or restrict individual choice on a wider scale at a later stage,
   then we are hardly arguing that individual choice is a bad thing. We
   want to arrange it so that the decisions we make now do not result in
   them restricting our ability to make choices in important areas of life
   at a latter stage. Which means we are in favour of individual choices
   and so liberty, not against them. Thirdly, the unforeseen or unplanned
   results of individual actions are not necessarily a good thing. If the
   aggregate outcome of individual choices harms individuals then we have
   a right to modify the circumstances within which choices are made
   and/or the aggregate results of these choices.

   An example will show what we mean (again drawn from Haworth's excellent
   Anti-Libertarianism, p. 35). Millions of people across the world bought
   deodorants which caused a hole to occur in the ozone layer surrounding
   the Earth. The resultant of these acts created a situation in which
   individuals and the eco-system they inhabited were in great danger. The
   actual acts themselves were by no means wrong, but the aggregate impact
   was. A similar argument can apply to any form of pollution. Now, unless
   the right-Libertarian argues that skin cancer or other forms of
   pollution related illness are fine, its clear that the resultant of
   individual acts can be harmful to individuals.

   The right-Libertarian could argue that pollution is an "initiation of
   force" against an individual's property-rights in their person and so
   individuals can sue the polluters. But hierarchy also harms the
   individual (see [26]section B.1) -- and so can be considered as an
   infringement of their "property-rights" (i.e. liberty, to get away from
   the insane property fetish of right-Libertarianism). The loss of
   autonomy can be just as harmful to an individual as lung cancer
   although very different in form. And the differences in wealth
   resulting from hierarchy is well known to have serious impacts on
   life-span and health.

   As noted in [27]section 2.1, the market is just as man-made as
   pollution. This means that the "circumstances" we face are due to
   aggregate of millions of individual acts and these acts occur within a
   specific framework of rights, institutions and ethics. Anarchists think
   that a transformation of our society and its rights and ideals is
   required so that the resultant of individual choices does not have the
   ironic effect of limiting individual choice (freedom) in many important
   ways (such as in work, for example).

   In other words, the circumstances created by capitalist rights and
   institutions requires a transformation of these rights and institutions
   in such a way as to maximise individual choice for all -- namely, to
   abolish these rights and replace them with new ones (for example,
   replace property rights with use rights). Thus Nozick's claims that "Z
   does choose voluntarily if the other individuals A through Y each acted
   voluntarily and within their rights" [Op. Cit., p. 263] misses the
   point -- it is these rights that are in question (given that Nozick
   assumes these rights then his whole thesis is begging the question).

   And we must add (before anyone points it out) that, yes, we are aware
   that many decisions will unavoidably limit current and future choices.
   For example, the decision to build a factory on a green-belt area will
   make it impossible for people to walk through the woods that are no
   longer there. But such "limitations" (if they can be called that) of
   choice are different from the limitations we are highlighting here,
   namely the lose of freedom that accompanies the circumstances created
   via exchange in the market. The human actions which build the factory
   modify reality but do not generate social relationships of domination
   between people in so doing. The human actions of market exchange, in
   contrast, modify the relative strengths of everyone in society and so
   has a distinct impact on the social relationships we "voluntarily"
   agree to create. Or, to put it another way, the decision to build on
   the green-belt site does "limit" choice in the abstract but it does not
   limit choice in the kind of relationships we form with other people nor
   create authoritarian relationships between people due to inequality
   influencing the content of the associations we form. However, the
   profits produced from using the factory increases inequality (and so
   market/economic power) and so weakens the position of the working class
   in respect to the capitalist class within society. This increased
   inequality will be reflected in the "free" contracts and working
   regimes that are created, with the weaker "trader" having to compromise
   far more than before.

   So, to try and defend wage slavery and other forms of hierarchy by
   arguing that "circumstances" are created by individual liberty runs
   aground on its own logic. If the circumstances created by individual
   liberty results in pollution then the right-Libertarian will be the
   first to seek to change those circumstances. They recognise that the
   right to pollute while producing is secondary to our right to be
   healthy. Similarly, if the circumstances created by individual liberty
   results in hierarchy (pollution of the mind and our relationships with
   others as opposed to the body, although it affects that to) then we are
   entitled to change these circumstances too and the means by which we
   get there (namely the institutional and rights framework of society).
   Our right to liberty is more important than the rights of property --
   sadly, the right-Libertarian refuses to recognise this.

2.6 Do Libertarian-capitalists support slavery?

   Yes. It may come as a surprise to many people, but right-Libertarianism
   is one of the few political theories that justifies slavery. For
   example, Robert Nozick asks whether "a free system would allow [the
   individual] to sell himself into slavery" and he answers "I believe
   that it would." [Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 371] While some
   right-Libertarians do not agree with Nozick, there is no logical basis
   in their ideology for such disagreement.

   The logic is simple, you cannot really own something unless you can
   sell it. Self-ownership is one of the cornerstones of laissez-faire
   capitalist ideology. Therefore, since you own yourself you can sell
   yourself.

   (For Murray Rothbard's claims of the "unenforceability, in libertarian
   theory, of voluntary slave contracts" see The Ethics of Liberty, pp.
   134-135 -- of course, other libertarian theorists claim the exact
   opposite so "libertarian theory" makes no such claims, but nevermind!
   Essentially, his point revolves around the assertion that a person
   "cannot, in nature, sell himself into slavery and have this sale
   enforced - for this would mean that his future will over his own body
   was being surrendered in advance" and that if a "labourer remains
   totally subservient to his master's will voluntarily, he is not yet a
   slave since his submission is voluntary." [p. 40] However, as we noted
   in [28]section 2, Rothbard emphasis on quitting fails to recognise that
   actual denial of will and control over ones own body that is explicit
   in wage labour. It is this failure that pro-slave contract
   "libertarians" stress -- as we will see, they consider the slave
   contract as an extended wage contract. Moreover, a modern slave
   contract would likely take the form of a "performance bond" [p. 136] in
   which the slave agrees to perform X years labour or pay their master
   substantial damages. The threat of damages that enforces the contract
   and such a "contract" Rothbard does agree is enforceable -- along with
   "conditional exchange" [p. 141] which could be another way of creating
   slave contracts.)

   Nozick's defence of slavery should not come as a surprise to any one
   familiar with classical liberalism. An elitist ideology, its main
   rationale is to defend the liberty and power of property owners and
   justify unfree social relationships (such as government and wage
   labour) in terms of "consent." Nozick just takes it to its logical
   conclusion, a conclusion which Rothbard, while balking at the label
   used, does not actually disagree with.

   This is because Nozick's argument is not new but, as with so many
   others, can be found in John Locke's work. The key difference is that
   Locke refused the term "slavery" and favoured "drudgery" as, for him,
   slavery mean a relationship "between a lawful conqueror and a captive"
   where the former has the power of life and death over the latter. Once
   a "compact" is agreed between them, "an agreement for a limited power
   on the one side, and obedience on the other . . . slavery ceases." As
   long as the master could not kill the slave, then it was "drudgery."
   Like Nozick, he acknowledges that "men did sell themselves; but, it is
   plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery: for, it is evident,
   the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power:
   for the master could not have power to kill him, at any time, whom, at
   a certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his service."
   [Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Section 24] In other words, like
   Rothbard, voluntary slavery was fine but just call it something else.

   Not that Locke was bothered by involuntary slavery. He was heavily
   involved in the slave trade. He owned shares in the "Royal Africa
   Company" which carried on the slave trade for England, making a profit
   when he sold them. He also held a significant share in another slave
   company, the "Bahama Adventurers." In the "Second Treatise", Locke
   justified slavery in terms of "Captives taken in a just war." [Section
   85] In other words, a war waged against aggressors. That, of course,
   had nothing to do with the actual slavery Locke profited from (slave
   raids were common, for example). Nor did his "liberal" principles stop
   him suggesting a constitution that would ensure that "every freeman of
   Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his Negro
   slaves." The constitution itself was typically autocratic and
   hierarchical, designed explicitly to "avoid erecting a numerous
   democracy." [The Works of John Locke, vol. X, p. 196]

   So the notion of contractual slavery has a long history within
   right-wing liberalism, although most refuse to call it by that name. It
   is of course simply embarrassment that stops Rothbard calling a spade a
   spade. He incorrectly assumes that slavery has to be involuntary. In
   fact, historically, voluntary slave contracts have been common (David
   Ellerman's Property and Contract in Economics has an excellent
   overview). Any new form of voluntary slavery would be a "civilised"
   form of slavery and could occur when an individual would "agree" to
   sell themselves to themselves to another (as when a starving worker
   would "agree" to become a slave in return for food). In addition, the
   contract would be able to be broken under certain conditions (perhaps
   in return for breaking the contract, the former slave would have pay
   damages to his or her master for the labour their master would lose - a
   sizeable amount no doubt and such a payment could result in debt
   slavery, which is the most common form of "civilised" slavery. Such
   damages may be agreed in the contract as a "performance bond" or
   "conditional exchange").

   In summary, right-Libertarians are talking about "civilised" slavery
   (or, in other words, civil slavery) and not forced slavery. While some
   may have reservations about calling it slavery, they agree with the
   basic concept that since people own themselves they can sell themselves
   as well as selling their labour for a lifetime.

   We must stress that this is no academic debate. "Voluntary" slavery has
   been a problem in many societies and still exists in many countries
   today (particularly third world ones where bonded labour -- i.e. where
   debt is used to enslave people -- is the most common form). With the
   rise of sweat shops and child labour in many "developed" countries such
   as the USA, "voluntary" slavery (perhaps via debt and bonded labour)
   may become common in all parts of the world -- an ironic (if not
   surprising) result of "freeing" the market and being indifferent to the
   actual freedom of those within it.

   And it is interesting to note that even Murray Rothbard is not against
   the selling of humans. He argued that children are the property of
   their parents. They can (bar actually murdering them by violence) do
   whatever they please with them, even sell them on a "flourishing free
   child market." [The Ethics of Liberty, p. 102] Combined with a whole
   hearted support for child labour (after all, the child can leave its
   parents if it objects to working for them) such a "free child market"
   could easily become a "child slave market" -- with entrepreneurs making
   a healthy profit selling infants to other entrepreneurs who could make
   profits from the toil of "their" children (and such a process did occur
   in 19th century Britain). Unsurprisingly, Rothbard ignores the possible
   nasty aspects of such a market in human flesh (such as children being
   sold to work in factories, homes and brothels). And, of course, such a
   market could see women "specialising" in producing children for it (the
   use of child labour during the Industrial Revolution actually made it
   economically sensible for families to have more children) and, perhaps,
   gluts and scarcities of babies due to changing market conditions. But
   this is besides the point.

   Of course, this theoretical justification for slavery at the heart of
   an ideology calling itself "libertarianism" is hard for many
   right-Libertarians to accept. Some of the "anarcho"-capitalist type
   argue that such contracts would be very hard to enforce in their system
   of capitalism. This attempt to get out of the contradiction fails
   simply because it ignores the nature of the capitalist market. If there
   is a demand for slave contracts to be enforced, then companies will
   develop to provide that "service" (and it would be interesting to see
   how two "protection" firms, one defending slave contracts and another
   not, could compromise and reach a peaceful agreement over whether slave
   contracts were valid). Thus we could see a so-called "anarchist" or
   "free" society producing companies whose specific purpose was to hunt
   down escaped slaves (i.e. individuals in slave contracts who have not
   paid damages to their owners for freedom). Of course, perhaps Rothbard
   would claim that such slave contracts would be "outlawed" under his
   "general libertarian law code" but this is a denial of market
   "freedom". If slave contracts are "banned" then surely this is
   paternalism, stopping individuals from contracting out their "labour
   services" to whom and however long they "desire". You cannot have it
   both ways.

   So, ironically, an ideology proclaiming itself to support "liberty"
   ends up justifying and defending slavery. Indeed, for the
   right-libertarian the slave contract is an exemplification, not the
   denial, of the individual's liberty! How is this possible? How can
   slavery be supported as an expression of liberty? Simple,
   right-Libertarian support for slavery is a symptom of a deeper
   authoritarianism, namely their uncritical acceptance of contract
   theory. The central claim of contract theory is that contract is the
   means to secure and enhance individual freedom. Slavery is the
   antithesis to freedom and so, in theory, contract and slavery must be
   mutually exclusive. However, as indicated above, some contract
   theorists (past and present) have included slave contracts among
   legitimate contracts. This suggests that contract theory cannot provide
   the theoretical support needed to secure and enhance individual
   freedom. Why is this?

   As Carole Pateman argues, "contract theory is primarily about a way of
   creating social relations constituted by subordination, not about
   exchange." Rather than undermining subordination, contract theorists
   justify modern subjection -- "contract doctrine has proclaimed that
   subjection to a master -- a boss, a husband -- is freedom." [The Sexual
   Contract, p. 40 and p. 146] The question central to contract theory
   (and so right-Libertarianism) is not "are people free" (as one would
   expect) but "are people free to subordinate themselves in any manner
   they please." A radically different question and one only fitting to
   someone who does not know what liberty means.

   Anarchists argue that not all contracts are legitimate and no free
   individual can make a contract that denies his or her own freedom. If
   an individual is able to express themselves by making free agreements
   then those free agreements must also be based upon freedom internally
   as well. Any agreement that creates domination or hierarchy negates the
   assumptions underlying the agreement and makes itself null and void. In
   other words, voluntary government is still government and the defining
   chararacteristic of an anarchy must be, surely, "no government" and "no
   rulers."

   This is most easily seen in the extreme case of the slave contract.
   John Stuart Mill stated that such a contract would be "null and void."
   He argued that an individual may voluntarily choose to enter such a
   contract but in so doing "he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any
   future use of it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his
   own case, the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him
   to dispose of himself. . .The principle of freedom cannot require that
   he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to
   alienate his freedom." He adds that "these reasons, the force of which
   is so conspicuous in this particular case, are evidently of far wider
   application." [quoted by Pateman, Op. Cit., pp. 171-2]

   And it is such an application that defenders of capitalism fear (Mill
   did in fact apply these reasons wider and unsurprisingly became a
   supporter of a market syndicalist form of socialism). If we reject
   slave contracts as illegitimate then, logically, we must also reject
   all contracts that express qualities similar to slavery (i.e. deny
   freedom) including wage slavery. Given that, as David Ellerman points
   out, "the voluntary slave . . . and the employee cannot in fact take
   their will out of their intentional actions so that they could be
   'employed' by the master or employer" we are left with "the rather
   implausible assertion that a person can vacate his or her will for
   eight or so hours a day for weeks, months, or years on end but cannot
   do so for a working lifetime." [Property and Contract in Economics, p.
   58]

   The implications of supporting voluntary slavery is quite devastating
   for all forms of right-wing "libertarianism." This was proven by
   Ellerman when he wrote an extremely robust defence of it under the
   pseudonym "J. Philmore" called The Libertarian Case for Slavery (first
   published in The Philosophical Forum, xiv, 1982). This classic rebuttal
   takes the form of "proof by contradiction" (or reductio ad absurdum)
   whereby he takes the arguments of right-libertarianism to their logical
   end and shows how they reach the memorably conclusion that the "time
   has come for liberal economic and political thinkers to stop dodging
   this issue and to critically re-examine their shared prejudices about
   certain voluntary social institutions . . . this critical process will
   inexorably drive liberalism to its only logical conclusion:
   libertarianism that finally lays the true moral foundation for economic
   and political slavery."

   Ellerman shows how, from a right-"libertarian" perspective there is a
   "fundamental contradiction" in a modern liberal society for the state
   to prohibit slave contracts. He notes that there "seems to be a basic
   shared prejudice of liberalism that slavery is inherently involuntary,
   so the issue of genuinely voluntary slavery has received little
   scrutiny. The perfectly valid liberal argument that involuntary slavery
   is inherently unjust is thus taken to include voluntary slavery (in
   which case, the argument, by definition, does not apply). This has
   resulted in an abridgment of the freedom of contract in modern liberal
   society." Thus it is possible to argue for a "civilised form of
   contractual slavery." ["J. Philmore,", Op. Cit.]

   So accurate and logical was Ellerman's article that many of its readers
   were convinced it was written by a right-libertarian (including, we
   have to say, us!). One such writer was Carole Pateman, who correctly
   noted that "[t]here is a nice historical irony here. In the American
   South, slaves were emancipated and turned into wage labourers, and now
   American contractarians argue that all workers should have the
   opportunity to turn themselves into civil slaves." [Op. Cit., p. 63]).

   The aim of Ellerman's article was to show the problems that employment
   (wage labour) presents for the concept of self-government and how
   contract need not result in social relationships based on freedom. As
   "Philmore" put it, "[a]ny thorough and decisive critique of voluntary
   slavery or constitutional nondemocratic government would carry over to
   the employment contract -- which is the voluntary contractual basis for
   the free-market free-enterprise system. Such a critique would thus be a
   reductio ad absurdum." As "contractual slavery" is an "extension of the
   employer-employee contract," he shows that the difference between wage
   labour and slavery is the time scale rather than the principle or
   social relationships involved. [Op. Cit.] This explains, firstly, the
   early workers' movement called capitalism "wage slavery" (anarchists
   still do) and, secondly, why capitalists like Rothbard support the
   concept but balk at the name. It exposes the unfree nature of the
   system they support! While it is possible to present wage labour as
   "freedom" due to its "consensual" nature, it becomes much harder to do
   so when talking about slavery or dictatorship. Then the contradictions
   are exposed for all to see and be horrified by.

   All this does not mean that we must reject free agreement. Far from it!
   Free agreement is essential for a society based upon individual dignity
   and liberty. There are a variety of forms of free agreement and
   anarchists support those based upon co-operation and self-management
   (i.e. individuals working together as equals). Anarchists desire to
   create relationships which reflect (and so express) the liberty that is
   the basis of free agreement. Capitalism creates relationships that deny
   liberty. The opposition between autonomy and subjection can only be
   maintained by modifying or rejecting contract theory, something that
   capitalism cannot do and so the right-wing Libertarian rejects autonomy
   in favour of subjection (and so rejects socialism in favour of
   capitalism).

   The real contrast between anarchism and right-Libertarianism is best
   expressed in their respective opinions on slavery. Anarchism is based
   upon the individual whose individuality depends upon the maintenance of
   free relationships with other individuals. If individuals deny their
   capacities for self-government from themselves through a contract the
   individuals bring about a qualitative change in their relationship to
   others - freedom is turned into mastery and subordination. For the
   anarchist, slavery is thus the paradigm of what freedom is not, instead
   of an exemplification of what it is (as right-Libertarians state). As
   Proudhon argued:

     "If I were asked to answer the following question: What is slavery?
     and I should answer in one word, It is murder, my meaning would be
     understood at once. No extended argument would be required to show
     that the power to take from a man his thought, his will, his
     personality, is a power of life and death; and that to enslave a man
     is to kill him." [What is Property?, p. 37]

   In contrast, the right-Libertarian effectively argues that "I support
   slavery because I believe in liberty." It is a sad reflection of the
   ethical and intellectual bankruptcy of our society that such an
   "argument" is actually taken seriously by (some) people. The concept of
   "slavery as freedom" is far too Orwellian to warrant a critique - we
   will leave it up to right Libertarians to corrupt our language and
   ethical standards with an attempt to prove it.

   From the basic insight that slavery is the opposite of freedom, the
   anarchist rejection of authoritarian social relations quickly follows
   (the right-wing Libertarians fear):

     "Liberty is inviolable. I can neither sell nor alienate my liberty;
     every contract, every condition of a contract, which has in view the
     alienation or suspension of liberty, is null: the slave, when he
     plants his foot upon the soil of liberty, at that moment becomes a
     free man. . . Liberty is the original condition of man; to renounce
     liberty is to renounce the nature of man: after that, how could we
     perform the acts of man?" [P.J. Proudhon, Op. Cit., p. 67]

   The employment contract (i.e. wage slavery) abrogates liberty. It is
   based upon inequality of power and "exploitation is a consequence of
   the fact that the sale of labour power entails the worker's
   subordination." [Carole Pateman, Op. Cit., P. 149] Hence Proudhon's
   (and Mill's) support of self-management and opposition to capitalism -
   any relationship that resembles slavery is illegitimate and no contract
   that creates a relationship of subordination is valid. Thus in a truly
   anarchistic society, slave contracts would be unenforceable -- people
   in a truly free (i.e. non-capitalist) society would never tolerate such
   a horrible institution or consider it a valid agreement. If someone was
   silly enough to sign such a contract, they would simply have to say
   they now rejected it in order to be free -- such contracts are made to
   be broken and without the force of a law system (and private defence
   firms) to back it up, such contracts will stay broken.

   The right-Libertarian support for slave contracts (and wage slavery)
   indicates that their ideology has little to do with liberty and far
   more to do with justifying property and the oppression and exploitation
   it produces. Their support and theoretical support for slavery
   indicates a deeper authoritarianism which negates their claims to be
   libertarians.

2.7 But surely abolishing capitalism would restrict liberty?

   Many "anarcho"-capitalists and other supporters of capitalism argue
   that it would be "authoritarian" to restrict the number of alternatives
   that people can choose between by abolishing capitalism. If workers
   become wage labourers, so it is argued, it is because they "value"
   other things more -- otherwise they would not agree to the exchange.
   But such an argument ignores that reality of capitalism.

   By maintaining capitalist private property, the options available to
   people are restricted. In a fully developed capitalist economy the vast
   majority have the "option" of selling their labour or starving/living
   in poverty -- self-employed workers account for less than 10% of the
   working population. Usually, workers are at a disadvantage on the
   labour market due to the existence of unemployment and so accept wage
   labour because otherwise they would starve (see [29]section 10.2 for a
   discussion on why this is the case). And as we argue in sections
   [30]J.5.11 and [31]J.5.12, even if the majority of the working
   population desired co-operative workplaces, a capitalist market will
   not provide them with that outcome due to the nature of the capitalist
   workplace (also see Juliet C. Schor's excellent book The Overworked
   American for a discussion of why workers desire for more free time is
   not reflected in the labour market). In other words, it is a myth to
   claim that wage labour exists or that workplaces are hierarchical
   because workers value other things -- they are hierarchical because
   bosses have more clout on the market than workers and, to use Schor's
   expression, workers end up wanting what they get rather than getting
   what they want.

   Looking at the reality of capitalism we find that because of inequality
   in resources (protected by the full might of the legal system, we
   should note) those with property get to govern those without it during
   working hours (and beyond in many cases). If the supporters of
   capitalism were actually concerned about liberty (as opposed to
   property) that situation would be abhorrent to them -- after all,
   individuals can no longer exercise their ability to make decisions,
   choices, and are reduced to being order takers. If choice and liberty
   are the things we value, then the ability to make choices in all
   aspects of life automatically follows (including during work hours).
   However, the authoritarian relationships and the continual violation of
   autonomy wage labour implies are irrelevant to "anarcho"-capitalists
   (indeed, attempts to change this situation are denounced as violations
   of the autonomy of the property owner!). By purely concentrating on the
   moment that a contract is signed they blind themselves to the restricts
   of liberty that wage contracts create.

   Of course, anarchists have no desire to ban wage labour -- we aim to
   create a society within which people are not forced by circumstances to
   sell their liberty to others. In order to do this, anarchists propose a
   modification of property and property rights to ensure true freedom of
   choice (a freedom of choice denied to us by capitalism). As we have
   noted many times, "bilateral exchanges" can and do adversely effect the
   position of third parties if they result in the build-up of power/money
   in the hands of a few. And one of these adverse effects can be the
   restriction of workers options due to economic power. Therefore it is
   the supporter of capitalist who restricts options by supporting an
   economic system and rights framework that by their very workings reduce
   the options available to the majority, who then are "free to choose"
   between those that remain (see also [32]section B.4). Anarchists, in
   contrast, desire to expand the available options by abolishing
   capitalist private property rights and removing inequalities in wealth
   and power that help restrict our options and liberties artificially.

   So does an anarchist society have much to fear from the spread of wage
   labour within it? Probably not. If we look at societies such as the
   early United States or the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution in
   Britain, for example, we find that, given the choice, most people
   preferred to work for themselves. Capitalists found it hard to find
   enough workers to employ and the amount of wages that had to be offered
   to hire workers were so high as to destroy any profit margins.
   Moreover, the mobility of workers and their "laziness" was frequently
   commented upon, with employers despairing at the fact workers would
   just work enough to make end meet and then disappear. Thus, left to the
   actions of the "free market," it is doubtful that wage labour would
   have spread. But it was not left to the "free market".

   In response to these "problems", the capitalists turned to the state
   and enforced various restrictions on society (the most important being
   the land, tariff and money monopolies -- see sections [33]B.3 and
   [34]8). In free competition between artisan and wage labour, wage
   labour only succeeded due to the use of state action to create the
   required circumstances to discipline the labour force and to accumulate
   enough capital to give capitalists an edge over artisan production (see
   [35]section 8 for more details).

   Thus an anarchist society would not have to fear the spreading of wage
   labour within it. This is simply because would-be capitalists (like
   those in the early United States) would have to offer such excellent
   conditions, workers' control and high wages as to make the possibility
   of extensive profits from workers' labour nearly impossible. Without
   the state to support them, they will not be able to accumulate enough
   capital to give them an advantage within a free society. Moreover, it
   is somewhat ironic to hear capitalists talking about anarchism denying
   choice when we oppose wage labour considering the fact workers were not
   given any choice when the capitalists used the state to develop wage
   labour in the first place!

2.8 Why should we reject the "anarcho"-capitalist definitions of freedom and
justice?

   Simply because they lead to the creation of authoritarian social
   relationships and so to restrictions on liberty. A political theory
   which, when consistently followed, has evil or iniquitous consequences,
   is a bad theory.

   For example, any theory that can justify slavery is obviously a bad
   theory - slavery does not cease to stink the moment it is seen to
   follow your theory. As right-Libertarians can justify slave contracts
   as a type of wage labour (see [36]section 2.6) as well as numerous
   other authoritarian social relationships, it is obviously a bad theory.

   It is worth quoting Noam Chomsky at length on this subject:

     "Consider, for example, the 'entitlement theory of justice'. . .
     [a]ccording to this theory, a person has a right to whatever he has
     acquired by means that are just. If, by luck or labour or ingenuity,
     a person acquires such and such, then he is entitled to keep it and
     dispose of it as he wills, and a just society will not infringe on
     this right.

     "One can easily determine where such a principle might lead. It is
     entirely possible that by legitimate means - say, luck supplemented
     by contractual arrangements 'freely undertaken' under pressure of
     need - one person might gain control of the necessities of life.
     Others are then free to sell themselves to this person as slaves, if
     he is willing to accept them. Otherwise, they are free to perish.
     Without extra question-begging conditions, the society is just.

     "The argument has all the merits of a proof that 2 + 2 = 5. . .
     Suppose that some concept of a 'just society' is advanced that fails
     to characterise the situation just described as unjust. . . Then one
     of two conclusions is in order. We may conclude that the concept is
     simply unimportant and of no interest as a guide to thought or
     action, since it fails to apply properly even in such an elementary
     case as this. Or we may conclude that the concept advanced is to be
     dismissed in that it fails to correspond to the pretheorectical
     notion that it intends to capture in clear cases. If our intuitive
     concept of justice is clear enough to rule social arrangements of
     the sort described as grossly unjust, then the sole interest of a
     demonstration that this outcome might be 'just' under a given
     'theory of justice' lies in the inference by reductio ad absurdum to
     the conclusion that the theory is hopelessly inadequate. While it
     may capture some partial intuition regarding justice, it evidently
     neglects others.

     "The real question to be raised about theories that fail so
     completely to capture the concept of justice in its significant and
     intuitive sense is why they arouse such interest. Why are they not
     simply dismissed out of hand on the grounds of this failure, which
     is striking in clear cases? Perhaps the answer is, in part, the one
     given by Edward Greenberg in a discussion of some recent work on the
     entitlement theory of justice. After reviewing empirical and
     conceptual shortcomings, he observes that such work 'plays an
     important function in the process of . . . 'blaming the victim,' and
     of protecting property against egalitarian onslaughts by various
     non-propertied groups.' An ideological defence of privileges,
     exploitation, and private power will be welcomed, regardless of its
     merits.

     "These matters are of no small importance to poor and oppressed
     people here and elsewhere."
     [The Chomsky Reader, pp. 187-188]

   It may be argued that the reductions in liberty associated with
   capitalism is not really an iniquitous outcome, but such an argument is
   hardly fitting for a theory proclaiming itself "libertarian." And the
   results of these authoritarian social relationships? To quote Adam
   Smith, under the capitalist division of labour the worker "has no
   occasion to exert his understanding, or exercise his invention" and "he
   naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exercise and generally
   becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature
   to become." The worker's mind falls "into that drowsy stupidity, which,
   in a civilised society, seems to benumb the understanding of almost all
   of the inferior [sic!] ranks of people." [cited by Chomsky, Op. Cit.,
   p. 186]

   Of course, it may be argued that these evil effects of capitalist
   authority relations on individuals are also not iniquitous (or that the
   very real domination of workers by bosses is not really domination) but
   that suggests a desire to sacrifice real individuals, their hopes and
   dreams and lives to an abstract concept of liberty, the accumulative
   effect of which would be to impoverish all our lives. The kind of
   relationships we create within the organisations we join are of as
   great an importance as their voluntary nature. Social relations shape
   the individual in many ways, restricting their freedom, their
   perceptions of what freedom is and what their interests actually are.
   This means that, in order not to be farcical, any relationships we
   create must reflect in their internal workings the critical evaluation
   and self-government that created them in the first place. Sadly
   capitalist individualism masks structures of power and relations of
   domination and subordination within seemingly "voluntary" associations
   -- it fails to note the relations of domination resulting from private
   property and so "what has been called 'individualism' up to now has
   been only a foolish egoism which belittles the individual. Foolish
   because it was not individualism at all. It did not lead to what was
   established as a goal; that is the complete, broad, and most perfectly
   attainable development of individuality." [Peter Kropotkin, Selected
   Writings, p. 297]

   This right-Libertarian lack of concern for concrete individual freedom
   and individuality is a reflection of their support for "free markets"
   (or "economic liberty" as they sometimes phrase it). However, as Max
   Stirner noted, this fails to understand that "[p]olitical liberty means
   that the polis, the State, is free; . . . not, therefore, that I am
   free of the State. . . It does not mean my liberty, but the liberty of
   a power that rules and subjugates me; it means that one of my despots .
   . . is free." [The Ego and Its Own, p. 107] Thus the desire for "free
   markets" results in a blindness that while the market may be "free" the
   individuals within it may not be (as Stirner was well aware, "[u]nder
   the regime of the commonality the labourers always fall into the hands
   of the possessors . . . of the capitalists, therefore." [Op. Cit., p.
   115])

   In other words, right-libertarians give the greatest importance to an
   abstract concept of freedom and fail to take into account the fact that
   real, concrete freedom is the outcome of self-managed activity,
   solidarity and voluntary co-operation. For liberty to be real it must
   exist in all aspects of our daily life and cannot be contracted away
   without seriously effecting our minds, bodies and lives. Thus, the
   right-Libertarian's "defence of freedom is undermined by their
   insistence on the concept of negative liberty, which all too easily
   translates in experience as the negation of liberty." [Stephan L.
   Newman, Liberalism as Wit's End, p. 161]

   Thus right-Libertarian's fundamental fallacy is that "contract" does
   not result in the end of power or domination (particularly when the
   bargaining power or wealth of the would-be contractors is not equal).
   As Carole Pateman notes, "[i]ronically, the contractarian ideal cannot
   encompass capitalist employment. Employment is not a continual series
   of discrete contracts between employer and worker, but . . . one
   contract in which a worker binds himself to enter an enterprise and
   follow the directions of the employer for the duration of the contract.
   As Huw Benyon has bluntly stated, 'workers are paid to obey.'" [The
   Sexual Contract, p. 148] This means that "the employment contract (like
   the marriage contract) is not an exchange; both contracts create social
   relations that endure over time - social relations of subordination."
   [Ibid.]

   Authority impoverishes us all and must, therefore, be combated wherever
   it appears. That is why anarchists oppose capitalism, so that there
   shall be "no more government of man by man, by means of accumulation of
   capital." [P-J Proudhon, cited by Woodcock in Anarchism, p. 110] If, as
   Murray Bookchin point it, "the object of anarchism is to increase
   choice" [The Ecology of Freedom, p. 70] then this applies both to when
   we are creating associations/relationships with others and when we are
   within these associations/relationships -- i.e. that they are
   consistent with the liberty of all, and that implies participation and
   self-management not hierarchy. "Anarcho"-capitalism fails to understand
   this essential point and by concentrating purely on the first condition
   for liberty ensures a society based upon domination, oppression and
   hierarchy and not freedom.

   It is unsurprising, therefore, to find that the basic unit of analysis
   of the "anarcho"-capitalist/right-libertarian is the transaction (the
   "trade," the "contract"). The freedom of the individual is seen as
   revolving around an act, the contract, and not in our relations with
   others. All the social facts and mechanisms that precede, surround and
   result from the transaction are omitted. In particular, the social
   relations that result from the transaction are ignored (those, and the
   circumstances that make people contract, are the two unmentionables of
   right-libertarianism).

   For anarchists it seems strange to concentrate on the moment that a
   contract is signed and ignore the far longer time the contract is
   active for (as we noted in [37]section A.2.14, if the worker is free
   when they sign a contract, slavery soon overtakes them). Yes, the
   voluntary nature of a decision is important, but so are the social
   relationships we experience due to those decisions.

   For the anarchist, freedom is based upon the insight that other people,
   apart from (indeed, because of) having their own intrinsic value, also
   are "means to my end", that it is through their freedom that I gain my
   own -- so enriching my life. As Bakunin put it:

     "I who want to be free cannot be because all the men around me do
     not yet want to be free, and consequently they become tools of
     oppression against me." [quoted by Errico Malatesta in Anarchy, p.
     27]

   Therefore anarchists argue that we must reject the right-Libertarian
   theories of freedom and justice because they end up supporting the
   denial of liberty as the expression of liberty. What this fails to
   recognise is that freedom is a product of social life and that (in
   Bakunin's words) "[n]o man can achieve his own emancipation without at
   the same time working for the emancipation of all men around him. My
   freedom is the freedom of all since I am not truly free in thought and
   in fact, except when my freedom and my rights are confirmed and
   approved in the freedom and rights of all men who are my equals."
   [Ibid.]

   Other people give us the possibilities to develop our full human
   potentiality and thereby our freedom, so when we destroy the freedom of
   others we limit our own. "To treat others and oneself as property,"
   argues anarchist L. Susan Brown, "objectifies the human individual,
   denies the unity of subject and object and is a negation of individual
   will . . . even the freedom gained by the other is compromised by this
   relationship, for to negate the will of another to achieve one's own
   freedom destroys the very freedom one sought in the first place." [The
   Politics of Individualism, p. 3]

   Fundamentally, it is for this reason that anarchists reject the
   right-Libertarian theories of freedom and justice -- it just does not
   ensure individual freedom or individuality.

References

   1. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secB1.html
   2. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/append132.html#secf26
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   4. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/append133.html
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   6. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/append132.html#secf23
   7. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secB4.html
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  37. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secA2.html#seca214
