                  What happened during the Russian Revolution?

   This appendix of the FAQ is not a full history of the Russian
   Revolution. The scope of such a work would simply be too large.
   Instead, this section will concentrate on certain key issues which
   matter in evaluating whether the Bolshevik revolution and regime were
   genuinely socialist or not. This is not all. Some Leninists acknowledge
   that that Bolshevik policies had little to do with socialism as such
   were the best that were available at the time. As such, this section
   will look at possible alternatives to Bolshevik policies and see
   whether they were, in fact, inevitable.

   So for those seeking a comprehensive history of the revolution will
   have to look elsewhere. Here, we concentrate on those issues which
   matter when evaluating the socialist content of the revolution and of
   Bolshevism. In other words, the development of working class
   self-activity and self-organisation, workers' resistance to their
   bosses (whether capitalist or "red"), the activity of opposition groups
   and parties and the fate of working class organisations like trade
   unions, factory committees and soviets. Moreover, the role of the
   ruling party and its ideals also need to be indicated and evaluated
   somewhat (see [1]"How did Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure
   of the Revolution?" for a fuller discussion of the role of Bolshevik
   ideology in the defeat of the revolution).

   This means that this section is about two things, what Alexander
   Berkman termed "the Bolshevik Myth" and what Voline called "the Unknown
   Revolution" (these being the titles of their respective books on the
   revolution). After his experiences in Bolshevik Russia, Berkman came to
   the conclusion that it was "[h]igh time the truth about the Bolsheviki
   were told. The whited sepulchre must unmasked, the clay feet of the
   fetish beguiling the international proletariat to fatal will o' wisps
   exposed. The Bolshevik myth must be destroyed." By so doing, he aimed
   to help the global revolutionary movement learn from the experience of
   the Russian revolution. Given that "[t]o millions of the disinherited
   and enslaved it became a new religion, the beacon of social salvation"
   it was an "imperative to unmask the great delusion, which otherwise
   might lead the Western workers to the same abyss as their brothers in
   Russia." Bolshevism had "failed, utterly and absolutely" and so it was
   "incumbent upon those who have seen though the myth to expose its true
   nature . . . Bolshevism is of the past. The future belongs to man and
   his liberty." [The Bolshevik Myth, p. 318 and p. 342]

   Subsequent events proved Berkman correct. Socialism became linked to
   Soviet Russia and as it fell into Stalinism, the effect was to
   discredit socialism, even radical change as such, in the eyes of
   millions. And quite rightly too, given the horrors of Stalinism. If
   more radicals had had the foresight of Berkman and the other
   anarchists, this association of socialism and revolution with tyranny
   would have been combated and an alternative, libertarian, form of
   socialism would have risen to take the challenge of combating
   capitalism in the name of a genuine socialism, rooted in the ideals of
   liberty, equality and solidarity.

   However, in spite of the horrors of Stalinism many people seeking a
   radical change in society are drawn to Leninism. This is partly to do
   with the fact that in many countries Leninist parties have a organised
   presence and many radicalised people come across them first. It is also
   partly to do with the fact that many forms of Leninism denounce
   Stalinism for what it was and raise the possibility of the "genuine"
   Leninism of the Bolshevik party under Lenin and Trotsky. This current
   of Leninism is usually called "Trotskyism" and has many offshoots. For
   some of these parties, the differences between Trotskyism and Stalinism
   is pretty narrow. The closer to orthodox Trotskyism you get, the more
   Stalinist it appears. As Victor Serge noted of Trotsky's "Fourth
   International" in the 1930s, "in the hearts of the persecuted I
   encountered the same attitudes as in their persecutors [the Stalinists]
   . . . Trotskyism was displaying symptoms of an outlook in harmony with
   the very Stalinism against which it had taken its stand . . . any
   person in the circles of the 'Fourth International' who went so far as
   to object to [Trotsky's] propositions was promptly expelled and
   denounced in the same language that the bureaucracy had] employed
   against us in the Soviet Union." [Memoirs of a Revolutionary, p. 349]
   As we discuss in [2]section 3 of the appendix on [3]"Were any of the
   Bolshevik oppositions a real alternative?", perhaps this is
   unsurprising given how much politically Trotsky's "Left Opposition" had
   shared with Stalinism.

   Other Trotskyist parties have avoided the worse excesses of orthodox
   Trotskyism. Parties associated with the International Socialists, for
   example portray themselves as defending what they like to term
   "socialism from below" and the democratic promise of Bolshevik as
   expressed during 1917 and in the early months of Bolshevik rule. While
   anarchists are somewhat sceptical that Leninism can be called
   "socialism from below" (see [4]section H.3.3), we need to address the
   claim that the period between February 1917 to the start of the Russian
   civil war at the end of May 1918 shows the real nature of Bolshevism.
   In order to do that we need to discuss what the Russian anarchist
   Voline called "The Unknown Revolution."

   So what is the "Unknown Revolution"? Voline, an active participant in
   1917 Russian Revolution, used that expression as the title of his
   classic account of the Russian revolution. He used it to refer to the
   rarely acknowledged independent, creative actions of the revolutionary
   people themselves. As Voline argued, "it is not known how to study a
   revolution" and most historians "mistrust and ignore those developments
   which occur silently in the depths of the revolution . . . at best,
   they accord them a few words in passing . . . [Yet] it is precisely
   these hidden facts which are important, and which throw a true light on
   the events under consideration and on the period." This section of the
   FAQ will try and present this "unknown revolution," those movements
   "which fought the Bolshevik power in the name of true liberty and of
   the principles of the Social Revolution which that power had scoffed at
   and trampled underfoot." [The Unknown Revolution, p. 19 and p. 437]
   Voline gives the Kronstadt rebellion (see the appendix on [5]"What was
   the Kronstadt Rebellion?") and the Makhnovist movement (see the
   appendix on [6]"Why does the Makhnovist movement show there is an
   alternative to Bolshevism?") pride of place in his account. Here we
   discuss other movements and the Bolshevik response to them.

   Leninist accounts of the Russian Revolution, to a surprising extent,
   fall into the official form of history -- a concern more with political
   leaders than with the actions of the masses. Indeed, the popular
   aspects of the revolution are often distorted to accord with a
   predetermined social framework of Leninism. Thus the role of the masses
   is stressed during the period before the Bolshevik seizure of power.
   Here the typical Leninist would agree, to a large extend, with
   summarised history of 1917 we present in [7]section 1. They would
   undoubtedly disagree with the downplaying of the role of the Bolshevik
   party (although as we discuss in [8]section 2, that party was far from
   the ideal model of the vanguard party of Leninist theory and modern
   Leninist practice). However, the role of the masses in the revolution
   would be praised, as would the Bolsheviks for supporting it.

   The real difference arises once the Bolsheviks seize power in November
   1917 (October, according to the Old Style calendar then used). After
   that, the masses simply disappear and into the void steps the
   leadership of the Bolshevik party. For Leninism, the "unknown
   revolution" simply stops. The sad fact is that very little is known
   about the dynamics of the revolution at the grassroots, particularly
   after October. Incredible as it may sound, very few Leninists are that
   interested in the realities of "workers' power" under the Bolsheviks or
   the actual performance and fate of such working class institutions as
   soviets, factory committees and co-operatives. What is written is often
   little more than vague generalities that aim to justify authoritarian
   Bolshevik policies which either explicitly aimed to undermine such
   bodies or, at best, resulted in their marginalisation when implemented.

   This section of the FAQ aims to make known the "unknown revolution"
   that continued under the Bolsheviks and, equally important, the
   Bolshevik response to it. As part of this process we need to address
   some of the key events of that period, such as the role of foreign
   intervention and the impact of the civil war. However, we do not go
   into these issues in depth here and instead cover them in depth in the
   appendix on [9]"What caused the degeneration of the Russian
   Revolution?". This is because most Leninists excuse Bolshevik
   authoritarianism on the impact of the civil war, regardless of the
   facts of the matter. As we discuss in the appendix on [10]"How did
   Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure of the Revolution?", the
   ideology of Bolshevism played its role as well -- something that modern
   day Leninists strenuously deny (again, regardless of the obvious). As
   we indicate in this section, the idea that Bolshevism came into
   conflict with the "unknown revolution" is simply not viable. Bolshevik
   ideology and practice made it inevitable that this conflict erupted, as
   it did before the start of the civil war (also see [11]section 3 of the
   appendix on [12]"What caused the degeneration of the Russian
   Revolution?").

   Ultimately, the reason why Leninist ideas still have influence on the
   socialist movement is due to the apparent success of the Russian
   Revolution. Many Leninist groups, mainly Trotskyists and derivatives of
   Trotskyism, point to "Red October" and the creation of the first ever
   workers state as concrete examples of the validity of their ideas. They
   point to Lenin's State and Revolution as proving the "democratic" (even
   "libertarian") nature of Leninism while, at the same time, supporting
   the party dictatorship he created and, moreover, rationalising the
   utter lack of working class freedom and power under it. We will try to
   indicate the falseness of such claims. As will become clear from this
   section, the following summation of an anonymous revolutionary is
   totally correct:

     "Every notion about revolution inherited from Bolshevism is false."

   In this, they were simply repeating the conclusions of anarchists. As
   Kropotkin stressed in 1920:

     "It seems to me that this attempt to build a communist republic on
     the basis of a strongly centralised state, under the iron law of the
     dictatorship of one party, has ended in a terrible fiasco. Russia
     teaches us how not to impose communism." [Peter Kropotkin, quoted by
     Guerin, Anarchism, p. 106]

   Ultimately, the experience of Bolshevism was a disaster. And as the
   Makhnovists in the Ukraine proved, Bolshevik ideology and practice was
   not the only option available (see the appendix on [13]"Why does the
   Makhnovist movement show there is an alternative to Bolshevism?").
   There were alternatives, but Bolshevik ideology simply excluded using
   them (we will discuss some possibilities in this various sub-sections
   below). In other words, Bolshevik ideology is simply not suitable for a
   real revolutionary movement and the problems it will face. In fact, its
   ideology and practice ensures that any such problems will be magnified
   and made worse, as the Russian revolution proves.

   Sadly many socialists cannot bring themselves to acknowledge this.
   While recognising the evils of the Stalinist bureaucracy, these
   socialists deny that this degeneration of Bolshevism was inevitable and
   was caused by outside factors (namely the Russian Civil War or
   isolation). While not denying that these factors did have an effect in
   the outcome of the Russian Revolution, the seeds for bureaucracy
   existed from the first moment of the Bolshevik insurrection. These
   seeds where from three sources: Bolshevik politics, the nature of the
   state and the post-October economic arrangements favoured and
   implemented by the ruling party.

   As we will indicate, these three factors caused the new "workers'
   state" to degenerate long before the out break of the Civil war in May
   of 1918. This means that the revolution was not defeated primarily
   because of isolation or the effects of the civil war. The Bolsheviks
   had already seriously undermined it from within long before the effects
   of isolation or civil war had a chance to take hold. The civil war
   which started in the summer of 1918 did take its toll in what
   revolutionary gains survived, not least because it allowed the
   Bolsheviks to portray themselves and their policies as the lessor of
   two evils. However, Lenin's regime was already defending (state)
   capitalism against genuine socialist tendencies before the outbreak of
   civil war. The suppression of Kronstadt in March 1921 was simply the
   logical end result of a process that had started in the spring of 1918,
   at the latest. As such, isolation and civil war are hardly good excuses
   -- particularly as anarchists had predicted they would affect every
   revolution decades previously and Leninists are meant to realise that
   civil war and revolution are inevitable. Also, it must be stressed that
   Bolshevik rule was opposed by the working class, who took collective
   action to resist it and the Bolsheviks justified their policies in
   ideological terms and not in terms of measures required by difficult
   circumstances (see the appendix on [14]"What caused the degeneration of
   the Russian Revolution?").

   One last thing. We are sure, in chronicling the "excesses" of the
   Bolshevik regime, that some Leninists will say "they sound exactly like
   the right-wing." Presumably, if we said that the sun rises in the East
   and sets in the West we would also "sound like the right-wing." That
   the right-wing also points to certain facts of the revolution does not
   in any way discredit these facts. How these facts are used is what
   counts. The right uses the facts to discredit socialism and the
   revolution. Anarchists use them to argue for libertarian socialism and
   support the revolution while opposing the Bolshevik ideology and
   practice which distorted it. Similarly, unlike the right we take into
   account the factors which Leninists urge us to use to excuse Bolshevik
   authoritarianism (such as civil war, economic collapse and so on). We
   are simply not convinced by Leninist arguments.

   Needless to say, few Leninists apply their logic to Stalinism. To
   attack Stalinism by describing the facts of the regime would make one
   sound like the "right-wing." Does that mean socialists should defend
   one of the most horrific dictatorships that ever existed? If so, how
   does that sound to non-socialists? Surely they would conclude that
   socialism is about Stalinism, dictatorship, terror and so on? If not,
   why not? If "sounding like the right" makes criticism of Lenin's regime
   anti-revolutionary, then why does this not apply to Stalinism? Simply
   because Lenin and Trotsky were not at the head of the dictatorship as
   they were in the early 1920s? Does the individuals who are in charge
   override the social relations of a society? Does dictatorship and
   one-man management become less so when Lenin rules? The apologists for
   Lenin and Trotsky point to the necessity created by the civil war and
   isolation within international capitalism for their authoritarian
   policies (while ignoring the fact they started before the civil war,
   continued after it and were justified at the time in terms of Bolshevik
   ideology). Stalin could make the same claim.

   Other objections may be raised. It may be claimed that we quote
   "bourgeois" (or even worse, Menshevik) sources and so our account is
   flawed. In reply, we have to state that you cannot judge a regime based
   purely on what it says about itself. As such, critical accounts are
   required to paint a full picture of events. Moreover, it is a sad fact
   that few, if any, Leninist accounts of the Russian Revolution actually
   discuss the class and social dynamics (and struggles) of the period
   under Lenin and Trotsky. This means we have to utilise the sources
   which do, namely those historians who do not identify with the
   Bolshevik regime. And, of course, any analysis (or defence) of the
   Bolshevik regime will have to account for critical accounts, either by
   refuting them or by showing their limitations. As will become obvious
   in our discussion, the reason why latter day Bolsheviks talk about the
   class dynamics post-October in the most superficial way is that it
   would be hard, even impossible, to maintain that Lenin's regime was
   remotely socialist or based on working class power. Simply put, from
   early 1918 (at the latest) conflict between the Bolsheviks and the
   Russian working masses was a constant feature of the regime. It is only
   when that conflict reached massive proportions that Leninists do not
   (i.e. cannot) ignore it. In such cases, as the Kronstadt rebellion
   proves, history is distorted in order to defend the Bolshevik state
   (see the appendix on [15]"What was the Kronstadt Rebellion?" for
   details).

   The fact that Leninists try to discredit anarchists by saying that we
   sound like the right is sad. In effect, it blocks any real discussion
   of the Russian Revolution and Bolshevism (as intended, probably). This
   ensures that Leninism remains above critique and so no lessons can be
   learnt from the Russian experience. After all, if the Bolsheviks had no
   choice then what lessons are there to learn? None. And if we are to
   learn no lessons (bar, obviously, mimic the Bolsheviks) we are doomed
   to repeat the same mistakes -- mistakes that are partly explained by
   the objective circumstances at the time and partly by Bolshevik
   politics. But given that most of the circumstances the Bolsheviks
   faced, such as civil war and isolation, are likely to reappear in any
   future revolution, modern-day Leninists are simply ensuring that Karl
   Marx was right -- history repeats itself, first time as tragedy, second
   time as farce.

   Such a position is, of course, wonderful for the pro-Leninist. It
   allows them to quote Lenin and Trotsky and use the Bolsheviks as the
   paradigm of revolution while washing their hands of the results of that
   revolution. By arguing that the Bolsheviks were "making a virtue of
   necessity," (to use the expression of Leninist Donny Gluckstein [The
   Tragedy of Bukharin, p. 41]), they are automatically absolved of
   proving their arguments about the "democratic" essence of Bolshevism in
   power. Which is useful as, logically, no such evidence could exist and,
   in fact, there is a whole host of evidence pointing the other way which
   can, by happy co-incidence, be ignored. Indeed, from this perspective
   there is no point even discussing the revolution at all, beyond
   praising the activities and ideology of the Bolsheviks while sadly
   noting that "fate" (to quote Leninist Tony Cliff) ensured that they
   could not fulfil their promises. Which, of course, almost Leninist
   accounts do boil down to. Thus, for the modern Leninist, the Bolsheviks
   cannot be judged on what they did nor what they said while doing it (or
   even after). They can only be praised for what they said and did before
   they seized power.

   However, anarchists have a problem with this position. It smacks more
   of religion than theory. Karl Marx was right to argue that you cannot
   judge people by what they say, only by what they do. It is in this
   revolutionary spirit that this section of the FAQ analyses the Russian
   revolution and the Bolshevik role within it. We need to analyse what
   they did when they held power as well as the election manifesto. As we
   will indicate in this section, neither was particularly appealing.

   Finally, we should note that Leninists today have various arguments to
   justify what the Bolsheviks did once in power. We discuss these in the
   appendix on [16]"What caused the degeneration of the Russian
   Revolution?". We also discuss in the appendix on [17]"How did Bolshevik
   ideology contribute to the failure of the Revolution?" the ideological
   roots of the counter-revolutionary role of the Bolsheviks during the
   revolution. That the politics of the Bolsheviks played its role in the
   failure of the revolution can be seen from the example of the anarchist
   influenced Makhnovist movement which applied basic libertarian
   principles in the same difficult circumstances of the Russian Civil War
   (see [18]"Why does the Makhnovist movement show there is an alternative
   to Bolshevism?" on this important movement).

1 Can you give a short summary of what happened in 1917?

2 How did the Bolsheviks gain mass support?

3 Surely the Russian Revolution proves that vanguard parties work?

   No, far from it. Looking at the history of vanguardism we are struck by
   its failures, not its successes. Indeed, the proponents of "democratic
   centralism" can point to only one apparent success of their model,
   namely the Russian Revolution. However, we are warned by Leninists that
   failure to use the vanguard party will inevitably condemn future
   revolutions to failure:

     "The proletariat can take power only through its vanguard. . .
     Without the confidence of the class in the vanguard, without support
     of the vanguard by the class, there can be no talk of the conquest
     of power . . . The Soviets are the only organised form of the tie
     between the vanguard and the class. A revolutionary content can be
     given this form only by the party. This is proved by the positive
     experience of the October Revolution and by the negative experience
     of other countries (Germany, Austria, finally, Spain). No one has
     either shown in practice or tried to explain articulately on paper
     how the proletariat can seize power without the political leadership
     of a party that knows what it wants." [Trotsky, Stalinism and
     Bolshevism]

   To anarchist ears, such claims seem out of place. After all, did the
   Russian Revolution actually result in socialism or even a viable form
   of soviet democracy? Far from it. Unless you picture revolution as
   simply the changing of the party in power, you have to acknowledge that
   while the Bolshevik party did take power in Russian in November 1917,
   the net effect of this was not the stated goals that justified that
   action. Thus, if we take the term "effective" to mean "an efficient
   means to achieve the desired goals"
   then vanguardism has not been proven to be effective, quite the reverse
   (assuming that your desired goal is a socialist society, rather than
   party power). Needless to say, Trotsky blames the failure of the
   Russian Revolution on "objective" factors rather than Bolshevik
   policies and practice, an argument we address in detail in [19]"What
   caused the degeneration of the Russian Revolution?" and will not do so
   here.

   So while Leninists make great claims for the effectiveness of their
   chosen kind of party, the hard facts of history are against their
   positive evaluation of vanguard parties. Ironically, even the Russian
   Revolution disproves the claims of Leninists. The fact is that the
   Bolshevik party in 1917 was very far from the "democratic centralist"
   organisation which supporters of "vanguardism" like to claim it is. As
   such, its success in 1917 lies more in its divergence from the
   principles of "democratic centralism" than in their application. The
   subsequent degeneration of the revolution and the party is marked by
   the increasing application of those principles in the life of the
   party.

   Thus, to refute the claims of the "effectiveness" and "efficiency" of
   vanguardism, we need to look at its one and only success, namely the
   Russian Revolution. As the Cohen-Bendit brothers argue, "far from
   leading the Russian Revolution forwards, the Bolsheviks were
   responsible for holding back the struggle of the masses between
   February and October 1917, and later for turning the revolution into a
   bureaucratic counter-revolution -- in both cases because of the party's
   very nature, structure and ideology." Indeed, "[f]rom April to October,
   Lenin had to fight a constant battle to keep the Party leadership in
   tune with the masses." [Obsolete Communism, p. 183 and p. 187] It was
   only by continually violating its own "nature, structure and ideology"
   that the Bolshevik party played an important role in the revolution.
   Whenever the principles of "democratic centralism" were applied, the
   Bolshevik party played the role the Cohen-Bendit brothers subscribed to
   it (and once in power, the party's negative features came to the fore).

   Even Leninists acknowledge that, to quote Tony Cliff, throughout the
   history of Bolshevism, "a certain conservatism arose." Indeed, "[a]t
   practically all sharp turning points, Lenin had to rely on the lower
   strata of the party machine against the higher, or on the rank and file
   against the machine as a whole." [Lenin, vol. 2, p. 135] This fact,
   incidentally, refutes the basic assumptions of Lenin's party schema,
   namely that the broad party membership, like the working class, was
   subject to bourgeois influences so necessitating central leadership and
   control from above.

   Looking at both the 1905 and 1917 revolutions, we are struck by how
   often this "conservatism" arose and how often the higher bodies were
   behind the spontaneous actions of the masses and the party membership.
   Looking at the 1905 revolution, we discover a classic example of the
   inefficiency of "democratic centralism." Facing in 1905 the rise of the
   soviets, councils of workers' delegates elected to co-ordinate strikes
   and other forms of struggle, the Bolsheviks did not know what to do.
   "The Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks," noted Trotsky, "was
   frightened at first by such an innovation as a non-partisan
   representation of the embattled masses, and could find nothing better
   to do than to present the Soviet with an ultimatum: immediately adopt a
   Social-Democratic program or disband. The Petersburg Soviet as a whole,
   including the contingent of Bolshevik workingmen as well ignored this
   ultimatum without batting an eyelash." [Stalin, vol. 1, p. 106] More
   than that, "[t]he party's Central Committee published the resolution on
   October 27, thereby making it the binding directive for all other
   Bolshevik organisations." [Oskar Anweiler, The Soviets, p. 77] It was
   only the return of Lenin which stopped the Bolshevik's open attacks
   against the Soviet (also see [20]section 8 of the appendix on [21]"How
   did Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure of the Revolution?").

   The rationale for these attacks is significant. The St. Petersburg
   Bolsheviks were convinced that "only a strong party along class lines
   can guide the proletarian political movement and preserve the integrity
   of its program, rather than a political mixture of this kind, an
   indeterminate and vacillating political organisation such as the
   workers council represents and cannot help but represent." [quoted by
   Anweiler, Op. Cit., p. 77] In other words, the soviets could not
   reflect workers' interests because they were elected by the workers!
   The implications of this perspective came clear in 1918, when the
   Bolsheviks gerrymandered and disbanded soviets to remain in power (see
   [22]section 6). That the Bolshevik's position flowed naturally from
   Lenin's arguments in What is to be Done? is clear. Thus the underlying
   logic of Lenin's vanguardism ensured that the Bolsheviks played a
   negative role with regards the soviets which, combined with "democratic
   centralism" ensured that it was spread far and wide. Only by ignoring
   their own party's principles and staying in the Soviet did rank and
   file Bolsheviks play a positive role in the revolution. This divergence
   of top and bottom would be repeated in 1917.

   Given this, perhaps it is unsurprising that Leninists started to
   rewrite the history of the 1905 revolution. Victor Serge, a "Left
   Oppositionist" and anti-Stalinist asserted in the late 1920s that in
   1905 the Petrograd Soviet was "led by Trotsky and inspired by the
   Bolsheviks." [Year One of the Russian Revolution, p. 36]. While the
   former claim is correct, the latter is not. As noted, the Bolsheviks
   were initially opposed the soviets and systematically worked to
   undermine them. Unsurprisingly, Trotsky at that time was a Menshevik,
   not a Bolshevik. After all, how could the most revolutionary party that
   ever existed have messed up so badly? How could democratic centralism
   faired so badly in practice? Best, then, to suggest that it did not and
   give the Bolsheviks a role better suited to the rhetoric of Bolshevism
   than its reality.

   Trotsky was no different. He, needless to say, denied the obvious
   implications of these events in 1905. While admitting that the
   Bolsheviks "adjusted themselves more slowly to the sweep of the
   movement" and that the Mensheviks "were preponderant in the Soviet," he
   tries to save vanguardism by asserting that "the general direction of
   the Soviet's policy proceeded in the main along Bolshevik lines." So,
   in spite of the lack of Bolshevik influence, in spite of the slowness
   in adjusting to the revolution, Bolshevism was, in fact, the leading
   set of ideas in the revolution! Ironically, a few pages later, he mocks
   the claims of Stalinists that Stalin had "isolated the Mensheviks from
   the masses" by noting that the "figures hardly bear [the claims] out."
   [Op. Cit., p. 112 and p. 117] Shame he did not apply this criteria to
   his own claims.

   Of course, every party makes mistakes. The question is, how did the
   "most revolutionary party of all time" fare in 1917. Surely that
   revolution proves the validity of vanguardism and "democratic
   centralism"? After all, there was a successful revolution, the
   Bolshevik party did seize power. However, the apparent success of 1917
   was not due to the application of "democratic centralism," quite the
   reverse. While the myth of 1917 is that a highly efficient, democratic
   centralist vanguard party ensured the overthrow of the Provisional
   Government in November 1917 in favour of the Soviets (or so it seemed
   at the time) the facts are somewhat different. Rather, the Bolshevik
   party throughout 1917 was a fairly loose collection of local
   organisations (each more than willing to ignore central commands and
   express their autonomy), with much internal dissent and infighting and
   no discipline beyond what was created by common loyalty. The
   "democratic centralist" party, as desired by Lenin, was only created in
   the course of the Civil War and the tightening of the party
   dictatorship. In other words, the party became more like a "democratic
   centralist" one as the revolution degenerated. As such, the various
   followers of Lenin (Stalinists, Trotskyists and their multitude of
   offshoots) subscribe to a myth, which probably explains their lack of
   success in reproducing a similar organisation since. So assuming that
   the Bolsheviks did play an important role in the Russian revolution, it
   was because it was not the centralised, disciplined Bolshevik party of
   Leninist myth. Indeed, when the party did operate in a vanguardist
   manner, failure was soon to follow.

   This claim can be proven by looking at the history of the 1917
   revolution. The February revolution started with a spontaneous protests
   and strikes. As Murray Bookchin notes, "the Petrograd organisation of
   the Bolsheviks opposed the calling of strikes precisely on the eve of
   the revolution which was destined to overthrow the Tsar. Fortunately,
   the workers ignored the Bolshevik 'directives' and went on strike
   anyway. In the events which followed, no one was more surprised by the
   revolution than the 'revolutionary' parties, including the Bolsheviks."
   [Post-Scarcity Anarchism, p. 194] Trotsky quotes one of the Bolshevik
   leaders at the time:

     "Absolutely no guiding initiative from the party centres was felt .
     . . the Petrograd Committee had been arrested and the representative
     of the Central Committee . . . was unable to give any directives for
     the coming day." [quoted by Trotsky, History of the Russian
     Revolution, vol. 1, p. 147]

   Not the best of starts. Of course rank and file Bolsheviks took part in
   the demonstrations, street fights and strikes and so violated the
   principles their party was meant to be based on. As the revolution
   progressed, so did the dual nature of the Bolshevik party (i.e. its
   practical divergence from "democratic centralism" in order to be
   effective and attempts to force it back into that schema which
   handicapped the revolution). However, during 1917, "democratic
   centralism" was ignored in order to ensure the the Bolsheviks played
   any role at all in the revolution. As one historian of the party makes
   clear, in 1917 and until the outbreak of the Civil War, the party
   operated in ways that few modern "vanguard" parties would tolerate:

     "The committees were a law unto themselves when it came to accepting
     orders from above. Democratic centralism, as vague a principle of
     internal administration as there ever has been, was commonly held at
     least to enjoin lower executive bodies that they should obey the
     behests of all higher bodies in the organisational hierarchy. But
     town committees in practice had the devil's own job in imposing firm
     leadership . . . Insubordination was the rule of the day whenever
     lower party bodies thought questions of importance were at stake.

     "Suburb committees too faced difficulties in imposing discipline.
     Many a party cell saw fit to thumb its nose at higher authority and
     to pursue policies which it felt to be more suited to local
     circumstances or more desirable in general. No great secret was made
     of this. In fact, it was openly admitted that hardly a party
     committee existed which did not encounter problems in enforcing its
     will even upon individual activists."
     [Robert Service, The Bolshevik Party in Revolution 1917-1923, pp.
     51-2]

   So while Lenin's ideal model of a disciplined, centralised and top-down
   party had been expounded since 1902, the operation of the party never
   matched his desire. As Service notes, "a disciplined hierarchy of
   command stretching down from the regional committees to party cells"
   had "never existed in Bolshevik history." In the heady days of the
   revolution, when the party was flooded by new members, the party
   ignored what was meant to be its guiding principles. As Service
   constantly stresses, Bolshevik party life in 1917 was the exact
   opposite of that usually considered (by both opponents and supporters
   of Bolshevism) as it normal mode of operation. "Anarchist attitudes to
   higher authority," he argues, "were the rule of the day" and "no
   Bolshevik leader in his right mind could have contemplated a regular
   insistence upon rigid standards of hierarchical control and discipline
   unless he had abandoned all hope of establishing a mass socialist
   party." This meant that "in the Russia of 1917 it was the easiest thing
   in the world for lower party bodies to rebut the demands and pleas by
   higher authority." He stresses that "[s]uburb and town committees . . .
   often refused to go along with official policies . . . they also . . .
   sometimes took it into their heads to engage in active obstruction."
   [Op. Cit., p. 80, p. 62 p. 56 and p. 60]

   This worked both ways, of course. Town committees did "snub their nose
   at lower-echelon viewpoints in the time before the next election. Try
   as hard as they might, suburb committees and ordinary cells could
   meanwhile do little to rectify matters beyond telling their own
   representative on their town committee to speak on their behalf. Or, if
   this too failed, they could resort to disruptive tactics by criticising
   it in public and refusing it all collaboration." [Op. Cit., pp. 52-3]
   Even by early 1918, the Bolshevik party bore little resemblance to the
   "democratic centralist" model desires by Lenin:

     "The image of a disciplined hierarchy of party committees was
     therefore but a thin, artificial veneer which was used by Bolshevik
     leaders to cover up the cracked surface of the real picture
     underneath. Cells and suburb committees saw no reason to kow-tow to
     town committees; nor did town committees feel under compulsion to
     show any greater respect to their provincial and regional committees
     then before." [Op. Cit., p. 74]

   It is this insubordination, this local autonomy and action in spite of
   central orders which explains the success of the Bolsheviks in 1917.
   Rather than a highly centralised and disciplined body of "professional"
   revolutionaries, the party in 1917 saw a "significant change . . .
   within the membership of the party at local level . . . From the time
   of the February revolution requirements for party membership had been
   all but suspended, and now Bolshevik ranks swelled with impetuous
   recruits who knew next to nothing about Marxism and who were united by
   little more than overwhelming impatience for revolutionary action."
   [Alexander Rabinowitch, Prelude to Revolution, p. 41]

   This mass of new members (many of whom were peasants who had just
   recently joined the industrial workforce) had a radicalising effect on
   the party's policies and structures. As even Leninist commentators
   argue, it was this influx of members who allowed Lenin to gain support
   for his radical revision of party aims in April. However, in spite of
   this radicalisation of the party base, the party machine still was at
   odds with the desires of the party. As Trotsky acknowledged, the
   situation "called for resolute confrontation of the sluggish Party
   machine with masses and ideas in motion." He stressed that "the masses
   were incomparably more revolutionary than the Party, which in turn was
   more revolutionary than its committeemen." Ironically, given the role
   Trotsky usually gave the party, he admits that "[w]ithout Lenin, no one
   had known what to make of the unprecedented situation." [Stalin, vol.
   1, p. 301, p. 305 and p. 297]

   Which is significant in itself. The Bolshevik party is usually claimed
   as being the most "revolutionary" that ever existed, yet here is
   Trotsky admitting that its leading members did not have a clue what to
   do. He even argued that "[e]very time the Bolshevik leaders had to act
   without Lenin they fell into error, usually inclining to the Right."
   [Op. Cit., p. 299] This negative opinion of the Bolsheviks applied even
   to the "left Bolsheviks, especially the workers" whom we are informed
   "tried with all their force to break through this quarantine" created
   by the Bolshevik leaders policy "of waiting, of accommodation, and of
   actual retreat before the Compromisers" after the February revolution
   and before the arrival of Lenin. Trotsky argues that "they did not know
   how to refute the premise about the bourgeois character of the
   revolution and the danger of an isolation of the proletariat. They
   submitted, gritting their teeth, to the directions of their leaders."
   [History of the Russian Revolution, vol. 1, p. 273] It seems strange,
   to say the least, that without one person the whole of the party was
   reduced to such a level given that the aim of the "revolutionary" party
   was to develop the political awareness of its members.

   Lenin's arrival, according to Trotsky, allowed the influence of the
   more radical rank and file to defeat the conservatism of the party
   machine. By the end of April, Lenin had managed to win over the
   majority of the party leadership to his position. However, as Trotsky
   argues, this "April conflict between Lenin and the general staff of the
   party was not the only one of its kind. Throughout the whole history of
   Bolshevism . . . all the leaders of the party at all the most important
   moments stood to the right of Lenin." [Op. Cit., p. 305] As such, if
   "democratic centralism" had worked as intended, the whole party would
   have been arguing for incorrect positions the bulk of its existence
   (assuming, of course, that Lenin was correct most of the time).

   For Trotsky, "Lenin exerted influence not so much as an individual but
   because he embodied the influence of the class on the Party and of the
   Party on its machine." [Stalin, vol. 1, p. 299] Yet, this was the
   machine which Lenin had forged, which embodied his vision of how a
   "revolutionary" party should operate and was headed by him. In other
   words, to argue that the party machine was behind the party membership
   and the membership behind the class shows the bankruptcy of Lenin's
   organisational scheme. This "backwardness," moreover, indicates an
   independence of the party bureaucracy from the membership and the
   membership from the masses. As Lenin's constantly repeated aim was for
   the party to seize power (based on the dubious assumption that class
   power would only be expressed, indeed was identical to, party power)
   this independence held serious dangers, dangers which became apparent
   once this goal was achieved.

   Trotsky asks the question "by what miracle did Lenin manage in a few
   short weeks to turn the Party's course into a new channel?"
   Significantly, he answers as follows: "Lenin's personal attributes and
   the objective situation." [Ibid.] No mention is made of the democratic
   features of the party organisation, which suggests that without Lenin
   the rank and file party members would not have been able to shift the
   weight of the party machine in their favour. Trotsky seems close to
   admitting this:

     "As often happens, a sharp cleavage developed between the classes in
     motion and the interests of the party machines. Even the Bolshevik
     Party cadres, who enjoyed the benefit of exceptional revolutionary
     training, were definitely inclined to disregard the masses and to
     identify their own special interests and the interests of the
     machine on the very day after the monarchy was overthrown." [Stalin,
     vol. 1, p. 298]

   Thus the party machine, which embodied the principles of "democratic
   centralism" proved less than able to the task assigned it in practice.
   Without Lenin, it is doubtful that the party membership would have over
   come the party machine:

     "Lenin was strong not only because he understood the laws of the
     class struggle but also because his ear was faultlessly attuned to
     the stirrings of the masses in motion. He represented not so much
     the Party machine as the vanguard of the proletariat. He was
     definitely convinced that thousands from among those workers who had
     borne the brunt of supporting the underground Party would now
     support him. The masses at the moment were more revolutionary than
     the Party, and the Party more revolutionary than its machine. As
     early as March the actual attitude of the workers and soldiers had
     in many cases become stormily apparent, and it was widely at
     variance with the instructions issued by all the parties, including
     the Bolsheviks." [Op. Cit., p. 299]

   Little wonder the local party groupings ignored the party machine,
   practising autonomy and initiative in the face of a party machine
   inclined to conservatism, inertia, bureaucracy and remoteness. This
   conflict between the party machine and the principles it was based on
   and the needs of the revolution and party membership was expressed
   continually throughout 1917:

     "In short, the success of the revolution called for action against
     the 'highest circles of the party,' who, from February to October,
     utterly failed to play the revolutionary role they ought to have
     taken in theory. The masses themselves made the revolution, with or
     even against the party -- this much at least was clear to Trotsky
     the historian. But far from drawing the correct conclusion, Trotsky
     the theorist continued to argue that the masses are incapable of
     making a revolution without a leader." [Daniel & Gabriel
     Cohn-Bendit, Op. Cit., p. 188]

   Looking at the development of the revolution from April onwards, we are
   struck by the sluggishness of the party hierarchy. At every
   revolutionary upsurge, the party simply was not to the task of
   responding to the needs of masses and the local party groupings closest
   to them. The can be seen in June, July and October itself. At each
   turn, the rank and file groupings or Lenin had to constantly violate
   the principles of their own party in order to be effective. The
   remoteness and conservatism of the party even under Lenin can be
   constantly seen.

   For example, when discussing the cancellation by the central committee
   of a demonstration planned for June 10th by the Petrograd Bolsheviks,
   the unresponsiveness of the party hierarchy can be seen. The "speeches
   by Lenin and Zinoviev [justifying their actions] by no means satisfied
   the Petersburg Committee. If anything, it appears that their
   explanations served to strengthen the feeling that at best the party
   leadership had acted irresponsibly and incompetently and was seriously
   out of touch with reality." Indeed, many "blamed the Central Committee
   for taking so long to respond to Military Organisation appeals for a
   demonstration." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 88 and p. 92]

   During the discussions in late June, 1917, on whether to take direct
   action against the Provisional Government there was a "wide gulf"
   between lower organs evaluations of the current situation and that of
   the Central Committee. [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 129] Indeed, among
   the delegates from the Bolshevik military groups, only Lashevich (an
   old Bolshevik) spoke in favour of the Central Committee position and he
   noted that "[f]requently it is impossible to make out where the
   Bolshevik ends and the Anarchist begins." [quoted by Rabinowitch, Op.
   Cit., p. 129]

   In the July days, the breach between the local party groups and the
   central committee increased. As we noted in the [23]section 1, this
   spontaneous uprising was opposed to by the Bolshevik leadership, in
   spite of the leading role of their own militants (along with
   anarchists) in fermenting it. While calling on their own militants to
   restrain the masses, the party leadership was ignored by the rank and
   file membership who played an active role in the event. Sickened by
   being asked to play the role of "fireman," the party militants rejected
   party discipline in order to maintain their credibility with the
   working class. Rank and file activists, pointing to the snowballing of
   the movement, showed clear dissatisfaction with the Central Committee.
   One argued that it "was not aware of the latest developments when it
   made its decision to oppose the movement into the streets." Ultimately,
   the Central Committee appeal "for restraining the masses . . . was
   removed from . . . Pravda . . . and so the party's indecision was
   reflected by a large blank space on page one." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit.,
   p. 150, p. 159 and P. 175] Ultimately, the indecisive nature of the
   leadership can be explained by the fact it did not think it could seize
   state power for itself. As Trotsky noted, "the state of popular
   consciousness . . . made impossible the seizure of power by the
   Bolsheviks in July." [History of the Russian Revolution, vol. 2, p. 81]

   The indecision of the party hierarchy did have an effect, of course.
   While the anarchists at Kronstadt looked at the demonstration as the
   start of an uprising, the Bolsheviks there were "wavering indecisively
   in the middle" between them and the Left-Social Revolutionaries who saw
   it as a means of applying pressure on the government. This was because
   they were "hamstrung by the indecision of the party Central Committee."
   [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 187] Little wonder so many Bolshevik party
   organisations developed and protected their own autonomy and ability to
   act!

   Significantly, one of the main Bolshevik groupings which helped
   organise and support the July uprising, the Military Organisation,
   started their own paper after the Central Committee had decreed after
   the failed revolt that neither it, nor the Petersburg Committee, should
   be allowed to have one. It "angrily insisted on what it considered its
   just prerogatives" and in "no uncertain terms it affirmed its right to
   publish an independent newspaper and formally protested what is
   referred to as 'a system of persecution and repression of an extremely
   peculiar character which had begun with the election of the new Central
   Committee.'" [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 227] The Central Committee
   backed down, undoubtedly due to the fact it could not enforce its
   decision.

   As the Cohn-Bendit brothers argue, "five months after the Revolution
   and three months before the October uprising, the masses were still
   governing themselves, and the Bolshevik vanguard simply had to toe the
   line." [Op. Cit., p. 186] Within that vanguard, the central committee
   proved to be out of touch with the rank and file, who ignored it rather
   than break with their fellow workers.

   Even by October, the party machine still lagged behind the needs of the
   revolution. In fact, Lenin could only impose his view by going over the
   head of the Central Committee. According to Trotsky's account, "this
   time he [wa]s not satisfied with furious criticism" of the "ruinous
   Fabianism of the Petrograd leadership" and "by way of protest he
   resign[ed] from the Central Committee." [History of the Russian
   Revolution, vol. 3, p. 131] Trotsky quotes Lenin as follows:

     "I am compelled to request permission to withdraw from the Central
     Committee, which I hereby do, and leave myself freedom of agitation
     in the lower ranks of the party and at the party congress." [quoted
     by Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 131]

   Thus the October revolution was precipitated by a blatant violation of
   the principles Lenin spent his life advocating. Indeed, if someone else
   other than Lenin had done this we are sure that Lenin, and his numerous
   followers, would have dismissed it as the action of a "petty-bourgeois
   intellectual" who cannot handle party "discipline." This is itself is
   significant, as is the fact that he decided to appeal to the "lower
   ranks" of the party. Simply put, rather than being "democratic" the
   party machine effectively blocked communication and control from the
   bottom-up. Looking at the more radical party membership, he "could only
   impose his view by going over the head of his Central Committee."
   [Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, Op. Cit., p. 187] He made sure to send
   his letter of protest to "the Petrograd and Moscow committees" and also
   made sure that "copies fell into the hands of the more reliable party
   workers of the district locals." By early October (and "over the heads
   of the Central Committee") he wrote "directly to the Petrograd and
   Moscow committees" calling for insurrection. He also "appealed to a
   Petrograd party conference to speak a firm word in favour of
   insurrection." [Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 131 and p. 132]

   In October, Lenin had to fight what he called "a wavering" in the
   "upper circles of the party" which lead to a "sort of dread of the
   struggle for power, an inclination to replace this struggle with
   resolutions protests, and conferences." [quoted by Trotsky, Op. Cit.,
   p. 132] For Trotsky, this represented "almost a direct pitting of the
   party against the Central Committee," required because "it was a
   question of the fate of the revolution" and so "all other
   considerations fell away." [Trotsky, Op. Cit., pp. 132-3] On October
   8th, when Lenin addressed the Bolshevik delegates of the forthcoming
   Northern Congress of Soviets on this subject, he did so "personally" as
   there "was no party decision" and the "higher institutions of the party
   had not yet expressed themselves." [Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 133]
   Ultimately, the Central Committee came round to Lenin's position but
   they did so under pressure of means at odds with the principles of the
   party.

   This divergence between the imagine and reality of the Bolsheviks
   explains their success. If the party had applied or had remained true
   to the principles of "democratic centralism" it is doubtful that it
   would have played an important role in the movement. As Alexander
   Rabinowitch argues, Bolshevik organisational unity and discipline is
   "vastly exaggerated" and, in fact, Bolshevik success in 1917 was down
   to "the party's internally relatively democratic, tolerant, and
   decentralised structure and method of operation, as well as its
   essentially open and mass character -- in striking contrast to the
   traditional Leninist model." In 1917, he goes on, "subordinate party
   bodies with the Petersburg Committee and the Military Organisation were
   permitted considerable independence and initiative . . . Most
   importantly, these lower bodies were able to tailor their tactics and
   appeals to suit their own particular constituencies amid rapidly
   changing conditions. Vast numbers of new members were recruited into
   the party . . . The newcomers included tens of thousands of workers and
   soldiers . . . who knew little, if anything, about Marxism and cared
   nothing about party discipline." For example, while the slogan "All
   Power to the Soviets" was "officially withdrawn by the Sixth [Party]
   Congress in late July, this change did not take hold at the local
   level." [The Bolsheviks Come to Power, p. 311, p. 312 and p. 313]

   It is no exaggeration to argue that if any member of a current vanguard
   party acted as the Bolshevik rank and file did in 1917, they would
   quickly be expelled (this probably explains why no such party has been
   remotely successful since). However, this ferment from below was
   quickly undermined within the party with the start of the Civil War. It
   is from this period when "democratic centralism" was actually applied
   within the party and clarified as an organisational principle:

     "It was quite a turnabout since the anarchic days before the Civil
     War. The Central Committee had always advocated the virtues of
     obedience and co-operation; but the rank-and-filers of 1917 had
     cared little about such entreaties as they did about appeals made by
     other higher authorities. The wartime emergency now supplied an
     opportunity to expatiate on this theme at will." [Service, Op. Cit.,
     p. 91]

   Service stresses that "it appears quite remarkable how quickly the
   Bolsheviks, who for years had talked idly about a strict hierarchy of
   command inside the party, at last began to put ideas into practice."
   [Op. Cit., p. 96]

   In other words, the conversion of the Bolshevik party into a fully
   fledged "democratic centralist" party occurred during the degeneration
   of the Revolution. This was both a consequence of the rising
   authoritarianism within the party and society as well as one of its
   causes. As such, it is quite ironic that the model used by modern day
   followers of Lenin is that of the party during the decline of the
   revolution, not its peak. This is not surprising. Once in power, the
   Bolshevik party imposed a state capitalist regime onto the Russian
   people. Can it be surprising that the party structure which it
   developed to aid this process was also based on bourgeois attitudes and
   organisation? Simply put, the party model advocated by Lenin may not
   have been very effective during a revolution but it was exceedingly
   effective at prompting hierarchy and authority in the
   post-revolutionary regime. It simply replaced the old ruling elite with
   another, made up of members of the radical intelligentsia and odd
   ex-worker or ex-peasant.

   This was due to the hierarchical and top-down nature of the party Lenin
   had created. While the party base was largely working class, the
   leadership was not. Full-time revolutionaries, they were either
   middle-class intellectuals or (occasionally) ex-workers and (even
   rarer) ex-peasants who had left their class to become part of the party
   machine. Even the delegates at the party congresses did not truly
   reflect class basis of the party membership. For example, the number of
   delegates was still dominated by white-collar or others (59.1% to
   40.9%) at the sixth party congress at the end of July 1917. [Cliff,
   Lenin, vol. 2, p. 160] So while the party gathered more working class
   members in 1917, it cannot be said that this was reflected in the party
   leadership which remained dominated by non-working class elements.
   Rather than being a genuine working class organisation, the Bolshevik
   party was a hierarchical group headed by non-working class elements
   whose working class base could not effectively control them even during
   the revolution in 1917. It was only effective because these newly
   joined and radicalised working class members ignored their own party
   structure and its defining ideology.

   After the revolution, the Bolsheviks saw their membership start to
   decrease. Significantly, "the decline in numbers which occurred from
   early 1918 onwards" started happening "contrary to what is usually
   assumed, some months before the Central Committee's decree in midsummer
   that the party should be purged of its 'undesirable' elements." These
   lost members reflected two things. Firstly, the general decline in the
   size of the industrial working class. This meant that the radicalised
   new elements from the countryside which had flocked to the Bolsheviks
   in 1917 returned home. Secondly, the lost of popular support the
   Bolsheviks were facing due to the realities of their regime. This can
   be seen from the fact that while the Bolsheviks were losing members,
   the Left SRS almost doubled in size to 100,000 (the Mensheviks claimed
   to have a similar number). Rather than non-proletarians leaving, "[i]t
   is more probable by far that it was industrial workers who were leaving
   in droves. After all, it would have been strange if the growing
   unpopularity of Sovnarkom in factory milieu had been confined
   exclusively to non-Bolsheviks." Unsurprisingly, given its position in
   power, "[a]s the proportion of working-class members declined, so that
   of entrants from the middle-class rose; the steady drift towards a
   party in which industrial workers no longer numerically predominated
   was under way." By late 1918 membership started to increase again but
   "[m]ost newcomers were not of working-class origin . . . the proportion
   of Bolsheviks of working-class origin fell from 57 per cent at the
   year's beginning to 48 per cent at the end." It should be noted that it
   was not specified how many were classed as having working-class origin
   were still employed in working-class jobs. [Robert Service, Op. Cit.,
   p. 70, pp. 70-1 and p. 90] A new ruling elite was thus born, thanks to
   the way vanguard parties are structured and the application of
   vanguardist principles which had previously been ignored.

   In summary, the experience of the Russian Revolution does not, in fact,
   show the validity of the "vanguard" model. The Bolshevik party in 1917
   played a leading role in the revolution only insofar as its members
   violated its own organisational principles (Lenin included). Faced with
   a real revolution and an influx of more radical new members, the party
   had to practice anarchist ideas of autonomy, local initiative and the
   ignoring of central orders which had no bearing to reality on the
   ground. When the party did try to apply the top-down and hierarchical
   principles of "democratic centralism" it failed to adjust to the needs
   of the moment. Moreover, when these principles were finally applied
   they helped ensure the degeneration of the revolution. As we discussed
   in [24]section H.5, this was to be expected.

4 Was Lenin's "State and Revolution" applied after October?

   In a nutshell, no. In fact the opposite was the case. Post-October, the
   Bolsheviks not only failed to introduce the ideas of Lenin's State and
   Revolution, they in fact introduced the exact opposite. As one
   historian puts it:

     "To consider 'State and Revolution' as the basic statement of
     Lenin's political philosophy -- which non-Communists as well as
     Communists usually do -- is a serious error. Its argument for a
     utopian anarchism never actually became official policy. The
     Leninism of 1917 . . . came to grief in a few short years; it was
     the revived Leninism of 1902 which prevailed as the basis for the
     political development of the USSR." [Robert V. Daniels, The
     Conscience of the Revolution, pp. 51-2]

   Daniels is being far too lenient with the Bolsheviks. It was not, in
   fact, "a few short years" before the promises of 1917 were forgotten.
   In some cases, it was a few short hours. In others, a few short months.
   However, in a sense Daniels is right. It did take until 1921 before all
   hope for saving the Russian Revolution finally ended. With the crushing
   of the Kronstadt rebellion, the true nature of the regime became
   obvious to all with eyes to see. Moreover, the banning of factions
   within the party at the same time did mark a return to the pattern of
   "What is to be Done?" rather than the more fluid practice Bolshevism
   exhibited in, say, 1917 (see [25]section 3). However, as we discuss in
   the appendix [26]"Were any of the Bolshevik oppositions a real
   alternative?", the various Bolshevik oppositions were, in their own
   way, just as authoritarian as the mainstream of the party.

   In order to show that this is the case, we need to summarise the main
   ideas contained in Lenin's work. Moreover, we need to indicate what the
   Bolsheviks did, in fact, do. Finally, we need to see if the various
   rationales justifying these actions hold water.

   So what did Lenin argue for in State and Revolution? Writing in the
   mid-1930s, anarchist Camillo Berneri summarised the main ideas of that
   work as follows:

     "The Leninist programme of 1917 included these points: the
     discontinuance of the police and standing army, abolition of the
     professional bureaucracy, elections for all public positions and
     offices, revocability of all officials, equality of bureaucratic
     wages with workers' wages, the maximum of democracy, peaceful
     competition among the parties within the soviets, abolition of the
     death penalty." ["The Abolition and Extinction of the State,"
     Cienfuegos Press Anarchist Review, no. 4, p. 50]

   As he noted, "[n]ot a single one of the points of this programme has
   been achieved." This was, of course, under Stalinism and most Leninists
   will concur with Berneri. However what Leninists tend not to mention is
   that in the 7 month period from November 1917 to May 1918 none of these
   points was achieved. So, as an example of what Bolshevism "really"
   stands for it seems strange to harp on about a work which was never
   implemented when the its author was in a position to do so (i.e. before
   the onslaught of a civil war Lenin thought was inevitable anyway!).

   To see that Berneri's summary is correct, we need to quote Lenin
   directly. Obviously the work is a wide ranging defence of Lenin's
   interpretation of Marxist theory on the state. As it is an attempt to
   overturn decades of Marxist orthodoxy, much of the work is quotes from
   Marx and Engels and Lenin's attempts to enlist them for his case (we
   discuss this issue in [27]section H.3.10). Equally, we need to discount
   the numerous straw men arguments about anarchism Lenin inflicts on his
   reader (see sections [28]H.1.3, [29]H.1.4 and [30]H.1.5 for the truth
   about his claims). Here we simply list the key points as regards
   Lenin's arguments about his "workers' state" and how the workers would
   maintain control of it:

   1) Using the Paris Commune as a prototype, Lenin argued for the
   abolition of "parliamentarianism" by turning "representative
   institutions from mere 'talking shops' into working bodies." This would
   be done by removing "the division of labour between the legislative and
   the executive." [Essential Works of Lenin, p. 304 and p. 306]

   2) "All officials, without exception, to be elected and subject to
   recall at any time" and so "directly responsible to their
   constituents." "Democracy means equality." [Op. Cit., p. 302, p. 306
   and p. 346]

   3) The "immediate introduction of control and superintendence by all,
   so that all shall become 'bureaucrats' for a time and so that,
   therefore, no one can become a 'bureaucrat'." Proletarian democracy
   would "take immediate steps to cut bureaucracy down to the roots . . .
   to the complete abolition of bureaucracy" as the "essence of
   bureaucracy" is officials becoming transformed "into privileged persons
   divorced from the masses and superior to the masses." [Op. Cit., p. 355
   and p. 360]

   4) There should be no "special bodies of armed men" standing apart from
   the people "since the majority of the people itself suppresses its
   oppressors, a 'special force' is no longer necessary." Using the
   example of the Paris Commune, Lenin suggested this meant "abolition of
   the standing army." Instead there would be the "armed masses." [Op.
   Cit., p. 275, p. 301 and p. 339]

   5) The new (workers) state would be "the organisation of violence for
   the suppression of . . . the exploiting class, i.e. the bourgeoisie.
   The toilers need a state only to overcome the resistance of the
   exploiters" who are "an insignificant minority," that is "the landlords
   and the capitalists." This would see "an immense expansion of democracy
   . . . for the poor, democracy for the people" while, simultaneously,
   imposing "a series of restrictions on the freedom of the oppressors,
   the exploiters, the capitalists. . . their resistance must be broken by
   force: it is clear that where is suppression there is also violence,
   there is no freedom, no democracy." [Op. Cit., p. 287 and pp. 337-8]

   This would be implemented after the current, bourgeois, state had been
   smashed. This would be the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and be
   "the introduction of complete democracy for the people." [Op. Cit., p.
   355] However, the key practical ideas on what the new "semi-state"
   would be are contained in these five points. He generalised these
   points, considering them valid not only for Russia in 1917 but in all
   countries. In this his followers agree. Lenin's work is considered
   valid for today, in advanced countries as it was in revolutionary
   Russia.

   Three things strike anarchist readers of Lenin's work. Firstly, as we
   noted in [31]section H.1.7, much of it is pure anarchism. Bakunin had
   raised the vision of a system of workers' councils as the framework of
   a free socialist society in the 1860s and 1870s. Moreover, he had also
   argued for the election of mandated and recallable delegates as well as
   for using a popular militia to defend the revolution (see [32]section
   H.2.1). What is not anarchist is the call for centralisation, equating
   the council system with a state and the toleration of a "new"
   officialdom. Secondly, the almost utter non-mention of the role of the
   party in the book is deeply significant. Given the emphasis that Lenin
   had always placed on the party, it's absence is worrying. Particularly
   (as we indicate in [33]section 5) he had been calling for the party to
   seize power all through 1917. When he does mention the party he does so
   in an ambiguous way which suggests that it, not the class, would be in
   power. As subsequent events show, this was indeed what happened in
   practice. And, finally, the anarchist reader is struck by the fact that
   every one of these key ideas were not implemented under Lenin. In fact,
   the opposite was done. This can be seen from looking at each point in
   turn.

   The first point as the creation of "working bodies", the combining of
   legislative and executive bodies. The first body to be created by the
   Bolshevik revolution was the "Council of People's Commissars" (CPC)
   This was a government separate from and above the Central Executive
   Committee (CEC) of the soviets congress. It was an executive body
   elected by the soviet congress, but the soviets themselves were not
   turned into "working bodies." Thus the promises of Lenin's State and
   Revolution did not last the night.

   As indicated in [34]section 5, the Bolsheviks clearly knew that the
   Soviets had alienated their power to this body. However, it could be
   argued that Lenin's promises were kept as this body simply gave itself
   legislative powers four days later. Sadly, this is not the case. In the
   Paris Commune the delegates of the people took executive power into
   their own hands. Lenin reversed this. His executive took legislative
   power from the hands of the people's delegates. In the former case,
   power was decentralised into the hands of the population. In the latter
   case, it was centralised into the hands of a few. This concentration of
   power into executive committees occurred at all levels of the soviet
   hierarchy (see [35]section 6 for full details). Simply put, legislative
   and executive power was taken from the soviets assemblies and handed to
   Bolshevik dominated executive committees.

   What of the next principle, namely the election and recall of all
   officials? This lasted slightly longer, namely around 5 months. By
   March of 1918, the Bolsheviks started a systematic campaign against the
   elective principle in the workplace, in the military and even in the
   soviets. In the workplace, Lenin was arguing for appointed one-man
   managers "vested with dictatorial powers" by April 1918 (see
   [36]section 10). In the military, Trotsky simply decreed the end of
   elected officers in favour of appointed officers (see [37]section 14).
   And as far as the soviets go, the Bolsheviks were refusing to hold
   elections because they "feared that the opposition parties would show
   gains." When elections were held, "Bolshevik armed force usually
   overthrew the results" in provincial towns. Moreover, the Bolsheviks
   "pack[ed] local soviets" with representatives of organisations they
   controlled "once they could not longer count on an electoral majority."
   [Samuel Farber, Before Stalinism, p. 22, p. 24 and p. 33] This
   gerrymandering was even practised at the all-Russian soviet congress
   (see [38]section 6 for full details of this Bolshevik onslaught against
   the soviets). So much for competition among the parties within the
   soviets! And as far as the right of recall went, the Bolsheviks only
   supported this when the workers were recalling the opponents of the
   Bolsheviks, not when the workers were recalling them.

   In summary, in under six months the Bolsheviks had replaced election of
   "all officials" by appointment from above in many areas of life.
   Democracy had simply being substituted by appointed from above (see
   [39]section 4 of the appendix on [40]"How did Bolshevik ideology
   contribute to the failure of the Revolution?"for the deeply
   undemocratic reasoning used to justify this top-down and autocratic
   system of so-called democracy). The idea that different parties could
   compete for votes in the soviets (or elsewhere) was similarly curtailed
   and finally abolished.

   Then there was the elimination of bureaucracy. As we show in
   [41]section 7 of the appendix on [42]"How did Bolshevik ideology
   contribute to the failure of the Revolution?", a new bureaucratic and
   centralised system quickly emerged. Rather than immediately cutting the
   size and power of the bureaucracy, it steadily grew. It soon became the
   real power in the state (and, ultimately, in the 1920s became the
   social base for the rise of Stalin). Moreover, with the concentration
   of power in the hands of the Bolshevik government, the "essence" of
   bureaucracy remained as the party leaders became "privileged persons
   divorced from the masses and superior to the masses." They were, for
   example, more than happy to justify their suppression of military
   democracy in terms of them knowing better than the general population
   what was best for them (see [43]section 4 of the appendix on [44]"How
   did Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure of the Revolution?"
   for details).

   Then there is the fourth point, namely the elimination of the standing
   army, the suppression of "special bodies of armed men" by the "armed
   masses." This promise did not last two months. On the 20th of December,
   1917, the Council of People's Commissars decreed the formation of a
   political (secret) police force, the "Extraordinary Commission to Fight
   Counter-Revolution." This was more commonly known by the Russian
   initials of the first two terms of its official name: The Cheka.
   Significantly, its founding decree stated it was to "watch the press,
   saboteurs, strikers, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries of the Right."
   [contained in Robert V. Daniels, A Documentary History of Communism,
   vol. 1, p. 133]

   While it was initially a small organisation, as 1918 progressed it grew
   in size and activity. By April 1918, it was being used to break the
   anarchist movement across Russia (see [45]section 23 for details). The
   Cheka soon became a key instrument of Bolshevik rule, with the full
   support of the likes of Lenin and Trotsky. The Cheka was most
   definitely a "special body of armed men" and not the same as the "armed
   workers." In other words, Lenin's claims in State and Revolution did
   not last two months and in under six months the Bolshevik state had a
   mighty group of "armed men" to impose its will.

   This is not all. The Bolsheviks also conducted a sweeping
   transformation of the military within the first six months of taking
   power. During 1917, the soldiers and sailors (encouraged by the
   Bolsheviks and other revolutionaries) had formed their own committees
   and elected officers. In March 1918, Trotsky simply abolished all this
   by decree and replaced it with appointed officers (usually ex-Tsarist
   ones). In this way, the Red Army was turned from a workers' militia
   (i.e. an armed people) into a "special body" separate from the general
   population (see [46]section 15 for further discussion on this subject).

   So instead of eliminating a "special force" above the people, the
   Bolsheviks did the opposite by creating a political police force (the
   Cheka) and a standing army (in which elections were a set aside by
   decree). These were special, professional, armed forces standing apart
   from the people and unaccountable to them. Indeed, they were used to
   repress strikes and working class unrest, a topic we now turn to.

   Then there is the idea of that Lenin's "workers' state" would simple be
   an instrument of violence directed at the exploiters. This was not how
   it turned out in practice. As the Bolsheviks lost popular support, they
   turned the violence of the "worker's state" against the workers (and,
   of course, the peasants). As noted above, when the Bolsheviks lost
   soviet elections they used force to disband them (see [47]section 6 for
   further details). Faced with strikes and working class protest during
   this period, the Bolsheviks responded with state violence (see
   [48]section 5 of the appendix on [49]"What caused the degeneration of
   the Russian Revolution?" for details). We will discuss the implications
   of this for Lenin's theory below. So, as regards the claim that the new
   ("workers") state would repress only the exploiters, the truth was that
   it was used to repress whoever opposed Bolshevik power, including
   workers and peasants.

   As can be seen, after the first six months of Bolshevik rule not a
   single measure advocated by Lenin in State and Revolution existed in
   "revolutionary" Russia. Some of the promises were broken in quiet
   quickly (overnight, in one case). Most took longer. For example, the
   democratisation of the armed forces had been decreed in late December
   1917. However, this was simply acknowledging the existing revolutionary
   gains of the military personnel. Similarly, the Bolsheviks passed a
   decree on workers' control which, again, simply acknowledged the actual
   gains by the grassroots (and, in fact, limited them for further
   development -- see [50]section 9). This cannot be taken as evidence of
   the democratic nature of Bolshevism as most governments faced with a
   revolutionary movement will acknowledge and "legalise" the facts on the
   ground (until such time as they can neutralise or destroy them). For
   example, the Provisional Government created after the February
   Revolution also legalised the revolutionary gains of the workers (for
   example, legalising the soviets, factory committees, unions, strikes
   and so forth). The real question is whether Bolshevism continued to
   encourage these revolutionary gains once it had consolidated its power.
   Which they did not. Indeed, it can be argued that the Bolsheviks simply
   managed to do what the Provisional Government it replaced had failed to
   do, namely destroy the various organs of popular self-management
   created by the revolutionary masses. So the significant fact is not
   that the Bolsheviks recognised the gains of the masses but that their
   toleration of the application of what their followers say were their
   real principles did not last long and was quickly ended. Moreover, when
   the leading Bolsheviks looked back at this abolition they did not
   consider it in any way in contradiction to the principles of
   "communism" (see [51]section 14).

   We have stressed this period for a reason. This was the period before
   the out-break of major Civil War and thus the policies applied show the
   actual nature of Bolshevism, it's essence if you like. This is a
   significant date as most Leninists blame the failure of Lenin to live
   up to his promises on this even. In reality, the civil war was not the
   reason for these betrayals -- simply because it had not started yet
   (see [52]section 16 on when the civil war started and its impact). Each
   of the promises were broken in turn months before the civil war
   happened. "All Power to the Soviets" became, very quickly, "All Power
   to the Bolsheviks." In the words of historian Marc Ferro:

     "In a way, The State and Revolution even laid the foundations and
     sketched out the essential features of an alternative to Bolshevik
     power, and only the pro-Leninist tradition has used it, almost to
     quieten its conscience, because Lenin, once in power, ignored its
     conclusions. The Bolsheviks, far from causing the state to wither
     away, found endless reasons for justifying its enforcement."
     [October 1917, pp. 213-4]

   Where does that leave Lenin's State and Revolution? Well, modern-day
   Leninists still urge us to read it, considering it his greatest work
   and the best introduction to what Leninism really stands for. For
   example, we find Leninist Tony Cliff calling that book "Lenin's real
   testament" while, at the same time, acknowledging that its "message . .
   . which was the guide for the first victorious proletarian revolution,
   was violated again and again during the civil war." Not a very good
   "guide" or that convincing a "message" if it was not applicable in the
   very circumstances it was designed to be applied in (a bit like saying
   you have an excellent umbrella but it only works when it is not
   raining). Moreover, Cliff is factually incorrect. The Bolsheviks
   "violated" that "guide" before the civil war started (i.e. when "the
   victories of the Czechoslovak troops over the Red Army in June 1918,
   that threatened the greatest danger to the Soviet republic," to quote
   Cliff). Similarly, much of the economic policies implemented by the
   Bolsheviks had their roots in that book and the other writings by Lenin
   from 1917 (see [53]section 5 of the appendix on [54]"How did Bolshevik
   ideology contribute to the failure of the Revolution?"). [Lenin, vol.
   3, p. 161 and p. 18]

   Given this, what use is Lenin's State and Revolution? If this really
   was the "guide" it is claimed to be, the fact that it proved totally
   impractical suggests it should simply be ignored. Simply put, if the
   side effects of a revolution (such as civil war) require it to be
   ripped up then modern Leninists should come clean and admit that
   revolution and workers' democracy simply do not go together. This was,
   after all, the conclusion of Lenin and Trotsky (see [55]section H.3.8).
   As such, they should not recommend Lenin's work as an example of what
   Bolshevism aims for. If, however, the basic idea of workers' democracy
   and freedom are valid and considered the only way of achieving
   socialism then we need to wonder why the Bolsheviks did not apply them
   when they had the chance, particularly when the Makhnovists in the
   Ukraine did. Such an investigation would only end up by concluding the
   validity of anarchism, not Leninism.

   This can be seen from the trajectory of Bolshevik ideology
   post-October. Simply put, it was not bothered by the breaking of the
   promises of State and Revolution and 1917 in general. As such, Cliff is
   just wrong to assert that while the message of State and Revolution was
   "violated again and again" it "was also invoked again and again against
   bureaucratic degeneration." [Cliff, Op. Cit., p. 161] Far from it.
   Lenin's State and Revolution was rarely invoked against degeneration by
   the mainstream Bolshevik leadership. Indeed, they happily supported
   party dictatorship and one-man management. Ironically for Cliff, it was
   famously invoked against the state capitalist policies being
   implemented in early 1918. This was done by the "Left Communists"
   around Bukharin in their defence of workers' self-management against
   Lenin's policy! Lenin told them to reread it (along with his other 1917
   works) to see that "state capitalism" was his aim all along! Not only
   that, he quoted from State and Revolution. He argued that "accounting
   and control" was required "for the proper functioning of the first
   stage of communist society." "And this control," he continued, "must be
   established not only over 'the insignificant capitalist minority, over
   the gentry . . . ', but also over the workers who 'have been thoroughly
   corrupted by capitalism . . . '" He ended by saying it was "significant
   that Bukharin did not emphasise this." [Collected Works, vol. 27, pp.
   353-4] Needless to say, the Leninists who urge us to read Lenin's work
   do not emphasis that either.

   As the Bolsheviks lost more and more support, the number of workers
   "thoroughly corrupted by capitalism" increased. How to identify them
   was easy: they did not support the party. As historian Richard
   summarises, a "lack of identification with the Bolshevik party was
   treated as the absence of political consciousness altogether." [Soviet
   Communists in Power, p. 94] This is the logical conclusion of
   vanguardism, of course (see [56]section H.5.3). However, to acknowledge
   that state violence was also required to "control" the working class
   totally undermines the argument of State and Revolution.

   This is easy to see and to prove theoretically. For example, by 1920,
   Lenin was more than happy to admit that the "workers' state" used
   violence against the masses. At a conference of his political police,
   the Cheka, Lenin argued as follows:

     "Without revolutionary coercion directed against the avowed enemies
     of the workers and peasants, it is impossible to break down the
     resistance of these exploiters. On the other hand, revolutionary
     coercion is bound to be employed towards the wavering and unstable
     elements among the masses themselves." [Collected Works, vol. 42, p.
     170]

   This was simply summarising Bolshevik practice from the start. However,
   in State and Revolution Lenin had argued for imposing "a series of
   restrictions on the freedom of the oppressors, the exploiters, the
   capitalists." In 1917 he was "clear that where is suppression there is
   also violence, there is no freedom, no democracy." [Op. Cit., pp.
   337-8] So if violence is directed against the working class then,
   obviously, there can be "no freedom, no democracy" for that class. And
   who identifies who the "wavering and unstable" elements are? Only the
   party. Thus any expression of workers' democracy which conflicts with
   the party is a candidate for "revolutionary coercion." So it probably
   just as well that the Bolsheviks had eliminated military democracy in
   March, 1918.

   Trotsky expands on the obvious autocratic implications of this in 1921
   when he attacked the Workers' Opposition's ideas on economic democracy:

     "The Party . . . is . . . duty bound to retain its dictatorship,
     regardless of the temporary vacillations of the amorphous masses,
     regardless of the temporary vacillations even of the working class.
     This awareness is essential for cohesion; without it the Party is in
     danger of perishing . . . At any given moment, the dictatorship does
     not rest on the formal principle of workers' democracy . . . if we
     look upon workers' democracy as something unconditional . . . then .
     . . every plant should elect its own administrative organs and so on
     . . . From a formal point of view this is the clearest link with
     workers' democracy. But we are against it. Why? . . . Because, in
     the first place, we want to retain the dictatorship of the Party,
     and, in the second place, because we think that the [democratic] way
     of managing important and essential plants is bound to be
     incompetent and prove a failure from an economic point of view . .
     ." [quoted by Jay B. Sorenson, The Life and Death of Soviet Trade
     Unionism, p. 165]

   Thus the Russian Revolution and the Bolshevik regime confirmed
   anarchist theory and predictions about state socialism. In the words of
   Luigi Fabbri:

     "It is fairly certain that between the capitalist regime and the
     socialist there will be an intervening period of struggle, during
     which proletariat revolutionary workers will have to work to uproot
     the remnants of bourgeois society . . . But if the object of this
     struggle and this organisation is to free the proletariat from
     exploitation and state rule, then the role of guide, tutor or
     director cannot be entrusted to a new state, which would have an
     interest in pointing the revolution in a completely opposite
     direction. . .

     "The outcome would be that a new government - battening on the
     revolution and acting throughout the more or less extended period of
     its 'provisional' powers - would lay down the bureaucratic, military
     and economic foundations of a new and lasting state organisation,
     around which a compact network of interests and privileges would,
     naturally, be woven. Thus in a short space of time what one would
     have would not be the state abolished, but a state stronger and more
     energetic than its predecessor and which would come to exercise
     those functions proper to it - the ones Marx recognised as being
     such - 'keeping the great majority of producers under the yoke of a
     numerically small exploiting minority.'

     "This is the lesson that the history of all revolutions teaches us,
     from the most ancient down to the most recent; and it is confirmed .
     . . by the day-to-day developments of the Russian revolution . . .

     "Certainly, [state violence] starts out being used against the old
     power . . . But as the new power goes on consolidating its position
     . . . ever more frequently and ever more severely, the mailed fist
     of dictatorship is turned against the proletariat itself in whose
     name that dictatorship was set up and is operated! . . . the actions
     of the present Russian government [of Lenin and Trotsky] have shown
     that in real terms (and it could not be otherwise) the 'dictatorship
     of the proletariat' means police, military, political and economic
     dictatorship exercised over the broad mass of the proletariat in
     city and country by the few leaders of the political party.

     "The violence of the state always ends up being used AGAINST ITS
     SUBJECTS, of whom the vast majority are always proletarians . . .
     The new government will be able to expropriate the old ruling class
     in whole or in part, but only so as to establish a new ruling class
     that will hold the greater part of the proletariat in subjection.

     "That will come to pass if those who make up the government and the
     bureaucratic, military and police minority that upholds it end up
     becoming the real owners of wealth when the property of everyone is
     made over exclusively to the state. In the first place, the failure
     of the revolution will be self evident. In the second, in spite of
     the illusions that many people create, the conditions of the
     proletariat will always be those of a subject class."
     ["Anarchy and 'Scientific' Communism", in The Poverty of Statism,
     pp. 13-49, Albert Meltzer (ed.), pp. 26-31]

   The standard response by most modern Leninists to arguments like this
   about Bolshevism is simply to downplay the authoritarianism of the
   Bolsheviks by stressing the effects of the civil war on shaping their
   ideology and actions. However, this fails to address the key issue of
   why the reality of Bolshevism (even before the civil war) was so
   different to the rhetoric. Anarchists, as we discuss in [57]"How did
   Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure of the Revolution?", can
   point to certain aspects of Bolshevik ideology and the social
   structures its favoured which can explain it. The problems facing the
   revolution simply brought to the fore the limitations and dangers
   inherent in Leninism and, moreover, shaping them in distinctive ways.
   We draw the conclusion that a future revolution, as it will face
   similar problems, would be wise to avoid applying Leninist ideology and
   the authoritarian practices it allows and, indeed, promotes by its
   support of centralisation, confusion of party power with class power,
   vanguardism and equation of state capitalism with socialism. Leninists,
   in contrast, can only stress the fact that the revolution was occurring
   in difficult circumstances and hope that "fate" is more kind to them
   next time -- as if a revolution, as Lenin himself noted in 1917, would
   not occur during nor create "difficult" circumstances! Equally, they
   can draw no lessons (bar repeat what the Bolsheviks did in 1917 and
   hope for better objective circumstances!) from the Russian experience
   simply because they are blind to the limitations of their politics.
   They are thus doomed to repeat history rather than make it.

   So where does this analysis of Lenin's State and Revolution and the
   realities of Bolshevik power get us? The conclusions of dissent Marxist
   Samuel Farber seem appropriate here. As he puts it, "the very fact that
   a Sovnarkom had been created as a separate body from the CEC [Central
   Executive Committee] of the soviets clearly indicates that, Lenin's
   State and Revolution notwithstanding, the separation of at least the
   top bodies of the executive and the legislative wings of the government
   remained in effect in the new Soviet system." This suggests "that State
   and Revolution did not play a decisive role as a source of policy
   guidelines for 'Leninism in power.'" After all, "immediately after the
   Revolution the Bolsheviks established an executive power . . . as a
   clearly separate body from the leading body of the legislature. . .
   Therefore, some sections of the contemporary Left appear to have
   greatly overestimated the importance that State and Revolution had for
   Lenin's government. I would suggest that this document . . . can be
   better understood as a distant, although doubtless sincere [!],
   socio-political vision . . . as opposed to its having been a
   programmatic political statement, let alone a guide to action, for the
   period immediately after the successful seizure of power." [Farber, Op.
   Cit., pp. 20-1 and p. 38]

   That is one way of looking at it. Another would be to draw the
   conclusion that a "distant . . . socio-political vision" drawn up to
   sound like a "guide to action" which was then immediately ignored is,
   at worse, little more than a deception, or, at best, a theoretical
   justification for seizing power in the face of orthodox Marxist dogma.
   Whatever the rationale for Lenin writing his book, one thing is true --
   it was never implemented. Strange, then, that Leninists today urge use
   to read it to see what "Lenin really wanted." Particularly given that
   so few of its promises were actually implemented (those that were just
   recognised the facts on the ground) and all of were no longer applied
   in less than six months after the seize of power.

   The best that can be said is that Lenin did want this vision to be
   applied but the realities of revolutionary Russia, the objective
   problems facing the revolution, made its application impossible. This
   is the standard Leninist account of the revolution. They seem
   unconcerned that they have just admitted that Lenin's ideas were
   utterly impractical for the real problems that any revolution is most
   likely to face. This was the conclusion Lenin himself drew, as did the
   rest of the Bolshevik leadership. This can be seen from the actual
   practice of "Leninism in power" and the arguments it used. And yet, for
   some reason, Lenin's book is still recommended by modern Leninists!

5 Did the Bolsheviks really aim for Soviet power?

   It seems a truism for modern day Leninists that the Bolsheviks stood
   for "soviet power." For example, they like to note that the Bolsheviks
   used the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" in 1917 as evidence.
   However, for the Bolsheviks this slogan had a radically different
   meaning to what many people would consider it to mean.

   As we discuss in [58]section 25, it was the anarchists (and those close
   to them, like the SR-Maximalists) who first raised the idea of soviets
   as the means by which the masses could run society. This was during the
   1905 revolution. At that time, neither the Mensheviks nor the
   Bolsheviks viewed the soviets as the possible framework of a socialist
   society. This was still the case in 1917, until Lenin returned to
   Russia and convinced the Bolshevik Party that the time was right to
   raise the slogan "All Power to the Soviets."

   However, as well as this, Lenin also advocated a somewhat different
   vision of what a Bolshevik revolution would result in. Thus we find
   Lenin in 1917 continually repeating the basic idea: "The Bolsheviks
   must assume power." The Bolsheviks "can and must take state power into
   their own hands." He raised the question of "will the Bolsheviks dare
   take over full state power alone?" and answered it: "I have already had
   occasion . . . to answer this question in the affirmative." Moreover,
   "a political party . . . would have no right to exist, would be
   unworthy of the name of party . . . if it refused to take power when
   opportunity offers." [Selected Works, vol. 2, p 328, p. 329 and p. 352]

   He equated party power with popular power: "the power of the Bolsheviks
   -- that is, the power of the proletariat." Moreover, he argued that
   Russia "was ruled by 130,000 landowners . . . and they tell us that
   Russia will not be able to be governed by the 240,000 members of the
   Bolshevik Party -- governing in the interest of the poor and against
   the rich." He stresses that the Bolsheviks "are not Utopians. We know
   that just any labourer or any cook would be incapable of taking over
   immediately the administration of the State." Therefore they "demand
   that the teaching should be conducted by the class-consciousness
   workers and soldiers, that this should be started immediately." Until
   then, the "conscious workers must be in control." [Will the Bolsheviks
   Maintain Power? p. 102, pp. 61-62, p. 66 and p. 68]

   As such, given this clear and unambiguous position throughout 1917 by
   Lenin, it seems incredulous, to say the least, for Leninist Tony Cliff
   to assert that "[t]o start with Lenin spoke of the proletariat, the
   class -- not the Bolshevik Party -- assuming state power." [Lenin, vol.
   3, p. 161] Surely the title of one of Lenin's most famous pre-October
   essays, usually translated as "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?",
   should have given the game away? As would, surely, quoting numerous
   calls by Lenin for the Bolsheviks to seize power? Apparently not.

   This means, of course, Lenin is admitting that the working class in
   Russia would not have power under the Bolsheviks. Rather than "the
   poor" governing society directly, we would have the Bolsheviks
   governing in their interests. Thus, rather than soviet power as such,
   the Bolsheviks aimed for "party power through the soviets" -- a
   radically different position. And as we discuss in the [59]next
   section, when soviet power clashed with party power the former was
   always sacrificed to ensure the latter. As we indicate in [60]section
   H.1.2, this support for party power before the revolution was soon
   transformed into a defence for party dictatorship after the Bolsheviks
   had seized power. However, we should not forget, to quote one
   historian, that the Bolshevik leaders "anticipated a 'dictatorship of
   the proletariat,' and that concept was a good deal closer to a party
   dictatorship in Lenin's 1917 usage than revisionist scholars sometimes
   suggest." [Sheila Fitzpatrick, "The Legacy of the Civil War," pp.
   385-398, Party, State, and Society in the Russian Civil War, Diane P.
   Koenker, William G. Rosenberg and Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.), p. 388]

   While modern-day Leninists tend to stress the assumption of power by
   the soviets as the goal of the Bolshevik revolution, the Bolsheviks
   themselves were more honest about it. For example, Trotsky quotes Lenin
   at the first soviet congress stating that it was "not true to say that
   no party exists which is ready to assume power; such a party exists:
   this is our party." Moreover, "[o]ur party is ready to assume power."
   As the Second Congress approached, Lenin "rebuked those who connected
   the uprising with the Second Congress of the Soviets." He protested
   against Trotsky's argument that they needed a Bolshevik majority at the
   Second Congress, arguing (according to Trotsky) that "[w]e have to win
   power and not tie ourselves to the Congress. It was ridiculous and
   absurd to warn the enemy about the date of the rising . . . First the
   party must seize power, arms in hand, and then we could talk about the
   Congress." [On Lenin, p. 71, p. 85]

   Trotsky argued that "the party could not seize power by itself,
   independently of the Soviets and behind its back. This would have been
   a mistake . . . [as the] soldiers knew their delegates in the Soviet;
   it was through the Soviet that they knew the party. If the uprising had
   taken place behind the back of the Soviet, independently of it, without
   its authority . . . there might have been a dangerous confusion among
   the troops." Significantly, Trotsky made no mention of the proletariat.
   Finally, Lenin came over to Trotsky's position, saying "Oh, all right,
   one can proceed in this fashion as well, provided we seize power." [Op.
   Cit., p. 86 and p. 89]

   Trotsky made similar arguments in his History of the Russian Revolution
   and his article Lessons of October. Discussing the July Days of 1917,
   for example, Trotsky discusses whether (to quote the title of the
   relevant chapter) "Could the Bolsheviks have seized the Power in July?"
   and noted, in passing, the army "was far from ready to raise an
   insurrection in order to give the power to the Bolshevik Party." As far
   as the workers were concerned, although "inclining toward the
   Bolsheviks in its overwhelming majority, had still not broken the
   umbilical cord attaching it to the Compromisers" and so the Bolsheviks
   could not have "seized the helm in July." He then lists other parts of
   the country where the soviets were ready to take power. He states that
   in "a majority of provinces and county seats, the situation was
   incomparably less favourable" simply because the Bolsheviks were not as
   well supported. Later he notes that "[m]any of the provincial soviets
   had already, before the July days, become organs of power." Thus
   Trotsky was only interested in whether the workers could have put the
   Bolsheviks in power or not rather than were the soviets able to take
   power themselves. Party power was the decisive criteria. [History of
   the Russian Revolution, vol. 2, p. 78, p. 77, p. 78, p. 81 and p. 281]

   This can be seen from the October insurrection. Trotsky again admits
   that the "Bolsheviks could have seized power in Petrograd at the
   beginning of July" but "they could not have held it." However, by
   September the Bolsheviks had gained majorities in the Petrograd and
   Moscow soviets. The second Congress of Soviets was approaching. The
   time was considered appropriate to think of insurrection. By in whose
   name and for what end? Trotsky makes it clear. "A revolutionary party
   is interested in legal coverings," he argued and so the party could use
   the defending the second Congress of Soviets as the means to justify
   its seizure of power. He raises the question: "Would it not have been
   simpler . . . to summon the insurrection directly in the name of the
   party?" and answers it in the negative. "It would be an obvious
   mistake," he argued, "to identify the strength of the Bolshevik party
   with the strength of the soviets led by it. The latter was much greater
   than the former. However, without the former it would have been mere
   impotence." He then quotes numerous Bolshevik delegates arguing that
   the masses would follow the soviet, not the party. Hence the importance
   of seizing power in the name of the soviets, regardless of the fact it
   was the Bolshevik party who would in practice hold "all power." Trotsky
   quotes Lenin are asking "Who is to seize power?" "That is now of no
   importance," argued Lenin. "Let the Military Revolutionary Committee
   take it, or 'some other institution,' which will declare that it will
   surrender the power only to the genuine representatives of the
   interests of the people." Trotsky notes that "some other institution"
   was a "conspirative designation for the Central Committee of the
   Bolsheviks." And who turned out to be the "genuine representatives of
   the interests of the people"? By amazing co-incidence the Bolsheviks,
   the members of whose Central Committee formed the first "soviet"
   government. [Op. Cit., vol. 3, p. 265, p. 259, p. 262, p. 263 and p.
   267]

   As we discuss in [61]section H.3.11, Trotsky was simply repeating the
   same instrumentalist arguments he had made earlier. Clearly, the
   support for the soviets was purely instrumental, simply a means of
   securing party power. For Bolshevism, the party was the key institution
   of proletarian revolution:

     "The party set the soviets in motion, the soviets set in motion the
     workers, soldiers, and to some extent the peasantry . . . If you
     represent this conducting apparatus as a system of cog-wheels -- a
     comparison which Lenin had recourse at another period on another
     theme -- you may say that the impatient attempt to connect the party
     wheel directly with the gigantic wheel of the masses -- omitting the
     medium-sized wheel of the soviets -- would have given rise to the
     danger of breaking the teeth of the party wheel." [Trotsky, Op.
     Cit., p. 264]

   Thus the soviets existed to allow the party to influence the workers.
   What of the workers running society directly? What if the workers
   reject the decisions of the party? After all, before the revolution
   Lenin "more than once repeated that the masses are far to the left of
   the party, just as the party is to the left of the Central Committee."
   [Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 258] What happens when the workers refuse to be
   set in motion by the party but instead set themselves in motion and
   reject the Bolsheviks? What then for the soviets? Looking at the logic
   of Trotsky's instrumentalist perspective, in such a case we would
   predict that the soviets would have to be tamed (by whatever means
   possible) in favour of party power (the real goal). And this is what
   did happen. The fate of the soviets after October prove that the
   Bolsheviks did not, in fact, seek soviet power without doubt (see
   [62]next section). And as we discuss in [63]section 4 of the appendix
   on [64]"How did Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure of the
   Revolution?", the peculiar Bolshevik definition of "soviet power"
   allowed them to justify the elimination of from the bottom-up
   grassroots democracy in the military and in the workplace with top-down
   appointments.

   Thus we have a distinctly strange meaning by the expression "All Power
   to the Soviets." In practice, it meant that the soviets alienate its
   power to a Bolshevik government. This is what the Bolsheviks considered
   as "soviet power," namely party power, pure and simple. As the Central
   Committee argued in November 1917, "it is impossible to refuse a purely
   Bolshevik government without treason to the slogan of the power of the
   Soviets, since a majority at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets
   . . . handed power over to this government." [contained in Robert v.
   Daniels (ed.), A Documentary History of Communism, vol. 1, pp. 128-9]
   Lenin was clear, arguing mere days after the October Revolution that
   "our present slogan is: No Compromise, i.e. for a homogeneous Bolshevik
   government." [quoted by Daniels, Conscience of the Revolution, p. 65]

   In other words, "soviet power" exists when the soviets hand power over
   the someone else (namely the Bolshevik leaders)! The difference is
   important, "for the Anarchists declared, if 'power' really should
   belong to the soviets, it could not belong to the Bolshevik party, and
   if it should belong to that Party, as the Bolsheviks envisaged, it
   could not belong to the soviets." [Voline, The Unknown Revolution, p.
   213]

   Which means that while anarchists and Leninists both use the expression
   "All Power to the Soviets" it does not mean they mean exactly the same
   thing by it. In practice the Bolshevik vision simply replaced the power
   of the soviets with a "soviet power" above them:

     "The success of the Bolsheviks in the October Revolution -- that is
     to say, the fact that they found themselves in power and from there
     subordinated the whole Revolution to their Party is explained by
     their ability to substitute the idea of a Soviet power for the
     social revolution and the social emancipation of the masses. A
     priori, these two ideas appear as non-contradictory for it was
     possible to understand Soviet power as the power of the soviets, and
     this facilitated the substitution of the idea of Soviet power for
     that of the Revolution. Nevertheless, in their realisation and
     consequences these ideas were in violent contraction to each other.
     The conception of Soviet Power incarnated in the Bolshevik state,
     was transformed into an entirely traditional bourgeois power
     concentrated in a handful of individuals who subjected to their
     authority all that was fundamental and most powerful in the life of
     the people -- in this particular case, the social revolution.
     Therefore, with the help of the 'power of the soviets' -- in which
     the Bolsheviks monopolised most of the posts - they effectively
     attained a total power and could proclaim their dictatorship
     throughout the revolutionary territory . . . All was reduced to a
     single centre, from where all instructions emanated concerning the
     way of life, of thought, of action of the working masses." [Peter
     Arshinov, The Two Octobers]

   Isolated from the masses, holding power on their behalf, the Bolshevik
   party could not help being influenced by the realities of their
   position in society and the social relationships produced by statist
   forms. Far from being the servants of the people, they become upon the
   seizing of power their masters. As we argue in [65]section 7 of the
   appendix on [66]"How did Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure
   of the Revolution?", the experience of Bolshevism in power confirmed
   anarchist fears that the so-called "workers' state" would quickly
   become a danger to the revolution, corrupting those who held power and
   generating a bureaucracy around the new state bodies which came into
   conflict with both the ruling party and the masses. Placed above the
   people, isolated from them by centralisation of power, the Bolsheviks
   pre-revolutionary aim for party power unsurprising became in practice
   party dictatorship.

   In less than a year, by July 1918, the soviet regime was a de facto
   party dictatorship. The theoretical revisions soon followed. Lenin, for
   example, was proclaiming in early December 1918 that while legalising
   the Mensheviks the Bolsheviks would "reserve state power for ourselves,
   and for ourselves alone." [Collected Works, vol. 28, p. 213] Victor
   Serge records how when he arrived in Russia in the following month he
   discovered "a colourless article" signed by Zinoviev on "The Monopoly
   of Power" which said "Our Party rules alone . . . it will not allow
   anyone . . . The false democratic liberties demanded by the
   counter-revolution." [Memoirs of a Revolutionary, p. 69] Serge, like
   most Bolsheviks, embraced this perspective wholeheartedly. For example,
   when the Bolsheviks published Bakunin's "confession" to the Tsar in
   1921 (in an attempt to discredit anarchism) "Serge seized on Bakunin's
   passage concerning the need for dictatorial rule in Russia, suggesting
   that 'already in 1848 Bakunin had presaged Bolshevism.'" [Lawrence D.
   Orton, "introduction," The Confession of Mikhail Bakunin, p. 21] At the
   time Bakunin wrote his "confession" he was not an anarchist. At the
   time Serge wrote his comments, he was a leading Bolshevik and
   reflecting mainstream Bolshevik ideology.

   Indeed, so important was it considered by them, the Bolsheviks revised
   their theory of the state to include this particular lesson of their
   revolution (see [67]section H.3.8 for details). As noted in [68]section
   H.1.2, all the leading Bolsheviks were talking about the "dictatorship
   of the party" and continued to do so until their deaths. Such a
   position, incidentally, is hard to square with support for soviet power
   in any meaningful term (although it is easy to square with an
   instrumentalist position on workers' councils as a means to party
   power). It was only in the mid-30s that Serge started to revise his
   position for this position (Trotsky still subscribed to it). By the
   early 1940s, he wrote that "[a]gainst the Party the anarchists were
   right when they inscribed on their black banners, 'There is no worse
   poison than power' -- meaning absolute power. From now on the psychosis
   of power was to captive the great majority of the leadership,
   especially at the lower levels." [Serge, Op. Cit., p. 100]

   Nor can the effects of the civil war explain this shift. As we discuss
   in the [69]next section, the Bolshevik assault on the soviets and their
   power started in the spring of 1918, months before the start of large
   scale civil war. And it should be stressed that the Bolsheviks were not
   at all bothered by the creation of party dictatorship over the soviets.
   Indeed, in spite of ruling over a one party state Lenin was arguing in
   November 1918 that "Soviet power is a million times more democratic
   than the most democratic bourgeois republic." How can that be when the
   workers do not run society nor have a say in who rules them? When Karl
   Kautsky raised this issue, Lenin replied by saying he "fails to see the
   class nature of the state apparatus, of the machinery of state . . .
   The Soviet government is the first in the world . . . to enlist the
   people, specifically the exploited people in the work of
   administration." [Collected Works, vol. 28, p. 247 and p. 248]

   However, the key issue is not whether workers take part in the state
   machinery but whether they determine the policies that are being
   implemented, i.e. whether the masses are running their own lives. After
   all, as Ante Ciliga pointed out, the Stalinist GPU (secret police)
   "liked to boast of the working class origin of its henchmen." One of
   his fellow prisoners retorted to such claims by pointing out they were
   "wrong to believe that in the days the Tsar the gaolers were recruited
   from among the dukes and the executioners from among the princes!" [The
   Russian Engima, pp. 255-6] Simply put, just because the state
   administration is made up of bureaucrats who were originally working
   class does not mean that the working class, as a class, manages
   society.

   In December of that year Lenin went one further and noted that at the
   Sixth Soviet Congress "the Bolsheviks had 97 per cent" of delegates,
   i.e. "practically all representatives of the workers and peasants of
   the whole of Russia."
   This was proof of "how stupid and ridiculous is the bourgeois
   fairy-tale about the Bolsheviks only having minority support." [Op.
   Cit., pp. 355-6] Given that the workers and peasants had no real choice
   in who to vote for, can this result be surprising? Of course not. While
   the Bolsheviks had mass support a year previously, pointing to election
   results under a dictatorship where all other parties and groups are
   subject to state repression is hardly convincing evidence for current
   support. Needless to say, Stalin (like a host of other dictators) made
   similar claims on similarly dubious election results. If the Bolsheviks
   were sincere in their support for soviet power then they would have
   tried to organise genuine soviet elections. This was possible even
   during the civil war as the example of the Makhnovists showed.

   So, in a nutshell, the Bolsheviks did not fundamentally support the
   goal of soviet power. Rather, they aimed to create a "soviet power," a
   Bolshevik power above the soviets which derived its legitimacy from
   them. However, if the soviets conflicted with that power, it were the
   soviets which were repudiated not party power. Thus the result of
   Bolshevik ideology was the marginalisation of the soviets and their
   replacement by Bolshevik dictatorship. This process started before the
   civil war and can be traced to the nature of the state as well as the
   underlying assumptions of Bolshevik ideology (see [70]"How did
   Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure of the Revolution?").

6 What happened to the soviets after October?

   As indicated in the last question, the last thing which the Bolsheviks
   wanted was "all power to the soviets." Rather they wanted the soviets
   to hand over that power to a Bolshevik government. As the people in
   liberal capitalist politics, the soviets were "sovereign" in name only.
   They were expected to delegate power to a government. Like the
   "sovereign people" of bourgeois republics, the soviets were much
   praised but in practice ignored by those with real power.

   In such a situation, we would expect the soviets to play no meaningful
   role in the new "workers' state." Under such a centralised system, we
   would expect the soviets to become little more than a fig-leaf for
   party power. Unsurprisingly, this is exactly what they did become. As
   we discuss in [71]section 7 of the appendix on [72]"How did Bolshevik
   ideology contribute to the failure of the Revolution?", anarchists are
   not surprised by this as the centralisation so beloved by Marxists is
   designed to empower the few at the centre and marginalise the many at
   the circumference.

   The very first act of the Bolshevik revolution was for the Second
   Congress of Soviets to alienate its power and hand it over to the
   "Council of People's Commissars." This was the new government and was
   totally Bolshevik in make-up (the Left SRs later joined it, although
   the Bolsheviks always maintained control). Thus the first act of the
   revolution was the creation of a power above the soviets. Although
   derived from the soviet congress, it was not identical to it. Thus the
   Bolshevik "workers' state" or "semi-state" started to have the same
   characteristics as the normal state (see [73]section H.3.7 for a
   discussion of what marks a state).

   The subsequent marginalisation of the soviets in the "soviet" state
   occurred from top to bottom should not, therefore be considered an
   accident or a surprise. The Bolshevik desire for party power within a
   highly centralised state could have no other effect. At the top, the
   Central Executive Committee (CEC or VTsIK) was quickly marginalised
   from power. This body was meant to be the highest organ of soviet power
   but, in practice, it was sidelined by the Bolshevik government. This
   can be seen when, just four days after seizing power, the Bolshevik
   Council of People's Commissars (CPC or Sovnarkom) "unilaterally
   arrogated to itself legislative power simply by promulgating a decree
   to this effect. This was, effectively, a Bolshevik coup d'etat that
   made clear the government's (and party's) pre-eminence over the soviets
   and their executive organ. Increasingly, the Bolsheviks relied upon the
   appointment from above of commissars with plenipotentiary powers, and
   they split up and reconstituted fractious Soviets and intimidated
   political opponents." [Neil Harding, Leninism, p. 253] Strange actions
   for a party proclaiming it was acting to ensure "All power to the
   soviets" (as we discussed in the [74]last section, this was always
   considered by Lenin as little more than a slogan to hide the fact that
   the party would be in power).

   It is doubtful that when readers of Lenin's State and Revolution read
   his argument for combining legislative and executive powers into one
   body, they had this in mind! But then, as we discussed in [75]section
   4, that work was never applied in practice so we should not be too
   surprised by this turn of events. One thing is sure, four days after
   the "soviet" revolution the soviets had been replaced as the effective
   power in society by a handful of Bolshevik leaders. So the Bolsheviks
   immediately created a power above the soviets in the form of the CPC.
   Lenin's argument in The State and Revolution that, like the Paris
   Commune, the workers' state would be based on a fusion of executive and
   administrative functions in the hands of the workers' delegates did not
   last one night. In reality, the Bolshevik party was the real power in
   "soviet" Russia.

   Given that the All-Russian central Executive Committee of Soviets
   (VTsIK) was dominated by Bolsheviks, it comes as no surprise to
   discover it was used to augment this centralisation of power into the
   hands of the party. The VTsIK ("charged by the October revolution with
   controlling the government," the Sovnarkom) was "used not to control
   but rather extend the authority and centralising fiat of the
   government. That was the work of Iakov Sverdlov, the VTsIK chairman,
   who -- in close collaboration with Lenin as chairman of the Sovnarkom
   -- ensured that the government decrees and ordinances were by the VTsIK
   and that they were thus endowed with Soviet legitimacy when they were
   sent to provincial soviet executive committees for transmission to all
   local soviets . . . To achieve that, Sverdlov had to reduce the 'Soviet
   Parliament' to nothing more than an 'administrative branch' (as
   Sukhanov put it) of the Sovnarkom. Using his position as the VTsIK
   chairman and his tight control over its praesidium and the large,
   disciplined and compliant Bolshevik majority in the plenary assembly,
   Sverdlov isolated the opposition and rendered it impotent. So
   successful was he that, by early December 1917, Sukhanov had already
   written off the VTsIK as 'a sorry parody of a revolutionary
   parliament,' while for the Bolshevik, Martin Latsis-Zurabs, the VTsIL
   was not even a good rubberstamp. Latsis campaigned vigorously in March
   and April 1918 for the VTsIK's abolition: with its 'idle, long-winded
   talk and its incapacity for productive work' the VTsIK merely held up
   the work of government, he claimed. And he may have had a point: during
   the period of 1917 to 1918, the Sovnarkom issued 474 decrees, the VTsIK
   a mere 62." [Israel Getzler, Soviets as Agents of Democratisation, p.
   27]

   This process was not an accident. Far from it. In fact, the Bolshevik
   chairman Sverdlov knew exactly what he was doing. This included
   modifying the way the CEC worked:

     "The structure of VTsIK itself began to change under Sverdlov. He
     began to use the presidium to circumvent the general meeting, which
     contained eloquent minority spokesmen . . . Sverdlov's used of the
     presidium marked a decisive change in the status of that body within
     the soviet hierarchy. In mid-1917 . . . [the] plenum had directed
     all activities and ratified bureau decisions which had a
     'particularly important social-political character.' The bureau . .
     . served as the executive organ of the VTsIK plenum . . . Only in
     extraordinary cases when the bureau could no be convened for
     technical reason could the presidium make decisions. Even then such
     actions remained subject to review by the plenum." [Charles Duval,
     "Yakov M. Sverdlov and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee
     of Soviets (VTsIK)", pp. 3-22, Soviet Studies, vol. XXXI, no. 1,
     January 1979, pp. 6-7]

   Under the Bolsheviks, the presidium was converted "into the de facto
   centre of power within VTsIK." It "began to award representations to
   groups and factions which supported the government. With the VTsIK
   becoming ever more unwieldy in size by the day, the presidium began to
   expand its activities." The presidium was used "to circumvent general
   meetings." Thus the Bolsheviks were able "to increase the power of the
   presidium, postpone regular sessions, and present VTsIK with policies
   which had already been implemented by the Sovnarkon. Even in the
   presidium itself very few people determined policy." [Charles Duval,
   Op. Cit., p.7, p. 8 and p. 18]

   So, from the very outset, the VTsIK was overshadowed by the "Council of
   People's Commissars" (CPC). In the first year, only 68 of 480 decrees
   issued by the CPC were actually submitted to the Soviet Central
   Executive Committee, and even fewer were actually drafted by it. The
   VTsIK functions "were never clearly delineated, even in the
   constitution, despite vigorous attempts by the Left SRs . . . that
   Lenin never saw this highest soviet organ as the genuine equal of his
   cabin and that the Bolsheviks deliberated obstructed efforts at
   clarification is [a] convincing" conclusion to draw. It should be
   stressed that this process started before the outbreak of civil war in
   late May, 1918. After that the All-Russian Congress of soviets, which
   convened every three months or so during the first year of the
   revolution, met annually thereafter. Its elected VTsIK "also began to
   meet less frequently, and at the height of the civil war in late 1918
   and throughout 1919, it never once met in full session." [Carmen
   Sirianni, Workers' Control and Socialist Democracy, pp. 203-4]

   The marginalisation of the soviets can be seen from the decision on
   whether to continue the war against Germany. As Cornelius Castoriadis
   notes, under Lenin "[c]ollectively, the only real instance of power is
   the Party, and very soon, only the summits of the Party. Immediately
   after the seizure of power the soviets as institutions are reduced to
   the status of pure window-dressing (we need only look at the fact that,
   already at the beginning of 1918 in the discussions leading up to the
   Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, their role was absolutely nil)." [The role
   of Bolshevik Ideology in the birth of the Bureaucracy, p. 97] In fact,
   on the 26th of February, 1918, the Soviet Executive "began a survey of
   200 local soviets; by 10 March 1918 a majority (105-95) had come out in
   favour of a revolutionary war, although the soviets in the two capitals
   voted . . . to accept a separate peace." [Geoffrey Swain, The Origins
   of the Russian Civil War, p. 128] This survey was ignored by the
   Bolshevik Central Committee which voted 4 against, 4 abstain and 5 for
   it. This took Russia out of the Great War but handed over massive areas
   to imperialist Germany. The controversial treaty was ratified at the
   Fourth Soviet Congress, unsurprisingly as the Bolshevik majority simply
   followed the orders of their Central Committee. It would be pointless
   to go over the arguments of the rights and wrongs of the decision here,
   the point is that the 13 members of the Bolshevik Central Committee
   decided the future faith of Russia in this vote. The soviets were
   simply ignored in spite of the fact it was possible to consult them
   fully. Clearly, "soviet power" meant little more than window-dressing
   for Bolshevik power.

   Thus, at the top summits of the state, the soviets had been
   marginalised by the Bolsheviks from day one. Far from having "all
   power" their CEC had given that to a Bolshevik government. Rather than
   exercise real power, it's basic aim was to control those who did
   exercise it. And the Bolsheviks successfully acted to undermine even
   this function.

   If this was happening at the top, what was the situation at the
   grassroots? Here, too, oligarchic tendencies in the soviets increased
   post-October, with "[e]ffective power in the local soviets relentlessly
   gravitated to the executive committees, and especially their presidia.
   Plenary sessions became increasingly symbolic and ineffectual." The
   party was "successful in gaining control of soviet executives in the
   cities and at uezd and guberniya levels. These executive bodies were
   usually able to control soviet congresses, though the party often
   disbanded congresses that opposed major aspects of current policies."
   Local soviets "had little input into the formation of national policy"
   and "[e]ven at higher levels, institutional power shifted away from the
   soviets." [C. Sirianni, Op. Cit., p. 204 and p. 203] The soviets
   quickly had become rubber-stamps for the Communist government, with the
   Soviet Constitution of 1918 codifying the centralisation of power and
   top-down decision making. Local soviets were expected to "carry out all
   orders of the respective higher organs of the soviet power" (i.e. to
   carry out the commands of the central government).

   This was not all. While having popular support in October 1917, the
   realities of "Leninism in power" soon saw a backlash develop. The
   Bolsheviks started to loose popular support to opposition groups like
   the Mensheviks and SRs (left and right). This growing opposition was
   reflected in two ways. Firstly, a rise in working class protests in the
   form of strikes and independent organisations. Secondly, there was a
   rise in votes for the opposition parties in soviet elections. Faced
   with this, the Bolsheviks responded in three ways, delaying elections.
   gerrymandering or force. We will discuss each in turn.

   Lenin argued in mid-April 1918 that the "socialist character of Soviet,
   i.e. proletarian, democracy" lies, in part, in because "the people
   themselves determine the order and time of elections." [The Immediate
   Tasks of the Soviet Government, pp. 36-7] However, the reality in the
   grassroots was somewhat different. There "the government [was]
   continually postponed the new general elections to the Petrograd
   Soviet, the term of which had ended in March 1918" because it "feared
   that the opposition parties would show gains. This fear was well
   founded since in the period immediately preceding 25 January, in those
   Petrograd factories where the workers had decided to hold new
   elections, the Mensheviks, SRs, and non-affiliated candidates had won
   about half the seats." [Samuel Farber, Before Stalinism, p. 22] In
   Yaroslavl, the more the Bolsheviks tried to postpone the elections, the
   more the idea of holding new elections became an issue itself." When
   the Bolsheviks gave in and held elections in early April, the
   Mensheviks won 47 of the 98 seats, the Bolsheviks 38 and the SRs 13.
   ["The Mensheviks' Political Comeback: The Elections to the Provincial
   City Soviets in Spring 1918", The Russian Review, vol. 42, pp. 1-50, p.
   18] The fate of the Yaroslavl soviet will be discussed shorted. As
   Geoffrey Swain summaries, Menshevik and SR "successes in recalling
   Bolshevik delegates from the soviets had forced the Bolsheviks
   increasingly to delay by-elections." [The Origins of the Russian Civil
   War, p. 91]

   As well as postponing elections and recall, the Bolsheviks also quickly
   turned to gerrymandering the soviets to ensure the stability of their
   majority in the soviets. In this they made use of certain institutional
   problems the soviets had had from the start. On the day which the
   Petrograd soviet was formed in 1917, the Bolshevik Shlyapnikov
   "proposed that each socialist party should have the right to two seats
   in the provisional executive committee of the soviet." This was
   "designed, initially, to give the Bolsheviks a decent showing, for they
   were only a small minority of the initiating group." It was agreed.
   However, the "result was that members of a dozen different parties and
   organisations (trades unions, co-operative movements, etc.) entered the
   executive committee. They called themselves 'representatives' (of their
   organisations) and, by virtue of this, they speedily eliminated from
   their discussions the committee members chosen by the general assembly
   although they were the true founders of the Soviet." This meant, for
   example, Bolshevik co-founders of the soviet made way for such people
   as Kamenev and Stalin. Thus the make-up of the soviet executive
   committee was decided upon by "the leadership of each organisation, its
   executive officers, and not with the [soviet] assembly. The assembly
   had lost its right to control." Thus, for example, the Bolshevik
   central committee member Yoffe became the presidium of the soviet of
   district committees without being elected by anyone represented at
   those soviets. "After October, the Bolsheviks were more systematic in
   their use of these methods, but there was a difference: there were now
   no truly free elections that might have put a brake to a procedure that
   could only benefit the Bolshevik party." [Marc Ferro, October 1917, p.
   191 and p. 195]

   The effects of this can be seen in Petrograd soviet elections of June
   1918. In these the Bolsheviks "lost the absolute majority in the soviet
   they had previously enjoyed" but remained its largest party. However,
   the results of these elections were irrelevant. This was because "under
   regulations prepared by the Bolsheviks and adopted by the 'old'
   Petrograd soviet, more than half of the projected 700-plus deputies in
   the 'new' soviet were to be elected by the Bolshevik-dominated district
   soviets, trade unions, factory committees, Red Army and naval units,
   and district worker conferences: thus, the Bolsheviks were assured of a
   solid majority even before factory voting began." [Alexander
   Rabinowitch, Early Disenchantment with Bolshevik Rule, p. 45] To be
   specific, the number of delegates elected directly from the workplace
   made up a mere third of the new soviet (i.e. only 260 of the 700 plus
   deputies in the new soviet were elected directly from the factories):
   "It was this arbitrary 'stacking' of the new soviet, much more than
   election of 'dead souls' from shut-down factories, unfair campaign
   practices, falsification of the vote, or direct repression, that gave
   the Bolsheviks an unfair advantage in the contest." [Alexander
   Rabinowitch, The Petrograd First City District Soviet during the Civil
   War, p. 140]

   In other words, the Bolsheviks gerrymandered and packed soviets to
   remain in power, so distorting the soviet structure to ensure Bolshevik
   dominance. This practice seems to have been commonplace. In Saratov, as
   in Petrograd, "the Bolsheviks, fearing that they would lose elections,
   changed the electoral rules . . . in addition to the delegates elected
   directly at the factories, the trade unions -- but only those in favour
   of soviet power, in other words supporters of the Bolsheviks and Left
   SRs -- were given representation. Similarly, the political parties
   supporting Soviet power automatically received twenty-five seats in the
   soviets. Needless to say, these rules heavily favoured the ruling
   parties" as the Mensheviks and SRs "were regarded by the Bolsheviks as
   being against Soviet power." [Brovkin, Op. Cit., p. 30]

   A similar situation existed in Moscow. For example, the largest single
   union in the soviet in 1920 was that of soviet employees with 140
   deputies (9% of the total), followed by the metal workers with 121
   (8%). In total, the bureaucracies of the four biggest trade unions had
   29.5% of delegates in the Moscow soviet. This packing of the soviet by
   the trade union bureaucracy existed in 1918 as well, ensuring the
   Bolsheviks were insulated from popular opposition and the recall of
   workplace delegates by their electors. Another form of gerrymandering
   was uniting areas of Bolshevik strength "for electoral purposes with
   places where they were weak, such as the creation of a single
   constituency out of the Moscow food administration (MPO) and the Cheka
   in February 1920." [Richard Sakwa, Soviet Communists in Power, p. 179
   and p. 178]

   However, this activity was mild compared to the Bolshevik response to
   soviet elections which did not go their way. According to one
   historian, by the spring of 1918 "Menshevik newspapers and activists in
   the trade unions, the Soviets, and the factories had made a
   considerable impact on a working class which was becoming increasingly
   disillusioned with the Bolshevik regime, so much so that in many places
   the Bolsheviks felt constrained to dissolve Soviets or prevent
   re-elections where Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries had gained
   majorities." [Israel Getzler, Martov, p. 179] This is confirmed by
   other sources. "By the middle of 1918," notes Leonard Schapiro, "the
   Mensheviks could claim with some justification that large numbers of
   the industrial working class were now behind them, and that for the
   systematic dispersal and packing of the soviets, and the mass arrests
   at workers' meetings and congresses, their party could eventually have
   won power by its policy of constitutional opposition. In the elections
   to the soviets which were taking place in the spring of 1918 throughout
   Russia, arrests, military dispersal, even shootings followed whenever
   Mensheviks succeeded in winning majorities or a substantial
   representation." [The Origin of the Communist Autocracy, p. 191]

   For example, the Mensheviks "made something of a comeback about Saratov
   workers in the spring of 1918, for which the Bolsheviks expelled them
   from the soviet." [Donald J. Raleigh, Experiencing Russia's Civil War,
   p. 187] Izhevsk, a town of 100,000 with an armaments industry which was
   the main suppliers of rifles to the Tzar's Army, experienced a swing to
   the left by the time of the October revolution. The Bolsheviks and
   SR-Maximalists became the majority and with a vote 92 to 58 for the
   soviet to assume power. After a revolt by SR-Maximalist Red Guards
   against the Bolshevik plans for a centralised Red Army in April, 1918,
   the Bolsheviks became the sole power. However, in the May elections the
   Mensheviks and [right] SRs "experienced a dramatic revival" and for
   "the first time since September 1917, these two parties constituted a
   majority in the Soviet by winning seventy of 135 seats." The Bolsheviks
   "simply refused to acquiesce to the popular mandate of the Mensheviks
   and Socialist Revolutionaries." In June, the Bolshevik leadership
   "appealed to the Karzan' Soviet . . . for assistance." The troops sent
   along with the Bolshevik dominated Red Guards "abrogated the results of
   the May and June elections" and imprisoned the SR and Menshevik soviet
   delegates. The summer of 1918 also saw victories for the SRs and
   Mensheviks in the soviet elections in Votkinsk, a steel town near
   Izhevsk. "As in Izhevsk the Bolsheviks voided the elections." [Stephan
   M. Merk, "The 'Class-Tragedy' of Izhevsk: Working Class Opposition to
   Bolshevism in 1918", pp. 176-90, Russian History, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 181
   and p. 186]

   However, the most in depth account of this destruction of soviet is
   found in the research of Vladimir Brovkin. According to him, there "are
   three factors" which emerge from the soviet election results in the
   spring of 1918. These are, firstly, "the impressive success of the
   Menshevik-SR opposition" in those elections in all regions in European
   Russia. The second "is the Bolshevik practice of outright disbandment
   of the Menshevik-SR-controlled soviets. The third is the subsequent
   wave of anti-Bolshevik uprisings." In fact, "in all provincial capitals
   of European Russia where elections were held on which there are data,
   the Mensheviks and the SRs won majorities on the city soviets in the
   spring of 1918." Brovkin stresses that the "process of the Menshevik-SR
   electoral victories threatened Bolshevik power. That is why in the
   course of the spring and summer of 1918, the soviet assemblies were
   disbanded in most cities and villages. To stay in power, the Bolsheviks
   had to destroy the soviets. . . These steps generated a far-reaching
   transformation in the soviet system, which remained 'soviet' in name
   only." Brovkin presents accounts from numerous towns and cities. As an
   example, he discusses Tver' where the "escalation of political tensions
   followed the already familiar pattern" as the "victory of the
   opposition at the polls" in April 1918 "brought about an
   intensification of the Bolshevik repression. Strikes, protests, and
   marches in Tver' lead to the imposition of martial law." [Brovkin, Op.
   Cit., p. 46, p. 47, p. 48 and p. 11] Thus Bolshevik armed force not
   only overthrew the election results, it also suppressed working class
   protest against such actions. (Brovkin's book The Mensheviks after
   October contains the same information as his article).

   This Bolshevik attack on the soviets usually started with attempts to
   stop new elections. For example, after a demonstration in Petrograd in
   favour of the Constituent Assembly was repressed by the Bolsheviks in
   mid-January 1918, calls for new elections to the soviet occurred in
   many factories. "Despite the efforts of the Bolsheviks and the Factory
   Committees they controlled, the movement for new elections to the
   soviet spread to more than twenty factories by early February and
   resulted in the election of fifty delegates: thirty-six SRs, seven
   Mensheviks and seven non-party." However, the Bolsheviks "unwillingness
   to recognise the elections and to seat new delegates pushed a group of
   Socialists to . . . lay plans for an alternative workers' forum . . .
   what was later to become the Assembly of Workers' Plenipotentiaries."
   [Scott Smith, "The Social-Revolutionaries and the Dilemma of Civil
   War", The Bolsheviks in Russian Society, pp. 83-104, Vladimir N.
   Brovkin (Ed.), pp. 85-86] This forum, like all forms of working class
   protest, was crushed by the Bolshevik state. By the time the elections
   were held, in June 1918, the civil war had started (undoubtedly
   favouring the Bolsheviks) and the Bolsheviks had secured their majority
   by packing the soviet with non-workplace "representatives."

   In Tula, again in the spring of 1918, local Bolsheviks reported to the
   Bolshevik Central Committee that the "Bolshevik deputies began to be
   recalled one after another . . . our situation became shakier with
   passing day. We were forced to block new elections to the soviet and
   even not to recognise them where they had taken place not in our
   favour." In the end, the local party leader was forced to abolish the
   city soviet and to vest power in the Provincial Executive Committee.
   This refused to convene a plenum of the city soviet for more than two
   months, knowing that newly elected delegates were non-Bolshevik.
   [Smith, Op. Cit., p. 87]

   In Yaroslavl', the newly elected soviet convened on April 9th, 1918,
   and when it elected a Menshevik chairman, "the Bolshevik delegation
   walked out and declared the soviet dissolved. In response, workers in
   the city went out on strike, which the Bolsheviks answered by arresting
   the strike committee and threatening to dismiss the strikers and
   replace them with unemployed workers." This failed and the Bolsheviks
   were forced to hold new elections, which they lost. Then "the
   Bolsheviks dissolved this soviet as well and places the city under
   martial law." A similar event occurred in Riazan' (again in April) and,
   again, the Bolsheviks "promptly dissolved the soviet and declared a
   dictatorship under a Military-Revolutionary Committee." [Op. Cit., pp.
   88-9]

   The opposition parties raised such issues at the All-Russian Central
   Executive Committee of Soviets (VTsIK), to little avail. On the 11th of
   April, one "protested that non-Bolshevik controlled soviets were being
   dispersed by armed force, and wanted to discuss the issue." The
   chairman "refus[ed] to include it in the agenda because of lack of
   supporting material" and such information be submitted to the presidium
   of the soviet. The majority (i.e. the Bolsheviks) "supported their
   chairman" and the facts were "submitted . . . to the presidium, where
   they apparently remained." It should be noted that the "same fate
   befell attempts to challenge the arrests of Moscow anarchists by the
   government on 12 April." The chairman's "handling of the anarchist
   matter ended its serious discussion in the VTsIK." [Charles Duval, Op.
   Cit., pp. 13-14] Given that the VTsIK was meant to be the highest
   soviet body between congresses, the lack of concern for Bolshevik
   repression against soviets and opposition groups clearly shows the
   Bolshevik contempt for soviet democracy.

   Needless to say, this destruction of soviet democracy continued during
   the civil war. For example, the Bolsheviks simply rejected the voice of
   people and would refuse to accept an election result. Emma Goldman
   attended an election meeting of bakers in Moscow in March, 1920. "It
   was," she said, "the most exciting gathering I had witnessed in
   Russia." However the "chosen representative, an Anarchist, had been
   refused his mandate by the Soviet authorities. It was the third time
   the workers gathered to re-elect their delegate . . . and every time
   they elected the same man. The Communist candidate opposing him was
   Semashko, the Commissar of the Department of Health . . . [who] raved
   against the workers for choosing a non-Communist, called anathema upon
   their heads, and threatened them with the Tcheka and the curtailment of
   their rations. But he had no effect on the audience except to emphasise
   their opposition to him, and to arouse antagonism against the party he
   represented. The workers' choice was repudiated by the authorities by
   the authorities and later even arrested and imprisoned." After a hunger
   strike, they were released. In spite of chekists with loaded guns
   attending union meetings, the bakers "would not be intimidated" and
   threatened a strike unless they were permitted to elect their own
   candidate. This ensured the bakers' demands were met. [My
   Disillusionment in Russia, pp. 88-9]

   Unsurprisingly, "there is a mass of evidence to support the Menshevik
   accusations of electoral malpractice" during elections in May 1920. And
   in spite of Menshevik "declaration of support for the Soviet regime
   against the Poles" the party was "still subject to harassment." [Skawa,
   Op. Cit., p. 178]

   This gerrymandering was not limited to just local soviets. The
   Bolsheviks used it at the fifth soviet congress as well.

   First, it should be noted that in the run up to the congress, "on 14
   June 1918, they expelled Martov and his five Mensheviks together with
   the Socialist Revolutionaries from the Central Executive Committee,
   closed down their newspapers . . and drove them underground, just on
   the eve of the elections to the Fifth Congress of Soviets in which the
   Mensheviks were expected to make significant gains." [Israel Getzler,
   Martov, p. 181] The rationale for this action was the claim that the
   Mensheviks had taken part in anti-soviet rebellions (as we discuss in
   [76]section 23, this was not true). The action was opposed by the Left
   SRs, who correctly questioned the legality of the Bolshevik expulsion
   of opposition groupings. They "branded the proposed expulsion bill
   illegal, since the Mensheviks and SRs had been sent to the CEC by the
   Congress of Soviets, and only the next congress had the right to
   withdraw their representation. Furthermore, the Bolsheviks had no right
   to pose as defenders of the soviets against the alleged SR
   counter-revolution when they themselves has been disbanding the
   peasants' soviets and creating the committees of the poor to replace
   them." [Brovkin, The Mensheviks After October, p. 231] When the vote
   was taken, only the Bolsheviks supported it. Their votes were
   sufficient to pass it.

   Given that the Mensheviks had been winning soviet elections across
   Russia, it is clear that this action was driven far more by political
   needs than the truth. This resulted in the Left Social Revolutionaries
   (LSRs) as the only significant party left in the run up to the fifth
   Congress. The LSR author (and ex-commissar for justice in the only
   coalition soviet government) of the only biography of LSR leader (and
   long standing revolutionary who suffered torture and imprisonment in
   her fight against Tsarism) Maria Spiridonova states that "[b]etween 900
   and 100 delegates were present. Officially the LSR numbered 40 percent
   of the delegates. They own opinion was that their number were even
   higher. The Bolsheviks strove to keep their majority by all the means
   in their power." He quotes Spiridonova's address to the Congress: "You
   may have a majority in this congress, but you do have not a majority in
   the country." [I. Steinberg, Spiridonova, p. 209]

   Historian Geoffrey Swain indicates that the LSRs had a point:

     "Up to the very last minute the Left SRs had been confident that, as
     the voice of Russia's peasant masses, they would receive a majority
     when the Fifth Congress of Soviets assembled . . . which would
     enable them to deprive Lenin of power and launch a revolutionary war
     against Germany. Between April and the end of June 1918 membership
     of their party had almost doubled, from 60,000 to 100,000, and to
     prevent them securing a majority at the congress Lenin was forced to
     rely on dubious procedures: he allowed so-called committees of poor
     peasants to be represented at the congress. Thus as late as 3 July
     1918 returns suggested a majority for the Left SRs, but a Congress
     of Committees of Poor Peasants held in Petrograd the same day
     'redressed the balance in favour of the Bolsheviks,' to quote the
     Guardian's Philips-Price, by deciding it had the right to represent
     the all those districts where local soviets had not been 'cleansed
     of kulak elements and had not delivered the amount of food laid down
     in the requisitioning lists of the Committees of Poor Peasants.'
     This blatant gerrymandering ensured a Bolshevik majority at the
     Fifth Congress of Soviets." [The Origins of the Russian Civil War,
     p. 176]

   Historian Alexander Rabinowitch confirms this gerrymandering. As he put
   it, by the summer of 1918 "popular disenchantment with Bolshevik rule
   was already well advanced, not only in rural but also in urban Russia"
   and the "primary beneficiaries of this nationwide grass-roots shift in
   public opinion were the Left SRs. During the second half of June 1918,
   it was an open question which of the two parties would have a majority
   at the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets . . . On the evening of 4
   July, virtually from the moment the Fifth Congress of Soviets opened in
   Moscow's Bolshoi Theatre, it was clear to the Left SRs that the
   Bolsheviks had effectively 'fabricated' a sizeable majority in the
   congress and consequently, that there was no hope whatever of utilising
   it to force a fundamental change in the government's pro-German,
   anti-peasant policies." While he acknowledges that an "exact breakdown
   of properly elected delegates may be impossible to ascertain" it was
   possible ("based on substantial but incomplete archival evidence") to
   conclude that "it is quite clear that the Bolshevik majority was
   artificially inflated and highly suspect." He quotes the report of one
   leading LSR, based on data from LSR members of the congress's
   Credentials Committee, saying that the Bolsheviks "conjured up" 299
   voting delegates. "The Bible tells us," noted the report's author,
   "that God created the heavens and the earth from nothing . . . In the
   twentieth century the Bolsheviks are capable of no lesser miracles: out
   of nothing, they create legitimate credentials." ["Maria Spiridonova's
   'Last Testament'", The Russian Review, pp. 424-46, vol. 54, July 1995,
   p. 426]

   This gerrymandering played a key role in the subsequent events.
   "Deprived of their democratic majority," Swain notes, "the Left SRs
   resorted to terror and assassinated the German ambassador Mirbach."
   [Swain, Op. Cit., p. 176] The LSR assassination of Mirbach and the
   events which followed were soon labelled by the Bolsheviks an
   "uprising" against "soviet power" (see [77]section 23 for more
   details). Lenin "decided that the killing of Mirbach provided a
   fortuitous opportunity to put an end to the growing Left SR threat."
   [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 427] After this, the LSRs followed the
   Mensheviks and Right SRs and were expelled from the soviets. This in
   spite of the fact that the rank and file knew nothing of the plans of
   the central committees and that their soviet delegates had been elected
   by the masses. The Bolsheviks had finally eliminated the last of their
   more left-wing opponents (the anarchists had been dealt with the in
   April, see [78]section 24 for details).

   As discussed in [79]section 21, the Committees of Poor Peasants were
   only supported by the Bolsheviks. Indeed, the Left SRs opposed then as
   being utterly counter-productive and an example of Bolshevik ignorance
   of village life. Consequently, we can say that the "delegates" from the
   committees were Bolsheviks or at least Bolshevik supporters.
   Significantly, by early 1919 Lenin admitted the Committees were
   failures and ordered them disbanded. The new policy reflected Left SR
   arguments against the Committees. It is hard not to concur with
   Vladimir Brovkin that by "establishing the committees of the poor to
   replace the [rural] soviets . . . the Bolsheviks were trying to create
   some institutional leverage of their own in the countryside for use
   against the SRs. In this light, the Bolshevik measures against the
   Menshevik-led city soviets . . . and against SR-led village soviets may
   be seen as a two-pronged attempt to stem the tide that threatened to
   leave them in the minority at the Fifth Congress of Soviets." [The
   Mensheviks after October, p. 226]

   Thus, by July 1918, the Bolsheviks had effectively secured a monopoly
   of political power in Russia. When the Bolsheviks (rightly, if
   hypocritically) disbanded the Constituent Assembly in January 1918,
   they had claimed that the soviets (rightly) represented a superior form
   of democracy. Once they started losing soviet elections, they could
   find no better way to "secure" workers' democracy than to destroy it by
   gerrymandering soviets, disbanding them and expelling opposition
   parties from them. All peaceful attempts to replace them had been
   destroyed. The soviet CEC was marginalised and without any real power.
   Opposition parties had been repressed, usually on little or no
   evidence. The power of the soviets had been replaced by a soviet power
   in less than a year. However, this was simply the culmination of a
   process which had started when the Bolsheviks seized power in November
   1917. Simply put, the Bolsheviks had always aimed for "all power to the
   party via the soviets" and once this had been achieved, the soviets
   could be dispensed with. Maurice Brinton simply stated the obvious when
   he wrote that "when institutions such as the soviets could no longer be
   influenced by ordinary workers, the regime could no longer be called a
   soviet regime." [The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control, p. xiii] By this
   obvious criteria, the Bolshevik regime was no longer soviet by the
   spring of 1918, i.e. before the outbreak of civil war. While opposition
   groups were not finally driven out of the soviets until 1923 (i.e.
   three years after the end of the civil war) their presence "does not
   indicate the existence of a multi-party system since they in no way
   threatened the dominating role of the Bolsheviks, and they had not done
   so from mid-1918." [Richard Sakwa, Op. Cit., p. 168]

   Tony Cliff, leader of the British Leninist party the SWP, justified the
   repression of the Mensheviks and SRs on the grounds that they were not
   prepared to accept the Soviet system and rejected the role of
   "constitutional opposition." He tries to move forward the repression
   until after the outbreak of full civil war by stating that "[d]espite
   their strong opposition to the government, for some time, i.e. until
   after the armed uprising of the Czechoslovakian Legion [in late May,
   1918] -- the Mensheviks were not much hampered in their propaganda
   work." If having papers banned every now and then, members arrested and
   soviets being disbanded as soon as they get a Menshevik majority is
   "not much hampered" then Cliff does seem to be giving that phrase a new
   meaning. Similarly, Cliff's claim that the "civil war undermined the
   operation of the local soviets" also seems lacking based on this new
   research. [Lenin: Revolution Besieged, vol. 3, p. 163, p. 167 and p.
   150]

   However, the Bolshevik assault on the soviets started during the spring
   of 1918 (i.e. in March, April and May). That is before the Czech rising
   and the onset of full scale civil war which occurred in late May (see
   [80]section 3 of the appendix on [81]"What caused the degeneration of
   the Russian Revolution?" on Bolshevik repression before the Czech
   revolt). Nor is it true that the Mensheviks rejected constitutional
   methods. Though they wished to see a re-convocation of the Constituent
   Assembly they believed that the only way to do this was by winning a
   majority of the soviets (see [82]section 23). Clearly, attempts to
   blame the Civil War for the elimination of soviet power and democracy
   seems woefully weak given the actions of the Bolsheviks in the spring
   of 1918. And, equally clearly, the reduction of local soviet influence
   cannot be fully understood without factoring in the Bolshevik prejudice
   in favour of centralisation (as codified in the Soviet Constitution of
   1918) along with this direct repression.

   The simple fact is that the soviets were marginalised and undermined
   after the October Revolution simply because they did reflect the wishes
   of the working class, in spite of their defects (defects the Bolsheviks
   exploited to consolidate their power). The problem was that the workers
   no longer supported Lenin. Few Leninists would support such an obvious
   conclusion. For example, John Rees states that "[i]n the cities the
   Reds enjoyed the fierce and virtually undivided loyalty of the masses
   throughout the civil war period." ["In Defence of October", pp. 3-82,
   International Socialism, no. 52, p. 47] Which, of course, explains the
   vast number of strikes and protests directed against the Bolshevik
   regime and the workers' resolutions calling its end! It also explains
   why the Bolsheviks, in the face of such "undivided loyalty", had to
   suppress opposition parties and impose a party dictatorship!

   Simply put, if the Bolsheviks did have the support Rees states they did
   then they had no need to repress soviet democracy and opposition
   parties. Such "fierce" loyalty would not have been amenable to
   opposition arguments. Strange, then, that the Bolsheviks continually
   explained working class unrest in terms of the influence of Mensheviks,
   Left SRs and so on during the civil war. Moreover, Rees contradicts
   himself by arguing that if the Kronstadt revolt had succeeded, then it
   would have resulted in "the fall of the Bolsheviks." [Op. Cit., p. 63]
   Now, given that the Kronstadt revolt called for free soviet elections
   (and not "soviets without parties" as Rees asserts), why did the
   Bolsheviks not agree to them (at least in the cities)? If, as Rees
   argues, the Reds had the fierce loyalty of the city workers, then why
   did the Bolsheviks not introduce soviet democracy in the cities after
   the end of the Civil War? Simply because they knew that such "loyalty"
   did not, in fact, exist. Zinoviev, for example, declared that the
   Bolsheviks' support had been reduced to 1 per cent in early 1920.
   [Farber, Before Stalinism, p. 188]

   So much for working class "loyalty" to the Bolsheviks. And, needless to
   say, Rees' comments totally ignore the election results before the
   start of the civil war which prompted the Bolsheviks to pack or disband
   soviets. As Bertrand Russell summarised from his experiences in Lenin's
   Russia during the civil war (in 1920): "No conceivable system of free
   elections would give majorities to the Communists, either in the town
   or country." [The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism, pp. 40-1] Thus we
   have a major contradiction in the pro-Leninist argument. On the one
   hand, they stress that the workers supported the Bolsheviks
   wholeheartedly during the civil war. On the other, they argue that
   party dictatorship had to be imposed. If the Bolsheviks had the support
   they claimed they had, then they would have won soviet elections
   easily. They did not and so free soviet elections were not held.

   This fact also explains the fate of the so-called "non party"
   conferences favoured by the Bolsheviks in late 1920. In spite of
   praising the soviets as "more democratic" than anything in the "best
   democratic republics of the bourgeois world," Lenin also argued that
   non-Party conferences were also required "to be able to watch the mood
   of the masses, to come closer to them, to respond to their demands."
   [Left-Wing Communism, p. 33 and p. 32] If the soviets were as
   democratic as Lenin claimed, then the Bolsheviks would have no need of
   "non-party" conferences. Significantly, the Bolsheviks "responded" to
   these conferences and "their demands" by disbanding them. This was
   because "[d]uring the disturbances" of late 1920, "they provided an
   effective platform for criticism of Bolshevik policies." Their
   frequency was decreased and they "were discontinued soon afterward."
   [Richard Sakwa, Soviet Communists in Power, p. 203] In other words,
   they meet the same fate as the soviets in the spring and summer of
   1918.

   Perhaps we should not be too surprised by these developments. After
   all, as we discuss in [83]section 8 of the appendix on [84]"How did
   Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure of the Revolution?", the
   Bolsheviks had long had a distinctly undemocratic political ideology.
   Their support for democratic norms were less than consistent. The one
   thing they were consistent was their hypocrisy. Thus democratic
   decisions were to be binding on their opponents (even if that majority
   had to be manipulated into being) but not upon them. Before the
   revolution Lenin had openly espoused a double standard of discipline.
   "We will not permit," he argued, "the idea of unity to tie a noose
   around our necks, and we shall under no circumstances permit the
   Mensheviks to lead us by the rope." [quoted by Robert V. Daniels, The
   Conscience of the Revolution, p. 17] Once in power, their political
   perspectives had little trouble ignoring the will of the working class
   when it classed with what they, as that class's self-proclaimed
   vanguard, had decided what was in its best interests. As we discussed
   in [85]section H.5, such a autocratic perspective is at the heart of
   vanguardism. If you aim for party power, it comes as no surprise that
   the organs used to achieve it will wither under it. Just as muscles
   only remain strong if you use them, so soviets can only work if it is
   used to run society, not nominate the handful of party leaders who do.
   As Kropotkin argued in 1920:

     "The idea of soviets . . . of councils of workers and peasants . . .
     controlling the economic and political life of the country is a
     great idea. All the more so, since it necessarily follows that these
     councils should be composed of all who take part in the production
     of natural wealth by their own efforts.

     "But as long as the country is governed by a party dictatorship, the
     workers' and peasants' councils evidently lose their entire
     significance. They are reduced to . . . [a] passive role . . . A
     council of workers ceases to be free and of any use when liberty of
     the press no longer exists . . . [and they] lose their significance
     when the elections are not preceded by a free electoral campaign,
     and when the elections are conducted under pressure of a party
     dictatorship . . . It means the death-knell of the new system."
     [Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets, pp. 254-5]

   Clearly, the fate of the soviets after October shows the dangers of
   Bolshevism to popular self-management and autonomy. We should be try
   and learn the lessons from the experience rather than, as
   pro-Bolsheviks do, rationalise and justify the usurpation of power by
   the party. The most obvious lesson to learn is to oppose the creation
   of any power above the soviets. This was not lost on Russian anarchists
   active in the revolution. For this reason, anarcho-syndicalists
   resolved, in August 1918, that they "were for the soviets but
   categorically against the Soviet of People's Commissars as an organ
   which does not stem from the soviet structure but only interferes with
   its work." Thus they were "for the establishment of free soviets of
   workers' and peasants' representatives, and the abolition of the Soviet
   of People's Commissars as an organisation inimical to the interests of
   the working class." [contained in Paul Avrich, The Anarchists in the
   Russian Revolution, p. 118 and p. 117] This resolution was driven by
   the experience of the Bolshevik dominated "soviet" regime.

   It is also worth quoting Rudolf Rocker at length on this issue:

     "Let no one object that the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' cannot
     be compared to run of the mill dictatorship because it is the
     dictatorship of a class. Dictatorship of a class cannot exist as
     such, for it ends up, in the last analysis, as being the
     dictatorship of a given party which arrogates to itself the right to
     speak for that class. Thus, the liberal bourgeoisie, in their fight
     against despotism, used to speak in the name of the 'people'. . .

     "We already know that a revolution cannot be made with rosewater.
     And we know, too, that the owning classes will never yield up their
     privileges spontaneously. On the day of victorious revolution the
     workers will have to impose their will on the present owners of the
     soil, of the subsoil and of the means of production, which cannot be
     done -- let us be clear on this -- without the workers taking the
     capital of society into their own hands, and, above all, without
     their having demolished the authoritarian structure which is, and
     will continue to be, the fortress keeping the masses of the people
     under dominion. Such an action is, without doubt, an act of
     liberation; a proclamation of social justice; the very essence of
     social revolution, which has nothing in common with the utterly
     bourgeois principle of dictatorship.

     "The fact that a large number of socialist parties have rallied to
     the idea of councils, which is the proper mark of libertarian
     socialist and revolutionary syndicalists, is a confession,
     recognition that the tack they have taken up until now has been the
     product of a falsification, a distortion, and that with the councils
     the labour movement must create for itself a single organ capable of
     carrying into effect the unmitigated socialism that the conscious
     proletariat longs for. On the other hand, it ought not to be
     forgotten that this abrupt conversion runs the risk of introducing
     many alien features into the councils concept, features, that is,
     with no relation to the original tasks of socialism, and which have
     to be eliminated because they pose a threat to the further
     development of the councils. These alien elements are able only to
     conceive things from the dictatorial viewpoint. It must be our task
     to face up to this risk and warn our class comrades against
     experiments which cannot bring the dawn of social emancipation any
     nearer -- which indeed, to the contrary, positively postpone it.

     "Consequently, our advice is as follows: Everything for the councils
     or soviets! No power above them! A slogan which at the same time
     will be that of the social revolutionary."
     [Anarchism and Sovietism]

   The validity of this argument can be seen, for example, from the
   expulsion of opposition parties from the soviets in June and July 1918.
   This act exposes the hollowness of Bolshevik claims of their soviet
   system presented a form of "higher" democracy. If the Bolshevik soviet
   system was, as they claimed, based on instant recall then why did they,
   for example, have to expel the Mensheviks and Right SRs from the soviet
   CEC in the first place? Why did the electors not simply recall them? It
   was two weeks after the Czech revolt before the Bolsheviks acted,
   surely enough time for voters to act? Perhaps this did not happen
   because the CEC was not, in fact, subject to instant recall at all?
   Being nominated at the quarterly soviet congress, they were effectively
   isolated from popular control. It also means that the Bolshevik
   government was even more insulated from popular control and
   accountability. To "recall" it, electors would have to either wait for
   the next national soviet congress or somehow convince the CEC to call
   an emergency one. As an example of workers' running society, the
   Bolshevik system leaves much to be desired.

   Another obvious lesson to learn was the use of appointments to the
   soviets and their executives from other organisations. As seen above,
   the Bolsheviks used the "representation" of other bodies they control
   (such as trade unions) to pack soviet assemblies in their favour.
   Similarly, allowing political parties to nominate representatives in
   soviet executives also marginalised the soviet assemblies and those
   delegates actually elected in the workplaces.

   This was obvious to the Russian anarchists, who argued "for effective
   soviets organised on collective lines with the direct delegation of
   workers and peasants from every factory, workshop, village, etc., and
   not political chatterboxes gaining entry through party lists and
   turning the soviets into talking shops." [contained in Paul Avrich, The
   Anarchists in the Russian Revolution, p. 118] The Makhnovists,
   likewise, argued that "[o]nly labourers who are contributing work
   necessary to the social economy should participate in the soviets.
   Representatives of political organisations have no place in
   worker-peasant soviets, since their participation in a workers' soviet
   will transform the latter into deputies of the party and can lead to
   the downfall of the soviet system." [contained in Peter Arshinov's
   History of the Makhnovist Movement, p. 266] As we discuss in
   [86]section 15 of the appendix on [87]"Why does the Makhnovist movement
   show there is an alternative to Bolshevism?", Leninists sometimes
   distort this into a claim that the Makhnovists opposed members of
   political standing for election.

   This use of party lists meant that soviet delegates could be anyone.
   For example, the leading left-wing Menshevik Martov recounts that in
   early 1920 Bolsheviks in a chemical factory "put up Lenin against me as
   a candidate [to the Moscow soviet]. I received seventy-six votes
   he-eight (in an open vote)." [quoted by Israel Getzler, Martov, p. 202]
   How would either of these two intellectuals actually know and reflect
   the concerns and interests of the workers they would be "delegates" of?
   If the soviets were meant to be the delegates of working people, then
   why should non-working class members of political parties be elected to
   a soviet?

   However, in spite of these problems, the Russian soviets were a key
   means of ensuring working class participation in the revolution. As
   recognised by all the socialist oppositions to the Bolsheviks, from the
   anarchists to the Mensheviks. As one historian put it:

     "Small wonder that the principal political demand of Mensheviks,
     Left SRs, SR Maximalists, Kronstadt sailors and of many
     oppositionists . . . has been for freely elected soviets which would
     this be restored to their original role as agents of
     democratisation." [Israel Getzler, Soviets as Agents of
     Democratisation, p. 30]

   The sad fate of the soviets after the Bolshevik seizure of power simply
   confirms the opinion of the left Menshevik Martov who had "rubbed it in
   to the Bolsheviks . . . at the first All-Russian Congress of Trade
   Unions [in January 1918], that they who were now extolling the Soviets
   as the 'highest forms of the socialist development of the proletariat,'
   had shown little love of them in 1905 or in 1917 after the July days;
   they loved Soviets only when they were 'in the hands of the Bolshevik
   party.'" [Getlzer, Martov, p. 174] As the next few months showed, once
   the soviets left those hands, then the soviets themselves were
   destroyed. The civil war did not start this process, it just gave the
   latter-day supporters of Bolshevism something to use to justify these
   actions.

7 How did the factory committee movement develop?

8 What was the Bolshevik position on "workers' control" in 1917?

9 What happened to the factory committees after October?

10 What were the Bolshevik economic policies in 1918?

11 Did Bolshevik economic policies work?

12 Was there an alternative to Lenin's "state capitalism" and "war communism"?

13 Did the Bolsheviks allow independent trade unions?

14 Was the Red Army really a revolutionary army?

15 Was the Red Army "filled with socialist consciousness"?

16 How did the civil war start and develop?

17 Was the civil war between just Reds and Whites?

18 How extensive was imperialist intervention?

19 Did the end of the civil war change Bolshevik policies?

20 Can the Red Terror and the Cheka be justified?

21 Did Bolshevik peasant policies work?

22 Was there an alternative to grain requisition?

23 Was the repression of the socialist opposition justified?

24 What did the anarchists do during the revolution?

25 Did the Russian revolution refute anarchism?

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