  Why does the Makhnovist movement show there is an alternative to Bolshevism?

   The key Leninist defence of the actions of the Bolsheviks in the
   Russian revolution is that they had no other choice. Complaints against
   the Bolshevik attacks on the gains of the revolution and the
   pro-revolutionary Left in Russia are met with a mantra involving the
   white terror, the primitive state of Russia and the reactionary
   peasantry, the invading imperialist armies (although the actual number
   can, and does, vary depending on who you are talking to) and other such
   "forces of nature" which we are to believe could only be met by a
   centralised authoritarian regime that would flinch at nothing in order
   to survive.

   However, this is not the case. This is for three reasons.

   Firstly, there is the slight problem that many of the attacks on the
   revolution (disbanding soviets, undermining the factory committees,
   repressing socialists and anarchists, and so on) started before the
   start of the civil war. As such, its difficult to blame the
   degeneration of the revolution on an event which had yet to happen (see
   [1]section 3 of the appendix [2]"What caused the degeneration of the
   Russian Revolution?" for details).

   Secondly, Leninists like to portray their ideology as "realistic," that
   it recognises the problems facing a revolution and can provide the
   necessary solutions. Some even claim, flying in the face of the facts,
   that anarchists think the ruling class will just "disappear" (see
   [3]section H.2.1 ) or that we think "full-blown" communism will appear
   "overnight" (see [4]section H.2.5). Only Bolshevism, it is claimed,
   recognises that civil war is inevitable during a revolution and only it
   provides the necessary solution, namely a "workers state." Lenin
   himself argued that "[n]ot a single great revolution in history has
   escaped civil war. No one who does not live in a shell could imagine
   that civil war is conceivable without exceptionally complicated
   circumstances." [Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power?, p. 81] As such,
   its incredulous that modern day followers of Lenin blame the
   degeneration of the Russian Revolution on the very factors (civil war
   and exceptional circumstances) that they claim to recognise an
   inevitable!

   Thirdly, and even more embarrassingly for the Leninists, numerous
   examples exist both from revolutionary Russia at the time and from
   earlier and later revolutions that suggest far from Bolshevik tactics
   being the most efficient way of defending the revolution other methods
   existed which looked to the massive creative energies of the working
   masses unleashed by the revolution.

   During the Russian Revolution the biggest example of this is found in
   South-Eastern Ukraine. For much of the Civil War this area operated
   without a centralised state apparatus of the Bolshevik type and was,
   instead, based on the anarchist idea of Free Soviets. There "the
   insurgents raised the black flag of anarchism and set forth on the
   anti-authoritarian road of the free organisation of the workers."
   [Arshinov, The History of the Makhnovist Movement, p. 50] The space in
   which this happened was created by a partisan force that instead of
   using the "efficiency" of executions for desertion, tsarist officers
   appointed over the rank and file soldiers' wishes and saluting so loved
   by the Bolsheviks instead operated as a volunteer army with elected
   officers and voluntary discipline. This movement was the Makhnovists,
   named after its leader, the Ukrainian anarchist Nestor Makhno. The
   Black Flag which floated over the lead wagon of the Insurgent Army was
   inscribed with the slogans "Liberty or Death" and "The Land to the
   Peasants, the Factories to the Workers." These slogans summarised what
   the Makhnovist were fighting for -- a libertarian socialist society. At
   its height in the autumn of 1919, the Maknovists numbered around 40,000
   and its extended area of influence corresponded to nearly one third of
   the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, comprising a population of over seven
   million.

   It is this that explains the importance of the Makhnovists. As
   historian Christopher Reed notes, the "Bolsheviks' main claim to
   legitimacy rested on the argument that they were the only ones capable
   of preventing a similar disaster [counter-revolution] for the workers
   and peasants of Russia and that their harsh methods were necessary in
   the face of a ruthless and unrelenting enemy." However, Reed argues
   that "the Makhno movement in the Ukraine suggests that there was more
   than one way to fight against the counter-revolution." [From Tsar to
   Soviets, pp. 258-9] This is why the Makhnovist movement is so
   important, why it shows that there was, and is, an alternative to the
   ideas of Bolshevism. Here we have a mass movement operating in the same
   "exceptional circumstances" as the Bolsheviks which did not implement
   the same policies. Indeed, rather than suppress soviet, workplace and
   military democracy in favour of centralised, top-down party power and
   modify their political line to justify their implementation of party
   dictatorship, the Makhnovists did all they could to implement and
   encourage working-class self-government.

   As such, it is difficult to blame the development of Bolshevik policies
   towards state-capitalist and party-dictatorship directions on the
   problems caused during the revolution when the Makhnovists, facing
   similar conditions, did all they could to protect working- class
   autonomy and freedom. Indeed, it could be argued that the problems
   facing the Makhnovists were greater in many ways. The Ukraine probably
   saw more fighting in the Russian Civil War then any other area. Unlike
   the Bolsheviks, the Makhnovists lost the centre of their movement and
   had to re-liberate it. To do so they fought the Austrian and German
   armies, Ukrainian Nationalists, Bolsheviks and the White Armies of
   Denikin and then Wrangel. There were smaller skirmishes involving
   Cossacks returning to the Don and independent "Green" bands. The
   anarchists fought all these various armies over the four years their
   movement was in existence. This war was not only bloody but saw
   constant shifts of fronts, advances and retreats and changes from near
   conventional war to mobile partisan war. The consequences of this was
   that no area of the territory was a safe "rear" area for any period of
   time and so little constructive activity was possible. [5]Section 4
   presents a summary of the military campaigns of these years. A brief
   idea of the depth of fighting in these years can be seen by considering
   the town at the centre of the Makhnovists, Hulyai Pole which changed
   hands no less then 16 times in the period from 1917-1921.

   Clearly, in terms of conflict (and the resulting disruption caused by
   it), the Makhnovists did not have the relative peace the Bolsheviks had
   (who never once lost their main bases of Petrograd or Moscow, although
   they came close). As such, the problems used to justify the repressive
   and dictatorial policies of the Bolsheviks also apply to the
   Makhnovists. Despite this, the activity of the Makhnovists in the
   Ukraine demonstrated that an alternative to the supposedly necessary
   methods of the Bolsheviks did exist. Where the Bolsheviks suppressed
   freedom of speech, assembly and press, the Makhnovists encouraged it.
   Where the Bolsheviks turned the soviets into mere cyphers of their
   government and undermined soviet power, the Makhnovists encouraged
   working-class participation and free soviets. As we discuss in
   [6]section 7, the Makhnovists applied their ideas of working class
   self-management whenever and wherever they could.

   Sadly, the Makhnovist movement is a relatively unknown event during the
   revolution. There are few non-anarchist accounts of it and the few
   histories which do mention it often simply slander it. However, as the
   Cohn-Bendit brothers correctly argue, the movement, "better perhaps
   than any other movement, shows that the Russian Revolution could have
   been a great liberating force." Equally, the reason why it has been
   almost totally ignored (or slandered, when mentioned) by Stalinist and
   Trotskyist writers is simple: "It shows the Bolsheviks stifling workers
   and peasants with lies and calumnies, and then crushing them in a
   bloody massacre." [Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, Obsolete Communism:
   The Left-Wing Alternative, p. 200]

   This section of our FAQ will indicate the nature and history of this
   important social movement. As we will prove, "the Makhnovshchina . . .
   was a true popular movement of peasants and workers, and . . . its
   essential goal was to establish the freedom of workers by means of
   revolutionary self-activity on the part of the masses." [Arshinov, The
   History of the Makhnovist Movement, p. 209] They achieved this goal in
   extremely difficult circumstances and resisted all attempts to limit
   the freedom of the working class, no matter where it came from. As
   Makhno himself once noted:

     "Our practice in the Ukraine showed clearly that the peasant problem
     had very different solutions from those imposed by Bolshevism. If
     our experience had spread to the rest of Russia, a pernicious
     division between country and city would not have been created. Years
     of famine would have been avoided and useless struggles between
     peasant and workers. And what is more important, the revolution
     would have grown and developed along very different lines . . . We
     were all fighters and workers. The popular assembly made the
     decisions. In military life it was the War Committee composed of
     delegates of all the guerrilla detachments which acted. To sum up,
     everyone took part in the collective work, to prevent the birth of a
     managing class which would monopolise power. And we were successful.
     Because we had succeeded and gave lie to Bolshevik bureaucratic
     practices, Trotsky, betraying the treaty between the Ukraine and the
     Bolshevik authorities, sent the Red Army to fight us. Bolshevism
     triumphed militarily over the Ukraine and at Kronstadt, but
     revolutionary history will acclaim us one day and condemn the
     victors as counter-revolutionary grave-diggers of the Russian
     Revolution." [quoted by Abel Paz, Durruti: The People Armed, p.
     88-9]

   Two distinct aspects of the anarchist movement existed in the Ukraine
   at this time, a political and non-military structure called the Nabat
   (Alarm) federation which operated through the soviets and collectives
   and a military command structure usually known after is commander
   Nestor Makhno as the Makhnovshchina
   (which means the "Makhno movement") although its proper name was the
   Revolutionary Insurgent Army of the Ukraine. This section of the FAQ
   will cover both, although the Makhnovshchina will be the main focus.

   For more information on the Makhnovist movement, consult the following
   books. Anarchist accounts of the movement can be found in Peter
   Arshinov's excellent The History of the Makhnovist Movement and
   Voline's The Unknown Revolution (Voline's work is based on extensive
   quotes from Arshinov's work, but does contain useful additional
   material). For non-anarchist accounts, Michael Malet's Nestor Makhno in
   the Russian Revolution is essential reading as it contains useful
   information on both the history of the movement, its social basis and
   political ideas. Malet considers his work as a supplement to Michael
   Palij's The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 1918-1921 which is primarily a
   military account of the movement but which does cover some of its
   social and political aspects. Unfortunately, both books are rare. Paul
   Avrich's The Russian Anarchists contains a short account of the
   movement and his Anarchist Portraits has a chapter on Nestor Makhno.
   Makhnovist source material is included in Avrich's The Anarchists in
   the Russian Revolution. Daniel Guerin includes a section on Makhno and
   the Makhnovist Movement in volume 2 of No Gods, No Masters. As well as
   extracts from Arshinov's book, it has various manifestos from the
   movement as well as Makhno's account of his meeting with Lenin.
   Christopher Read's From Tsar to Soviets has an excellent section on the
   Makhnovists. Serge Cipko presents an excellent overview of works on the
   Makhnovists in his "Nestor Makhno: A Mini-Historiography of the
   Anarchist Revolution in Ukraine, 1917-1921" (The Raven, no. 13).
   Alexander Skirda presents an overview of perestroika soviet accounts of
   Makhno in his essay "The Rehabilitation of Makhno" (The Raven, no. 8).
   Skirda's biography Nestor Makhno: Le Cosaque de l'anarchie is by far
   the best account of the movement available.

   Lastly, a few words on names. There is a large variation on the
   spelling of names within the source material. For example, Makhno's
   home town has been translated as Gulyai Pole, Gulyai Polye Huliai-Pole
   and Hulyai Pole. Similarly, with other place names. The bandit
   Grigor'ev has been also translated as Hryhor'iv and Hryhoriyiv. We
   generally take Michael Malet's translations of names as a basis (i.e.
   we use Hulyai Pole and Hryhoriyiv, for example).

1 Who was Nestor Makhno?

   The Makhnovist movement was named after Nestor Makhno, a Ukrainian
   anarchist who played a key role in the movement from the start. Indeed,
   Makhnoshchina literally means "Makhno movement" and his name is forever
   linked with the revolution in the South-East of the Ukraine. So who was
   Makhno?

   Nestor Ivanovich Makhno was born on the 27th of October, 1889 in Hulyai
   Pole, which is situated in Katerynoslav province, in the south east of
   the Ukraine between the Dnieper River and the Sea of Azov. While it
   seems to be conventional for many historians to call Hulyai Pole a
   "village," it was in fact a town with a population of about 30,000 and
   boasted several factories and schools.

   Makhno was the son of a poor peasant family. His father died when he
   was ten months old, leaving him and his four brothers in the care of
   their mother. Due to the extreme poverty of his family, he had to start
   work as a shepherd at the age of seven. At eight he started to attend
   the Second Hulyai Pole primary school in winter and worked for local
   landlords during the summer. He left school when he was twelve and took
   up full-time employment as a farmhand on the estates of nobles and on
   the farms of the German colonist kulaks. At the age of seventeen, he
   started to work in Hulyai Pole itself, first as an apprentice painter,
   then as an unskilled worker in a local iron foundry and, finally, as a
   founder in the same establishment.

   It was when he was working in the iron foundry that he became involved
   in revolutionary politics. In the stormy years following the 1905
   revolution, Makhno got involved in revolutionary politics. This
   decision was based on his experiences of injustice at work and seeing
   the terror of the Russian regime during the 1905 events (in Hulyai Pole
   there had been no serious disorder, yet the regime sent a detachment of
   mounted police to suppress gatherings and meetings in the town,
   terrorising the population by whipping those caught in the streets and
   beating prisoners with rifle butts). In 1906, Makhno decided to join
   the anarchist group in Hulyai Pole (which had been formed the previous
   year and consisted mainly of sons of poorer peasants).

   At the end of 1906 and in 1907, Makhno was arrested and accused of
   political assassinations, but was released due to lack of evidence. In
   1908, due to the denunciation of a police spy within the anarchist
   group, he was arrested and put in jail. In March, 1910, Makhno and
   thirteen others were tried by a military court and sentenced to death
   by hanging. Due to his youth and the efforts of his mother, the death
   penalty was commuted to life imprisonment with hard labour. He served
   his time at the Butyrki prison in Moscow, resisting the prison
   authorities by every means available to him. Due to this resistance, he
   spent much of his time in chains or in damp and freezing confinement.
   This experience ensured that Makhno developed an intense hatred of
   prisons (later, during the revolution, his first act in entering a town
   or city was to release all prisoners and destroy the prison).

   It was during his time in Butykri that Makhno met Peter Arshinov, a
   fellow anarchist prisoner and later activist and historian of the
   Makhnovist movement. Arshinov was born in 1887 in the Ukrainian
   industrial town of Katerinoslav. His father was a factory worker and he
   was a metal worker. Originally a Bolshevik, he had become an anarchist
   in 1906, taking a leading part in organising factory workers and
   actions against the regime. In 1907 he was arrested and sentenced to
   death, escaping to Western Europe. In 1909, he returned to Russia and
   was again arrested and again escaped. In 1910, he was arrested and
   placed in the Butykri prison where he met Makhno. The two anarchists
   established a close personal and political friendship, with Arshinov
   helping Makhno develop and deepen his anarchist ideas.

   On March 2nd, 1917, after eight years and eight months in prison,
   Makhno was released along with all other political prisoners as a
   result of the February Revolution. After spending three weeks in Moscow
   with the Moscow anarchists, Makhno returned to Hulyai Pole. As the only
   political prisoner who was returned to his family by the revolution,
   Makhno became very well-respected in his home town. After years of
   imprisonment, suffering but learning, Makhno was no longer an
   inexperienced young activist, but a tested anarchist militant with both
   a powerful will and strong ideas about social conflict and
   revolutionary politics. Ideas which he immediately set about applying.

   Once home in Hulyai Pole, Makhno immediately devoted himself to
   revolutionary work. Unsurprisingly, the remaining members of the
   anarchist group, as well as many peasants, came to visit him. After
   discussing ideas with them, Makhno proposed beginning organisational
   work immediately in order to strengthen links between the peasants in
   Hulyai Pole and its region with the anarchist group. On March 28-29, a
   Peasant Union was created with Makhno as its chairman. Subsequently, he
   organised similar unions in other villages and towns in the area.
   Makhno also played a large part in a successful strike by wood and
   metal workers at a factory owned by his old boss (this defeat led to
   the other bosses capitulating to the workers as well). At the same
   time, peasants refused to pay their rent to the landlords. [Michael
   Malet, Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War, p. 4] Regional
   assemblies of peasants were called, both at Hulyai Pole and elsewhere,
   and on August 5-7, the provincial congress at Katerinoslav decided to
   reorganise the Peasant Unions into Soviets of Peasants' and Workers'
   Deputies.

   In this way, "Makhno and his associates brought socio-political issues
   into the daily life of the people, who in turn supported his efforts,
   hoping to expedite the expropriation of large estates." [Michael Palij,
   The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, p. 71] In Hulyai Pole, the revolution
   was moving faster than elsewhere (for example, while the Aleksandrovsk
   soviet supported the actions of the Provisional Government during the
   July days in Petrograd, a meeting in Hulyai Pole saluted the rebellious
   soldiers and workers). Peasants were drawn to Hulyai Pole for advice
   and help from the neighbouring volosts (administrative districts). The
   peasantry wanted to seize the land of the large landowners and the
   kulaks (rich peasants). Makhno presented this demand at the first
   sessions of the regional Soviet, which were held in Hulyai Pole. In
   August, Makhno called all the local landlords and rich peasants
   (kulaks) together and all documents concerning ownership (of land,
   livestock and equipment) were taken from them. An inventory of this
   property was taken and reported to the session of the local soviet and
   then at a regional meeting. It was agreed that all land, livestock and
   equipment was to be divided equally, the division to include the former
   owners. This was the core of the agrarian program of the movement,
   namely the liquidation of the property of the landowners and kulaks.
   No-one could own more land than they could work with their own labour.
   All this was in flat defiance to the Provisional Government which was
   insisting that all such questions be left to the Constituent Assembly.
   Free communes were also created on ex-landlord estates.

   Unsurprisingly, the implementation of these decisions was delayed
   because of the opposition of the landlords and kulaks, who organised
   themselves and appealed to the provisional authorities. When General
   Kornilov tried to march on Petrograd and take power, the Hulyai Pole
   soviet took the initiative and formed a local "Committee for the
   Salvation of the Revolution" headed by Makhno. The real aim was to
   disarm the potential local enemy -- the landlords, bourgeoisie, and
   kulaks -- as well as to expropriate their ownership of the people's
   wealth: the land, factories, plants, printing shops, theatres and so
   on. On 25 September a volost congress of Soviets and peasant
   organisations in Hulyai Pole proclaimed the confiscation of the
   landowners' land and its transformation into social property. Raids on
   the estates of landlords and rich peasants, including German colonists,
   began and the expropriation of the expropriators began.

   Makhno's activities came to a halt the following spring when Lenin's
   government signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This treaty gave
   sizeable parts of the Russian Empire, including the Ukraine, to Germany
   and Austria in return for peace. The Treaty also saw the invasion of
   the Ukraine by large numbers of German and Austrian troops, who
   conquered the entire country in less than three months. Makhno
   succeeded in forming several military units, consisting of 1700 men,
   but could not stop Hulyai Pole being taken. After an anarchist congress
   at the end of April in Taganrog, it was decided to organise small
   combat units of five to ten peasants and workers, to collect arms from
   the enemy and to prepare for a general peasant uprising against the
   Austro-German troops and, finally, to send a small group to Soviet
   Russia to see at first hand what was happening there to both the
   revolution and to the anarchists under Bolshevik rule. Makhno was part
   of that group.

   By June, Makhno had arrived in Moscow. He immediately visited a number
   of Russian anarchists (including his old friend Peter Arshinov). The
   anarchist movement in Moscow was cowed, due to a Cheka raid in April
   which broke the backbone of the movement, so ending a political threat
   to the Bolsheviks from the left. To Makhno, coming from an area where
   freedom of speech and organisation was taken for granted, the low level
   of activity came as a shock. He regarded Moscow as the capital of the
   "paper revolution," whose red tape and meaninglessness had affected
   even the anarchists. Makhno also visited Peter Kropotkin, asking his
   advice on revolutionary work and the situation in the Ukraine. To
   Makhno, "Moscow appeared as 'the capital of the Paper Revolution,' a
   vast factory turning out empty resolutions and slogans while one
   political party, by means of force and fraud, elevated itself into the
   position of a ruling class." [David Footman, Op. Cit., p. 252]

   While in Moscow, Makhno met with Lenin. This meeting came about by
   chance. Visiting the Kremlin to obtain a permit for free board and
   lodging, he met the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive
   Committee of the Soviets, Jakov M. Sverdlov, who arranged for Makhno to
   meet Lenin. Lenin asked Makhno, "How did the peasants of your region
   understand the slogan ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS IN THE VILLAGES?" Makhno
   states that Lenin "was astonished" at his reply:

     "The peasants understood this slogan in their own way. According to
     their interpretation, all power, in all areas of life, must be
     identified with the consciousness and will of the working people.
     The peasants understand that the soviets of workers and peasants of
     village, country and district are neither more nor less than the
     means of revolutionary organisation and economic self-management of
     working people in the struggle against the bourgeoisie and its
     lackeys, the Right socialists and their coalition government."

   To this Lenin replied: "Well, then, the peasants of your region are
   infected with anarchism!" [Nestor Makhno, My Visit to the Kremlin, p.
   18] Later in the interview, Lenin stated: "Do the anarchists ever
   recognise their lack of realism in present-day life? Why, they don't
   even think of it." Makhno replied:

     "But I must tell you, comrade Lenin, that your assertion that the
     anarchists don't understand 'the present' realistically, that they
     have no real connection with it and so forth, is fundamentally
     mistaken. The anarchist-communists in the Ukraine . . . the
     anarchist-communists, I say, have already given many proofs that
     they are firmly planted in 'the present.' The whole struggle of the
     revolutionary Ukrainian countryside against the Central Rada has
     been carried out under the ideological guidance of the
     anarchist-communists and also in part by the Socialist
     Revolutionaries . . . Your Bolsheviks have scarcely any presence in
     our villages. Where they have penetrated, their influence is
     minimal. Almost all the communes or peasant associations in the
     Ukraine were formed at the instigation of the anarchist-communists.
     The armed struggle of the working people against the
     counter-revolution in general and the Austro-German invasion in
     particular has been undertaken with the ideological and organic
     guidance of the anarchist-communists exclusively.

     "Certainly it is not in your party's interest to give us credit for
     all this, but these are the facts and you can't dispute them. You
     know perfectly well, I assume, the effective force and the fighting
     capacity of the free, revolutionary forces of the Ukraine. It is not
     without reason that you have evoked the courage with which they have
     heroically defended the common revolutionary conquests. Among them,
     at least one half have fought under the anarchist banner. . .

     "All this shows how mistaken you are, comrade Lenin, in alleging
     that we, the anarchist-communists, don't have our feet on the
     ground, that our attitude towards 'the present' is deplorable and
     that we are too fond of dreaming about the future. What I have said
     to you in the course of this interview cannot be questioned because
     it is the truth. The account which I have made to you contradicts
     the conclusions you expressed about us. Everyone can see we are
     firmly planted in 'the present,' that we are working and searching
     for the means to bring about the future we desire, and that we are
     in fact dealing very seriously with this problem."

   Lenin replied: "Perhaps I am mistaken." [Makhno, Op. Cit., pp. 24-5]

   The Bolsheviks helped Makhno to return to the Ukraine. The trip was
   accomplished with great difficulty. Once Makhno was almost killed. He
   was arrested by Austro-German troops and was carrying libertarian
   pamphlets at the time. A Jewish inhabitant of Hulyai Pole, who had know
   Makhno for some time, succeeded in saving him by paying a considerable
   sum of money for his liberation. Once back in Hulyai-Pole, he started
   to organise resistance to the occupying forces of the Austro-Germans
   and their puppet regime led by Hetman Skoropadsky. With the resistance,
   the Makhno movement can be said to have arisen (see [7]section 3 on way
   it was named after Makhno). From July 1918 to August 1921, Makhno led
   the struggle for working class freedom against all oppressors, whether
   Bolshevik, White or Nationalist. During the course of this struggle, he
   proved himself to be "a guerrilla leader of quite outstanding ability."
   [David Footman, Civil War in Russia, p. 245] The military history of
   this movement is discussed in [8]section 4, while other aspects of the
   movement are discussed in other sections.

   After the defeat of the Makhnovist movement in 1921, Makhno was exiled
   in Western Europe. In 1925 he ended up in Paris, where he lived for the
   rest of his life. While there, he remained active in the anarchist
   movement, with the pen replacing the sabre (to use Alexander Skirda's
   colourful expression). Makhno contributed articles to various anarchist
   journals and in particular to Delo Truda, an anarchist-communist paper
   started in Paris by Peter Arshinov (many of these articles have been
   published in the book The Struggle Against the State and Other Essays).
   He remained active in the anarchist movement to the end.

   In Paris, Makhno met the famous Spanish anarchists Buenaventura Durruti
   and Francisco Ascaso in 1927. He argued that in Spain "conditions for a
   revolution with a strong anarchist content are better than in Russia"
   because not only was there "a proletariat and a peasantry with a
   revolutionary tradition whose political maturity is shown in its
   reactions," the Spanish anarchists had "a sense of organisation which
   we lacked in Russia. It is organisation which assures the success in
   depth of all revolutions." Makhno recounted the activities of the
   Hulyai Pole anarchist group and the events in revolutionary Ukraine:

     "Our agrarian commune was at once the economic and political vital
     centre of our social system. These communities were not based on
     individual egoism but rested on principles of communal, local and
     regional solidarity. In the same way that the members of a community
     felt solidarity among themselves, the communities were federated
     with each other . . . It is said against our system that in the
     Ukraine, that it was able to last because it was based only on
     peasant foundations. It isn't true. Our communities were mixed,
     agricultural-industrial, and, even, some of them were only
     industrial. We were all fighters and workers. The popular assembly
     made the decisions. In military life it was the War Committee
     composed of delegates of all the guerrilla detachments which acted.
     To sum up, everyone took part in the collective work, to prevent the
     birth of a managing class which would monopolise power. And we were
     successful." [quoted by Abel Paz, Durruti: The People Armed, p.
     88-9]

   As can be seen from the social revolution in Aragon, Durruti took
   Makhno's advice seriously (see [9]section I.8 for more on the Spanish
   Revolution). Unsurprisingly, in 1936 a number of veterans of Makhno's
   Insurgent Army went to fight in the Durruti column. Sadly, Makhno's
   death in 1934 prevented his own concluding statement to the two
   Spaniards: "Makhno has never refused to fight. If I am alive when you
   start your struggle, I will be with you." [quoted by Paz, Op. Cit., p.
   90]

   Makhno's most famous activity in exile was his association with, and
   defence of, the Organisational Platform of the Libertarian Communists
   (known as the "Platform"). As discussed in [10]section J.3.3, the
   Platform was an attempt to analyse what had gone wrong in the Russian
   Revolution and suggested a much tighter anarchist organisation in
   future. This idea provoked intense debate after its publication, with
   the majority of anarchists rejecting it (for Makhno's discussion with
   Malatesta on this issue, see The Anarchist Revolution published by
   Freedom Press). This debate often resulted in bitter polemics and left
   Makhno somewhat isolated as some of his friends, like Voline, opposed
   the Platform. However, he remained an anarchist to his death in 1934.

   Makhno died on the morning of July 25th and was cremated three days
   later and his ashes placed in an urn within Pere Lachaise, the cemetery
   of the Paris Commune. Five hundred Russian, French, Spanish and Italian
   comrades attended the funeral, at which the French anarchist Benar and
   Voline spoke (Voline used the occasion to refute Bolshevik allegations
   of anti-Semitism). Makhno's wife, Halyna, was too overcome to speak.

   So ended the life of one great fighters for working-class freedom.
   Little wonder Durruti's words to Makhno:

     "We have come to salute you, the symbol of all those revolutionaries
     who struggled for the realisation of Anarchist ideas in Russia. We
     also come to pay our respects to the rich experience of the
     Ukraine." [quoted by Abel Paz, Op. Cit., p. 88]

   For fuller details of Makhno's life, see the accounts by Peter Arshinov
   (The History of the Makhnovist Movement), Paul Avrich ("Nestor Makhno:
   The Man and the Myth," in Anarchist Portraits), Michael Palij, (The
   Anarchism of Nestor Makhno) and Michael Malet (Nestor Makhno in the
   Russian Revolution).

2 Why was the movement named after Makhno?

   Officially, the Makhnovist movement was called the Revolutionary
   Insurrectionary Army of the Ukraine. In practice, it was usually called
   the "Makhno movement" ("Makhnovshchina" in Russian) or the Makhnovists.
   Unsurprisingly, Trotsky placed great significance on this:

     "The anti-popular character of the Makhno movement is most clearly
     revealed in the fact that the army of Hulyai Pole is actually called
     'Makhno's Army'. There, armed men are united not around a programme,
     not around an ideological banner, but around a man." [The Makhno
     Movement]

   Ignoring the irony of a self-proclaimed Marxist (and later Leninist and
   founder of Trotskyism!) making such a comment, we can only indicate why
   the Makhnovists called themselves by that name:

     "Because, first, in the terrible days of reaction in the Ukraine, we
     saw in our ranks an unfailing friend and leader, MAKHNO, whose voice
     of protest against any kind of coercion of the working people rang
     out in all the Ukraine, calling for a battle against all oppressors,
     pillagers and political charlatans who betray us; and who is now
     marching together with us in our common ranks unwavering toward the
     final goal: liberation of the working people from any kind of
     oppression." [contained in Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 272]

   The two of the anarchists who took part in the movement and later wrote
   its history concur. Voline argues that the reason why the movement was
   known as the "Makhnovist movement" was because the "most important role
   in this work of unification [of the peasant masses] and in the general
   development of the revolutionary insurrection in the southern Ukraine
   was performed by the detachment of partisans guided by a peasant native
   to the region: Nestor Makhno." [The Unknown Revolution, p. 551] "From
   the first days of the movement," Arshinov notes, "up to its culminating
   point, when the peasants vanquished the landowners, Makhno played a
   preponderant and central role to such an extent that the whole
   insurgent region and the most heroic moments of the struggle are linked
   to his name. Later, when the insurrection had triumphed completely over
   the Skoropadsky counter-revolution and the region was threatened by
   Denikin, Makhno became the rallying point for millions of peasants in
   several regions." [Op. Cit., p. 50]

   It must be stressed that Nestor Mahkno was not the boss of the
   Mahknovista. He was not their ruler or general. As such, the fact that
   the Makhnovists were (unofficially) named after Makhno does not imply
   that it was his personal fiefdom, nor that those involved followed him
   as an individual. Rather, the movement was named after him because he
   was universally respected within it as a leading militant. This fact
   also explains why Makhno was nicknamed "Batko" (see [11]next section).

   This can be seen from how the movement was organised and was run. As we
   discuss in [12]section 5, it was organised in a fundamentally
   democratic way, by means of mass assemblies of insurgents, elected
   officers, regular insurgent, peasant and worker congresses and an
   elected "Revolutionary Military Soviet." The driving force in the
   Makhnovist movement was not, therefore, Makhno but rather the anarchist
   ideas of self-management. As Trotsky himself was aware, the Makhnovists
   were influenced by anarchist ideas:

     "Makhno and his companions-in-arms are not non-party people at all.
     They are all of the Anarchist persuasion, and send out circulars and
     letters summoning Anarchists to Hulyai Pole so as to organise their
     own Anarchist power there." [Trotsky, Op. Cit.]

   As part of this support for anarchist theory, the Makhnovists organised
   insurgent, peasant and worker conferences to discuss key issues in the
   revolution and the activities of the Makhno movement itself. Three such
   conferences had been before Trotsky wrote his diatribe The Makhno
   Movement on June 2nd, 1919. A fourth one was called for June 15th,
   which Trotsky promptly banned (on pain of death) on June 4th (see
   [13]section 13 for full details). Unlike the Bolshevik dictatorship,
   the Makhnovists took every possibility of ensuring the participation of
   the working people they were fighting for in the revolution. The
   calling of congresses by the Makhnovists shows clearly that the
   movement did not, as Trotsky asserted, follow a man, but rather ideas.

   As Voline argued, "the movement would have existed without Makhno,
   since the living forces, the living masses who created and developed
   the movement, and who brought Makhno forward merely as their talented
   military leader, would have existed without Makhno." Ultimately, the
   term "Makhnovshchina" is used "to describe a unique, completely
   original and independent revolutionary movement of the working class
   which gradually becomes conscious of itself and steps out on the broad
   arena of historical activity." ["preface," Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 19]

3 Why was Makhno called "Batko"?

   Nestor Makhno was often called in the movement "Batko", which is
   Ukrainian for "father." Peter Arshinov explains how and in what
   circumstances Makhno was given this name:

     "It was . . . in September 1918, that Makhno received the nickname
     Batko -- general leader of the revolutionary insurrection in the
     Ukraine. This took place in the following circumstances. Local
     pomeshchiks [landed gentry] in the major centres, the kulaks [rich
     peasants], and the German authorities [the Ukraine being occupied by
     them at the time], decided to eliminate Makhno and his detachment
     [of partisans] at any cost. The pomeshchiks created a special
     volunteer detachment consisting of their own sons and those of
     kulaks for the decisive struggle against Makhno. On the 30th of
     September this detachment, with the help of the Austro-Germans,
     corned Makhno in the region of Bol'shaya Mihhailovka, setting up
     strong military posts on all roads. At this time Makhno found
     himself with only 30 partisans and one machine gun. He was forced to
     make a fighting retreat, manoeuvring in the midst of numerous enemy
     forces. Arriving in the forest of Dibrivki, Makhno found himself in
     an extremely difficult situation. The paths of retreat were occupied
     by the enemy. It was impossible for the detachment to break through,
     and escaping individually was beneath their revolutionary dignity.
     No-one in the detachment would agree to abandon their leader so as
     to save himself. After some reflection, two days later, Makhno
     decided to return to the village of Bol'shaya Mikhailovka
     (Dibrivki). Leaving the forest the partisans met peasants who came
     to warn them that there were large enemy forces in Dibrivki and that
     they should make haste to go elsewhere. This information did not
     stop Makhno and his partisans . . . [and] they set out for Bol'shaya
     Mikhailovka. They approached the village guardedly. Makhno himself
     and a few of his comrades went on reconnaissance and saw a large
     enemy camp on the church square, dozens of machine guns, hundreds of
     saddle horses, and groups of cavalry. Peasants informed them that a
     battalion of Austrians and a special pomeshchik detachment were in
     the village. Retreat was impossible. Then Makhno, with his usual
     stubbornness and determination, said to his companions: 'Well, my
     friends! We should all be ready to die on this spot . . .' The
     movement was ominous, the men were firm and full of enthusiasm. All
     30 saw only one path before them -- the path toward the enemy, who
     had about a thousand well-armed men, and they all realised that this
     meant certain death for them. All were moved, but none lost courage.

     "It was at this movement that one of the partisans, Shchus', turned
     to Makhno and said:

     "'From now on you will be Batko to all of us, and we vow to die with
     you in the ranks of the insurgents.'

     "Then the whole detachment swore never to abandon the insurgent
     ranks, and to consider Makhno the general Batko of the entire
     revolutionary insurrection. Then they prepared to attack. Shchus'
     with five to seven men was assigned to attack the flank of the
     enemy. Makhno with the others attacked from the front. With a
     ferocious 'Hurrah!' the partisans threw themselves headlong against
     the enemy, smiting the very centre with sabres, rifles and
     revolvers. The attack had a shattering effect. The enemy, who were
     expecting nothing of the kind, were bowled over and began to flee in
     panic, saving themselves in groups and individually, abandoning
     arms, machine guns and horses. Without leaving them time to come to
     themselves, to become aware of the number of attacking forces, and
     to pass to a counter-attack, the insurgents chased them in separate
     groups, cutting them down in full gallop. A part of the pomeshchik
     detachment fled to the Volchya River, where they were drowned by
     peasants who had joined the battle. The enemy's defeat was complete.

     "Local peasants and detachments of revolutionary insurgents came
     from all directions to triumphantly acclaim the heroes. They
     unanimously agreed to consider Makhno as Batko of the entire
     revolutionary insurrection in the Urkaine."
     [Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 59-60]

   This was how Makhno acquired the nickname "Batko," which stuck to him
   thereafter.

   It should be stressed that "Batko" was a nickname and did not signify
   any form of autocratic or hierarchical position within the movement:

     "During the civil war, it signified the leadership and control of a
     specific area and its population in both civil and military fields.
     The central point of the use of the word, rather than 'leader' or
     'dictator' is that the leadership is usually based on respect, as in
     Makhno's case, and always on intimate knowledge of the home
     territory." [Michael Malet, Op. Cit., p. 17]

   That this was a nickname can be seen from the fact that "[a]fter 1920
   he was usually called 'Malyi' ('Shorty'), a nickname referring to his
   short stature, which was introduced by chance by one of the
   insurgents." [Peter Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 226] To attach significance
   to the fact that the peasants called Makhno "Batko" (as the Bolsheviks
   did) simply signifies an ignorance of the Makhnovist movement and its
   social environment.

4 Can you give a short overview of the Makhnovist movement?

   This section of the FAQ gives a short overview of the Makhnovists from
   July 1918 (when Makhno returned to the Ukraine) and August 1921, when
   it was finally defeated by Bolshevik armed force. It will be primarily
   a military history, with the socio-political aspects of the movement
   discussed in sections [14]6 (its theory) and [15]7 (its practice). For
   details of the rise of influence of Makhno after his release from
   prison in 1917, see [16]section 1.

   The history of the Makhno movement can be broken up into roughly four
   periods -- from July 1918 to February 1919, then the rest of 1919, then
   January to October 1920 and, finally, from October 1920 to August 1921.
   This section will give an overview of each period in turn.

   By the time Makhno arrived back in the Ukraine in July, 1918,
   opposition to the German-backed Hetman's regime was mounting and was
   frequently met with brutal repression, including reprisal executions.
   Makhno was forced to live underground and on the move, secretly meeting
   with others, with the Austrians always close behind. Voline recounts
   Makhno's activities at this time:

     "Back in Hulyai Pole, Makhno came to the decision to die or obtain
     victory for the peasants . . . He did not delay starting his mission
     openly among the great masses of peasants, speaking at improvised
     meetings, writing and distributing letters and tracts. By pen and
     mouth, he called on the peasants for a decisive struggle against the
     power of Skoropadsky and the landlords. He declared tirelessly that
     the workers should now take their fates into their own hands and not
     let their freedom to act be taken from them . . .

     "Besides his appeals, Makhno proceeded immediately to direct action.
     His first concern was to form a revolutionary military unit,
     sufficiently strong to guarantee freedom of propaganda and action in
     the villages and towns and at the same time to begin guerrilla
     operations. This unit was quickly organised .. . .

     "His first unit undertook two urgent tasks, namely, pursuing
     energetically the work of propaganda and organisation among the
     peasants and carrying out a stubborn armed struggle against all
     their enemies. The guiding principle of this merciless struggle was
     as follows. No lord who persecuted the peasants, no policeman of the
     Hetman, no Russian or German officer who was an implacable enemy of
     the peasants, deserved any pity; he must be destroyed. All who
     participated in the oppression of the poor peasants and workers, all
     who sought to suppress their rights, to exploit their labour, should
     be executed.

     "Within two or three weeks, the unit had already become the terror,
     not only of the local bourgeoisie, but also of the Austro-German
     authorities."
     [The Unknown Revolution, p. 558]

   The night of 26 September saw Hulyai Pole briefly liberated from Hetman
   and Austrian troops by the actions of Makhno's troops in association
   with local people. On the retreat from this Makhno's small band grew
   when he met the partisan troops headed by Schus. When the Austrians
   cornered them, they launched a surprise counter attack and routed the
   opposition. This became known as the battle of Dibrivki and it is from
   this date, 5 October 1918 that Makhno is given the nickname 'Batko',
   meaning "father" (see [17]section 3 for details). For the next two
   months already- existing partisan groups sought out and joined the
   growing army.

   In this period, Makhno, with portable printing equipment, was raiding
   the occupying garrisons and troop trains in the Southern Ukraine.
   Normal practice was to execute the officers and free the troops. In
   this period the moral of the occupying troops had crumbled and
   revolutionary propaganda had made inroads into many units. This was
   also affecting the nationalist troops and on 20 November the first
   nationalist unit defected to the Makhnovists. This encouraged them to
   return to Hulyai Pole on 27 December and there the insurrectionary
   Staff was formed, this body was to lead the army in the coming years
   and consisted initially of four old and trusted friends and three
   political comrades. The Makhnovist presence allowed the setting up of a
   local soviet and the re-opening of the anarchist clubs. German forces
   started pulling back to the major cities and on December 14 the Hetman
   fled Kiyiv. In the resulting vacuum, the Makhnovists rapidly expanded
   taking in most of the South East Ukraine and setting up fronts against
   local whites. The Ukrainian nationalists had taken power in the rest of
   the Ukraine under Petliura and on the 15th December the Makhnovists
   agreed to make common cause with them against the Whites. In return for
   arms and ammunition they allowed the nationalists to mobilise in the
   Makhnovist area (while engaging in propaganda directed at the mobilised
   troops on their way by train to Katerynoslav).

   This was a temporary and pragmatic arrangement directed against the
   greater enemy of the Whites. However, the nationalists were no friends
   of working-class autonomy. The nationalists banned elections to the
   Katerynoslav soviet on 6th of December and the provincial soviet at
   Kharkiv meet with a similar fate on the 22nd. [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 22]
   At the same time as their agreement with the nationalists, the
   Makhnovista had set up links with Bolshevik partisans to the south and
   before dawn on the 26th the Bolshevik and Makhnovista forces launched a
   joint attack on the nationalists at Katerynoslav. The city was taken
   but held only briefly when a nationalist attack on the 29th drove out
   all the insurgent forces with heavy losses. In the south, White
   reinforcements led to the insurgents being pushed North and losing
   Hulyai Pole.

   1919 opened with the Makhnovists organising a congress of front- unit
   delegates to discuss the progress of the struggle. Over forty delegates
   attended and a committee of five was elected, along with an operational
   staff to take charge of the southern front and its rear. It was agreed
   that local soviets were to be supported in every way, with no military
   violence directed towards them permitted. [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 25]

   By the end of January, white reinforcements were landing in the ports
   of the south. On January 22nd, a worker, peasant and insurgent congress
   was held at Velyka Mykhailivka. A resolution was passed urging an end
   to conflict between Makhnovists, Nationalists and Bolsheviks. An
   alliance was signed between the Makhnovists and the Bolsheviks in early
   February. This agreement ensured that the Partisan units entered the
   Red Army as distinct formations, with their internal organisation
   (including the election of commanders) intact, and the Red Army in the
   area formed a brigade to be known as "the third Transdnieper Batko
   Makhno brigade" with Makhno as commander. The Whites were repulsed and
   Hulyai Pole retaken and the front pushed some distance eastwards.

   Thus the military situation had improved by the time of the second
   worker, peasant and insurgent congress held at Hulyai Pole on February
   12th. This congress set up a "Revolutionary Military Soviet" to
   co-ordinate civilian affairs and execute its decisions. The congress
   resolved that "the land belongs to nobody" and should be cultivated
   without the use of hired labour. It also accepted a resolution opposing
   anti-Jewish pogroms. Also passed was a resolution which sharply
   attacked the Bolsheviks, caused by their behaviour since their arrival
   in the Ukraine. [Palij, Op. Cit., pp. 154-5] A report by the commander
   of the 2nd Red Army, Skatchco, indicates the nature of this behaviour:

     "Little local Chekas are undertaking a relentless campaign against
     the Makhnovists, even when they are shedding their blood at the
     front. They are hunting them down from the rear and persecuting them
     solely for belonging to the Makhnovist movement . . . It cannot
     continue like this: the activity of the local Chekas is deliberately
     ruining the front, reducing all military successes to nothing, and
     contributing to the creation of a counter-revolution that neither
     Denikin nor Krasnov [Hetman of the Don Cossacks] could have
     achieved. . ." [quoted by Alexander Skirda, The Rehabilitation of
     Makhno, p. 346]

   Unsurprisingly, the peasants reacted strongly to the Bolshevik regime.
   Their "agricultural policy and terrorism" ensured that "by the middle
   of 1919, all peasants, rich and poor, distrusted the Bolsheviks."
   [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 156] In April alone, there were 93 separate armed
   rebellions against the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine. The "more oppressive
   the Bolshevik policy, the more the peasants supported Makhno.
   Consequently, the Bolsheviks began to organise more systematically
   against the Makhno movement, both as an ideology and as a social
   movement." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 157]

   In mid-March the Red Army attacked eastwards. In the course of this
   Dybenko, commander of the Trandneiper division, recommended one of
   Makhno's commanders for a medal. Then the Makhnovists attacked the
   Donbas (east) to relieve the pressure on the Soviet 8th Army caused by
   a White advance. They took Mariupol following a White incursion at the
   beginning of April. A White counter-offensive resulted in the Red 9th
   division panicking, allowing the Whites into Makhno's rear. Red
   Commander Dybenko refused orders to come to the Makhnovists aid as he
   was more interested in the Crimea (south). [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 31]

   This period saw the most sustained freedom for the region around Hulyai
   Pole. It had been free of enemy occupation since January, allowing
   constructive activity to restart. The inhabitants of the free region
   "created new forms of social organisation: free workers' communes and
   Soviets." [Voline, Op. Cit., p. 574] The Revolutionary Military Soviet
   (RMS) called a third regional worker, peasant and insurgent congresses
   had on April 10th to review progress and to look forward. This was the
   largest congress to date, with delegates from 72 volosts containing two
   million people. The Bolshevik military commander Dybenko tried to ban
   it. The Makhnovists, needless to say, ignored him and the RMS made a
   famous reply to his arrogance (see [18]section 13 for more details).

   It was during this period (late 1918 and early 1919), that the Nabat
   anarchist federation was organised. "Anarchist influence was reported
   from Aleksandrovsk and other centres," notes David Footman, "Anarchists
   were holding a conference in Kursk at about the same time and in one of
   their resolutions it was stated that 'the Ukrainian Revolution will
   have great chances of rapidly becoming Anarchist in its ideas.' The
   position called for renewed Bolshevik measures against the Anarchists.
   Nabat, the main Anarchist newspaper in the Ukraine, was suppressed, and
   its editorial board dispersed under threat of arrest." [Op. Cit., p.
   270] Daniel Guerin has reproduced two documents from the Nabat
   federation in volume II of his No Gods, No Masters.

   The anarchist influence in and around Hulyai Pole also worried the
   Bolsheviks. They started a slander campaign against the Makhnovists, to
   the alarm of Antonov, the overall front commander, who replied in
   response to an article in Kharkiv Izvestiya:

     "The article is the most perverted fiction and does not in the least
     correspond to the existing situation. The insurgents fighting the
     whites are on a level with the Red Army men, but are in a far worse
     condition for supplies." [quoted by Malet, Op. Cit., p. 33]

   In a postscript, Antonov added that the press campaign had certainly
   helped turn Makhno anti-Soviet (i.e. anti-Bolshevik, as Makhno
   supported free soviets).

   At the beginning of May, another partisan commander, Hryhoriyiv,
   revolted against the Bolsheviks in the central Ukraine. Hryhoriyiv,
   like the Makhnovists, had joined with the Bolsheviks when they had
   re-entered the Ukraine, however his social and political background was
   totally different. Hryhoriyiv was a former Tsarist officer, who had
   commanded numerous troops under the Petliurist authority and joined the
   Bolsheviks once that that regime's armed forces had disintegrated.
   Arshinov notes that he had "never been a revolutionary" and that there
   had been a "great deal of adventurism in his joining the ranks of the
   Petliurists and then the ranks of the Red Army." His temperament was
   mixed, consisting of "a certain amount of sympathy for oppressed
   peasants, authoritarianism, the extravagance of a Cossack chieftain,
   nationalist sentiments and anti-Semitism." [Op. Cit., p. 110]

   Hryhoriyov started his revolt by issuing a Universal, or declaration to
   the Ukrainian people, which contained a virulent attack on the
   Bolsheviks as well as one explicit anti-Semitic reference, but without
   mention of Makhno. The height of the revolt was his appearance in the
   suburbs of Katerynoslav, which he was stopped from taking. He started a
   pogrom in Yelyzavethrad which claimed three thousand victims.

   Once the Makhnovists had been informed of this rebellion, an enlarged
   staff and RMS meeting was held. A telegram was sent to the soldiers at
   the front urging them to hold the front and another to the Bolsheviks
   with a similar message. A few days latter, when more information had
   been received, a proclamation was issued against Hyyhoriyiv attacking
   him for seeking to impose a new authority on the working class, for
   encouraging toiling people to attack each other, and for inciting
   pogroms. [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 112 and pp. 114-7]

   While it took a fortnight for Red forces to contain Hryhoriyiv without
   trouble, this involved using all available reverses of all three
   Ukrainian armies. This left none for Makhno's hard-pressed forces at
   the front. In addition, Dybenko withdrew a front-line regiment from
   Makhno for use against the revolt and diverted reinforcements from the
   Crimea which were intended for Makhno. Despite this Makhnos forces (now
   numbering 20,000) were ordered to resume the attack on the whites. This
   was due to "unremitting pressure from Moscow to take Taganrog and
   Rostov." [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 36] The Makhnovist advance stopped due to
   the non-fulfilment of an urgent order for ammunition.

   On the 19th of May, a White counter-attack not only stopped the advance
   of the Red Army, it forced the 9th division (and then the Makhnovists)
   to retreat. On the 29th, the Whites launched a further offensive
   against the northern Donblas, opening a gap between the 13th and 8th
   Red Armies. Due to the gravity of the situation, the RSV summoned a
   fourth congress for June 15th. Trotsky not only banned this congress
   but took the lead in slandering the Makhnovists and calling for their
   elimination (see [19]section 13 for details). As well as "this
   deliberately false agitational campaign, the [Bolshevik] blockade of
   the region was carried to the limit . . . The provisioning of shells,
   cartridges and other indispensable equipment which was used by daily at
   the front, ceased completely." [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 118] Palij
   confirms this, noting that "the supplies of arms and other war material
   to Makhno was stopped, thus weakening the Makhno forces vis-a-vis the
   Denikin troops." [Op. Cit., p. 175] David Footman also notes that the
   Bolshevik "hold-back of supplies for the Insurgents developed into a
   blockade of the area. Makhnovite units at the front ran short of
   ammunition." He also mentions that "[i]n the latter part of May the
   Cheka sent over two agents to assassinate Makhno." [Civil War in
   Russia, p. 271]

   Needless to say, Trotsky blamed this White success to the Makhnovists,
   arguing it was retreating constantly before even the slightest attack
   by the Whites. However, this was not the case. Analysing these events
   in July 1919, Antonov (the commander of the Southern Front before
   Trotsky replaced him) wrote:

     "Above all, the facts witness that the affirmations about the
     weakness of the most contaminated region -- that from Hulyai Pole to
     Berdiansk -- are without foundation . . . It is not because we
     ourselves have been better organised militarily, but because those
     troops were directly defending their native place . . . Makhno
     stayed at the front, in spite of the flight of the neighbouring 9th
     division, following by the whole of the 13th army . . . The reasons
     for the defeat on the southern front do not rest at all in the
     existence of 'Ukrainian partisans' . . . above all it must be
     attributed to the machinery of the southern front, in not keeping
     its fighting spirit and reinforcing its revolutionary discipline."
     [quoted by Alexander Skirda, The Rehabilitation of Makhno, p. 348]

   This, incidentally, tallies with Arshinov's account that "hordes of
   Cossacks had overrun the region, not through the insurrectionary front
   but from the left flank where the Red Army was stationed." [Op. Cit.,
   p. 126] For what it is worth, General Denikin himself concurs with this
   account of events, noting that by the 4th of June his forces "repulsed
   the routed and demoralised contingents of the Eight and Thirteenth
   Soviet Armies . . . The resistance of the Thirteenth Army being
   completely broken." He notes that an attempt by the Fourteenth Army
   (which Makhno's troops were part of) to attack on the flank came to
   nothing. He only mentions Makhno when he recounts that "General
   Shkuro's division routed Makhno at Hulyai Pole." [The White Armies, p.
   272] With Whites broken through on their flank and with limited
   ammunition and other supplies (thanks to the Bolsheviks), the
   Makhnovists had no choice but to retreat.

   It was around this time that Trotsky, in a public meeting in Kharkov,
   "announced that it were better to permit the Whites to remain in the
   Ukraine than to suffer Makhno. The presence of the Whites, he said,
   would influence the Ukrainian peasantry in favour of the Soviet
   Government, whereas Makhno and his povstantsi, would never make peace
   with the Bolsheviki; they would attempt to possess themselves of some
   territory and to practise their ideas, which would be a constant menace
   to the Communist Government." [Emma Goldman, My Disillusionment in
   Russia, p. 63]

   Due to this Bolshevik betrayal, the Makhnovist sector was in very grave
   danger. At Hulyai Pole, a peasant regiment was scraped together in 24
   hours in an attempt to save the town. It encountered White Cossacks ten
   miles away from the town and was mown down. The Whites entered Hulyai
   Pole the next day (June 6th) and gave it a good going over. On the same
   day, the Bolsheviks issued an order for Makhno's arrest. Makhno was
   warned and put in his resignation, arguing that it was "an inviolable
   right of the workers and peasants, a right won by the revolution, to
   call congresses on their own account, to discuss their affairs."
   Combined with the "hostile attitude" of the Bolshevik authorities
   towards him, which would lead "unavoidably to the creation of a special
   internal front," Makhno believed it was his duty to do what he could to
   avert it, and so he left his post. [quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit., p.
   129] While Makhno escaped, his staff was not so lucky. Five of them
   were arrested the same day and shot as a result of Trotsky's order to
   ban the fourth congress.

   Leaving his troops in the frontline, Makhno left with a small cavalry
   detachment. While leaving the rest under Red command, Makhno made a
   secret agreement with his regimental commanders to await a message from
   him to leave the Red Army and join up against with the partisans. On
   the 9th and 10th of June, Hulyai Pole was retaken by Bolshevik forces,
   who took the opportunity to attack and sack the Makhnovist communes.
   [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 86f]

   After intense fighting, the Whites finally split the Southern Front
   into three on June 21st. Needless to say, Trotsky and the Bolsheviks
   blamed this on the partisan forces (even stating that they had "opened
   the front" to the Whites). This was nonsense, as noted above.

   After leaving the front, Makhno took refuge in the Chorno-Znamenski
   forest before continuing the retreat north and skirmishing with Red
   Army units. This brought him into the territory held by Hryhoriyiv and
   this, in turn, meant they had to proceed carefully. While the
   Makhnovists had made a public denunciation of Hryhoriyiv, Makhno was
   approaching the centre of Hryhoriyov's remaining influence. Surrounded
   by enemies, Makhno had little choice but to begin discussions with
   Hryhoriyiv. This was problematic to say the least. Hryhoriyiv's revolt
   had been tinged with anti-Semitism and had seen at least one major
   pogrom. Being faced with Hryhoriyov's anti-Semitism and his proposal
   for an alliance with the Whites against the Reds led the Makhnovists to
   plot his downfall at a meeting planned for the 27th July.

   This meeting had originally been called to discuss the current tasks of
   the insurgents in the Ukraine and was attended by nearly 20,000
   insurgents and local peasants. Hryhoriyiv spoke first, arguing that the
   most urgent task was to chase out the Bolsheviks and that they should
   ally themselves with any anti-Red forces available (a clear reference
   to the Whites under Denikin). The Makhnovist Chubenko spoke next,
   declaring that the "struggle against the Bolsheviks could be
   revolutionary only if it were carried out in the name of the social
   revolution. An alliance with the worst enemies of the people -- with
   generals -- could only be a counter-revolutionary and criminal
   adventure." Following him, Makhno "demanded before the entire congress"
   that Hryhoriyiv "immediately answer for the appalling pogrom of Jews he
   had organised in Elisavetgrad in May, 1919, as well as other
   anti-Semitic actions." [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 136]

   Seeing that things were going badly, Hryhoriyiv went for his revolver,
   but was shot by a Makhnovist. Makhno finished him off. Makhnovist
   guards disarmed the leading Hryhoriyivists. Then Makhno, Chubenko and
   others justified the killing before the mass meeting, which approved
   the act passing a resolution that stated that Hryhoriyiv's death was
   "an historical and necessary fact, for his policy, acts and aims were
   counter-revolutionary and mainly directed to helping Denikin and other
   counter-revolutionaries, as is proved by his Jewish pogroms." [quoted
   by Malet, Op. Cit., p. 42] The troops under Hryhoriyiv became part of
   the general Insurrectionary Army.

   At the end of July, Makhno recalled the troops he had earlier left in
   the Red Army and by mid-August the forces met up, becoming an army of
   some 15,000. At Mykolaiv, the Red Army units were defecting to Makhno
   in large numbers due in part to the feeling that the Red Army were
   abandoning the defence of the Ukraine. This was the start of Denikin's
   massive push north and Petliura's push east. By the end of August,
   Makhno felt strong enough to go on the offensive against the Whites.
   Superior White forces pushed the Makhnovists further and further west,
   away from their home region. "Denikin," in Voline's words, "not only
   made war on the army as such, but also on the whole peasant population.
   In addition to the usual persecutions and beatings, the villages he
   occupied were burnt and wrecked. The greater part of the peasants'
   dwellings were looted and wrecked. Hundreds of peasants were shot. The
   women maltreated, and nearly all the Jewish women . . . were raped."
   This repression "obliged the inhabitants of the villages threatened by
   the approach of the Denikinists to abandon their hearths and flee. Thus
   the Makhnovist army was joined and followed in their retreat by
   thousands of peaant families in flight from their homes with their
   livestock and belongings. It was a veritable migration. An enormous
   mass of men, women and children trailed after the army in its slow
   retreat towards the west, a retreat which gradually extended over
   hundreds of kilometres." [Op. Cit., p. 607]

   Meeting the Nationalists in mid-September, it was agreed on both sides
   that fighting would only aid the Whites and so the Makhnovists entered
   a non-aggression pact with Petliura. This enabled them to offload over
   1,000 wounded. The Makhnovists continued their propaganda campaign
   against the Nationalists, however. By the 24th of September,
   intelligence reports suggested that White forces had appeared to the
   west of their current position (i.e. where the Nationalists where). The
   Makhnovists concluded that the only way this could have happened was if
   the Nationalists had allowed the Whites to cross their territory (the
   Nationalists disputed this, pointing to the fighting that had started
   two days before between them and the Whites).

   This meant that the Makhnovists were forced to fight the numerically
   superior Whites. After two days of desperate fighting, the Whites were
   routed and two regiments were destroyed at the battle of Peregonovka
   village. Makhno's forces then conducted an incredibly rapid advance in
   three directions helped by their mobile cart-transported infantry, in
   three days smashing three reserve regiments and at the greatest point
   advancing 235 miles east. On the 6th October a drive to the south
   started which took key White ports and captured a huge quantity of
   equipment including 600 trucks of British-supplied ammunition and an
   aeroplane. This was disastrous for Denikin whose forces had reached the
   northernmost point on their advance on Moscow, for these ports were key
   for his supply routes. The advance continued, cutting the railway route
   and so stopping all shells reaching Denikin's Moscow front.

   Denikin was forced to send some of his best troops from the Moscow
   front to drive back the Makhnovists and British boats were sent to
   towns on the coast where Makhno might retreat through. The key city of
   Katerinoslav was taken with the aid of a workers' uprising on November
   9th and held for a month before the advancing Whites and a typhoid
   epidemic which was to devastate the Makhnovista ranks by the end of the
   year forced them out of the city. In December, the Red Army advance
   made possible by Makhno's devastation of Denikin's supply lines
   continued.

   Thus Voline:

     "It is necessary to emphasise here the historic fact that the honour
     of having annihilated the Denikinist counter-revolution in the
     autumn of 1919, belongs entirely to the Makhnovist Insurrectionary
     Army. If the insurgents had not won the decisive victory of
     Peregonovka, and had not continued to sap the bases in Denikin's
     rear, destroying his supply service for artillery, food and
     ammunition, the Whites would probably have entered Moscow in
     December 1919 at the latest." [Op. Cit., p. 625]

   In December the Red Army advance made possible by Makhno's devastation
   of Denikin's supply lines continued. By early January the Reds had
   split White forces into three and their troops had reached
   Katerynoslav. The attitude of the Bolsheviks to the Makhnovists had
   already been decided. On December 12th, 1919, Trotsky stated that when
   the two forces met, the Bolsheviks had "an order . . . from which we
   must not retreat one single step." While we discuss this secret order
   in more depth in [20]section 13, we will note here that it gave
   partisans the option of becoming "fully subordinate to [Bolshevik]
   command" or "be subjected to ruthless punishment." [How the Revolution
   Armed, vol. II., pp. 110-1 and p. 442] Another secret order to the 45th
   division issued on January 4th instructed them to "annihilate
   Makhnovist bands" and "disarm the population." The 41st was sent "into
   reserve" to the Hulyai Pole region. This was "five days before Makhno
   was outlawed, and shows that the Bolshevik command had a clear view of
   Makhno's future, even if the latter did not." [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 54]

   Unaware of this, the Makhnovista put out propaganda leaflets directed
   at the Red Army rank and file, appealing to them as comrades. At
   Aleksandrovsk on December 5th talks occurred between a representative
   of the Makhnovists and the commander of the 45th division's 1st
   brigade. These broke down when Makhno was ordered to the Polish front,
   which the Makhnovists refused. On January 9th, Yegorov, commander of
   the Red Army southern front, used this pretext to outlaw Makhno. This
   outlawing was engineered deliberately by the Bolsheviks:

     "The author of the order realised at that time there was no real war
     between the Poles and the Bolsheviks at that time and he also knew
     that Makhno would not abandon his region .. . . Uborevich [the
     author] explained that 'an appropriate reaction by Makhno to this
     order would give us the chance to have accurate grounds for our next
     steps' . . . [He] concluded: 'The order is a certain political
     manoeuvre and, at the very least, we expect positive results from
     Makhno's realisation of this.'" [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 210]

   In addition, war with Poland did not break out until the end of April,
   over three months later.

   Needless to say, the Makhnovists did realise the political motivations
   behind the order. As Arshinov notes, "[s]ending the insurrectionary
   army to the Polish front meant removing from the Ukraine the main nerve
   centre of the revolutionary insurrection. This was precisely what the
   Bolsheviks wanted: they would then be absolute masters of the
   rebellious region, and the Makhnovists were perfectly aware of this."
   Moreover, the Makhnovists considered the move "physically impossible"
   as "half the men, the entire staff and the commander himself were in
   hospital with typhus." [Op. Cit., p. 163]

   This was the signal for nine months of bitter fighting between the Red
   Army and the Makhnovists. Military events in this period are confused,
   with the Red Army claiming victory again and again, only for the
   Makhnovists to appear somewhere else. Hulyai Pole changed hands on a
   couple of occasions. The Bolsheviks did not use local troops in this
   campaign, due to fear of fraternisation. In addition, they used "new
   tactics," and "attacked not only Makhno's partisans, but also the
   villages and towns in which the population was sympathetic toward
   Makhno. They shot ordinary soldiers as well as their commanders,
   destroying their houses, confiscating their properties and persecuting
   their families. Moreover the Bolsheviks conducted mass arrests of
   innocent peasants who were suspected of collaborating in some way with
   the partisans. It is impossible to determine the casualties involved."
   They also set up "Committees of the Poor" as part of the Bolshevik
   administrative apparatus, which acted as "informers helping the
   Bolshevik secret police in its persecution of the partisans, their
   families and supporters, even to the extent of hunting down and
   executing wounded partisans." [Palij, Op. Cit., pp. 212-3]

   In addition to this suffering, the Bolshevik decision to attack Makhno
   rather than push into the Crimea was also to prolong the civil war by
   nine more months. The Whites re-organised themselves under General
   Wrangel, who began a limited offensive in June. Indeed, the Bolshevik
   "policy of terror and exploitation turned almost all segments of
   Ukrainian society against the Bolsheviks, substantially strengthened
   the Makhno movement, and consequently facilitated the advance of the
   reorganised anti-Bolshevik force of General Wrangel from the Crimea
   into South Ukraine, the Makhno region." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 214]

   It was widely believed on the White side that Makhno was ready to
   co-operate with them and, desperate for men, Wrangel decided to appeal
   to the Makhnovists for an alliance. Their response was simple and
   direct, they decided to immediately execute his delegate and publish
   both his letter and a response in the Makhnovist paper "The Road to
   Freedom." [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 60] Of course, this did not stop the
   Bolsheviks later claiming such an alliance existed!

   Ironically enough, at a general assembly of insurgents, it was decided
   that "the destruction of Wrangel" would "eliminate a threat to the
   revolution" and so free "all of Russia" from "the counter-revolutionary
   barrage." The mass of workers and peasants "urgently needed an end to
   all those wars" and so they proposed "to the Communists that
   hostilities between them and the Makhnovists be suspended in order that
   they might wipe out Wrangel. In July and August, 1920, telegrams to
   this effect were sent to Moscow and Kharkov." There was no reply and
   the Bolsheviks "continued their war against the Makhnovists, and they
   also continued their previous campaign of lies and calumnies against
   them." [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 176]

   In July and August the Makhnovists went on the offensive, raiding the
   Bolsheviks in three provinces and attacking the Red Army
   infrastructure. Wrangel began another offensive in September, driving
   the Red Army back again and again and threatening the Makhnovist area.
   Faced with Wrangel's success, the Bolsheviks started to rethink their
   position on Makhno, although on the 24th of September the Bolshevik
   commander-in-chief Kamenev was still declaring the need for "the final
   liquidation of the Makhno band." [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 62] A few days
   later, the Bolsheviks changed their mind and negotiations began.

   So, by October 1920, the success of the Wrangel offensive was again
   forcing the Bolsheviks and Makhnovists to put aside their differences
   and take on the common enemy. A deal was reached and on October 2nd,
   Frunze, the new Red Army commander of the Southern Front, ordered a
   cessation of hostilities against the Makhnovists. A statement from the
   Soviet of the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of the Ukraine (Makhnovists)
   explained the treaty as necessitated by the White offensive but also
   representing a victory over the "high-handed communists and commissars"
   in forcing them to recognise the "free insurrection." [Malet, Op. Cit.,
   p. 64]

   The agreement was signed between October 10th and 15th. It consisted of
   two parts, a Political and a Military agreement (see [21]section 13 for
   full details). The Political agreement simply gave the Makhnovists and
   anarchists the rights they should have had according to the Soviet
   Constitution. The Military agreement resulted in the Makhnovists
   becoming part of the Red Army, keeping their established internal
   structure and, significantly, stopped them from accepting into their
   ranks any Red Army detachments or deserters therefrom. According to
   Bolshevik sources, "there was never the slightest intention on the
   Bolshevik side of keeping to the agreement once its military value had
   passed." [David Footman, Op. Cit., p. 296]

   Even before the agreement came into effect, the Makhnovists were
   fighting alongside the Bolsheviks and between October 4 and 17, Hulyai
   Pole was retaken by the Aleksandrovsk group, which included 10,000
   Makhnovista. On October 22, Aleksandrovsk was taken with 4,000 white
   prisoners and from then to early November the Makhnovists cut through
   Wrangel's rear, hoping to cut off his retreat by seizing the Crimean
   passes. The Whites fought a skilful rearguard which together with the
   new White fortifications on the peninsula held up the advance. But by
   the 11th, his hold in the Crimea gone, Wrangel had no choice but to
   order a general retreat to the ports and an evacuation. Even the
   Bolsheviks had to acknowledge that the "Makhnovist units fulfilled
   their military tasks with no less heroism than the Red Army units."
   [quoted by Malet, Op. Cit., p. 69]

   On hearing this success on 16th November, the reaction of the
   Makhnovista still at Hulyai Pole was cynical but realistic: "It's the
   end of the agreement. I'll bet you anything that the Bolsheviks will be
   on us within the week." [quoted by Malet, Op. Cit., p. 70] They were
   not wrong. Already Frunze, the Red Army commander, had ordered two
   entire cavalry armies to concentrate near Hulyai Pole at the same time
   as he ordered the Makhnovist forces to the Caucasus Front! By 24th
   November Frunze was preparing for the treachery to come, in Order 00149
   (which was not sent to the Makhnovist units) saying if they had not
   departed to the Caucasus front by the 26th "the Red regiments of the
   front, who have now finished with Wrangel, will start speaking a
   different language to these Makhnovist youths." [quoted by Malet, Op.
   Cit., p. 71]

   Of course this treachery went right to the top, just before the 26th
   "deadline" (which Makhno, not having seen the orders, was unaware of),
   Lenin urged Rakovski, head of the Ukrainian government to "[k]eep a
   close watch on all anarchists and prepare documents of a criminal
   nature as soon as possible, on the basis of which charges can be
   preferred against them." [quoted by Malet, Op. Cit., p. 71] Indeed, it
   later appeared the treachery had been prepared from at least 14th or
   16th November, as prisoners captured later stated they had received
   undated anti-Makhnovist proclamations on that date. [Malet, Ibid.]

   At 3am on the 26th the attacks on the Makhnovists started. Alongside
   this one of the Makhnovist commanders was lured to a meeting by the
   Bolsheviks, seized and shot. Some Makhnovist forces managed to break
   through the encircling Bolsheviks but only after taking heavy losses --
   of the 2,000-4,000 cavalry at Simferopol, only 250 escaped. By the 1st
   December, Rakovsi reported the imminent demise of the Makhnovists to
   the Kharkiv soviet only to have to eat his words when Makhno routed the
   42nd division on the 6th, retaking Hulyai Pole and 6,000 prisoners, of
   whom 2,000 joined his forces. [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 72] Simultaneously
   with the attack on the Makhnovists, the Bolsheviks rounded up all known
   anarchists in the Ukraine (many of whom were in Kharkiv waiting for a
   legally organised Nabat conference to begin).

   In the resulting struggle between the two forces, as Palij notes, the
   "support of the population was a significant advantage to Makhno, for
   they supplied the partisans with needed material, including horses and
   food, while the Red troops operated among a foreign and hostile
   people." The Bolsheviks found that the peasants not only refused to
   supply them with goods, they also refused to answer their questions or,
   at best, gave answers which were vague and confusing. "In contrast to
   the Bolsheviks, Makhno partisans received detailed, accurate
   information from the population at all times." [Palij, Op. Cit., pp.
   236-7]

   Frunze brought in extra forces and ordered both the "annihilation of
   the Makhnovists" and total disarming of the region. Plagued by
   desertions, it was also ordered that all Makhnovist prisoners were to
   be shot, to discourage the local population and Red Army soldiers
   thinking of joining them. There is also evidence of unrest in the Azov
   fleet, with acts of sabotage being carried out by sailors to prevent
   their weapons being used against the Makhnovists. [Malet, Op. Cit., p.
   73] While it was common practice for the Bolsheviks to shoot all
   Makhnovist prisoners, the "existence of roundup detachments at the end
   of 1920, whose task was to re-collect prisoners freed by the
   Makhnovists" shows that the Makhnovists did not reciprocate in kind.
   [Malet Op. Cit., p. 129]

   At the end of 1920, the Makhnovists had ten to fifteen thousand troops
   and the "growing strength of the Makhno army and its successes caused
   serious concern in the Bolshevik regime, so it was decided to increase
   the number of troops opposing Makhno." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 237] All
   the pressure exerted by the Bolsheviks was paying off. Although Makhno
   repeatedly broke through numerous mass encirclements and picked up
   deserters from the Red Army, his forces were being eroded by the far
   greater numbers employed against them. In addition, "the Red command
   worked out new plans to fight Makhno by stationing whole regiments,
   primarily cavalry, in the occupied villages, to terrorise the peasants
   and prevent them from supporting Makhno. . . Also the Cheka punitive
   units were constantly trailing the partisans, executing Makhno's
   sympathisers and the partisans' families." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 238] In
   spite of the difficult conditions, Makhno was still able to attract
   some Red Army soldiers and even whole units to his side. For example,
   "when the partisans were fighting Budenny's Fourth Cavalry Division,
   their First Brigade, commanded by Maslak, joined Makhno." [Palij, Op.
   Cit., p. 239]

   Makhno was forced to leave his home areas of operations and flee east,
   then west again. By early January his forces had fought 24 battles in
   24 days. This pattern continued throughout March and April into May. In
   June, the Bolsheviks changed their strategy to one of predicting where
   Makhno was heading and garrisoning troops in that area. In one battle
   on 15 June, Frunze himself was almost captured. Despite this, the
   insurgents were very weak and their peasant base was exhausted by years
   of war and civil war. In the most sympathetic areas, Red Army troops
   were garrisoned on the peasants. Thus Palij:

     "[T]hrough combat losses, hardship, and sickness, the number of
     Makhno partisans was diminishing and they were cut off from their
     main sources of recruits and supplies. The Ukrainian peasants were
     tried of the endless terror caused by successive occupation of
     village after village by the Red troops and the Cheka. The
     continuous fighting and requisitions were leaving the peasants with
     little food and horses for the partisans. They could not live in a
     state of permanent revolution. Moreover, there was extreme drought
     and consequently a bad harvest in Ukraine, especially in the region
     of the Makhno movement." [Op. Cit., pp. 240-1]

   The state terrorism and the summer drought caused Makhno to give up the
   struggle in mid-August and instead fight his way to the Dniester with
   the last of his forces and cross into Romania on August 26. Some of his
   forces which stayed behind were still active for a short time. In
   November 1921 the Cheka seized 20 machine guns and 2,833 rifles in the
   new Zaporizhya province alone.

   For more details of the history of the movement, Michael Malet's Nestor
   Makhno in the Russian Revolution is an excellent summary. Michael
   Palij's The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno is also worth consulting, as are
   the anarchist histories of Voline and Arshinov.

5 How were the Makhnovists organised?

   Being influenced by anarchist ideas, the Makhnovists were organised
   along libertarian lines. This meant that in both civilian and military
   areas, self-management was practised. This section discusses the
   military organisation, while the next discusses the social aspect of
   the movement.

   By practising self-management, the Makhnovists offered a completely
   different model of military organisation to that of both the Red Army
   and traditional military forces. While the army structure changed
   depending on its circumstances, the core ideas remained. These were as
   follows:

     "The Makhnovist insurrectionary army was organised according to
     three fundamental principles: voluntary enlistment, the electoral
     principle, and self-discipline.

     "Voluntary enlistment meant that the army was composed only of
     revolutionary fighters who entered it of their own free will.

     "The electoral principle meant that the commanders of all units of
     the army, including the staff, as well as all the men who held other
     positions in the army, were either elected or accepted by the
     insurgents of the unit in question or by the whole army.

     "Self-discipline meant that all the rules of discipline were drawn
     up by commissions of insurgents, then approved by general assemblies
     of the various units; once approved, they were rigorously observed
     on the individual responsibility of each insurgent and each
     commander."
     [Op. Cit., p. 96]

   Voline paints a similar picture. He also notes that the electoral
   principle was sometimes violated and commanders appointed "in urgent
   situations by the commander himself," although such people had to be
   "accepted without reservation" by "the insurgents of the unit in
   question or by the whole army." [Op. Cit., p. 584]

   Thus the Makhnovist army, bar some deviation provoked by circumstances,
   was a fundamentally democratic organisation. The guerrillas elected the
   officers of their detachments, and, at mass assemblies and congresses,
   decided policy and discipline for the army. In the words of historian
   Michael Palij:

     "As the Makhno army gradually grew, it assumed a more regular army
     organisation. Each tactical unit was composed of three subordinate
     units: a division consisted of three brigades; a brigade, of three
     regiments; a regiment, of three battalions. Theoretically commanders
     were elected; in practice, however, the top commanders were usually
     carefully selected by Makhno from among his close friends. As a
     rule, they were all equal and if several units fought together the
     top commanders commanded jointly. The army was nominally headed by a
     Revolutionary Military Council of about ten to twenty members . . .
     Like the commanders, the council members were elected, but some were
     appointed by Makhno .. . . There also was an elected cultural
     section in the army. Its aim was to conduct political and
     ideological propaganda among the partisans and peasants." [Palij,
     Op. Cit., pp. 108-9]

   The Revolutionary Military Council was elected and directly accountable
   to the regional workers, peasants and insurgent congresses. It was
   designed to co-ordinate the local soviets and execute the decisions of
   the regional congresses.

   Hence Voline:

     "This council embraced the whole free region. It was supposed to
     carry out all the economic, political, social and military decisions
     made at the congress. It was thus, in a certain sense, the supreme
     executive of the whole movement. But it was not at all an
     authoritarian organ. Only strictly executive functions were assigned
     to it. It confined itself to carrying out the instructions and
     decisions of the congress. At any moment, it could be dissolved by
     the congress and cease to exist." [Op. Cit., p. 577]

   As such, when Palij notes that this council "had no decisive voice in
   the army's actions," he misses the point of the council. [Palij, Ibid.]
   It did not determine the military affairs of the army, but rather the
   interaction of the military and civilians and made sure that the
   decisions of congresses were executed. Thus the whole army was
   nominally under the control of the regional congresses of workers,
   peasants and insurgents. At these congresses, delegates of the toiling
   people decided upon the policy to be pursued by the Makhnovist Army.
   The Revolutionary Military Soviet existed to oversee that decisions
   were implemented, not to determine the military activities of the
   troops.

   It should also be noted that women not only supported the Makhnovists,
   they also "fought alongside the men." [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 145]
   However, "the participation of women in the movement (by all accounts,
   quite substantial)" needs "further investigation." [Serge Cipko,
   "Nestor Makhno: A Mini-Historiography of the Anarchist Revolution in
   Ukraine, 1917-1921," pp. 57-75, The Raven, no. 13, p. 75]

   At its height, the army was made up of infantry, cavalry, artillery,
   machine-gun units, and special branches, including an intelligence
   service. As the success of partisan warfare depends upon mobility, the
   army gradually mounted its infantry in light carts (called "tachanka")
   during 1918-19. As Michael Malet notes, this was a "novel tactic" and
   Makhno "could be described as the inventor of the motorised division
   before the car came into general use." [Op. Cit., p. 85] The tachanka
   was used to transport as many troops as possible, giving the
   Makhnovists mobile infantry which could keep up with the cavalry. In
   addition, a machine-gun was sometimes mounted in the rear (in autumn
   1919, the 1st machine-gun regiment consisted of 120 guns, all mounted
   on tachanki).

   For the most part the Makhnovist army was a volunteer army, unlike all
   others operating in the Russian Civil War. However, at times of crisis
   attempts were made to mobilise troops. For example, the Second regional
   congress agreed that a "general voluntary and equalitarian
   mobilisation" should take place. This meant that this appeal,
   "sanctioned by the moral authority of the congress, emphasised the need
   for fresh troops in the insurrectionary army, no-one was compelled to
   enlist." [Voline, Op. Cit., p. 577] The Congress itself passed a
   resolution after a long and passionate debate that stated it "rejected
   'compulsory' mobilisation, opting for an 'obligatory' one; that is,
   each peasant who is able to carry arms, should recognise his obligation
   to enlist in the ranks of the partisans and to defend the interests of
   the entire toiling people of Ukraine." [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p.
   155] There were far more volunteers than arms, the opposite of what
   occurred to both the Reds and Whites during the Civil War. [Malet, Op.
   Cit., p. 106]

   The third Congress decided to conduct a voluntary mobilisation all
   those born between 1889 and 1898. This congress told them to assemble
   at certain points, organise themselves and elect their officers.
   Another mobilisation decided at the Aleksandrovsk congress never took
   place. How far the Makhnovists were forced to conscript troops is still
   a matter of debate. Paul Avrich, for example, states that "voluntary
   mobilisation" in reality "meant outright conscription, as all
   able-bodied men were required to serve." [Op. Cit., p. 114] On the
   other side, surviving leaflets from 1920 "are in the nature of appeals
   to join up, not instructions." [Malet,Op. Cit., p. 105] Trotsky,
   ironically, noted that "Makhno does not have general mobilisations, and
   indeed these would be impossible, as he lacks the necessary apparatus."
   [quoted by Malet, Op. Cit., p. 106] It is probably right to say that
   the Congresses desired that every able-bodied man join the Makhnovist
   army, but they simply did not have the means to enforce that desire and
   that the Makhnovists tried their best to avoid conscription by
   appealing to the peasants' revolutionary conscience, with some success.

   As well as the military organisation, there was also an explicitly
   anarchist federation operating in the Ukraine at the same time. The
   first conference to organise a "Confederation of Anarchist
   Organisations of the Ukraine" was held between November 12th to 16th,
   1918. The new federation was named "Nabat" (Alarm) and had a six-person
   Secretariat. Kharkiv was chosen as its headquarters, while it had
   groups in other major Ukrainian cities (including Kyiv, Odessa and
   Katerynoslav). The final organisation of the Nabat was accomplished at
   a conference held in April 2-7, 1919. The federation aimed to form a
   "united anarchism" and guaranteed a substantial degree of autonomy for
   every participating group and individual. A number of newspapers
   appeared in a Ukrainian towns and cities (mostly entitled Nabat), as
   did leaflets and pamphlets. There was a main weekly paper (called
   Nabat) which was concerned largely with anarchist theory. This
   completed the Makhnovist papers Road to Freedom (which was often daily,
   sometimes weekly and dealt with libertarian ideas, everyday problems
   and information on partisan activities) and The Makhnovist Voice (which
   dealt primarily with the interests, problems, and tasks of the
   Makhnovist movement and its army). The Nabat organisation was also
   published a pamphlet dealing with the Makhnovist movement's problems,
   the economic organisation of the region, the free soviets, the social
   basis of the society that was to be built, and the problem of defence.

   Unsurprisingly, the Nabat federation and the Makhnovists worked
   together closely, with Nabat members worked in the army (particularly
   its cultural section). Some of its members were also elected to the
   Makhnovist Revolutionary Military Soviet. It should be noted that the
   Nabat federation gained a number of experienced anarchists from Soviet
   Russia, who fled to the Ukraine to escape Bolshevik repression. The
   Nabat shared the fortunes of the Makhno movement. It carried on its
   work freely as long as the region was controlled by the Makhnovist
   Army, but when Bolshevik or White forces prevailed, the anarchists were
   forced underground. The movement was finally crushed in November 1920,
   when the Bolsheviks betrayed the Makhnovists.

   As can be seen, the Makhnovists implemented to a large degree the
   anarchist idea of self-managed, horizontally federated associations
   (when possible, of course). Both the two major organisational layers to
   the Makhnovist structure (the army and the congresses) were federated
   horizontally and the "top" structure was essentially a mass peasant,
   worker and guerrilla decision-making coalition. In other words, the
   masses took decisions at the "top" level that the Revolutionary
   Military Soviet and the Makhnovist army were bound to follow. The army
   was answerable to the local Soviets and to the congresses of soviets
   and, as we discuss in [22]section 7, the Makhnovists called
   working-people and insurgent congresses whenever they could.

   The Makhnovist movement was, fundamentally, a working class movement.
   It was "one of the very few revolutionary movements to be led and
   controlled throughout by members of 'the toiling masses.'" [David
   Footman, Op. Cit., p. 245] It applied its principles of working class
   autonomy and self-organisation as far as it could. Unlike the Red Army,
   it was predominantly organised from the bottom up, rejecting the use of
   Tsarist officers, appointed commanders, and other "top-down" ways of
   the Red Army (see [23]section 14 for further discussion of the
   differences between the two forces).

   The Makhnovist army was not by any means a perfect model of anarchist
   military organisation. However, compared to the Red Army, its
   violations of principle are small and hardly detract from their
   accomplishment of applying anarchist ideas in often extremely difficult
   circumstances.

6 Did the Makhnovists have a constructive social programme?

   Yes, they did. The Makhnovists spent a great deal of energy and effort
   in developing, propagating and explaining their ideas on how a free
   society should be created and run. As Michael Malet noted, the "leading
   Makhnovists had definite ideas about the ideal form of social
   organisation." [Nestor Makhno in the Russian Civil War, p. 107]
   Moreover, as we discuss in the [24]next section, they also successfully
   applied these ideas when and where they could.

   So what was their social programme? Being anarchists, it comprised two
   parts, namely political and economic aspects. The Makhnovists aimed for
   a true social revolution in which the working classes (both urban and
   rural) could actively manage their own affairs and society. As such,
   their social programme reflected the fact that oppression has its roots
   in both political and economic power and so aimed at eliminating both
   the state and private property. As the core of their social ideas was
   the simple principle of working-class autonomy, the idea that the
   liberation of working-class people must be the task of the
   working-class people themselves. This vision is at the heart of
   anarchism and was expressed most elegantly by Makhno:

     "Conquer or die -- such is the dilemma that faces the Ukrainian
     peasants and workers at this historic moment . . . But we will not
     conquer in order to repeat the errors of the past years, the error
     of putting our fate into the hands of new masters; we will conquer
     in order to take our destinies into our own hands, to conduct our
     lives according to our own will and our own conception of the
     truth." [quoted by Peter Arshinov, The History of the Makhnovist
     Movement, p. 58]

   As such, the Makhnovists were extremely hostile to the idea of state
   power, recognising it simply as a means by which the majority are ruled
   by the few. Equally, they were opposed to wage slavery (to private or
   state bosses), recognising that as long as the workers do not manage
   their own work, they can never be free. As they put it, their goals
   could only be achieved by an "implacable revolution and consistent
   struggle against all lies, arbitrariness and coercion, wherever they
   come from, a struggle to the death, a struggle for free speech, for the
   righteous cause, a struggle with weapons in hand. Only through the
   abolition of all rulers, through the destruction of the whole
   foundation of their lies, in state affairs as well as in political and
   economic affairs. And only through the social revolution can the
   genuine Worker-Peasant soviet system be realised and can we arrive at
   SOCIALISM." [contained in Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 273] They, like other
   anarchists and the Kronstadt rebels, termed this programme of working
   class self-management the "third revolution."

   We will discuss the political aspect of the Makhnovist programme first,
   then its economic one. However, the Maknovists considered (correctly)
   that both aspects could not be separated. As they put it: "We will not
   lay down our arms until we have wiped out once and for all every
   political and economic oppression and until genuine equality and
   brotherhood is established in the land." [contained in Arshinov, Op.
   Cit., p. 281] We split the aspects simply to aid the presentation of
   their ideas.

   At the core of their ideas was what they termed the "Free Soviet
   System" (or "free soviets" for short). It was this system which would
   allow the working class to create and run a new society. As they put
   it:

     "[The] Makhnovists realise that the working people are no longer a
     flock of sheep to be ordered about by anyone. We consider the
     working people capable of building, on their own and without
     parties, commissars or generals, their own FREE SOVIET SYSTEM, in
     which those who are elected to the Soviet will not, as now [under
     the Bolsheviks], command and order us, but on the contrary, will be
     only the executors of the decisions made in our own workers'
     gatherings and conferences." [contained in Peter Arshinov, Op. Cit.,
     pp. 280-1]

   Thus the key idea advocated by the leading Makhnovista for social
   organisation and decision-making was the "free toilers' soviet of
   peasant and worker organisations." This meant they were to be
   independent of all central authority and composed of those who worked,
   and not political parties. They were to federate on a local, then
   regional and then national level, and power within the federation was
   to be horizontal and not vertical. [Michael Malet, Op. Cit., p. 107]
   Such a system was in opposition to the Bolshevik practice of Soviets
   defined and dominated by political parties with a vertical decision-
   making structure that reached its highest point in the Bolshevik
   Central Committee.

   Thus, for the Makhnovists, the soviet system would be a "bottom-up"
   system, one designed not to empower a few party leaders at the centre
   but rather a means by which working people could manage their own
   affairs. As the put it, the "soviet system is not the power of the
   social-democratic Communist-Bolsheviks who now call themselves a soviet
   power; rather it is the supreme form of non-authoritarian anti-state
   socialism, which expresses itself in the organisation of a free, happy
   and independent system of social life for the working people." This
   would be based on the "principles of solidarity, friendship and
   equality." This meant that in the Makhnovist system of free soviets,
   the "working people themselves must freely choose their own soviets,
   which will carry out the will and desires of the working people
   themselvs, that is to say, ADMINISTRATIVE, not ruling soviets."
   [contained in Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 272-3]

   As David Footman summarises, Makhno's "ultimate aims were simple. All
   instruments of government were to be destroyed. All political parties
   were to be opposed, as all of them were working for some or other form
   of new government in which the party members would assume the role of a
   ruling class. All social and economic affairs were to be settled in
   friendly discussion between freely elected representatives of the
   toiling masses." [Op. Cit., p. 247]

   Hence the Makhnovist social organisation was a federation of
   self-managed workers' and peasants' councils (soviets), which would "be
   only the executors of the decisions made in our workers' gatherings and
   conferences." [contained in Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 281] In other words,
   an anarchist system based on mass assemblies and decision-making from
   the bottom up.

   Economically, as is to be expected, the Makhnovists opposed private
   property, capitalism and wage-slavery. Their economic ideas were
   summarised in a Makhnovist declaration as follows:

     "The lands of the service gentry, of the monasteries, of the princes
     and other enemies of the toiling masses, with all their livestock
     and goods, are passed on to the use of those peasants who support
     themselves solely through their own labour. This transfer will be
     carried out in an orderly fashion determined in common at peasant
     assemblies, which must remember in this matter not only each of
     their own personal interests, but also bear in mind the common
     interest of all the oppressed, working peasantry.

     "Factories, workshops, mines and other tools and means of production
     become the property of the working class as a whole, which will run
     all enterprises themselves, through their trade unions, getting
     production under way and striving to tie together all industry in
     the country in a single, unitary organisation."
     [contained in Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 266]

   They continually stressed that the "land, the factories, the workshops,
   the mines, the railroads and the other wealth of the people must belong
   to the working people themselves, to those who work in them, that is to
   say, they must be socialised." This meant a system of use-rights, as
   "the land, the mines, the factories, the workshops, the railroads, and
   so on, will belong neither to individuals nor to the government, but
   solely to those who work with them." [Op. Cit., p. 273 and p. 281]

   In industry, such a system clearly implied a system of worker's
   self-management within a system of federated factory committees or
   union branches. On the land, it meant the end of landlordism, with
   peasants being entitled to as much land and equipment as they could
   cultivate without the use of hired labour. As a Makhnovist congress in
   1919 resolved:

     "The land question should be decided on a Ukraine-wide scale at an
     all-Ukrainian congress of peasants on the following basis: in the
     interests of socialism and the struggle against the bourgeoisie, all
     land should be transferred to the hands of the toiling peasants.
     According to the principle that 'the land belongs to nobody' and can
     be used only by those who care about it, who cultivate it, the land
     should be transferred to the toiling peasantry of Ukraine for their
     use without pay according to the norm of equal distribution."
     [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 155]

   In addition to advocating the abolition of private property in land and
   the end of wage labour by distributing land to those who worked it, the
   Makhnovists also supported the forming of "free" or "working" communes.
   Like their policy of land distribution, it also aimed to benefit the
   poorer peasants and rural wage labourers. The "free commune" was a
   voluntary association of rural workers who took over an expropriated
   estate and managed the land in common. The commune was managed by a
   general meeting of all its members and based on the liberty, equality
   and solidarity of its members.

   Clearly, in terms of their economic policies, the Makhnovists proposed
   a clear and viable alternative to both rural and urban capitalism,
   namely workers' self-management. Industry and land would be socialised,
   with the actual management of production resting in the hands of the
   workers themselves and co-ordinated by federated workers'
   organisations. On the land, they proposed the creation of voluntary
   communes which would enable the benefits of co-operative labour to be
   applied. Like their political ideas, their economic ideas were designed
   to ensure the freedom of working people and the end of hierarchy in all
   aspects of society.

   In summary, the Makhnovist had a constructive social ideas which aimed
   to ensure the total economic and political emancipation of the working
   people. Their vision of a free society was based on a federation of
   free, self-managed soviets, the socialisation of the means of life and
   workers' self-management of production by a federation of labour unions
   or factory committees. As the black flags they carried into battle
   read, "liberty or death" and "the land to the peasants, the factories
   to the workers."

7 Did they apply their ideas in practice?

   Yes, the Makhnovists consistently applied their political and social
   ideas when they had the opportunity to do so. Unlike the Bolsheviks,
   who quickly turned away from their stated aims of soviet democracy and
   workers' control in favour of dictatorship by the Bolshevik party, the
   Makhnovists did all in their power to encourage, create and defend
   working-class freedom and self-management (see [25]section 14 for
   further discussion). In the words of historian Christopher Reed:

     "there can be no question that the anarchists did everything they
     could to free the peasants and workers and give them the opportunity
     to develop their own forms of collective control over land and
     factories . . . [T]he Ukrainian anarchists fought under the slogan
     of land to the peasants, factories to the workers and power to the
     soviets. Wherever they had influence they supported the setting up
     of communes and soviets. They introduced safeguards intended to
     protect direct self-government from organised interference . . .
     They conducted relentless class war against landlords, officers,
     factory owners and the commercial classes could expect short shrift
     from Makhno and his men, especially if they had taken up arms
     against the people or, like the Whites . . ., had been responsible
     for looting, pogroms and vicious reprisals against unarmed peasants
     on a colossal scale." [From Tsar to Soviets, p. 263]

   As we discussed in the [26]last section, the core ideas which inspired
   the Makhnovists were working-class self-determination and
   self-management. They aimed at the creation of a "free soviet system"
   and the end of capitalism by rural and industrial self-management. It
   is to the credit of the Makhnovists that they applied these ideas in
   practice rather than talking about high principles and doing the exact
   opposite.

   In practice, of course, the war left little room for much construction
   work. As Voline pointed out, one of the key disadvantages of the
   movement was the "almost continual necessity of fighting and defending
   itself against all kinds of enemies, without being able to concentrate
   on peaceful and truly positive works." [The Unknown Revolution, p. 571]
   However, in the disruption of the Civil War the Makhnovists applied
   their ideas when and where they could.

   Within the army, as we discussed in [27]section 5, the insurgent troops
   elected their own commanders and had regular mass assemblies to discuss
   policy and the agreed norms of conduct within it. In civilian matters,
   the Makhnovists from the start encouraged working-class
   self-organisation and self-government. By late 1917, in the area around
   Hulyai Pole "the toiling masses proceeded . . . to consolidate their
   revolution. The little factories functioned . . . under the control of
   the workers. The estates were split up . . . among the peasants . . . a
   certain number of agricultural communes were formed." [David Footman,
   Op. Cit., p. 248]

   The aim of the Makhnovists was to "transfer all the lands owned by the
   gentry, monasteries, and the state into the hands of peasants or to
   organise, if they wished, peasant communes." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 70]
   This policy was introduced from the start, and by the autumn of 1917,
   all land, equipment and livestock around Hulyai Pole had been
   expropriated from the gentry and kulaks and placed in the hands of
   working peasants. Land reform had been achieved by the direct action of
   the peasantry.

   However, "many of the peasants understood that the task was not
   finished, that it was not enough to appropriate a plot of land and be
   content with it. From the hardships of their lives they learned that
   enemies were watching from all sides, and that they must stick
   together. In several places there were attempts to organise social life
   communally." [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 86]

   In line with social anarchist theory, the Makhnovists also tried to
   introduce collective forms of farming. These experiments in collective
   working and living were called "free communes." Despite the difficult
   military situation communes were established, principally near Hulyai
   Pole, in the autumn of 1917. This activity was resumed in February to
   March of 1918. They re-appeared in early 1919, once the threat of
   counter-revolution had been (temporarily) defeated.

   There were four of these communes within five miles of Hulyai Pole
   itself and many more further afield. According to Makhno, these
   agricultural communes "were in most cases organised by peasants, though
   sometimes their composition was a mixture of peasants and workmen
   [sic!]. Their organisation was based on equality and solidarity of the
   members. All members of these communes -- both men and women -- applied
   themselves willingly to their tasks, whether in the field or the
   household." Unlike many communes, people were given the personal space
   they desired, so "any members of the commune who wanted to cook
   separately for themselves and their children, or to take food from the
   communal kitchens and eat it in their own quarters, met with no
   objection from the other members." The management of each commune "was
   conducted by a general meeting of all its members." In addition, the
   communes decided to introducing anarchist schooling based on the ideas
   of Franciso Ferrer (see [28]section J.5.13 for details). Makhno himself
   worked on one for two days a week for a period. [Makhno, quoted by Paul
   Avrich, Anarchists in the Russian Revolution, pp. 131]

   They were set up on the former estates of landlords, and consisted of
   around 10 families or 100 to 300 people and although each had peasant
   anarchist members not all the members were anarchists. Makhno worked on
   Commune No. 1, which was on the estate of former landlord Klassen. When
   re-founded in 1919 this commune was named after Rosa Luxemburg, the
   Marxist revolutionary who had recently been murdered in the German
   revolution. It was a success, for by the spring sowing it had grown
   from nine families to 285 members working 340 acres of land. The
   communes represented a way that poor and middle peasants could pool
   resources to work estates that they could not have worked otherwise
   and, as Michael Malet points out, "they were organised from the bottom
   up, not the top down." [Op. Cit., p. 121]

   However, as Makhno himself acknowledged, while the "majority of the
   toiling population saw in the organisation of rural communes the
   healthy germ of a new social life" which could provide a "model of a
   free and communal form of life," the "mass of people did not go over to
   it." They cited as their reasons "the advance of the German and
   Austrian armies, their own lack of organisation, and their inability to
   defend this order against the new 'revolutionary' [Bolshevik] and
   counter-revolutionary authorities. For this reason the toiling
   population of the district limited their revolutionary activity to
   supporting in every way those bold springs." [Makhno, quoted by Avrich,
   Op. Cit., p. 132] Given that the communes were finally destroyed by
   White and Red forces in June 1919, their caution was justified. After
   this, peace did not return long enough for the experiment to be
   restarted.

   As Michael Malet argues:

     "Very few peasant movements in history have been able to show in
     practice the sort of society and type of landholding they would like
     to see. The Makhnovist movement is proof that peasant
     revolutionaries can put forward positive, practical ideas." [Op.
     Cit., p. 121]

   The Makhnovist experiments, it should be noted, have strong
   similarities to the rural revolution during the Spanish Revolution of
   1936 (see sections [29]I.8.5 and [30]I.8.6 for more details).

   As well as implementing their economic ideas on workers'
   self-management, land reform and free communes, the Makhnovists also
   organised regional congresses as well as local soviets. Most of the
   activity happened in and around Hulyai Pole, the focal point of the
   movement.This was in accord with their vision of a "free soviet
   system." Needless to say, the congresses could only be called during
   periods of relative calm (i.e. the Makhnovist home area was not
   occupied by hostile forces) and so congresses of insurgents, peasants
   and workers were called in early 1919 and another in October of that
   year. The actual dates of the regional congresses were:

     23 January 1919 at Velyka Mykhailivka

     12 February 1919 at Hulyai Pole

     10 April 1919 at Hulyai Pole

     20 October 1919 at Aleksandrovsk

   A congress for the fifteenth of June 1919 never met because Trotsky
   unilaterally banned it, under pain of death to anyone even discussing
   it, never mind calling for it or attending as a delegate. Unlike the
   third congress, which ignored a similar ban by Dybenko, the fourth
   congress could not go ahead due to the treacherous attack by the Red
   Army that preceded it. Four Makhnovist commanders were executed by the
   Red Army for advertising this congress. Another congress planned for
   Aleksandrovsk in November 1920 was also prevented by Bolshevik
   betrayal, namely the attack after Wrangel had been defeated. [Malet,
   Op. Cit., p. 108] See [31]section 13 for further details.

   The reason for these regional congresses was simple, to co-ordinate the
   revolution. "It was indispensable," Arshinov notes, "to establish
   institutions which unified first a district composed of various
   villages, and then the districts and departments which composed the
   liberated region. It was indispensable to find general solutions for
   problems common to the entire region. It was indispensable to create
   organs suitable for these tasks. And the peasants did not fail to
   create them. These organs were the regional congresses of peasants and
   workers." [Op. Cit., pp. 87-8] These congresses "were composed of
   delegates of peasants, workers and of the insurgent army, and were
   intended to clarify and record the decisions of the toiling masses and
   to be regarded as the supreme authority for the liberated area." [David
   Footman, Op. Cit., p. 266]

   The first congress, which was the smallest, discussed the strengthening
   of the front, the adoption of a common nomenclature for popular
   organisations (soviets and the like) and to send a delegation to
   convince the draftees in the Nationalist forces to return home. It was
   also decided to organise a second congress. The second congress was
   larger, having 245 delegates from 350 districts. This congress "was
   strongly anti-Bolshevik and favoured a democratic socio-political way
   of life." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 153] One delegate made the issue clear:

     "No party has a right to usurp governmental power into its own hands
     . . . We want life, all problems, to be decided locally, not by
     order from any authority above; and all peasants and workers should
     decide their own fate, while those elected should only carry out the
     toilers' wish." [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 154]

   A general resolution was passed, which acknowledged the fact that the
   Bolshevik party was "demanding a monopoly of the Revolution." It also
   stated:

     "With deep regret the Congress must also declare that apart from
     external enemies a perhaps even greater danger, arising from its
     internal shortcomings, threatens the Revolution of the Russian and
     Ukrainian peasants and workers. The Soviet Governments of Russia and
     of the Ukraine, by their orders and decrees, are making efforts to
     deprive local soviets of peasants and workers' deputies of their
     freedom and autonomy." [quoted by Footman, Op. Cit., p. 267]

   As noted in [32]section 5, the congress also decided to issue an
   "obligatory" mobilisation to gather troops for the Army. It also
   accepted a resolution on land reform, stating that the land "belongs to
   nobody" and could be used by anyone as long as they did not use wage
   labour (see [33]section 6 for the full resolution). The congress
   accepted a resolution against plunder, violence, and anti-Jewish
   pogroms, recognising it as an attempt by the Tsarist government to
   "turn the attention of all toiling people away from the real reason for
   their poverty," namely the Tsarist regime's oppression. [quoted by
   Palij, Op. Cit., p. 155]

   The second congress also elected the Revolutionary Military Soviet of
   Peasants, Workers and Insurgents, which had "no powers to initiate
   policy but designed merely to implement the decisions of the periodic
   congresses." [Footman, Op. Cit., p. 267]

   The third congress was the largest and most representative, with
   delegates from 72 volosts (in which two million people lived). This
   congress aimed to "clarify the situation and to consider the prospects
   for the future of the region." It decided to conduct a voluntary
   mobilisation of men to fight the Whites and "rejected, with the
   approval of both rich and poor peasants, the Bolshevik expropriations."
   [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 158] Toward the end of the congress, it received a
   telegram from the Bolshevik commander Dybenko calling it
   "counter-revolutionary," its organisers "outlaws" and dissolving it by
   his order. The congress immediately voted an indignant resolution in
   rely. This corrected Dybenko's factual mistakes on who called it,
   informed him why it was called, gave him a history lesson on the
   Makhnovist region and asked him:

     "Can there exist laws made by a few people who call themselves
     revolutionaries which permit them to outlaw a whole people who are
     more revolutionary than they are themselves? . . .

     "Is it permissible, is it admissible, that they should come to the
     country to establish laws of violence, to subjugate a people who
     have just overthrown all lawmakers and all laws?

     "Does there exist a law according to which a revolutionary has the
     right to apply the most severe penalties to a revolutionary mass, of
     which he calls himself the defender, simply because this mass has
     taken the good things which the revolution promised them, freedom
     and equality, without his permission?

     "Should the mass of revolutionary people perhaps be silent when such
     a revolutionary takes away the freedom which they have just
     conquered?

     "Do the laws of the revolution order the shooting of a delegate
     because he believes he ought to carry out the mandate given him by
     the revolutionary mass which elected him?

     "Whose interests should the revolutionary defend; those of the Party
     or those of the people who set the revolution in motion with their
     blood?"
     [quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 103]

   As we discuss in [34]section 13, Trotsky's order to ban the fourth
   congress indicates that such laws do exist, with the "entire peasant
   and labouring population are declared guilty of high treason if they
   dare participate in their own free congress." [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p.
   123]

   The last congress was held between 20th and 26th of October in
   Aleksandrovsk. One delegate was to be elected per 3000 people and one
   delegate per military unit. This gave 270 mostly peasant delegates.
   Only 18 were workers, of which 6 were Mensheviks, who walked out after
   Makhno called them "lapdogs of the bourgeoisie" during the discussion
   on "free socio-economic organisations"! [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 109] The
   congress passed a number of resolutions, concentrating on the care of
   the wounded and the poorest part of the population, a voluntary
   mobilisation, voluntary peasant contributions to feed the army and
   forced levies on the bourgeoisie.

   According to Voline, the chairman, Makhnovist ideas were freely
   discussed:

     "The idea of free Soviets, genuinely functioning in the interests of
     the working population; the question of direct relationships between
     peasants and city workers, based on mutual exchange of the products
     of their labour; the launching of a libertarian and egalitarian
     social organisation in the cities and the country; all these
     question were seriously and closely studied by the delegates
     themselves, with the assistance and co-operation of qualified
     comrades." [Op. Cit., p. 640]

   He notes that the congress "decided that the workers, without any
   authority, would organise their economic, political and administrative
   life for themselves, by means of their own abilities, and through their
   own direct organs, united on a federative basis." [Op. Cit., p. 641]

   It is significant to note that the congress also discussed the
   activities of the Makhnovists within the city itself. One delegate
   raised the issue of the activities of the Kontrrazvedka, the Makhnovist
   "counter-intelligence" section. As noted in [35]section 5, the
   Makhnovists, like all the armies in the Russian Civil War, had its
   intelligence service. It combined a number of functions, such as
   military reconnaissance, arrest and holding of prisoners,
   counter-insurgency ("Originally it had a punitive function, but because
   of improper treatment of prisoners of war, it was deprived of its
   punitive function." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 300]). The delegate stated
   that this "counter-espionage service" was engaged in "arbitrary acts
   and uncontrolled actions -- of which some are very serious, rather like
   the Bolshevik Cheka." [quoted by Voline, Op. Cit., p. 643] Immediately
   a commission of several delegates was created to investigate the
   situation. Voline argues that "[s]uch an initiative on the part of
   workers' delegates would not have been possible under the Bolshevik
   regime. It was by activity of this kind that the congress gave a
   preview of the way in which a society should function from the
   beginning if it is based on a desire for progress and
   self-realisation." [Voline, Ibid.] Sadly, the commission could not
   complete its work due to the city being evacuated soon after the
   congress.

   Another incident shows that under the Makhnovists the civilian
   population was in control. A delegate noted that Klein, the Makhnovist
   military commander in the city, had become publicly and riotously drunk
   after issuing proclamations against drunkenness. Klein was called
   before the congress, which accepted his apology and his request to be
   sent to the front, away from the boredom of desk work which had driven
   him to drink! This, according to Voline, showed that the workers and
   their congress were the masters and the army its servant. [Voline, Op.
   Cit., pp. 645-7]

   Outside of the congresses the work of local Soviets was to be
   co-ordinated through the Revolutionary Military Soviet (RMS), the first
   RMS was set up by the 2nd congress and consisted of one delegate for
   each of the 32 volsts the Makhnovista had liberated. The RMS was to be
   answerable to the congresses and limited to implementing their
   decisions but the difficult military situation meant this seldom
   happened. When it did (the 3rd Congress) the Congress had no problems
   with its actions in the previous period. After the Aleksandrovsk
   congress, the RMS consisted of 22 delegates including three known
   Bolsheviks and four known Makhnovists, the Bolsheviks considered the
   remaining delegates "anarchists or anarchist sympathisers".

   The military chaos of 1920 saw the RMS dissolved and replaced by the
   Soviet of Revolutionary Insurgents of the Ukraine, which consisted of
   seven members elected by the insurgent army. Its secretary was a left
   Socialist Revolutionary. The RMS in addition to making decisions
   between Congresses carried out propaganda work including the editing of
   the Makhnovist paper "The Road to Freedom" and collected and
   distributed money.

   Lastly, we must discuss what happened when the Makhnovists applied
   their ideas in any cities they liberated as this gives a clear idea of
   the way they applied their ideas in practice. Anarchist participant
   Yossif the Emigrant stated that it was "Makhno's custom upon taking a
   city or town to call the people together and announce to them that
   henceforth they are free to organise their lives as they think best for
   themselves. He always proclaims complete freedom of speech and press;
   he does not fill the prisons or begin executions, as the Communists
   do." He stressed it was "the expression of the toilers themselves" and
   "the first great mass movement that by its own efforts seeks to free
   itself from government and establish economic self-determination. In
   that sense it is thoroughly Anarchistic." [Alexander Berkman, The
   Bolshevik Myth, pp. 193-5]

   Arshinov paints a similar picture:

     "As soon as they entered a city, they declared that they did not
     represent any kind of authority, that their armed forces obliged no
     one to any sort of obligation and had no other aim than to protect
     the freedom of the working people. The freedom of the peasants and
     the workers, said the Makhnovists, resides in the peasants and
     workers themselves and may not be restricted. In all fields of their
     lives it is up to the workers and peasants themselves to construct
     whatever they consider necessary. As for the Makhnovists -- they can
     only assist them with advice, by putting at their disposal the
     intellectual or military forces they need, but under no
     circumstances can the Makhnovists prescribe for them in any manner."
     [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 148]

   In addition, the Makhnovists "fully applied the revolutionary
   principles of freedom of speech, of thought, of the press, and of
   political association. In all cities and towns occupied by the
   Makhnovists, they began by lifting all the prohibitions and repealing
   all the restrictions imposed on the press and on political
   organisations by one or another power." Indeed, the "only restriction
   that the Makhnovists considered necessary to impose on the Bolsheviks,
   the left Socialist-Revolutionaries and other statists was a prohibition
   on the formation of those 'revolutionary committees' which sought to
   impose a dictatorship over the people." They also took the opportunity
   to destroy every prison they got their hands on, believing that free
   people "have no use for prisons" which are "always built only to
   subjugate the people, the workers and peasants." [Op. Cit., p. 153, p.
   154 and p. 153]

   The Makhnovists encouraged self-management. Looking at Aleksandrovsk:

     "They immediately invited the working population to participate in a
     general conference of the workers of the city. When the conference
     met, a detailed report was given on the military situation in the
     region and it was proposed that the workers organise the life of the
     city and the functioning of the factories with their own forces and
     their own organisations, basing themselves on the principles of
     labour and equality. The workers enthusiastically acclaimed all
     these suggestions; but they hesitated to carry them out, troubled by
     their novelty, and troubled mainly by the nearness of the front,
     which made them fear that the situation of the town was uncertain
     and unstable. The first conference was followed by a second. The
     problems of organising life according to principles of
     self-management by workers were examined and discussed with
     animation by the masses of workers, who all welcomed these ideas
     with the greatest enthusiasm, but who only with difficulty succeeded
     in giving them concrete forms. Railroad workers took the first step
     in this direction. They formed a committee charged with organising
     the railway network of the region . . . From this point, the
     proletariat of Aleksandrovsk began to turn systematically to the
     problem of creating organs of self-management." [Op. Cit., p. 149]

   Unfortunately, the Makhnovists occupied only two cities (Alexandrovsk
   for four weeks and Katerinoslav for two periods of one and five weeks
   respectively). As a rule the Makhnovist rank and file had little or no
   experience of life in the cities and this placed severe limits on their
   ability to understand the specific problems of the workers there. In
   addition, the cities did not have a large anarchist movement, meaning
   that the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks had more support then they did. Both
   parties were, at best, neutral to the Makhnovists and anarchists, so
   making it likely that they would influence the city workers against the
   movement. As Voline noted, the "absence of a vigorous organised
   workers' movement which could support the peasant insurgents" was a
   disadvantage. [Op. Cit., p. 571]

   There were minor successes in both cities. In Alexandrovsk, some trains
   were got running and a few factories reopened. In Katerinoslav (where
   the city was under a state of siege and constant bombardment by the
   Whites), the tobacco workers won a collective agreement that had long
   been refused and the bakers set themselves to preparing the
   socialisation of their industry and drawing up plans to feed both the
   army and the civilian population. Unsurprisingly, the bakers had long
   been under anarcho-syndicalist influence. [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 124]

   Clearly, whenever they could, the Makhnovists practised their stated
   goals of working-class self-management and supported the organisational
   structures to ensure the control of and participation in the social
   revolution by the toiling masses. Equally, when they liberated towns
   and cities they did not impose their own power upon the working-class
   population but rather urged it to organise itself by setting up
   soviets, unions and other forms of working-class power. They urged
   workers to organise self-management of industry. True to the anarchist
   vision of a free society, they advocated and practised freedom of
   assembly, speech and organisation. In the words of historian
   Christopher Reed:

     "Makhno's Insurgent Army . . . was the quintessence of a
     self-administered, people's revolutionary army. It arose from the
     peasants, it was composed of peasants, it handed power to the
     peasants. It encouraged the growth of communes, co-operatives and
     soviets but distrusted all permanent elites attempting to take hold
     within them. It would be foolish to think that Makhno was supported
     by every peasant or that he and his followers could not, on
     occasions, direct their cruelty towards dissidents within their own
     ranks, but, on the whole, the movement perhaps erred on the side of
     being too self-effacing, of handing too much authority to the
     population at key moments." [From Tsar to Soviets, p. 260]

   As such, Makhnovist practice matched its theory. This can be said of
   few social movements and it is to their credit that this is the case.

8 Weren't the Makhnovists just Kulaks?

   According to Trotsky (and, of course, repeated by his followers),
   "Makhno created a cavalry of peasants who supplied their own horses.
   These were not the downtrodden village poor whom the October revolution
   first awakened, but the strong and well-fed peasants who were afraid of
   losing what they had. The anarchist ideas of Makhno (ignoring of the
   state, non-recognition of the central power) corresponded to the spirit
   of this kulak cavalry as nothing else could." He argued that the
   Makhnovist struggle was not the anarchist struggle against the state
   and capitalism, but rather "a struggle of the infuriated petty property
   owner against the proletarian dictatorship." The Makhno movement, he
   stressed, was just an example of the "convulsions of the peasant petty
   bourgeoisie which desired, of course, to liberate itself from capital
   but at the same time did not consent to subordinate itself to the
   dictatorship of the proletariat." [Lenin and Trotsky, Kronstadt, p. 80,
   p. 89 and pp. 89-90]

   Unfortunately for those who use this kind of argument against the
   Makhnovists, it fails to stand up to any kind of scrutiny. Ignoring the
   sophistry of equating the Bolshevik party's dictatorship with the
   "dictatorship of the proletariat," we can easily refute Trotsky's
   somewhat spurious argument concerning the background of the
   Makhnovists.

   Firstly, however, we should clarify what is meant by the term "kulak."
   According to one set of Trotskyist editors, it was "popularly used to
   refer to well-to-do peasants who owned land and hired poor peasants to
   work it." ["glossary," Lenin and Trotsky, Kronstadt, p. 146] The term
   itself derives from the Russian for "fist," with appropriate overtones
   of grasping and meanness. In other words, a rural small-scale
   capitalist (employer of wage labour and often the renter of land and
   loaner of money as well) rather than a well-off peasant as such.
   Trotsky, however, muddies the water considerably by talking about the
   "peasant petty bourgeoisie" as well. Given that a peasant is "petty"
   (i.e. petit) bourgeois (i.e. own and use their own means of
   production), Trotsky is blurring the lines between rural capitalist
   (kulak) and the middle peasantry, as occurred so often under Bolshevik
   rule.

   Secondly, we could just point to the eyewitness accounts of the
   anarchists Arshinov and Voline. Both stress that the Makhno movement
   was a mass revolutionary movement of the peasant and working poor in
   the Southern Ukraine. Arshinov states that after Denikin's troops had
   been broken in 1919, the Makhnovists "literally swept through villages,
   towns and cities like an enormous broom" and the "returned pomeshchiks
   [landlords], the kulaks , the police, the priests" were destroyed, so
   refuting the "the myth spread by the Bolsheviks about the so-called
   kulak character of the Makhnovshchina." Ironically, he states that
   "wherever the Makhnovist movement developed, the kulaks sought the
   protection of the Soviet authorities, and found it there." [Op. Cit.,
   p. 145] Yossif the Emigrant, another anarchist active in the movement,
   told anarchist Alexander Berkman that while there was a "kulak" element
   within it, "the great majority are not of that type." [quoted by
   Berkman, The Bolshevik Myth, p. 187] According to Gallina Makhno
   (Makhno's wife), when entering a town or village it was "always
   Makhno's practice to compel the rich peasants, the kulaki , to give up
   their surplus wealth, which was then divided among the poor, Makhno
   keeping a share for his army. Then he would call a meeting of the
   villagers, address them on the purposes of the povstantsi [partisan]
   movement, and distribute his literature." [Emma Goldman, My
   Disillusionment in Russia, p. 149]

   However, this would be replying to Trotsky's assertions with testimony
   which was obviously pro-Makhnovist. As such, we need to do more than
   this, we need to refute Trotsky's assertions in depth, drawing on as
   many non-anarchist sources and facts as possible.

   The key to refuting Trotsky's argument that the Makhnovists were just
   kulaks is to understand the nature of rural life before and during
   1917. Michael Malet estimates that in 1917, the peasantry could be
   divided into three broad categories. About 40 percent could no longer
   make a living off their land or had none, another 40 per cent who could
   make ends meet, except in a bad year, and 20 per cent who were
   relatively well off, with a fraction at the very top who were very well
   off. [Op. Cit., p. 117] Assuming that "kulak" simply meant "rich" or
   "well-off" peasant, then Trotsky is arguing that the Makhnovist
   movement represented and was based on this top 20 per cent. However, if
   we take the term "kulak" to mean "small rural capitalist" (i.e.
   employer of wage labour) then this figure would be substantially
   smaller as few within this group would employ hired labour or rent
   land. In fact, the percentage of peasant households in Russia employing
   permanent wage-labour was 3.3% in 1917, falling to 1% in 1920. [Teodor
   Shanin, The Awkward Class, p. 171]

   In 1917, the peasants all across the Russian Empire took back the land
   stolen by the landlords. This lead to two developments. Firstly, there
   was a "powerful levelling effect" in rural life. [Shanin, Op. Cit., p.
   159] Secondly, the peasants would only support those who supported
   their aspirations for land reform (which was why the Bolsheviks
   effectively stole the Socialist-Revolutionary land policy in 1917). The
   Ukraine was no different. In 1917 the class structure in the
   countryside changed when the Hulyai Pole peasants were amongst the
   first to seize the landlords' land. In August 1917 Makhno assembled all
   the landed gentry ("pomeshchiks") of the region "and made them give him
   all the documents relating to lands and buildings." After making an
   exact inventory of all this property and presenting a report to the
   local and then district congress of soviets, he "proceeded to equalise
   the rights of the pomeshchiks and kulaks with those of the poor peasant
   labourers in regard to the use of the land . . . the congress decided
   to let the pomeshchiks and kulaks have a share of the land, as well as
   tools and livestock, equal to that of the labourers." Several other
   peasant congresses nearby followed this example and adopted the same
   measure. [Peter Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 53-4]

   Most of this land, tools and livestock was distributed to poor
   peasants, the rest was used to set up voluntary communes where the
   peasants themselves (and not the state) self-managed the land. Thus the
   peasants' "economic conditions in the region of the Makhno movement
   were greatly improved at the expense of the landlords, the church,
   monasteries, and the richest peasants." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 214] This
   redistribution was based on the principle that every peasant was
   entitled to as much land as their family could cultivate without the
   use of hired labour. The abolition of wage labour in the countryside
   was also the method the anarchists were to use in Spain to divide up
   the land some 20 years later.

   We should also note that the Makhnovist policy of land reform based on
   the abolition of wage labour was, as we noted in [36]section 7, the
   position agreed at the second regional congress called in 1919. The
   Makhnovists specifically argued with regards to the kulaks:

     "We are sure that . . . the kulak elements of the village will be
     pushed to one side by the very course of events. The toiling
     peasantry will itself turn effortlessly on the kulaks, first by
     adopting the kulak's surplus land for general use, then naturally
     drawing the kulak elements into the social organisation." [cited by
     Michael Malet, Op. Cit., pp. 118-9]

   As such, when Trotsky talks about the "downtrodden village poor whom
   the October revolution first awakened," he is wrong. In the area around
   Hulyai Pole it was not the October revolution which "first awakened"
   them into action, it was the activities of Makhno and the anarchists
   during the summer and autumn of 1917 which had done that (or, more
   correctly, it was their activities which aided this process as the poor
   peasants and landless workers needed no encouragement to expropriate
   the landlords).

   Needless to say, this land redistribution reinforced Makhno's
   popularity with the people and was essential for the army's later
   popularity and its ability to depend on the peasants for support.
   However, the landlords and richer kulaks did not appreciate it and,
   unsurprisingly, tried to crush the movement when they could. Once the
   Austro-Germans invaded, the local rich took the opportunity to roll
   back the social revolution and the local pomeshchiks and kulaks formed
   a "special volunteer detachment" to fight Makhno once he had returned
   from exile in July 1918. [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 59]

   This system of land reform did not seek to divide the village. Indeed,
   the Makhnovist approach is sometimes called the "united village"
   theory. Rather than provoke unnecessary and damaging conflict behind
   the frontlines, land reform would be placed in the hands of the village
   community, which would ensure that even the kulaks would have a fair
   stake in the post-revolutionary society as everyone would have as much
   land as they could till without using hired labour. The Bolshevik
   policy, as we will see, aimed at artificially imposing "class conflict"
   upon the villages from without and was a disaster as it was totally
   alien to the actual socio-economic situation. Unsurprisingly, peasant
   communities as a whole rose up against the Bolsheviks all across
   Russia.

   As such, the claim that the Makhnovists were simply "kulaks" is false
   as it fails to, firstly, acknowledge the actual pre-revolutionary
   composition of the peasantry and, secondly, to understand the
   social-revolution that had happened in the region of Hulyai Pole in
   1917 and, thirdly, totally ignores the actual Makhnovist position on
   land reform. As Michael Malet argues, the Bolsheviks "totally
   misconstrued the nature of the Makhno movement. It was not a movement
   of kulaks, but of the broad mass of the peasants, especially the poor
   and middle peasants." [Op. Cit., p. 122]

   This was sometimes acknowledged by Bolsheviks themselves. IAkovlev
   acknowledged in 1920 that in 1919 Makhno "was a real peasant idol, an
   expression of all peasant spontaneity against . . . Communists in the
   cities and simultaneously against city capitalists and landowners. In
   the Makhno movement it is difficult to distinguish where the poor
   peasant begins [and] the 'kulak' ends. It was a spontaneous peasant
   movement .. . . In the village we had no foothold, there was not one
   element with which we could join that would be our ally in the struggle
   against the bandits [sic!]." [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 157]

   According to a Soviet author present at the Makhnovist regional
   congresses on January 23 and February 12: "In 1919 when I asked the
   chairman of the two Congresses (a Jewish farmer) whether the 'kulaks'
   were allowed to participate in the Congress, he angrily responded:
   'When will you finally stop talking about kulaks? Now we have no kulaks
   among us: everybody is tilling as much land as he wishes and as much as
   he can.'" [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 293]

   According to Christian Rakovskii, the Bolshevik ruler of Ukraine,
   "three-fourths of the membership of the [partisan] bands were poor
   peasants." He presented a highly original and inventive explanation of
   this fact by arguing that "rich peasants stayed in the village and paid
   poor ones to fight. Poor peasants were the hired army of the kulaks."
   [Vladimir N. Brovkin, Behind the Front the Lines of the Civil War, p.
   112 and p. 328]

   Even Trotsky (himself the son of a rich peasant!) let the cat out of
   the bag in 1919:

     "The liquidation of Makhno does not mean the end of the
     Makhnovschyna, which has its roots in the ignorant popular masses."
     [quoted by Malet, Op. Cit., p. 122]

   Ultimately, all sources (including Bolshevik ones) accept that in the
   autumn of 1919 (at the very least) Makhno's support was overwhelming
   and came from all sections of the population.

   Even ignoring the fact there was a social revolution and the
   eye-witness Bolshevik accounts (including Trotsky's!) which contradict
   Trotsky's assertions, Trotsky can be faulted for other reasons.

   The most important issue is simply that the Makhnovist movement could
   not have survived four years if (at best) 20 per cent of the population
   supported it. As Christopher Reed notes, when the Makhnovists were "in
   retreat they would abandon their weapons and merge with the local
   population. The fact that they were able to succeed shows how closely
   they were linked with the ordinary peasants because such tactics made
   Makhno's men very vulnerable to informers. There were very few examples
   of betrayal." [Op. Cit., p. 260] If Makhno's social base was as weak as
   claimed there would have been no need for the Bolsheviks to enter into
   alliances with him, particularly in the autumn of 1920 when the
   Makhnovists held no significant liberated area. Even after the defeat
   of Wrangel and the subsequent Bolshevik betrayal and repression,
   Makhno's mass base allowed him to remain active for months. Indeed, it
   was only when the peasants themselves had become exhausted in 1921 due
   to worsening economic conditions and state repression, were the
   Makhnovists finally forced into exile.

   In the attempt to "eradicate his influence in the countryside" the
   Bolsheviks "by weight of numbers and consistent ruthlessness they
   achieved a partial success." This was achieved by state terrorism:

     "On the occupation of a village by the Red Army the Cheka would hunt
     out and hang all active Makhnovist supporters; an amenable Soviet
     would be set up; officials would be appointed or imported to
     organise the poor peasants . . . and three or four Red militia men
     left as armed support for the new village bosses." [David Footman,
     Op. Cit., p. 292]

   Moreover, in these "military operations the Bolsheviks shot all
   prisoners. The Makhnovists shot all captured officers unless the Red
   rank and file strongly interceded for them. The rank and file were
   usually sent home, though a number volunteered for service with the
   Insurgents. Red Army reports complain of poor morale . . . The Reds
   used a number of Lettish and Chinese troops to decrease the risk of
   fraternisation." [Footman, Op. Cit., p. 293] If the Makhnovists were
   made up of kulaks, why would the Bolsheviks fear fraternisation?
   Equally, if the Makhnovists were "kulaks" then how could they have such
   an impact on Red Army troops (who were mostly poor peasants)? After
   all, Trotsky had been complaining that "Makhnovism" had been infecting
   nearby Red Army troops and in August 1919 was arguing that it was
   "still a poison which has infected backward units in the Ukrainian
   army." In December 1919, he noted that "disintegration takes place in
   unstable units of our army when they came into contact with Makhno's
   forces." It seems unlikely that a movement made up of "kulaks" could
   have such an impact. Moreover, as Trotsky noted, not all Makhnovists
   were anarchists, "some of them wrongly regard themselves as
   Communists." Again, why would people who regarded themselves as
   Communists join a movement of "kulaks"? [How the Revolution Armed, vol.
   II, p. 367, p. 110 and p. 137]

   In addition, it seems highly unlikely (to say the least!) that a
   movement which is alleged to be either made up of or supported by the
   kulaks could have had a land policy which emphasised and implemented an
   equal share for the poorest peasantry, not just of land but also of
   live and dead stock as well as opposing the hiring of labour. This fact
   is reinforced when we look at the peasant reaction to the Bolshevik
   (and, presumably, anti-kulak and pro-"downtrodden village poor") land
   policy. Simply put, their policies resulted in massive peasant unrest
   directed against the Bolsheviks.

   The Bolshevik land decrees of the 5th and 11th of February, 1919,
   stated that large landlord holdings would become state farms and all
   stock was to be taken over by the Ministry of Agriculture, with only
   between one third and one half of the land being reserved for poor
   peasants. This was "largely irrelevant, since the peasantry had
   expected, and in some cases already controlled, all of it. To them, the
   government was taking away their land, and not seizing it from the
   landlords, then keeping some of it and handing the rest over to its
   rightful owners." [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 134] Thus the land was to
   expropriated by the state, not by the peasants. The result of this
   policy soon became clear:

     "The Bolsheviks expropriation policy was countervailed by the
     peasants' resistance based upon their assumption that 'the land
     belongs to nobody . . . it can be used only by those who care about
     it, who cultivate it.' Thus the peasants maintained that all the
     property of the former landlords was now by right their own. This
     attitude was shared not only by the rich and middle peasants but
     also the poor and landless, for they all wished to be independent
     farmers. The poorer the areas, the more dissatisfied were the
     peasants with the Bolshevik decrees.

     "Thus Communist agricultural policy and terrorism brought about a
     strong reaction against the new Bolshevik regime. By the middle of
     1919, all peasants, rich and poor, distrusted the Bolsheviks."
     [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 156]

   The Bolshevik inspired Poor Peasant Committees were "associated with
   this disastrous policy, were discredited, and their reintroduction
   would need the aid of troops." [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 135] The
   Makhnovists, in contrast, did not impose themselves onto the villages,
   nor did they attempt to tell the peasants what to do and how to divide
   the land. Rather they advocated the formation of Free Soviets through
   which these decisions could be made. This, along with their support for
   land reform, helped win them mass support.

   After evacuating the Ukraine in mid-1919 due to the success of
   Denikin's counter-revolution, the Ukrainian Communists took time to
   mull over what had happened. The Central Committee's November 1919
   resolution on the Ukraine "gave top priority to the middle peasant --
   so often and so conveniently lumped in together with the kulak and
   dealt with accordingly -- the transfer of landlord land to the poor
   peasants with only minimum exceptions for state farms." These points
   were the basis of the new Ukrainian land law of 5th of February, 1920.
   [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 135] This new law reflected long standing
   Makhnovist theory and practice. Therefore, the changing nature of
   Bolshevik land policy in the Ukraine indicates that Trotsky's claims
   are false. The very fact that the Bolsheviks had to adjust their
   policies in line with Makhnovist theory indicates that the later
   appealed to the middle and poor peasants.

   Equally, it seems strange that the "kulaks" who apparently dominated
   the movement should have let themselves be led by poor peasants and
   workers. Voline presents a list of some of the participants of the
   movement and the vast majority are either peasants or workers. [Op.
   Cit., pp. 688-91] As historian Michael Palij notes, "[a]lmost to a man,
   they [the Makhnovist leadership] were of poor peasant origin, with
   little formal education." [Op. Cit., p. 254] Exceptions to the general
   rule were usually workers. Most were Anarchists or
   Socialist-Revolutionaries. [Palij, Op. Cit., pp. 254-62]

   Of course, it can be argued that the leadership of a movement need not
   come from the class which it claims to lead. The leadership of the
   Bolsheviks, for example, had very few actual proletarians within it.
   However, it seems unlikely that a class would select as its leaders
   members of the population it oppressed! Equally, it seems as unlikely
   that poor peasants and workers would let themselves lead a movement of
   kulaks, whose aims would be alien to theirs. After all, poor peasants
   would seek land reform while kulaks would view this as a threat to
   their social position. As can be seen from the Makhnovist land policy,
   they argued for (and implemented) radical land reform, placing the land
   into the hands of peasants who worked the land without hiring labour
   (see [37]section 7)

   As regards Trotsky's argument that the Makhnovists had to be kulaks
   because they originally formed a cavalry unit, it is easy to refute.
   Makhno himself was the son of poor peasants, an agricultural labourer
   and a worker in a factory. He was able to ride a horse, so why could
   other poor peasants not do so? Ultimately, it simply shows that Trotsky
   knew very little of Ukrainian peasant life and society.

   Given that the Bolshevik government was meant to be a "worker-peasant"
   power, it seems strange that Trotsky dismisses the concerns of the
   peasantry so. He should have remembered that peasant uprisings against
   the Bolshevik government occurred constantly under the Bolsheviks,
   forcing them (eventually) to, first, recognise the false nature of
   their peasant policies in 1919 and, second, to introduce the NEP in
   1921. As such, it seems somewhat ironic for Trotsky to attack the
   Makhnovists for not following flawed Bolshevik ideology as regards the
   peasantry!

   The Bolsheviks, as Marxists, saw the peasants as "petit bourgeoisie"
   and uninterested in the revolution except as a means to grab their own
   plot of land. Their idea of land collectivisation was limited to state
   ownership. The initial Bolshevik land strategy can be summed up as
   mobilising the poor peasantry against the rest on the one hand and
   mobilising the city worker against the peasants (through forced grain
   confiscation on the other). The lack of knowledge of peasant life was
   the basis of this policy, which was abandoned in 1919 when it was soon
   proven to be totally wrong. Rather than see wealth extremes rise, the
   1917 revolution saw a general levelling.

   As regards the peasantry, here as elsewhere the Bolsheviks claimed
   their strategy was the objectively necessary (only possible) one in the
   circumstances. And here again the Makhnovists demonstrate this to be
   false, as the Bolsheviks themselves acknowledged in practice by
   changing their agricultural policies and bringing them closer to the
   Makhnovist position.

   Clearly, both factually and logically, Trotsky's arguments are false.
   Ultimately, like most Bolsheviks, Trotsky uses the term "kulak" as a
   meaningless term of abuse, with no relation to the actual class
   structure of peasant life. It simply means a peasant opposed to the
   Bolsheviks rather than an actual social strata. Essentially, he is
   using the standard Leninist technique of specifying a person's class
   (or ideas) based on whether they subscribe to (or simply follow without
   question) Leninist ideology (see [38]section H.2.12 for further
   discussion of this). This explains why the Makhnovists went from being
   heroic revolutionaries to kulak bandits (and back again!) depending on
   whether their activity coincided with the needs of Bolshevik power or
   not. Expediency is not a sound base to build a critique, particularly
   one based simply on assertions like Trotsky's.

9 Were the Makhnovists anti-Semitic and pogromists?

   No, they were not. Anyone who claims that the Mahnovist movement was
   anti-Semitic or conducted pogroms against Jews simply shows ignorance
   or a desire to deceive. As we will show, the Makhnovists were both
   theoretically and practically opposed to anti-Semitism and progroms.

   Unsurprisingly, many Leninists slander the Makhnovists on this score.
   Trotsky, for example, asserted in 1937 that Makhno's followers
   expressed "a militant anti-Semitism." [Lenin and Trotsky, Kronstadt, p.
   80] Needless to say, the Trotskyist editors of the book in question did
   not indicate that Trotsky was wrong in the accusation. In this way a
   slander goes unchecked and becomes "accepted" as being true. As the
   charge of "militant anti-Semitism" is a serious one, so it is essential
   that we (unlike Trotsky) provide evidence to refute it.

   To do so we will present a chronological overview of the evidence
   against it. This will, to some degree, result in some duplication as
   well as lengthy quotations, however it is unavoidable. We are sorry to
   labour this point, but this allegation is sadly commonplace and it is
   essential to refute it fully.

   Unsurprisingly, Arshinov's 1923 account of the movement takes on the
   allegations that the Makhnovists were anti-Semitic. He presents
   extensive evidence to show that the Makhnovists opposed anti-Semitism
   and pogroms. It is worth quoting him at length:

     "In the Russian press as well as abroad, the Makhnovshchina was
     often pictured as a very restricted guerrilla movement, foreign to
     ideas of brotherhood and international solidarity, and even tainted
     with anti-Semitism. Nothing could be more criminal than such
     slanders. In order to shed light on this question, we will cite here
     certain documented facts which relate to this subject.

     "An important role was played in the Makhnovist army by
     revolutionaries of Jewish origin, many of whom had been sentenced to
     forced labour for participation in the 1905 revolution, or else had
     been obliged to emigrate to Western Europe or America. Among others,
     we can mention:

     "Kogan -- vice-president of the central organ of the movement, the
     Regional Revolutionary Military Council of Hulyai Pole. Kogan was a
     worker who, for reasons of principle, had left his factory well
     before the revolution of 1917, and had gone to do agricultural work
     in a poor Jewish agricultural colony. Wounded at the battle of
     Peregonovka, near Uman, against the Denikinists, he was seized by
     them at the hospital at Uman where he was being treated, and,
     according to witnesses, the Denikinists killed him with sabres.

     "L. Zin'kovsky (Zadov) -- head of the army's counter espionage
     section, and later commander of a special cavalry regiment. A worker
     who before the 1917 revolution was condemned to ten years of forced
     labour for political activities. One of the most active militants of
     the revolutionary insurrection.

     "Elena Keller -- secretary of the army's cultural and educational
     section. A worker who took part in the syndicalist movement in
     America. One of the organisers of the 'Nabat' Confederation.

     "Iosif Emigrant (Gotman) -- Member of the army's cultural and
     educational section. A worker who took an active part in the
     Ukrainian anarchist movement. One of the organisers of the 'Nabat'
     Confederation, and later a member of its secretariat.

     "Ya. Alyi (Sukhovol'sky) -- worker, and member of the army's
     cultural and educational section. In the Tsarist period he was
     condemned to forced labor for political activity. One of the
     organisers of the 'Nabat' Confederation and a member of its
     secretariat.

     "We could add many more names to the long list of Jewish
     revolutionaries who took part in different areas of the Makhnovist
     movement, but we will not do this, because it would endanger their
     security.

     "At the heart of the revolutionary insurrection, the Jewish working
     population was among brothers. The Jewish agricultural colonies
     scattered throughout the districts of Mariupol, Berdyansk,
     Aleksandrovsk and elsewhere, actively participated in the regional
     assemblies of peasants, workers and insurgents; they sent delegates
     there, and also to the regional Revolutionary Military Council.

     "Following certain anti-Semitic incidents which occurred in the
     region in February, 1919, Makhno proposed to all the Jewish colonies
     that they organise their self-defence and he furnished the necessary
     guns and ammunition to all these colonies. At the same time Makhno
     organised a series of meetings in the region where he appealed to
     the masses to struggle against anti-Semitism.

     "The Jewish working population, in turn, expressed profound
     solidarity and revolutionary brotherhood toward the revolutionary
     insurrection. In answer to the call made by the Revolutionary
     Military Council to furnish voluntary combatants to the Makhnovist
     insurgent army, the Jewish colonies sent from their midst a large
     number of volunteers.

     "In the army of the Makhnovist insurgents there was an exclusively
     Jewish artillery battery which was covered by an infantry
     detachment, also made up of Jews. This battery, commanded by the
     Jewish insurgent Shneider, heroically defended Hulyai Pole from
     Denikin's troops in June, 1919, and the entire battery perished
     there, down to the last man and the last shell.

     "In the extremely rapid succession of events after the uprising of
     1918-19, there were obviously individuals who were hostile to Jews,
     but these individuals were not the products of the insurrection;
     they were products of Russian life. These individuals did not have
     any importance in the movement as a whole. If people of this type
     took part in acts directed against Jews, they were quickly and
     severely punished by the revolutionary insurgents.

     "We described earlier the speed and determination with which the
     Makhnovists executed Hryhoriyiv and his staff, and we mentioned that
     one of the main reasons for this execution was their participation
     in pogroms of Jews.

     "We can mention other events of this nature with which we are
     familiar.

     "On May 12, 1919, several Jewish families - 20 people in all - were
     killed in the Jewish agricultural colony of Gor'kaya, near
     Aleksandrovsk. The Makhnovist staff immediately set up a special
     commission to investigate this event. This commission discovered
     that the murders had been committed by seven peasants of the
     neighbouring village of Uspenovka. These peasants were not part of
     the insurrectionary army. However, the Makhnovists felt it was
     impossible to leave this crime unpunished, and they shot the
     murderers. It was later established that this event and other
     attempts of this nature had been carried out at the instigation of
     Denikin's agents, who had managed to infiltrate the region and had
     sought by these means to prepare an atmosphere favourable for the
     entry of Denikin's troops into the Ukraine.

     "On May 4th or 5th, 1919, Makhno and a few commanders hurriedly left
     the front and went to Hulyai Pole, where they were awaited by the
     Extraordinary Plenipotentiary of the Republic, L. Kamenev, who had
     arrived from Khar'kov with other representatives of the Soviet
     government. At the Verkhnii Tokmak station, Makhno saw a poster with
     the words: 'Death to Jews, Save the Revolution, Long Live Batko
     Makhno.'

     "'Who put up that poster?' Makhno asked.

     "He learned that the poster had been put up by an insurgent whom
     Makhno knew personally, a soldier who had taken part in the battle
     against Denikin's troops, a person who was in general decent. He
     presented himself immediately and was shot on the spot.

     "Makhno continued the journey to Hulyai Pole. During the rest of the
     day and during his negotiations with the Plenipotentiary of the
     Republic, he could not free himself from the influence of this
     event. He realised that the insurgent had been cruelly dealt with,
     but he also knew that in conditions of war and in view of Denikin's
     advance, such posters could represent an enormous danger for the
     Jewish population and for the entire revolution if one did not
     oppose them quickly and resolutely.

     "When the insurrectionary army retreated toward Uman in the summer
     of 1919, there were several cases when insurgents plundered Jewish
     homes. When the insurrectionary army examined these cases, it was
     learned that one group of four or five men was involved in all these
     incidents -- men who had earlier belonged to Hryhoriyiv's
     detachments and who had been incorporated into the Makhnovist army
     after Hryhoriyiv was shot. This group was disarmed and discharged
     immediately. Following this, all the combatants who had served under
     Hryhoriyiv were discharged from the Makhnovist army as an unreliable
     element whose re-education was not possible in view of the
     unfavorable conditions and the lack of time. Thus we see how the
     Makhnovists viewed anti-Semitism. Outbursts of anti-Semitism in
     various parts of the Ukraine had no relation to the Makhnovshchina.

     "Wherever the Jewish population was in contact with the Makhnovists,
     it found in them its best protectors against anti-Semitic incidents.
     The Jewish population of Hulyai Pole, Aleksandrovsk, Berdyansk,
     Mariupol, as well as all the Jewish agricultural colonies scattered
     throughout the Donets region, can themselves corroborate the fact
     that they always found the Makhnovists to be true revolutionary
     friends, and that due to the severe and decisive measures of the
     Makhno visits, the anti-Semitic leanings of the
     counter-revolutionary forces in this region were promptly squashed.

     "Anti-Semitism exists in Russia as well as in many other countries.
     In Russia, and to some extent in the Ukraine, it is not a result of
     the revolutionary epoch or of the insurrectionary movement, but is
     on the contrary a vestige of the past. The Makhnovists always fought
     it resolutely in words as well as deeds. During the entire period of
     the movement, they issued numerous publications calling on the
     masses to struggle against this evil. It can firmly be stated that
     in the struggle against anti-Semitism in the Ukraine and beyond its
     borders, their accomplishment was enormous."
     [Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 211-215]

   Arshinov then goes on to quote an appeal published by Makhnovists
   together with anarchists referring to an anti-Semitic incident which
   took place in the spring of 1919. It is called WORKERS, PEASANTS AND
   INSURGENTS FOR THE OPPRESSED, AGAINST THE OPPRESSORS -- ALWAYS!:

     "During the painful days of reaction, when the situation of the
     Ukrainian peasants was especially difficult and seemed hopeless, you
     were the first to rise as fearless and unconquerable fighters for
     the great cause of the liberation of the working masses. . . This
     was the most beautiful and joyful moment in the history of our
     revolution. You marched against the enemy with weapons in your hands
     as conscious revolutionaries, guided by the great idea of freedom
     and equality. . . But harmful and criminal elements succeeded in
     insinuating themselves into your ranks. And the revolutionary songs,
     songs of brotherhood and of the approaching liberation of the
     workers, began to be disrupted by the harrowing cries of poor Jews
     who were being tormented to death. . . On the clear and splendid
     foundation of the revolution appeared indelible dark blots caused by
     the parched blood of poor Jewish martyrs who now, as before,
     continue to be innocent victims of the criminal reaction, of the
     class struggle . . . Shameful acts are being carried out.
     Anti-Semitic pogroms are taking place.

     "Peasants, workers and insurgents! You know that the workers of all
     nationalities -- Russians, Jews, Poles, Germans, Armenians, etc. --
     are equally imprisoned in the abyss of poverty. You know that
     thousands of Jewish girls, daughters of the people, are sold and
     dishonoured by capital, the same as women of other nationalities.
     You know how many honest and valiant revolutionary Jewish fighters
     have given their lives for freedom in Russia during our whole
     liberation movement. . . The revolution and the honour of workers
     obliges all of us to declare as loudly as possible that we make war
     on the same enemies: on capital and authority, which oppress all
     workers equally, whether they be Russian, Polish, Jewish, etc. We
     must proclaim everywhere that our enemies are exploiters and
     oppressors of various nationalities: the Russian manufacturer, the
     German iron magnate, the Jewish banker, the Polish aristocrat .. . .
     The bourgeoisie of all countries and all nationalities is united in
     a bitter struggle against the revolution, against the labouring
     masses of the whole world and of all nationalities.

     "Peasants, workers and insurgents! At this moment when the
     international enemy -- the bourgeoisie of all countries -- hurries
     to the Russian revolution to create nationalist hatred among the
     mass of workers in order to distort the revolution and to shake the
     very foundation of our class struggle - the solidarity and unity of
     all workers -- you must move against conscious and unconscious
     counter-revolutionaries who endanger the emancipation of the working
     people from capital and authority. Your revolutionary duty is to
     stifle all nationalist persecution by dealing ruthlessly with all
     instigators of anti-Semitic pogroms.

     "The path toward the emancipation of the workers can be reached by
     the union of all the workers of the world."
     [quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit., 215-7]

   Arshinov also quotes an order issued by Makhno to "all revolutionary
   insurgents without exception" which states, in part, that the "goal of
   our revolutionary army, and of every insurgent participating in it, is
   an honourable struggle for the full liberation of the Ukrainian workers
   from all oppression." This was "why every insurgent should constantly
   keep in mind that there is no place among us for those who, under the
   cover of the revolutionary insurrection, seek to satisfy their desires
   for personal profit, violence and plunder at the expense of the
   peaceful Jewish population." [quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 217-8]

   Unsurprisingly, as an anarchist, Makhno presents a class analysis of
   the problem of racism, arguing as follows:

     "Every revolutionary insurgent should remember that his personal
     enemies as well as the enemies of all the people are the rich
     bourgeoisie, regardless of whether they be Russian, or Jewish, or
     Ukrainian. The enemies of the working people are also those who
     protect the unjust bourgeois regime, i.e., the Soviet Commissars,
     the members of repressive expeditionary corps, the Extraordinary
     Commissions which go through the cities and villages torturing the
     working people who refuse to submit to their arbitrary dictatorship.
     Every insurgent should arrest and send to the army staff all
     representatives of such expeditionary corps, Extraordinary
     Commissions and other institutions which oppress and subjugate the
     people; if they resist, they should be shot on the spot. As for any
     violence done to peaceful workers of whatever nationality - such
     acts are unworthy of any revolutionary insurgent, and the
     perpetrator of such acts will be punished by death." [quoted by
     Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 218]

   It should also be noted that the chairmen of three Makhnovist regional
   congresses were Jewish. The first and second congresses had a Jewish
   chairman [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 293], while Voline was the chair for the
   fourth one held at Aleksandrovsk. Similarly, one of the heads of the
   army's counter-espionage section was Jewish. [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p.
   212] Little wonder both Arshinov and Voline stress that an important
   role was played by Jews within the movement.

   The Jewish American anarchists Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman were
   also in Russia and the Ukraine during the revolution. Between 1920 and
   1921, they were in contact with anarchists involved with the
   Makhnovists and were concerned to verify what they had heard about the
   movement from Bolshevik and other sources. Berkman recounts meeting the
   Jewish anarchist Yossif the Emigrant (shot by the Bolsheviks in late
   1920). Yossif stated that "Nestor is merciless toward those guilty of
   Jew-baiting. Most of you have read his numerous proclamations against
   pogroms, and you know how severely he punishes such things." He
   stressed that any stories of atrocities and pogroms committed by the
   Makhnovists were "lies wilfully spread by the Bolsheviks" who "hate
   Nestor worse than they do Wrangel." For Yossif, "Makhno represents the
   real spirit of October." [quoted by Berkman, Op. Cit., pp. 187-9] He
   also notes that Gallina Makhno, Nestor's wife, would "slightly raise
   her voice in indignation when reports of Jew-baiting by povstantsi
   [partisans] were mentioned. These stories were deliberately spread by
   the Bolsheviki, she averred. No-one could be more severe in punishing
   such excesses than Nestor. Some of his best comrades are Jews; there
   are a number of them in the Revolutionary Soviet and in other branches
   of the army. Few men are so loved and respected by the povstantsi as
   Yossif the Emigrant, who is a Jew, and Makhno's best friend." [Berkman,
   Op. Cit., pp. 238-9] Both Goldman and Berkman became friends with
   Makhno during his exile in Paris.

   After his exile, Makhno himself spent time refuting allegations of
   anti-Semitism. Two articles on this subject are contained in The
   Struggle Against the State and other Essays, a collection of Makhno's
   exile writings. In the article "The Makhnovshchina and Anti-Semitism"
   he recounts various examples of the "uncompromising line on the
   anti-Semitism of pogromists" which the Makhnovists took "throughout its
   entire existence." This was "because it was a genuinely revolutionary
   toilers' movement in the Ukraine." He stressed that "[a]t no time did
   the movement make it its business to carry out pogroms against Jews nor
   did it ever encourage any." [The Struggle Against the State and Other
   Essays, p. 38 and p. 34] He wrote another article (called "To the Jews
   of All Countries"):

     "In my first 'Appeal to Jews, published in the French libertarian
     newspaper, Le Libertaire, I asked Jews in general, which is to say
     the bourgeois and the socialist ones as well as the 'anarchist' ones
     like Yanovsky, who have all spoken of me as a pogromist against Jews
     and labelled as anti-Semitic the liberation movement of the
     Ukrainian peasants and workers of which I was the leader, to detail
     to me the specific facts instead of blathering vacuously away: just
     where and just when did I or the aforementioned movement perpetrate
     such acts? . . . Thus far, no such evidence advanced by Jews has
     come to my attention. The only thing that has appeared thus far in
     the press generally, certain Jewish anarchist organs included,
     regarding myself and the insurgent movement I led, has been the
     product of the most shameless lies and of the vulgarity of certain
     political mavericks and their hirelings." [Op. Cit., p. 28]

   It should be noted that Yanovsky, editor of the Yiddish language
   anarchist paper Freie Arbeiter Stimme later admitted that Makhno was
   right. Yanovsky originally believed the charges of anti-Semitism made
   against Makhno, going so far as ignoring Makhno's appeal to him out of
   hand. However, by the time of Makhno's death in 1934, Yanovsky had
   learned the truth:

     "So strongly biased was I against him [Makhno] at that time I did
     not think it necessary to find out whether my serious accusation was
     founded on any real facts during the period of his great fight for
     real freedom in Russia. Now I know that my accusations of
     anti-Semitism against Makhno were built entirely on the lies of the
     Bolsheviks and to the rest of their crimes must be added this great
     crime of killing his greatness and the purity of this fighter for
     freedom."

   Due to this, he could not forgive himself for "so misjudg[ing] a man
   merely on the basis of calumny by his bitter enemies who more than once
   shamefully betrayed him, and against whom he fought so heroically." He
   also notes that it had "become known to me that a great many Jewish
   comrades were heart and soul with Makhno and the whole Makhno movement.
   Amongst them was one whom I knew well personally, Joseph Zutman of
   Detroit, and I know that he would not have had anything to do with
   persons, or a movement, which possessed the slightest leaning towards
   anti-Semitism." ["appendix," My Visit to the Kremlin, pp. 36-7]

   However, by far the best source to refute claims of anti-Semitism the
   work of the Jewish anarchist Voline. He summarises the extensive
   evidence against such claims:

     "We could cover dozens of pages with extensive and irrefutable
     proofs of the falseness of these assertions. We could mention
     articles and proclamations by Makhno and the Council of
     Revolutionary Insurgents denouncing anti-Semitism. We could tell of
     spontaneous acts by Makhno himself and other insurgents against the
     slightest manifestation of the anti-Semitic spirit on the part of a
     few isolated and misguided unfortunates in the army and the
     population. . . One of the reasons for the execution of Grigoriev by
     the Makhnovists was his anti-Semitism and the immense pogrom he
     organised at Elizabethgrad . . .

     "We could cite a whole series of similar facts, but we do not find
     it necessary . . . and will content ourselves with mentioning
     briefly the following essential facts:

     "1. A fairly important part in the Makhnovist movement was played by
     revolutionists of Jewish origin.

     "2. Several members of the Education and Propaganda Commission were
     Jewish.

     "3. Besides many Jewish combatants in various units of the army,
     there was a battery composed entirely of Jewish artillery men and a
     Jewish infantry unit.

     "4. Jewish colonies in the Ukraine furnished many volunteers to the
     Insurrectionary Army.

     "5. In general the Jewish population, which was very numerous in the
     Ukraine, took an active part in all the activities of the movement.
     The Jewish agricultural colonies which were scattered throughout the
     districts of Mariupol, Berdiansk, Alexandrovsk, etc., participated
     in the regional assemblies of workers, peasants and partisans; they
     sent their delegates to the regional Revolutionary Military Council.

     "6. Rich and reactionary Jews certainly had to suffer from the
     Makhnovist army, not as Jews, but just in the same way as non-Jewish
     counter-revolutionaries."
     [The Unknown Revolution, pp. 967-8]

   However, it could be claimed that these accounts are from anarchists
   and so are biased. Ignoring the question of why so many Jewish
   anarchists should defend Makhno if he was, in fact, a pogromist or
   anti-Semite, we can turn to non-anarchist sources for confirmation of
   the fact that Makhno and the Makhnovist movement were not anti-Semites.

   First, we turn to Voline, who quotes the eminent Jewish writer and
   historian M. Tcherikover about the question of the Makhnovists and
   anti-Semitism. Tcherikover had, for a number of years, had specialised
   in research on the persecutions of the Jews in Russia. The Jewish
   historian states "with certainty that, on the whole, the behaviour of
   Makhno's army cannot be compared with that of the other armies which
   were operating in Russian during the events 1917-21. Two facts I can
   certify absolutely explicitly.

   "1. It is undeniable that, of all these armies, including the Red Army,
   the Makhnovists behaved best with regard the civil population in
   general and the Jewish population in particular. I have numerous
   testimonies to this. The proportion of justified complaints against the
   Makhnovist army, in comparison with the others, is negligible.

   "2. Do not speak of pogroms alleged to have been organised by Makhno
   himself. That is a slander or an error. Nothing of the sort occurred.
   As for the Makhnovist Army, I have had hints and precise denunciations
   on this subject. But, up to the present, every time I have tried to
   check the facts, I have been obliged to declare that on the day in
   question no Makhnovist unit could have been at the place indicated, the
   whole army being far away from there. Upon examining the evidence
   closely, I established this fact, every time, with absolute certainty,
   at the place and on the date of the pogrom, no Makhnovist unit was
   operating or even located in the vicinity. Not once have I been able to
   prove the existence of a Makhnovist unit at the place a pogrom against
   the Jews took place. Consequently, the pogroms in question could not
   have been the work of the Makhnovists."
   [quoted by Voline, Op. Cit., p. 699]

   This conclusion is confirmed by later historians. Paul Avrich notes
   that "[c]harges of Jew-baiting and of anti-Jewish pogroms have come
   from every quarter, left, right, and centre. Without exception,
   however, they are based on hearsay, rumour, or intentional slander, and
   remain undocumented and unproved." He adds that the "Soviet propaganda
   machine was at particular pains to malign Makhno as a bandit and
   pogromist." Wishing to verify the conclusions of Tcherikover proved by
   Voline, Avrich examined several hundred photographs in the Tcherikover
   Collection, housed in the YIVO Library in New York and depicting
   anti-Jewish atrocities in the Ukraine during the Civil War. He found
   that "only one [was] labelled as being the work of the Makhnovists,
   though even here neither Makhno himself nor any of his recognisable
   subordinates are to be seen, nor is there any indication that Makhno
   had authorised the raid or, indeed, that the band involved was in fact
   affiliated with his Insurgent Army." Avrich then states that "there is
   evidence that Makhno did all in his power to counteract anti-Semitic
   tendencies among his followers" and that "a considerable number of Jews
   took part in the Makhnovist movement." He also points out that the
   Jewish anarchists Alexander Berkman, Emma Goldman, Sholem Schwartzbard,
   Voline, Senya Fleshin, and Mollie Steimer did not criticise Makhno as
   an anti-Semite, they also "defended him against the campaign of slander
   that persisted from all sides." [Anarchist Portraits, pp. 122-3] It
   should be noted that Schwartzbard assassinated the Nationalist leader
   Petliura in 1926 because he considered him responsible for pogroms
   conducted by Nationalist troops during the civil war. He shot Petliura
   the day after he, Makhno and Berkman had seen him at a Russian
   restaurant in Paris. [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 189]

   Michael Malet, in his account of the Makhnovists, states that "there is
   overwhelming evidence that Makhno himself was not anti-Semitic." [Op.
   Cit., p. 168] He indicates that in the period January to September
   1919, the Central Committee of Zionist Organisations in Russia listed
   the Nationalists as creating 15,000 victims of pogroms, then the
   Denikinists with 9,500 followed by Hryhoriyiv, Sokolovsky, Struk,
   Yatsenko and Soviet troops (500 victims). Makhno is not mentioned. Of
   the pogroms listed, almost all took place on the western Ukraine, where
   the local otamany (warlords) and the Nationalists were strong. Very few
   took place where Makhno's influence predominated, the nearest being in
   Katerinoslav town and Kherson province; none in the provinces of
   Katerinoslav or Tavria. It should also be noted that the period of
   January to June of that year was one of stability within the Makhnovist
   region, so allowing them the space to apply their ideas. Malet
   summarises:

     "Even granted the lower level of Jewish involvement in left-bank
     trade, the almost total lack of anti-Semitic manifestations would
     show that Makhno's appeals, at a time when anti-Semitism was fast
     becoming fashionable, did not go unheeded by the population. There
     were a number of Jewish colonies in the south-east Ukraine." [Op.
     Cit., p. 169]

   Unsurprisingly, Malet notes that apart from certain personal
   considerations (such as his friendship with a number of Jews, including
   Voline and Yossif the Emigrant), "the basis of Makhno's hostility to
   anti-Semitism was his anarchism. Anarchism has always been an
   international creed, explicitly condemning all forms of racial hatred
   as incompatible with the freedom of individuals and the society of
   equals." And like other serious historians, he points to "the continual
   participation in the movement of both intellectual Jews from outside,
   and Jews from the local colonies" as "further proof . . . of the low
   level of anti-Semitism within the Makhnovshchina." [Op. Cit., p. 171
   and pp. 171-2]

   Anarchist Serge Cipko summarises the literature by stating that the
   "scholarly literature that discusses Makhno's relationships with the
   Jewish population is of the same opinion [that the Makhnovists were not
   anti-Semitic] and concur that unlike the Whites, Bolsheviks and other
   competing groups in Ukraine during the Revolution, the Makhnovists did
   not engage in pogroms." ["Nestor Makhno: A Mini-Historiography of the
   Anarchist Revolution in Ukraine, 1917-1921," pp. 57-75, The Raven, no.
   13, p. 62]

   Historian Christopher Reed concurs, noting that "Makhno actively
   opposed anti-Semitism . . . Not surprisingly, many Jews held prominent
   positions in the Insurgent movement and Jewish farmers and villagers
   staunchly supported Makhno in the face of the unrestrained
   anti-Semitism of Ukrainian nationalists like Grigoriev and of the Great
   Russian chauvinists like the Whites." [Op. Cit., pp. 263-4] Arthur E.
   Adams states that "Makhno protected Jews and in fact had many serving
   on his own staff." [Bolsheviks in the Urkaine, p. 402]

   We apologise again for labouring this point, but the lie that Makhno
   and the Makhnovists were anti-Semitic is relatively commonplace and
   needs to be refuted. As noted, Trotskyists repeat Trotsky's false
   assertions without correction. Other repeat the lie from other sources.
   It was essential, therefore, to spend time making the facts available
   and to nail the lie of Makhnovist anti- Semitism once and for all!

10 Did the Makhnovists hate the city and city workers?

   For some reason the Makhnovists have been portrayed as being against
   the city and even history as such. This assertion is false, although
   sometimes made. For example, historian Bruce Lincoln states that Makhno
   "had studied the anarchist writings of Bakunin, whose condemnation of
   cities and large-scale industries fit so well with the anti-urban,
   anti-industrial feelings of the Ukrainian peasants, and his program was
   precisely the sort that struck responsive chords in peasant hearts."
   [Red Victory, p. 325] Lincoln fails to present any evidence for this
   claim. This is unsurprising as it is doubtful that Makhno read such
   condemnations in Bakunin as they do not, in fact, exist. Similarly, the
   Makhnovist "program" (like anarchism in general) was not "anti-urban"
   or "anti-industrial."

   However, Lincoln's inventions are mild compared to Trotsky's. According
   to Trotsky, "the followers of Makhno" were marked by "hatred for the
   city and the city worker." He later gives some more concrete examples
   of this "hostility to the city" which, as with the general peasant
   revolt, also "nourished the movement of Makhno, who seized and looted
   trains marked for the factories, the plants, and the Red Army; tore up
   railway tracks, shot Communists, etc." [Lenin and Trotsky, Kronstadt,
   p. 80 and p. 89]

   Unsurprisingly, Trotsky simply shows his ignorance of the Makhno
   movement by these statements. To refute Trotsky's claim we can simply
   point to how the Makhnovists acted once they occupied a city. As we
   discuss in [39]section 7, the first thing the Makhnovists did was to
   call a conference of workers and urge them to organise their own
   affairs directly, using their own class organs of self-management
   (soviets, unions, etc.). Hardly the activity of a group of people who
   allegedly "hated" city workers!

   We can also point to the fact that the Makhnovists arranged direct
   exchanges of goods between the towns and country. In early 1918, for
   example, corn was shipped directly to a Moscow factory in return for
   textiles (without state interference). In 1919, 1500 tons of grain (and
   a small amount of coal) was sent by train to Petrograd and Moscow where
   the commander of the train was to exchange it again for textiles. The
   initiative in both cases came from the Hulyai Pole peasants. Again,
   hardly the work of city-hating peasants.

   Peter Arshinov indicates the underlying theory behind the Makhnovists
   as regards the relations between city and country:

     "The Makhnovshchina . . . understands that the victory and
     consolidation of the revolution . . . cannot be realised without a
     close alliance between the working classes of the cities and those
     of the countryside. The peasants understand that without urban
     workers and powerful industrial enterprises they will be deprived of
     most of the benefits which the social revolution makes possible.
     Furthermore, they consider the urban workers to be their brothers,
     members of the same family of workers.

     "There can be no doubt that, at the moment of the victory of the
     social revolution, the peasants will give their entire support to
     the workers. This will be voluntary and truly revolutionary support
     given directly to the urban proletariat. In the present-day
     situation [under the Bolsheviks], the bread taken by force from the
     peasants nourishes mainly the enormous governmental machine. The
     peasants see and understand perfectly that this expensive
     bureaucratic machine is not in any way needed by them or by the
     workers, and that in relation to the workers it plays the same role
     as that of a prison administration toward the inmates. This is why
     the peasants do not have the slightest desire to give their bread
     voluntarily to the State. This is why they are so hostile in their
     relations with the contemporary tax collectors -- the commissars and
     the various supply organs of the State.

     "But the peasants always try to enter into direct relations with the
     urban workers. The question was raised more than once at peasant
     congresses, and the peasants always resolved it in a revolutionary
     and positive manner."
     [Op. Cit., p. 258]

   Simply put, Trotsky misinterprets hostility to the repressive policies
   of the Bolshevik dictatorship with hostility to the city.

   Moreover, ignoring the actual relationships of the Makhnovists with the
   city workers, we can fault Trotsky's arguments without resource to such
   minor things as facts. This is because every one of his "examples" of
   "hatred for the city and the city worker" can be explained by more
   common sense arguments.

   As regards the destruction of trains and railway tracks, a far simpler
   and more plausible explanation can be found than Trotsky's "hostility
   to the city." This is the fact that a civil war was taking place. Both
   the Reds and Whites used armoured trains to move troops and as bases of
   operations. To destroy the means by which your enemy attacks you is
   common sense! Equally, in the chaotic times of the war, resources were
   often in low supply and in order to survive the Makhnovists had to
   "loot" trains (needless to say, Trotsky does not explain how the
   Makhnovists knew the trains were "marked for the factories."). It
   should be noted that the Bolsheviks "looted" the countryside, can we
   surmise that the Bolsheviks simply expressed "hostility to the
   village"?

   As regards the shooting of Communists, a far simpler and more plausible
   explanation also exists. Rather than show "hostility to the city," it
   shows "hostility" to the Communist Party, its policies and its
   authoritarian ideas. Given that the Bolsheviks had betrayed the
   Makhnovists on three occasions (see [40]section 13) and attacked them,
   "hostility" to Communists seems a sensible position to take! Equally,
   the first Bolshevik attack on the Makhnovists occurred in mid-1919,
   when the Bolsheviks began justifying their party dictatorship as
   essential for the success of the revolution. The other two occurred in
   1920, when the Bolsheviks were announcing to the whole world at the
   Communist International (to quote Zinoviev) that "the dictatorship of
   the proletariat is at the same time the dictatorship of the Communist
   Party." [Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress 1920, vol. 1,
   p. 152] Given this, perhaps the fact that the Makhnovists shot
   Communists can be explained in terms of defence against Bolshevik
   betrayal and opposition to the dictatorship of the Communist Party
   rather than "hostility to the city." Needless to say, the Communists
   shot Makhnovists and anarchists. What does that suggest a "hostility"
   to by the Bolsheviks? Working-class autonomy and freedom?

   Clearly, Trotsky was clutching at straws in his smearing of the
   Makhnovist movement as haters of the city worker. The "hostility"
   Trotsky speaks of can be far more easily explained in terms of the
   necessities imposed upon the Makhnovists by the civil war and the
   betrayals of the Bolsheviks. As such, it would be fairer to state that
   the Makhnovists showed "hostility" or "hatred" to the city or city
   workers only if you equate both with the Bolshevik party dictatorship.
   In other words, the Makhnovists showed "hostility" to the new ruling
   class of the Communist Party hierarchy.

   All this does not mean that there were not misunderstandings between
   the Makhno movement, a predominantly rural movement, and the workers in
   the cities. Far from it. Equally, it can be said that the Makhnovists
   did not understand the workings of an urban economy and society as well
   as they understood their own. However, they made no attempt to impose
   their world-view on the city workers (unlike the Bolsheviks, who did so
   on both urban and rural workers). However, ignorance of the city and
   its resulting misunderstandings do not constitute "hostility" or
   "hatred."

   Moreover, where these misunderstandings developed show that the claims
   that the Makhnovists hated the city workers are simply false. Simply
   put, the misunderstanding occurred when the Makhnovists had liberated
   cities from the Whites. As we discussed in [41]section 7, the first
   thing the Makhnovists did was to call a conference of workers'
   delegates to discuss the current situation and to urge them to form
   soviets, unions and co-operatives in order to manage their own affairs.
   This hardly shows "hatred" of the city worker. In contrast, the first
   thing the Bolsheviks did in taking a city was to form a "revolutionary
   committee" to govern the town and implement Bolshevik policy.

   This, needless to say, shows a distinct "hostility" to the city workers
   on the part of the Bolsheviks. Equally, the Bolshevik advocacy of party
   dictatorship to overcome the "wavering" of the working class. In the
   words of Trotsky himself (in 1921):

     "The Workers' Opposition has come out with dangerous slogans, making
     a fetish of democratic principles! They place the workers' right to
     elect representatives above the Party, as if the party were not
     entitled to assert its dictatorship even if that dictatorship
     temporarily clashed with the passing moods of the workers'
     democracy. It is necessary to create amongst us the awareness of the
     revolutionary birthright of the party. which is obliged to maintain
     its dictatorship, regardless of temporary wavering even in the
     working classes. This awareness is for us the indispensable element.
     The dictatorship does not base itself at every given moment on the
     formal principle of a workers' democracy." [quoted by Samuel Farber,
     Before Stalinism, p. 209]

   Opposing workers' democracy because working people could make decisions
   that the party thought were wrong shows a deep "hostility" to the real
   city workers and their liberty and equality. Equally, Bolshevik
   repression of workers' strikes, freedom of speech, assembly,
   organisation and self-determination shows far more "hostility" to the
   city worker than a few Makhnovist misunderstandings!

   All in all, any claim that the Makhnovists "hated" city workers is
   simply false. While some Makhnovists may not have liked the city nor
   really understood the complexities of an urban economy, they did
   recognise the importance of encouraging working-class autonomy and
   self-organisation within them and building links between the rural and
   urban toilers. While the lack of a large-scale anarcho-syndicalist
   movement hindered any positive construction, the Makhnovists at least
   tried to promote urban self-management. Given Bolshevik
   authoritarianism and its various rationalisations, it would be fairer
   to say that it was the Bolsheviks who expressed "hostility" to the city
   workers by imposing their dictatorship upon them rather than supporting
   working-class self-management as the Makhnovists did!

11 Were the Makhnovists nationalists?

   Some books on the Makhnovist movement try to present the Makhnovists as
   being Ukrainian nationalists. A few discuss the matter in order,
   perhaps, to increase the respectability of the Makhnovist movement by
   associating it with a more "serious" and "respectable" political theory
   than anarchism, namely "Nationalism." Those who seriously investigate
   the issue come to the same conclusion, namely that neither Makhno nor
   the Makhnovist movement was nationalist (see, for example, Frank
   Sysyn's essay Nestor Makhno and the Ukrainian Revolution which
   discusses this issue).

   Therefore, any claims that the Makhnovists were nationalists are
   incorrect. The Makhnovist movement was first and foremost an
   internationalist movement of working people. This is to be expected as
   anarchists have long argued that nationalism is a cross-class movement
   which aims to maintain the existing class system but without foreign
   domination (see [42]section D.6 for details). As such, the Makhnovists
   were well aware that nationalism could not solve the social question
   and would simply replace a Russian ruling class and state with a
   Ukrainian one.

   This meant that the aims of the Makhnovists went further than simply
   national liberation or self-determination. Anarchists, rather, aim for
   working-class self-liberation and self-determination, both as
   individuals and as groups, as well as politically, economically and
   socially. To quote Makhno's wire to Lenin in December 1918, the
   Makhnovist "aims are known and clear to all. They are fighting against
   the authority of all political governments and for liberty and
   independence of the working people." [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 80]

   From this class and anti-hierarchical perspective, it is not
   unsurprising that the Makhnovists were not nationalists. They did not
   seek Ukrainian independence but rather working- class autonomy. This,
   of necessity, meant they opposed all those who aimed to govern and/or
   exploit the working class. Hence Arshinov:

     "Composed of the poorest peasants, who were united by the fact that
     they all worked with their own hands, the Makhnovist movement was
     founded on the deep feeling of fraternity which characterises only
     the most oppressed. During its entire history it did not for an
     instant appeal to national sentiments. The whole struggle of the
     Makhnovists against the Bolsheviks was conducted solely in the name
     of the rights and interests of the workers. Denikin's troops, the
     Austro-Germans, Petliura, the French troops in Berdyansk, Wrangel --
     were all treated by the Makhnovists as enemies of the workers. Each
     one of these invasions represented for them essentially a threat to
     the workers, and the Makhnovists had no interest in the national
     flag under which they marched." [Op. Cit., p. 210]

   He stressed that "national prejudices had no place in the
   Makhnovshchina. There was also no place in the movement for religious
   prejudices . . . Among modern social movements, the Makhnovshchina was
   one of the few in which an individual had absolutely no interest in his
   own or his neighbour's religion or nationality, in which he respected
   only the labour and the freedom of the worker." [Op. Cit., p. 211]

   The Makhnovists made their position on nationalism clear in the
   'Declaration' published by the Revolutionary Military Council of the
   army in October, 1919:

     "When speaking of Ukrainian independence, we do not mean national
     independence in Petliura's sense but the social independence of
     workers and peasants. We declare that Ukrainian, and all other,
     working people have the right to self-determination not as an
     'independent nation' but as 'independent workers'" [quoted by
     Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 210]

   In other words, the Makhnovists "declared, that in their option
   Petlurovtchina [the Petliura movement, Petliura being the leader of the
   Nationalists] was a bourgeois nationalist movement whose road was
   entirely different from that of the revolutionary peasants, that the
   Ukraine should be organised on a basis of free labour and the
   independence of the peasants and the workers . . . and that nothing but
   struggle was possible between the Makhnovitchina , the movement of the
   workers, and the Petlurovtchina , the movement of the bourgeoisie."
   [Voline, Op. Cit., p. 572]

   This does not mean that anarchists are indifferent to cultural and
   national domination and oppression. Far from it! As we discussed in
   sections [43]D.6 and [44]D.7, anarchists are against foreign domination
   and cultural imperialism, believing that every community or national
   group has the right to be itself and develop as it sees fit. This means
   that anarchists seek to transform national liberation struggles into
   human liberation struggles, turning any struggle against foreign
   oppression and domination into a struggle against all forms of
   oppression and domination.

   This means that the Makhnovists, like anarchists in general, seek to
   encourage local culture and language while opposed nationalism. As
   Frank Sysyn argues, it "would be a mistake . . . to label the
   Makhnivtsi as 'anti-Ukrainian.' Although they opposed the political
   goals of most 'svidomi ukraintsi' (nationally conscious Ukrainians),
   they accepted the existence of a Ukrainian nation and used the terms
   'Ukraine' and 'Ukrainian.'" [Nestor Makhno and the Ukrainian
   Revolution, p. 288] It should be noted that opponents of Ukrainian
   independence generally called it the "south of Russia" or "Little
   Russia."

   Thus an opposition to nationalism did not imply a rejection or
   blindness to foreign domination and free cultural expression. On the
   question of the language to be taught in schools, the
   Cultural-Educational Section of the Makhnovist Insurgent Army wrote the
   following in October, 1919:

     "The cultural-educational section of the Makhnovist army constantly
     receives questions from school teachers asking about the language in
     which instruction should be given in the schools, now that Denikin's
     troops have been expelled.

     "The revolutionary insurgents, holding to the principles of true
     socialism, cannot in any field or by any measure do violence to the
     natural desires and needs of the Ukrainian people. This is why the
     question of the language to be taught in the schools cannot be
     solved by our army, but can only be decided by the people
     themselves, by parents, teachers and students

     "It goes without saying that all the orders of Denikin's so-called
     'Special Bureau' as well as General Mai-Maevsky's order No. 22,
     which forbids the use of the mother tongue in the schools, are null
     and void, having been forcibly imposed on the schools.

     "In the interest of the greatest intellectual development of the
     people, the language of instruction should be that toward which the
     local population naturally tends, and this is why the population,
     the students, the teachers and the parents, and not authorities or
     the army, should freely and independently resolve this question."
     [quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 210-1]

   They also printed a Ukrainian version of their paper ("The Road to
   Freedom").

   Clearly their opposition to Ukrainian nationalism did not mean that the
   Makhnovists were indifferent to imperialism and foreign political or
   cultural domination. This explains why Makhno criticised his enemies
   for anti-Ukrainian actions and language. Michael Malet summarises, for
   the Makhnovists "Ukrainian culture was welcome, but political
   nationalism was highly suspect." [Op. Cit., p. 143]

   Given anarchist support for federal organisation from below upwards,
   working-class self-determination and autonomy, plus a healthy respect
   for local culture, it is easy to see why some historians have fostered
   a nationalist perspective onto the Makhnovists where none existed. This
   means that when they agitated with the slogan "All to whom freedom and
   independence are dear should stay in the Ukraine and fight the
   Denikinists," it should be noted that "[n]owhere .. . . nationalism
   openly advocated, and the line of argument put forward can more easily
   be interpreted as libertarian and, above all, anti-White." [Malet, Op.
   Cit., p. 146]

   In 1928, Makhno wrote a rebuttal to a Soviet historian's claim that
   Makhno became a Ukrainian Nationalist during the 1920-21 period. He
   "totally dismissed the charges" and argued that the historian
   "distorted anarchism's espousal of local autonomy so as to create
   trumped-up charges of nationalism." As Sysyn argues, while Makhno
   "never became a nationalist, he did to a degree become a Ukrainian
   anarchist." [Op. Cit., p. 292 and p. 303]

   Thus while neither Makhno nor the movement were nationalists, they were
   not blind to national and cultural oppression. They considered
   nationalism as too narrow a goal to satisfy the social aspirations of
   the working classes. As Makhno argued in exile, the Ukrainian toilers
   had "asserted their rights to use their own language and their
   entitlement to their own culture, which had been regarded before the
   revolution as anathema. They also asserted their right to conform in
   their lives to their own way of life and specific customs." However,
   "[i]n the aim of building an independent Ukrainian State, certain
   statist gentlemen would dearly love to arrogate to themselves all
   natural manifestations of Ukrainian reality." Yet the "healthy
   instincts of the Ukrainian toilers and their baleful life under the
   Bolshevik yoke has not made them oblivious of the State danger in
   general" and so they "shun the chauvinist trend and do not mix it up
   with their social aspirations, rather seeking their own road to
   emancipation." [The Struggle Against the State and Other Essays, pp.
   24-5]

   In summary, the Makhnovists were opposed to nationalism but supported
   culture diversity and self-determination within a free federation of
   toilers communes and councils. They did not limit their aims to
   national liberation, but rather sought the self-liberation of the
   working classes from every oppression -- foreign or domestic, economic
   or political, cultural or social.

12 Did the Makhnovists support the Whites?

   No, they did not. However, black propaganda by the Bolsheviks stated
   they did. Victor Serge wrote about the "strenuous calumnies put out by
   the Communist Party" against him "which went so far as to accuse him of
   signing pacts with the Whites at the very moment when he was engaged in
   a life-and-death struggle against them." [Memoirs of a Revolutionary,
   p. 122]

   According to Arshinov, "Soviet newspapers spread the false news of an
   alliance between Makhno and Wrangel" and in the summer of 1920, a
   representative of the Kharkov government "declared at the Plenary
   Session of the Ekaterinoslav Soviet, that Soviet authorities had
   written proof of the alliance between Makhno and Wrangel. This was
   obviously an intentional lie." Wrangel, perhaps believing these lies
   had some basis, sent a messenger to Makhno in July, 1920. "Wrangel's
   messenger was immediately executed" and the "entire incident was
   reported in the Makhnovist press. All this was perfectly clear to the
   Bolsheviks. They nevertheless continued to trumpet the alliance between
   Makhno and Wrangel. It was only after a military-political agreement
   had been concluded between the Makhnovists and the Soviet power that
   the Soviet Commissariat of War announced that there had never been an
   alliance between Makhno and Wrangel, that earlier Soviet assertions to
   this effect were an error." [Op. Cit., pp. 173-5]

   Needless to say, while the Bolsheviks spread the rumour to discredit
   Makhno, the Whites spread it to win the confidence of the peasants.
   Thus when Trotsky stated that Wrangel had "united with the Ukrainian
   partisan Makhno," he was aiding the efforts of Wrangel to learn from
   previous White mistakes and build some kind of popular base. [quoted by
   Palij, Op. Cit., p. 220] By October, Trotsky had retracted this
   statement:

     "Wrangel really tried to come into direct contact with Makhno's men
     and dispatched to Makhno's headquarters two representatives for
     negotiations . . . [However] Makhno's men not only did not enter
     into negotiations with the representatives of Wrangel, but publicly
     hanged them as soon as they arrived at the headquarters." [quoted by
     Palij, Ibid.]

   Trotsky, of course, still tried to blacken the Makhnovists. In the same
   article he argued that "[u]ndoubtedly Makhno actually co-operated with
   Wrangel, and also with the Polish szlachta, as he fought with them
   against the Red Army. However, there was no formal alliance between
   them. All the documents mentioning a formal alliance were fabricated by
   Wrangel . . . All this fabrication was made to deceive the protectors
   of Makhno, the French, and other imperialists." [quoted by Palij, Op.
   Cit., p. 225]

   It is hard to know where to start in this amazing piece of political
   story-telling. As we discuss in more detail in [45]section 13, the
   Makhnovists were fighting the Red Army from January to September 1920
   because the Bolsheviks had engineered their outlawing! As historian
   David Footman points out, the attempt by the Bolsheviks to transfer
   Makhno to Polish front was done for political reasons:

     "it is admitted on the Soviet side that this order was primarily
     'dictated by the necessity' of liquidating Makhnovshchina as an
     independent movement. Only when he was far removed from his home
     country would it be possible to counteract his influence" [Op. Cit.,
     p. 291]

   Indeed, it could be argued that by attacking Makhno in January helped
   the Whites to regroup under Wrangel and return later in the year.
   Equally, it seems like a bad joke for Trotsky to blame the victim of
   Bolshevik intrigues for defending themselves. And the idea that Makhno
   had "protectors" in any imperialist nation is a joke, which deserves
   only laughter as a response!

   It should be noted that it is "agreed that the initiative for joint
   action against Wrangel came from the Makhnovites." This was ignored by
   the Bolsheviks until after "Wrangel started his big offensive" in
   September 1920 [Footman, Op. Cit., p. 294 and p. 295]

   So while the Bolsheviks claimed that the Makhnovists had made a pact
   with General Wrangel, the facts are that Makhnovists fought the Whites
   with all their energy. Indeed, they considered the Whites so great a
   threat to the revolution they even agreed to pursue a pact with the
   Bolsheviks, who had betrayed them twice already and had subjected both
   them and the peasantry to repression. As such, it could be argued that
   the Bolsheviks were the only counter-revolutionaries the Makhnovists
   can be accurately accused of collaborating with.

   Every historian who has studied the movement has refuted claims that
   the Makhnovist movement made any alliance with the
   counter-revolutionary White forces. For example, Michael Palij notes
   that Denikin "was the main enemy that Makhno fought, stubbornly and
   uncompromising, from the end of 1918 to the end of 1919. Its social and
   anti-Ukrainian policies greatly antagonised all segments of Ukrainian
   society. The result of this was an increased resistance to the
   Volunteer Army and its regime and a substantial strengthening of the
   Makhno movement." He also notes that after several months of "hard
   fighting" Denikin's troops "came to regard Makhno's army as their most
   formidable enemy." Makhno's conflict with Wrangel was equally as fierce
   and "[a]lthough Makhno had fought both the Bolsheviks and Wrangel, his
   contribution to the final defeat of the latter was essential, as is
   proved by the efforts of both sides to have him as an ally." [Op. Cit.,
   p. 177, p. 202 and p. 228] According to Footman, Makhno "remained to
   the end the implacable enemy of the Whites." [Op. Cit., p. 295] Malet
   just states the obvious: "The Makhnovists were totally opposed to the
   Whites." [Op. Cit., p. 140]

   We will leave the last word to the considered judgement of the White
   General Denikin who, in exile, stated that the Makhno movement was "the
   most antagonistic to the idea of the White movement." [quoted by Malet,
   Op. Cit., p. 140]

   In summary, the Makhnovists fought the White counter-revolution with
   all their might, playing a key role in the struggle and defeat of both
   Denikin and Wrangel. Anyone who claims that they worked with the Whites
   is either ignorant or a liar.

13 What was the relationship of the Bolsheviks to the movement?

   The Makhnovists worked with the Bolsheviks in three periods. The first
   (and longest) was against Denikin after the Red Army had entered the
   Ukraine after the withdrawal of the Austro-Germans. The second was an
   informal agreement for a short period after Denikin had been defeated.
   The third was a formal political and military agreement between October
   and November 1920 in the struggle against Wrangel. Each period of
   co-operation ended with Bolshevik betrayal and conflict between the two
   forces.

   As such, the relationship of the Bolsheviks to the Makhnovists was one
   of, at best, hostile co-operation against a common enemy. Usually, it
   was one of conflict. This was due, fundamentally, to two different
   concepts of social revolution. While the Makhnovists, as anarchists,
   believed in working-class self-management and autonomy, the Bolsheviks
   believed that only a centralised state structure (headed by themselves)
   could ensure the success of the revolution. By equating working-class
   power with Bolshevik party government (and from 1919 onwards, with the
   dictatorship of the Bolshevik party), they could not help viewing the
   Makhnovist movement as a threat to their power (see [46]section 14 for
   a discussion of the political differences and the evolving nature of
   the Bolshevik's conception of party rule).

   Such a perspective ensured that they could only co-operate during
   periods when the White threat seemed most dangerous. As soon as the
   threat was defeated or they felt strong enough, the Bolsheviks turned
   on their former allies instantly. This section discusses each of the
   Bolshevik betrayals and the subsequent conflicts. As such, it is
   naturally broken up into three parts, reflecting each of the betrayals
   and their aftermath.

   Michael Malet sums up the usual Bolshevik-Makhnovist relationship by
   arguing that it "will be apparent that the aim of the Soviet government
   from the spring of 1919 onwards was to destroy the Makhnovists as an
   independent force, preferably killing Makhno himself in the process . .
   . Given the disastrous nature of Bolshevik land policy . . . this was
   not only unsurprisingly, it was inevitable." He also adds that the
   "fact that Makhno had a socio-political philosophy to back up his
   arguments only made the Bolsheviks more determined to break his hold
   over the south-east Ukraine, as soon as they realised that Nestor would
   not surrender that hold voluntarily." [Op. Cit., p. 128 and p. 129]

   The first betrayal occurred in June 1919. The Makhnovists had been
   integrated with the Red Army in late January 1919, retaining their
   internal organisation (including the election of commanders) and their
   black flags. With the Red Army they fought against Denikin's Volunteer
   Army. Before the arrival of Red forces in their region and the
   subsequent pact, the Makhnovists had organised a successful regional
   insurgent, peasant and worker congress which had agreed to call a
   second for February 12th. This second congress set up a Revolutionary
   Military Soviet to implement the decisions of this and following
   congresses. This congress (see [47]section 7) passed an anti-Bolshevik
   resolution, which urged "the peasants and workers to watch vigilantly
   the actions of the Bolshevik regime that cause a real danger to the
   worker-peasant revolution." Such actions included the monopolisation of
   the revolution, centralising power and overriding local soviets,
   repressing anarchists and Left Socialist Revolutionaries and "stifling
   any manifestation of revolutionary expression." [quoted by Palij, Op.
   Cit., p. 154]

   This change from the recent welcome was simply the behaviour of the
   Bolsheviks since their arrival. The (unelected) Ukrainian Bolshevik
   government had tried to apply the same tactics as its Russian
   equivalent, particularly as regards the peasants. In addition, the
   Bolshevik land policy (as indicated in [48]section 8) was a complete
   disaster, alien to the ideas and needs of the peasants and, combined
   with grain requisitioning, alienating them.

   The third congress was held on the 10th of April. By this time,
   Communist agricultural policy and terrorism had alienated all the
   peasantry, who "rich and poor alike" were "united in their opposition"
   to the Bolsheviks. [Footman, Op. Cit., p. 269] Indeed, the "poorer the
   areas, the more dissatisfied were the peasants with the Bolshevik
   decrees." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 156] As we indicated in [49]section 7,
   the third congress was informed that it was "counter-revolutionary" and
   banned by the Bolshevik commander Dybenko, provoking a famous reply
   which stressed the right of a revolutionary people to apply the gains
   of that revolution when they see fit. It is worth re-quoting the
   relevant section:

     "Can there exist laws made by a few people who call themselves
     revolutionaries which permit them to outlaw a whole people who are
     more revolutionary than they are themselves? . . .

     "Is it permissible, is it admissible, that they should come to the
     country to establish laws of violence, to subjugate a people who
     have just overthrown all lawmakers and all laws?

     "Does there exist a law according to which a revolutionary has the
     right to apply the most severe penalties to a revolutionary mass, of
     which he calls himself the defender, simply because this mass has
     taken the good things which the revolution promised them, freedom
     and equality, without his permission?

     "Should the mass of revolutionary people perhaps be silent when such
     a revolutionary takes away the freedom which they have just
     conquered?

     "Do the laws of the revolution order the shooting of a delegate
     because he believes he ought to carry out the mandate given him by
     the revolutionary mass which elected him?

     "Whose interests should the revolutionary defend; those of the Party
     or those of the people who set the revolution in motion with their
     blood?"
     [quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 103]

   After the 3rd congress, the Bolsheviks started to turn against Makhno:

     "It was now that favourable mention of Makhno ceased to appear in
     the Soviet Press; an increasingly critical note became apparent.
     Supplies failed to get through to Makhnovite units and areas."
     [Footman, Op. Cit., p. 271]

   Lenin himself advised local Bolshevik leaders on Makhno, stating in
   early May that "temporarily, while Rostov is not yet captured, it is
   necessary to be diplomatic." [quoted by Arthur E. Adams, Bolsheviks in
   the Ukraine, pp. 352-3] Thus, as long as the Bolsheviks needed cannon
   fodder, Makhno was to be tolerated. Things changed when Trotsky
   arrived. On May 17th he promised a "radical and merciless liquidation
   of partisanshchina [the partisan movement], independence, hooliganism,
   and leftism." [quoted by Adams, Op. Cit., p. 360] According to one
   historian, Trotsky "favoured a thorough-going annihilation of the
   partisan's ideological leaders as well as men like Hryhoriyov who
   wielded political power." [Adams, Op. Cit., p. 360] Unsurprisingly,
   given Trotsky's stated mission, Bolshevik hostility towards the
   Makhnovists became more than mere words. It took the form of both
   direct and indirect aggression. "In the latter part of May," states
   Footman, "the Cheka sent over two agents to assassinate Makhno." Around
   the same time, the Red "hold-back of supplies for the Insurgents
   developed into a blockade of the area. Makhnovite units at the front
   ran short of ammunition." [Op. Cit., p. 271 and p. 272] This,
   obviously, had a negative impact the Makhnovists' ability to fight the
   Whites.

   Due to the gravity of the military and political situations both at and
   behind the front, the Makhnovist Revolutionary Military Soviet decided
   to call an extraordinary congress of peasants, workers, insurgents and
   Red soldiers. This congress was to determine the immediate tasks and
   the practical measures to be taken by the workers to remedy the mortal
   danger represented by the Whites. On May 31st, a call was sent out
   which stated, in part, "that only the working masses themselves can
   find a solution [to the current problem], and not individuals or
   parties." The congress would be based as follows: "elections of
   delegates of peasants and workers will take place at general assemblies
   of villages, towns, factories and workshops." [quoted by Arshinov, Op.
   Cit., p. 121]

   The Bolshevik reply came quickly, with Trotsky issuing his infamous
   Order no. 1824 on June 4th:

     "This Congress is directed squarely against the Soviet Power in the
     Ukraine and against the organisation of the southern front, where
     Makhno's brigade is stationed. This congress can have no other
     result then to excite some new disgraceful revolt like that of
     Grigor'ev, and to open the front to the Whites, before whom Makhno's
     brigade can only retreat incessantly on account of the incompetence,
     criminal designs and treason of its commanders.

     "1. By the present order this congress is forbidden, and will in no
     circumstances be allowed to take place.

     "2. All the peasant and working class population shall be warned.
     orally and in writing, that participation in the said congress will
     be considered an act of high treason against the Soviet Republic and
     the Soviet front.

     "3. All delegates to the said Congress shall be arrested immediately
     and bought before the Revolutionary Military Tribunal of the 14th,
     formerly 2nd, Army of the Ukraine.

     "4. The persons spreading the call of Makhno and the Hulyai Pole
     Executive Committee to the Congress shall likewise be arrested.

     "5. The present order shall have the force of law as soon as it is
     telegraphed. It should be widely distributed, displayed in all
     public places, and sent to the representatives of the executive
     committees of towns and villages, as well as to all the
     representatives of Soviet authority, and to commanders and
     commissars of military units."
     [quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 122-3]

   Arshinov argues that this "document is truly classic" and "[w]hoever
   studies the Russian revolution should learn it by heart." He compares
   Trotsky's order to the reply the Makhnovists had sent to the
   Bolsheviks' attempt to ban the third congress. Clearly, Order No. 1824
   shows that laws did exist "made by a a few people who call themselves
   revolutionaries which permit them to outlaw a whole people who are more
   revolutionary than they are themselves"! Equally, the order shows that
   "a revolutionary has the right to apply the most severe penalties to a
   revolutionary mass . . . simply because this mass has taken the good
   things which the revolution has promised them, freedom and equality,
   without his permission"! Little wonder Arshinov states that this order
   meant that the "entire peasant and labouring population are declared
   guilty of high treason if they dare to participate in their own free
   congress." [Op. Cit., p. 123]

   According to Voline, in Alexandrovsk "all workers meetings planned for
   the purpose of discussing the call of the Council and the agenda of the
   Congress were forbidden under pain of death. Those which were organised
   in ignorance of the order were dispersed by armed force. In other
   cities and towns, the Bolsheviks acted in the same way. As for the
   peasants in the villages, they were treated with still less ceremony;
   in many places militants and even peasants 'suspected of acting in
   favour of the insurgents and the Congress' were seized and executed
   after a semblance of a trial. Many peasants carrying the call were
   arrested, 'tried' and shot, before they could even find out about Order
   No. 1824." [Op. Cit., pp. 599-600]

   As Arshinov summarises:

     "This entire document represents such a crying usurpation of the
     rights of the workers that it is pointless to comment further on
     it." [Op. Cit., p. 124]

   Trotsky continued his usurpation of the rights of the workers in a
   later order on the congress. In this, Trotsky called this openly
   announced workers, peasant and insurgent congress a "conspiracy against
   Soviet power" and a "congress of Anarchist-kulaks delegates for
   struggle against the Red Army and the Soviet power" (which explains why
   the congress organisers had asked that hotbed of kulakism, the Red Army
   troops, to send delegates!). Trotsky indicated the fate of those
   workers and peasants who dared participate in their own revolution:
   "There can be only one penalty for these individuals: shooting." [How
   the Revolution Armed, vol. II, p. 293]

   Trotsky also ordered the arrest of Makhno, who escaped but who ordered
   his troops to remain under Bolshevik command to ensure that the front
   against Denikin was maintained. However, five members of his staff were
   shot for having distributed literature concerning the banned fourth
   congress. This order was the first step in the Bolshevik attempt to
   "liquidate the Makhnovist movement." This campaign saw Bolshevik
   regiments invade the insurgent area, shooting militants on the spot and
   destroying the free communes and other Makhnovist organisations.
   [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 121] It should be noted that during the Spanish
   Revolution, the Stalinists acted in the same way, attacking rural
   collectives while the anarchist troops fought against Franco at the
   front.

   Thus the participating event for the break between the Makhnovists and
   Bolsheviks was Trotsky's banning of the fourth regional congress.
   However, this was preceded by an intense press campaign against the
   Makhnovists as well as holding back of essential supplies from the
   frontline troops. Clearly the Bolsheviks considered that the soviet
   system was threatened if soviet conferences were called and that the
   "dictatorship of the proletariat" was undermined if the proletariat
   took part in the revolutionary process!

   With the Makhnovist front weakened, they could not hold against
   Denikin's attacks, particularly when Red Army troops retreated on their
   flank. Thus, the front which the Makhnovists themselves had formed and
   held for more than six months was finally broken. [Arshinov, Op. Cit.,
   p. 124] The Red Army was split into three and the Whites entered the
   Ukraine, which the Bolsheviks promptly abandoned to its fate. The
   Makhnovists, drawing stray Red Army and other forces to it, continued
   to fight the Whites, ultimately inflicting a decisive defeat on them at
   Peregonovka, subsequently destroying their supply lines and ensuring
   Denikin's defeat (see [50]section 4).

   The Red Army re-entered the Ukraine at the end of 1919. Bolshevik plans
   with regard to the Makhnovists had already been decided in a secret
   order written by Trotsky on December 11th. Red Army troops had to "be
   protected against infection by guerrilla-ism and Makhnovism" by various
   means, including "extensive agitation" which used "examples from the
   past to show the treacherous role played by the Makhnovites." A
   "considerable number of agents" would be sent "ahead" of the main
   forces to "join the guerrilla detachments" and would agitate against
   "guerrilla-ism." Once partisan forces meet with Red Army troops, the
   former "ceases to be a military unit after it has appeared on our side
   of the line . . . From that moment it becomes merely material for
   processing, and for that purpose is to be sent to our rear." To "secure
   complete subordination of the detachments," the Red forces "must make
   use of the agents previously set to these detachments." The aim, simply
   put, was to ensure that the partisans became "fully subordinate to our
   command." If the partisans who had been fighting for revolution and
   against the Whites opposed becoming "material for processing" (i.e
   cannon fodder), "refuses to submit to orders, displays unruliness and
   self-will," then it "must be subjected to ruthless punishment."
   Recognising the organic links the partisans had with the peasants,
   Trotsky argues that "in the Ukraine, guerrilla detachments appear and
   disappear with ease, dissolving themselves into the mass of the armed
   peasant population" and so "a fundamental condition for the success
   against guerrilla-ism is unconditional disarmament of the rural
   population, without exception." [Trotsky, How the Revolution Armed,
   vol. II, pp. 440-2] As events would show, the Bolsheviks implemented
   Trotsky's order to the letter.

   On December 24th, Makhno's troops met with the Bolshevik 14th army and
   its commander "admitted Makhno's service in defeating Denikin."
   However, while "the Bolsheviks fraternised with the Makhno troops . . .
   they distrusted Makhno, fearing the popularity he had gained as a
   result of his successful fighting against Denikin." The Bolsheviks had
   "no intention of tolerating Makhno's independent policy, but hoped
   first to destroy his army by removing it from its own base. With this
   in mind, on January 8th, 1920, the Revolutionary Military Council of
   the Fourteenth Army ordered Makhno to move to the Polish Front . . .
   The author of the order realised that there was no real war between the
   Poles and the Bolsheviks at the time and he also knew that Makhno would
   not abandon his region. .. . . Uborevich [the author] explained that
   'an appropriate reaction by Makhno to this order would give us the
   chance to have accurate grounds for our next steps' . . . [He]
   concluded: 'The order is a certain political manoeuvre and, at the very
   least, we expect positive results from Makhno's realisation of this.'"
   [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 209 and p. 210] As can be seen, these actions fit
   perfectly with Trotsky's secret order and with Bolshevik desire for a
   monopoly of power for itself (see [51]next section).

   As expected, the Makhnovists refused to leave their territory. They
   realised the political motivations behind the order. As Arshinov notes,
   "[s]ending the insurrectionary army to the Polish front meant removing
   from the Ukraine the main nerve centre of the revolutionary
   insurrection. This was precisely what the Bolsheviks wanted: they would
   then be absolute masters of the rebellious region, and the Makhnovists
   were perfectly aware of this." [Op. Cit., p. 163] As well as political
   objections, the Makhnovists listed practical reasons for not going.
   Firstly, "the Insurrectionary Army was subordinate neither to the 14th
   Corps nor to any other unit of the Red Army. The Red commander had no
   authority to give orders to the Insurrectionary Army." Secondly, "it
   was materially impossible to carry it out, since half the men, as well
   as nearly all the commanders and staff, and Makhno himself, were sick
   [with typhus]." Thirdly, "the fighting qualities and revolutionary
   usefulness of the Insurrectionary Army were certainly much greater on
   their own ground." [Voline, Op. Cit., pp. 650-1]

   The Bolsheviks refused to discuss the issue and on the 14th of January,
   they declared the Makhnovists outlawed. They then "made a great effort
   to destroy" Makhno. [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 210] In summary, the
   Bolsheviks started the conflict in order to eliminate opposition to
   their power. This led to nine months of bitter fighting between the Red
   Army and the Makhnovists. To prevent fraternisation, the Bolsheviks did
   not use local troops and instead imported Latvian, Estonian and Chinese
   troops. They also used other "new tactics," and "attacked not only
   Makhno's partisans, but also the villages and towns in which the
   population was sympathetic toward Makhno. They shot ordinary soldiers
   as well as their commanders, destroying their houses, confiscating
   their properties and persecuting their families. Moreover the
   Bolsheviks conducted mass arrests of innocent peasants who were
   suspected of collaborating in some way with the partisans. It is
   impossible to determine the casualties involved." They also set up
   "Committees of the Poor" as part of the Bolshevik administrative
   apparatus, which acted as "informers helping the Bolshevik secret
   police in its persecution of the partisans, their families and
   supporters, even to the extent of hunting down and executing wounded
   partisans." [Palij, Op. Cit., pp. 212-3]

   This conflict undoubtedly gave time for the Whites to reorganise
   themselves and encouraged the Poles to invade the Ukraine, so
   prolonging the Civil War. The Makhnovists were threatened by both the
   Bolsheviks and Wrangel. By mid-1920, Wrangel appeared to be gaining the
   upper hand and the Makhnovists "could not remain indifferent to
   Wrangel's advance . . . Everything done to destroy him would in the
   last analysis benefit the revolution." This lead the Makhnovists to
   consider allying with the Bolsheviks as "the difference between the
   Communists and Wrangel was that the Communists had the support of the
   masses with faith in the revolution. It is true that these masses were
   cynically misled by the Communists, who exploited the revolutionary
   enthusiasm of the workers in the interests of Bolshevik power." With
   this in mind, the Makhnovists agreed at a mass assembly to make an
   alliance with the Bolsheviks against Wrangel as this would eliminate
   the White threat and end the civil war. [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 176]

   The Bolsheviks ignored the Makhnovist offer using mid-September, when
   "Wrangel's success caused the Bolsheviks leaders to reconsider."
   [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 223] Sometime between the 10th and 15th of October
   the final agreement was signed:

     "Part I -- Political Agreement.

     "1. Immediate release of all Makhnovists and anarchists imprisoned
     or in exile in the territories of the Soviet Republic; cessation of
     all persecutions of Makhnovists or anarchists, except those who
     carry on armed conflict against the Soviet Government.

     "2. Complete freedom in all forms of public expression and
     propaganda for all Makhnovists and anarchists, for their principles
     and ideas, in speech and the press, with the exception of anything
     that might call for the violent overthrow of the Soviet Government,
     and on condition that the requirements of military censorship be
     respected. For all kinds of publications, the Makhnovists and
     anarchists, as revolutionary organisations recognised by the Soviet
     Government may make use of the technical apparatus of the Soviet
     State, while naturally submitting to the technical rules for
     publication.

     "3. Free participation in elections to the Soviets; and the right of
     Makhnovists and anarchists to be elected thereto. Free participation
     in the organisation of the forthcoming Fifth Pan-Ukrainian Congress
     of Soviets . . .

     "Part II -- Military Agreement.

     "1. The Ukrainian Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army (Makhnovist)
     will join the armed forces of the Republic as a partisan army,
     subordinate, in regard to operations, to the supreme command of the
     Red Army; it will retain its established internal structure, and
     does not have to adopt the bases and principles of the regular Red
     Army.

     "2. When crossing Soviet territory at the front, or going between
     fronts, the Insurrectionary Army will not accept into its ranks
     neither any detachments of, nor deserters from, the Red Army . . .

     "3. For the purpose of destroying the common enemy -- the White Army
     -- the Ukrainian Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army (Makhnovists)
     will inform the working masses that collaborate with it the
     agreement that has been concluded; it will call upon the people to
     cease all military actions hostile to the Soviet power; and for its
     part, the Soviet power will immediately publish the clauses of the
     agreement.

     "4. The families of combatants of the Makhnovist Revolutionary
     Insurrectionary Army living in the territory of the Soviet Republic
     shall enjoy the same rights as those of soldiers of the Red Army . .
     ."
     [quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 178]

   This agreement was agreed by both sides, although the Bolsheviks
   immediately broke it by publishing the military agreement first,
   followed by the political agreement a week later, so obscuring the real
   meaning of the pact. As it stands, the political clause simply gave
   anarchists and Makhnovists the rights they should have already had,
   according to the constitution of the Soviet state. This shows how far
   the Bolsheviks had applied that constitution.

   The agreement is highly significant as in itself it disproves many of
   the Bolsheviks slanders about the Makhnovists and it proves the
   suppression of the anarchist press to have been on political grounds.

   However, the Makhnovists desired to add a fourth clause to the
   Political Agreement:

     "Since one of the essential principles of the Makhnovist movement is
     the struggle for the self-management of the workers, the
     Insurrectionary Army (Makhnovist) believes it should insist on the
     following fourth point of the political agreement: in the region
     where the Makhnovist Army is operating, the population of workers
     and peasants will create its own institutions of economic and
     political self-management; these institutions will be autonomous and
     joined in federation, by means of agreement, with the government
     organs of the Soviet Republic," [quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp.
     179-80]

   Unsurprisingly, the Bolsheviks refused to ratify this clause. As one
   Bolshevik historian pointed out, the "fourth point was fundamental to
   both sides, it meant the system of free Soviets, which was in total
   opposition to the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat." [quoted
   by Malet, Op. Cit., p. 108] As we discuss in the [52]next section, the
   Bolsheviks had equated the "dictatorship of the proletariat" with the
   dictatorship of their party and so working-class self-management could
   not be allowed. It should be noted that this fourth clause was the
   cause of Lenin and Trotsky's toying with the idea of allowing the
   Makhnovists south-eastern Ukraine as an anarchist experiment (as
   mentioned by both Victor Serge and Trotsky in later years).

   Once Wrangel had been defeated by Makhnovist and Red Army units, the
   Bolsheviks turned on the movement. Makhno had "assumed that the coming
   conflict with the Bolsheviks could be limited to the realm of ideas,
   feeling that the strong revolutionary ideas and feelings of the
   peasants, together with their distrust of the foreign invaders, were
   the best guarantees for the movement's territory. Moreover, Makhno
   believed that the Bolsheviks would not attack his movement immediately.
   A respite of some three months would have allowed him to consolidate
   his power [sic!] and to win over much of the Bolshevik rank and file."
   [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 231] From the wording of the second clause of the
   military agreement (namely, to refuse Red Army deserters or units), it
   is clear that the Bolsheviks were aware of the appeal of Makhnovist
   politics on the Red Army soldiers. As soon as Wrangel was defeated, the
   Red Army attacked. Makhnovist commanders were invited to meetings,
   arrested and then shot. The Red Army surrounded Makhnovist units and
   attacked them. At the same time, anarchists were arrested all across
   the Ukraine. Hulyai Pole itself was attacked (Makhno, despite
   overwhelming odds, broke out). [Malet, Op. Cit., pp. 71-2]

   In the words of Makhno:

     "In this difficult and responsible revolutionary position the Makhno
     movement made one great mistake: alliance with the Bolsheviks
     against a common enemy, Wrangel and the Entente. In the period of
     this alliance that was morally right and of practical value for the
     revolution, the Makhno movement mistook Bolshevik revolutionism and
     failed to secure itself in advance against betrayal. The Bolsheviks
     and their experts treacherously circumvented it." [quoted by Palij,
     Op. Cit., p. 234]

   While the Bolsheviks continuously proclaimed the final defeat of the
   Makhnovists, they held out for nearly a year before being forced to
   leave the Ukraine in August 1921. Indeed, by the end of 1920 his troops
   number ten to fifteen thousand men and the "growing strength of the
   Makhno army and its successes caused serious concern in the Bolshevik
   regime." More Red troops were deployed, "stationing whole regiments,
   primarily cavalry, in the occupied villages to terrorise the peasants
   and prevent them from supporting Makhno. . . Cheka punitive units were
   constantly trailing the partisans, executing Makhno's sympathisers and
   the partisans' families." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 237 and p. 238] Combined
   with this state terrorism, economic conditions in the villages got
   worse. The countryside was exhausted and 1921 was a famine year. With
   his rural base itself barely surviving, the Makhnovists could not
   survive long.

   It should be noted that during the periods after the Bolsheviks had
   turned on the Makhnovists, the latter appealed to rank-and-file Red
   Army troops not to attack them. As one of their leaflets put it: "Down
   with fratricidal war among the working people!" They urged the Red Army
   troops (with some success) to rebel against the commissars and
   appointed officers and join with the Makhnovists, who would "greet
   [them] as our own brothers and together we will create a free and just
   life for workers and peasants and will struggle against all tyrants and
   oppressors of the working people." [contained in Arshinov, Op. Cit., p.
   276 and p. 283]

   Even after the defeat of the Makhnovists, the Bolsheviks did not stop
   their campaign of lies. For example, Trotsky reported to the Ninth
   Congress of Soviets on December 26th, 1921, that the Makhnovists were
   "in Romania," where Makhno had "received a friendly welcome" and was
   "liv[ing] comfortably in Bucharest." The Makhnovists had picked Romania
   because it was, like Poland, "a country where they . . . felt secure"
   due to the way they treated "Russian counter-revolutionary bands." [How
   the Revolution Armed, vol. IV, p. 404] In reality, the "Romanian
   authorities put Makhno, his wife, and his followers in an internment
   camp." The Bolsheviks were not unaware of this, as they "sent a series
   of sharp diplomatic notes demanding Makhno's extradiction." They
   expelled Makhno and his wife to Poland on April 11, 1922. The Poles
   also interned them and, again, the Bolsheviks demanded Makhno's
   extradition "on the ground that he was a criminal and not entitled to
   political asylum." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 242] Trotsky's lies come as no
   surprise, given his and his party's track record on slandering
   anarchists.

   As can be seen, the relationship of the Makhnovists to the Bolsheviks
   was one of constant betrayal of the former by the latter. Moreover, the
   Bolsheviks took every opportunity to slander the Makhnovists, with
   Trotsky going so far as to report Makhno was living well while he was
   rotting in a capitalist prison. This is to be expected, as the aims of
   the two groups were at such odds. As we discuss in the [53]next
   section, while the Makhnovists did whatever they could to encourage
   working-class self-management and freedom, the Bolsheviks had evolved
   from advocating the government of their party as the expression of "the
   dictatorship of the proletariat" to stating that only the dictatorship
   of their party could ensure the success of a social revolution and so
   was "the dictatorship of the proletariat." As the Makhnovist movement
   shows, if need be, the party would happily exercise its dictatorship
   over the proletariat (and peasantry) if that was needed to retain its
   power.

14 How did the Makhnovists and Bolsheviks differ?

   Like chalk and cheese.

   Whereas the Bolsheviks talked about soviet democracy while exercising a
   party dictatorship, the Makhnovists not only talked about "free
   soviets," they also encouraged them with all their ability. Similarly,
   while Lenin stated that free speech was "a bourgeois notion" and that
   there could be "no free speech in a revolutionary period," the
   Makhnovists proclaimed free speech for working people. [Lenin quoted by
   Goldman, My Disillusionment in Russia, p. 33] While the Bolsheviks
   ended up arguing for the necessity of party dictatorship during a
   revolution, the Makhnovists introduced free soviets and organised
   peasant, worker and insurgent congresses to conduct the revolution.

   We have discussed the Makhnovist ideas in both theory and practice in
   sections [54]5, [55]6 and [56]7. In spite of the chaos and difficulties
   imposed upon the movement by having to fight the counter-revolution,
   the Makhnovists applied their ideals constantly. The Makhnovists were a
   mass movement and its constructive efforts showed that there was an
   alternative route the Russian revolution could have followed other than
   the authoritarian dictatorship that Leninists, then and now, claimed
   was inevitable if the revolution was to be saved.

   To see why, we must compare Bolshevik ideology and practice to that of
   the Makhnovists in three key areas. Firstly, on how a revolution should
   be defended. Secondly, on the role of the soviets and party in the
   revolution. Thirdly, on the question of working-class freedom.

   Early in 1918, after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty the
   Bolsheviks re-introduced Tsarist officers into the army alongside
   bourgeois military discipline. As Maurice Brinton correctly summarises:

     "Trotsky, appointed Commissar of Military Affairs after
     Brest-Litovsk, had rapidly been reorganising the Red Army. The death
     penalty for disobedience under fire had been restored. So, more
     gradually, had saluting, special forms of address, separate living
     quarters and other privileges for officers. Democratic forms of
     organisation, including the election of officers, had been quickly
     dispensed with." [The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control, p. 37]

   Officers were appointed rather then elected. They argued this had to be
   done to win the war. The "principle of election," stated Trotsky, "is
   politically purposeless and technically inexpedient and has been, in
   practice, abolished by decree." Thus the election of officers and the
   creation of soldiers' committees was abolished from the top, replaced
   by appointed officers. Trotsky's rationale for this was simply that
   "political power is in the hands of the same working class from whose
   ranks the Army is recruited." In other words, the Bolshevik Party held
   power as power was actually held by it, not the working class. Trotsky
   tried to answer the obvious objection:

     "Once we have established the Soviet regime, that is a system under
     which the government is headed by persons who have been directly
     elected by the Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers'
     Deputies, there can be no antagonism between the government and the
     mass of the workers, just as there is no antagonism between the
     administration of the union and the general assembly of its members,
     and, therefore, there cannot be any grounds for fearing the
     appointment of members of the commanding staff by the organs of the
     Soviet Power." [Work, Discipline, Order]

   He repeated this argument in his 1919 diatribe against the Makhnovists:

     "The Makhnovites shout raucously: 'Down with appointed commanders!'
     This they do only so as to delude the ignorant element among their
     own soldiers. One can speak of 'appointed' persons only under the
     bourgeois order, when Tsarist officials or bourgeois ministers
     appointed at their own discretion commanders who kept the soldier
     masses subject to the bourgeois classes. Today there is no authority
     in Russia but that which is elected by the whole working class and
     working peasantry. It follows that commanders appointed by the
     central Soviet Government are installed in their positions by the
     will of the working millions. But the Makhnovite commanders reflect
     the interests of a minute group of Anarchists who rely on the kulaks
     and the ignorant." [The Makhno Movement]

   Of course, most workers are well aware that the administration of a
   trade union usually works against them during periods of struggle.
   Indeed, so are most Trotskyists as they often denounce the betrayals by
   that administration. Thus Trotsky's own analogy indicates the fallacy
   of his argument. Equally, it was not "the will of the working millions"
   which appointed anyone, it was a handful of leaders of the Bolshevik
   party (which had manipulated the soviets to remain in power). Needless
   to say, this was a vast change from Lenin's comments in State and
   Revolution opposing appointment and calling for election of all
   officials!

   Moreover, the explanation that "the ignorant" were to blame for
   Makhnovist opposition to appointed officers had a long legacy with
   Trotsky. In April 1918, when justifying Bolshevik introduction of
   appointed officers, he had argued that the "Soviet government is the
   same as the committee of a trade union. It is elected by the workers
   and peasants and you can at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, at any
   moment you like, dismiss that government and appoint another. But once
   you have appointed it, you must give it the right to choose the
   technical specialists." He stressed that this applied "in military
   affairs, in particular." Using the trade union analogy, he argued that
   the workers had "entrusted us [the Bolshevik leaders] with the
   direction of the union" and this meant that the Bolshevik leaders, not
   the workers, should decide things as "we are better able to judge in
   the matter" than them! The workers role was stated clearly: "if our way
   of conducting the business is bad, then throw us out and elect another
   committee!" [Leon Trotsky Speaks, p. 113] In other words, like any
   bureaucrat, for Trotsky working-class participation in the affairs of
   the revolution was seen as irrelevant: the masses had voted and their
   role was now that of obeying those who "are better able to judge."

   Using an argument the Tsar could have been proud of, Trotsky defended
   the elimination of soldier democracy:

     "How could soldiers who have just entered the army choose the
     chiefs! Have they any vote to go by? They have none. And therefore
     elections are impossible." [Ibid.]

   Equally, how could workers and peasants who have just entered political
   or economic struggle in 1917 choose the chiefs? Had they any vote to go
   by? They had none. And therefore political and workplace elections are
   impossible. Unsurprisingly, Trotsky soon ended up applying this logic
   to politics as well, defending (like all the leaders of Bolshevism) the
   dictatorship of the party over working class. How could the "ignorant"
   workers be expected to elect the best "chiefs" never mind manage their
   own affairs!

   Ironically, in 1936 the Stalinist Communist Party in Spain was to make
   very similar arguments about the need for a regular army and army
   discipline to win the war. As Aileen O'Carroll in her essay "Freedom
   and Revolution" argues:

     "The conventional army structure evolved when feudal kings or
     capitalist governments required the working class to fight its wars
     for them. These had to be authoritarian institutions, because
     although propaganda and jingoism can play a part initially in
     encouraging enlistment, the horrors of war soon expose the futility
     of nationalism. A large part of military organisation is aimed at
     ensuring that soldiers remain fighting for causes they do not
     necessarily believe in. Military discipline attempts to create an
     unthinking, unquestioning body of soldiers, as fearful of their own
     side as of the other." [Red & Black Revolution, no. 1]

   In short in both Russia and Spain the Bolsheviks wanted an army that
   would obey them regardless of whether the individual soldiers felt they
   were doing the correct thing, indeed who would obey through fear of
   their officers even when they knew what they were doing was wrong. Such
   a body would be essential for enforcing minority rule over the wishes
   of the workers. Would a self-managed army be inclined to repress
   workers' and peasants' strikes and protests? Of course not.

   The Makhnovists show that another kind of revolutionary army was
   possible in the Russian Revolution and that the "ignorant" masses could
   choose their own officers. In other words, the latter-day
   justifications of the followers of Bolshevism are wrong when they
   assert that the creation of the top-down, hierarchical Red Army was a
   result of the "contradiction between the political consciousness and
   circumstantial coercion" and "a retreat" because "officers were
   appointed and not elected," it was a conscript army and "severe
   military discipline." [John Rees, "In Defence of October",
   International Socialism, no. 52, pp. 3-82, p. 46] As can be seen,
   Trotsky did not consider it as a "retreat" or caused by
   "circumstances." Equally, the Makhnovists managed to organise
   themselves relatively democratically in the circumstances created by
   the same civil war.

   As such, the differences between the Makhnovists and the Bolsheviks as
   regards the internal organisation of a revolutionary army are clear.
   The Bolsheviks applied top-down, bourgeois methods of internal
   organisation and discipline. The Makhnovists applied democratic
   internal organisation and discipline as far as possible.

   From our discussion of the Bolshevik justifications for its system of
   appointed officers in the Red Army, it will come as no surprise that as
   regards the relationship of the soviets to the revolutionary
   organisation (party) the Makhnovists and Bolsheviks were (again) miles
   apart. While we discuss this in greater detail in [57]section 14 of the
   appendix [58]"What happened during the Russian Revolution?", we will
   give a flavour of Bolshevik ideology on this subject here.

   From the start, Lenin identified soviet (or working class) power with
   the power of their own party. In October 1917, Lenin was equating party
   and class: "the power of the Bolsheviks -- that is, the power of the
   proletariat." [Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power?, p. 102] After the
   October Revolution, the Bolsheviks were clear that the soviets would
   not have "all power." Rather, the first act of soviet sovereignty was
   to alienate it into the hands of a Bolshevik government. In response to
   a few leading Bolsheviks who called for a coalition government, the
   Bolshevik Central Committee stated that it was "impossible to refuse a
   purely Bolshevik government without treason to the slogan of the power
   of the Soviets, since a majority at the Second All-Russian Congress of
   Soviets . . . handed power over to this government." [quoted by Robery
   V. Daniels, A Documentary History of Communism, vol. 1, pp. 127-8] How
   can the "power of the Soviets" exist when said soviets immediately
   "handed power" over to another body? Thus the only "power" the soviets
   had was simply the "power" to determine who actually held political
   power.

   The question of who held power, the soviets or the party, came into
   focus when the soviet elections resulted in non-Bolshevik majorities
   being elected. After the initial honeymoon period, soviet elections
   started to go badly for the Bolsheviks. Ever since taking power in
   1917, the Bolsheviks had become increasingly alienated from the working
   class. The spring and summer of 1918 saw "great Bolshevik losses in the
   soviet elections" in all provincial city elections that data is
   available for. The Mensheviks were the main beneficiaries of these
   election swings (Socialist Revolutionaries also gained) The Bolsheviks
   forcibly disbanded such soviets. They continually postponed elections
   and "pack[ed] local soviets once they could no longer count on an
   electoral majority" by giving representation to the organisations they
   dominated which made workplace elections meaningless. [Samuel Farber,
   Before Stalinism, pp. 22-4 and p. 33] In Petrograd, such packing
   swamped the actual number of workplace delegates, transforming the
   soviets and making elections irrelevant. Of the 700-plus deputies to
   the "new" soviet, over half were elected by Bolshevik dominated
   organisations so ensuring a solid Bolshevik majority even before the
   factory voting began.

   Thus, the regime remained "soviet" in name only. Faced with a defeat in
   the soviets, the Bolsheviks simply abolished them or changed them to
   ensure their position. This process, it should be noted, started before
   the outbreak of Civil War in late May 1918, implying that Bolshevik
   authoritarianism cannot be explained as reactions to difficult
   objective circumstances.

   Unsurprisingly, Bolshevik ideology started to adjust to the position
   the party found itself in. As Samuel Farber argues, in the "period of
   March to June 1918, Lenin began to make frequent distinctions within
   the working class, singling out workers who could still be trusted,
   denouncing workers whom he accused of abandoning the working class and
   deserting to the side of the bourgeoisie, and complaining about how the
   working class had become 'infected with the disease of petty-bourgeois
   disintegration.'" [Op. Cit., p. 25] Combined with the vision of
   "working-class" or "soviet" power expressed by the power of his party,
   this laid the foundations for what came next. In 1919 Lenin fully and
   explicitly argued that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was, in
   fact, the dictatorship of the Bolshevik party:

     "we are reproached with having established a dictatorship of one
     party . . . we say, 'Yes, it is a dictatorship of one party! This is
     what we stand for and we shall not shift from that position . . . '"
     [Collected Works, vol. 29, p. 535]

   This quickly become Bolshevik orthodoxy. Trotsky argued in his infamous
   work Terrorism and Communism that there was "no substitution at all"
   when "the power of the party" replaces "the power of the working
   class." Zinoviev argued this point at the Second Congress of the
   Communist International. As he put it:

     "Today, people like Kautsky come along and say that in Russia you do
     not have the dictatorship of the working class but the dictatorship
     of the party. They think this is a reproach against us. Not in the
     least! We have a dictatorship of the working class and that is
     precisely why we also have a dictatorship of the Communist Party.
     The dictatorship of the Communist Party is only a function, an
     attribute, an expression of the dictatorship of the working class .
     . . [T]he dictatorship of the proletariat is at the same time the
     dictatorship of the Communist Party." [Proceedings and Documents of
     the Second Congress, 1920, vol. 1, pp. 151-2]

   Neither Lenin nor Trotsky disagreed. By the end of the civil war, Lenin
   was arguing that "the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be
   exercised through an organisation embracing the whole of the class,
   because in all capitalist countries (and not only over here, in one of
   the most backward) the proletariat is still so divided, so degraded,
   and so corrupted in parts . . . that an organisation taking in the
   whole proletariat cannot directly exercise proletarian dictatorship. It
   can be exercised only by a vanguard . . . the dictatorship of the
   proletariat cannot be exercised by a mass proletarian organisation."
   [Collected Works, vol. 32, p. 21]

   This places the Bolshevik betrayals of the Makhnovists in 1919 and 1920
   into political context. It also explains the Bolshevik opposition to
   the proposed fourth clause of the 1920 political and military agreement
   (see [59]last section). Simply put, at the time (and long afterwards)
   the Bolsheviks equated the revolution with their own power. As such,
   Makhnovist calls for soviet self-management threatened the
   "dictatorship of the proletariat" (i.e. dictatorship of the party) by
   encouraging working people to participate in the revolution and giving
   the radically false idea that working-class power could be exercised by
   working people and their own class organisations.

   Lenin, Trotsky and Zinoviev held this position until their deaths.
   Trotsky, for example, was arguing in 1923 that "[i]f there is one
   question which basically not only does not require revision but does
   not so much as admit the thought of revision, it is the question of the
   dictatorship of the Party, and its leadership in all spheres of our
   work." [Leon Trotsky Speaks, p. 158] Even after the rise of Stalinism,
   he was still arguing for the "objective necessity" of the
   "revolutionary dictatorship of a proletarian party" in 1937. He
   stressed that the "revolutionary party (vanguard) which renounces its
   own dictatorship surrenders the masses to the counter-revolution . . .
   Abstractly speaking, it would be very well if the party dictatorship
   could be replaced by the 'dictatorship' of the whole toiling people
   without any party, but this presupposes such a high level of political
   development among the masses that it can never be achieved under
   capitalist conditions." [Trotsky, Writings 1936-37, pp. 513-4]

   This suggests that the later Trotskyist argument that the Bolsheviks
   were forced by "objective factors" to replace the dictatorship of the
   proletariat by that of the party is false. At the time, and afterwards,
   the Bolsheviks did not argue in these terms. The end of soviet
   democracy was not considered a problem or a retreat for the revolution.
   The opposite was the case, with the elimination of democracy being
   raised to an ideological truism to be applied everywhere. Equally, the
   fact that the Makhnovists did all they could to promote soviet
   self-management and actually called regional congresses of workers,
   peasants and insurgents suggests that "objective factors" simply cannot
   explain Bolshevik actions. Simply put, like the Bolshevik betrayals of
   the Makhnovists, the Bolshevik elimination of soviet democracy by party
   dictatorship can only be fully understood by looking at Bolshevik
   ideology.

   Little wonder the Makhnovists argued as followed:

     "Since the arrival of the Bolsheviks the dictatorship of their party
     has been established here. As a party of statists, the Bolshevik
     Party everywhere has set up state organs for the purpose of
     governing the revolutionary people. Everything has to be submitted
     to their authority and take place under their vigilant eye. All
     opposition, protest, or even independent initiative has been stifled
     by their Extraordinary Commissions [the secret police, the Cheka].
     Furthermore, all these institutions are composed of people who are
     removed from labour and from revolution. In other words, what has
     been created is a situation in which the labouring and revolutionary
     people have fallen under the surveillance and rule of people who are
     alien to the working classes, people who are inclined to exercise
     arbitrariness and violence over the workers. Such is the
     dictatorship of the Bolshevik-Communist Party . . .

     "We again remind the working people that they will liberate
     themselves from oppression, misery and violence only through their
     own efforts. No change in power will help them in this. Only by
     means of their own free worker-peasant organisations can the workers
     reach the summit of the social revolution -- complete freedom and
     real equality."
     [quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit. pp. 116-7]

   Which brings us to the next issue, namely working-class freedom. For
   anarchists, the key point of a revolution is to increase working-class
   freedom. It means the end of hierarchy and the direct participation in
   the revolution by the working classes themselves. As Bakunin put it,
   "revolution is only sincere, honest and real in the hands of the
   masses, and that when it is concentrated in those of a few ruling
   individuals it inevitably and immediately becomes reaction." [Michael
   Bakunin: Selected Writings, p. 237] For this reason, the Makhnovists
   (like Bakunin) argued for a revolutionary society based on free
   federations of worker and peasant organisations (free soviets).

   This means that actions which consolidated rule by a few cannot be
   revolutionary, even if the few are made up of the most revolutionary of
   the revolutionaries. Thus working class power cannot be equated to the
   power of a political party, no matter how "socialist" or
   "revolutionary" its ideas or rhetoric. This means that Bolshevik
   restrictions on working class freedom (of speech, assembly, press,
   organisation) struck at the heart of the revolution. It did not signify
   the defence of the revolution, but rather its defeat. Ultimately, as
   Emma Goldman quickly recognised, what the Bolsheviks called "defence of
   the Revolution" was "really only the defence of [the] party in power."
   [My Disillusionment in Russia, p. 57]

   Anarchists had long argued that, to quote Goldman again, there is "no
   greater fallacy than the belief that aims and purposes are one thing,
   while methods and tactics are another. This conception is a potent
   menace to social regeneration. All human experience teaches that
   methods and means cannot be separated from the ultimate aim. The means
   employed become, through individual practice, part and parcel of the
   final purpose; they influence it, modify it, and presently the aims and
   means become identical." [Op. Cit., p. 260] The evolution of Bolshevik
   practice and theory reinforces this argument. The means used had an
   impact on the course of events, which in turn shaped the next set of
   means and the ideology used to justify it.

   This explains the Makhnovist and Bolshevik differences in relationship
   to working-class freedom. For anarchists, only freedom or the struggle
   for freedom can teach people to be free (and so is genuinely
   revolutionary). This explains why the Makhnovists not only proclaimed
   freedom of election, speech, press, assembly and organisation for
   working people, which was an essential revolutionary position, they
   also implemented it (see [60]section 7). The Bolsheviks did the
   reverse, clamping down on the opposition at every occasion (including
   workers' strikes and protests). For the Makhnovists, working-class
   freedom was the key gain of the revolution, and so had to be
   introduced, practised and defended. Hence Makhno:

     "I consider it an inviolable right of the workers and peasants, a
     right won by the revolution, to call congresses on their own
     account, to discuss their affairs. That is why the prohibitions of
     such congresses, and the declaration proclaiming them illegal . . .
     , represent a direct and insolent violation of the rights of the
     workers." [quoted by Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 129]

   For the Bolsheviks, working-class freedom was something to fear. Back
   in 1903, Lenin laid the groundwork for this by arguing that the
   "spontaneous development of the labour movement leads to it being
   subordinated to bourgeois ideology." He stressed that "the working
   class, exclusively by their own effort, is able to develop only trade
   union consciousness . . . the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy
   arose quite independently of the spontaneous growth of the labour
   movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of ideas among
   the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia." This meant that "Social
   Democratic [i.e. socialist] consciousness . . . could only be brought
   to them from without." [Essential Works of Lenin, p. 82 and pp. 74-5]
   Clearly, if the workers turned against the party, then the workers were
   "being subordinated to bourgeois ideology." It was in their own
   interests, therefore, for the party to subordinate the workers and so
   soviet democracy became not an expression of working-class power but
   rather something which undermined it!

   This perspective can be seen when the Makhnovists liberated cities. In
   Alexandrovsk and Katerinoslav, the Bolsheviks proposed to the
   Makhnovists spheres of action - their Revkom (Revolutionary Committee)
   would handle political affairs and the Makhnovists military ones.
   Makhno advised them "to go and take up some honest trade instead of
   seeking to impose their will on the workers." Instead, the Makhnovists
   called upon "the working population to participate in a general
   conference .. . . and it was proposed that the workers organise the
   life of the city and the functioning of the factories with their own
   forced and their organisations." [Arshinov Op. Cit., p. 154 and p. 149]
   The differences between the Bolsheviks and Makhnovists could not be
   clearer.

   Lastly, we should note that while Lenin and the leading Bolsheviks
   wholeheartedly opposed working-class economic self-management by
   factory committees and instead urged "efficient" top-down one-man
   management, the Makhnovists supported working-class self-management of
   production. Under the Bolsheviks, as Arshinov argued, the
   "nationalisation of industry, [while] removing the workers from the
   hands of individual capitalists, delivered them to the yet more
   rapacious hands of a single, ever-present capitalist boss, the State.
   The relations between the workers and this new boss are the same as
   earlier relations between labour and capital, with the sole difference
   that the Communist boss, the State, not only exploits the workers, but
   also punishes them himself . . . Wage labour has remained what it was
   before, except that it has taken on the character of an obligation to
   the State . . . It is clear that in all this we are dealing with a
   simple substitution of State capitalism for private capitalism." [Op.
   Cit., p. 71] The Makhnovist propaganda, in contrast, stressed the need
   for workers to socialise the means of production and place it under
   their direct management by their own class organs. In other words, the
   abolition of wage slavery by workers' self-management of production.

   Unsurprisingly, the Makhnovists supported the Kronstadt rebellion (see
   the appendix [61]"What was the Kronstadt uprising?" for more on
   Kronstadt). Indeed, there is significant overlap between the Kronstadt
   demands and the ideas of the Makhnovist movement. For example, the
   Makhnovist idea of free soviets is almost identical to the first three
   points of the Kronstadt programme and their land policy the same as
   point 11 of the Kronstadt demands. The Kronstadt rebels also raised the
   idea of "free soviets" and the "third revolution," common Makhnovist
   slogans (see [62]section 3 of the appendix [63]"What was the Kronstadt
   uprising?" for details). As one Bolshevik writer notes, it is
   "characteristic that the anarchist-Makhnovists in the Ukraine reprinted
   the appeal of the Kronstadters, and in general did not hide their
   sympathy for them." [quoted by Malet, Op. Cit., p. 108] Voline also
   noted that the "ideas and activities of the Makhnovist peasants were
   similar in all respects to those of the Kronstadt rebels in 1921." [Op.
   Cit., p. 575]

   In summary, the major difference between the Makhnovists and the
   Bolsheviks is that the former stuck by and introduced their stated aims
   of "soviet power" and working-class freedom while the latter rejected
   them once they clashed with Bolshevik party policies.

15 How do the modern followers of Bolshevism slander the Makhnovists?

   Many modern-day supporters of Bolshevism, on the rare occasions when
   they do mention the Makhnovist movement, simply repeat the old
   Bolshevik (and Stalinist) slanders against them.

   For example, this is what Joseph Seymour of the U.S. Spartacus League
   did. Their newspaper Workers Vanguard ran a series entitled "Marxism
   vs. Anarchism" and in part 7, during his discussion of the Russian
   Revolution, Seymour claimed:

     "The most significant counter-revolutionary force under the banner
     of anarchism was the Ukrainian peasant-based army of Nestor Makhno,
     which carried out pogroms against Jewish communities and
     collaborated with White armies against the Bolsheviks." [Workers
     Vanguard, 8/30/1996, p. 7]

   Seymour, needless to say, made these accusations without providing any
   documentation, and with good reason, for outside of Stalinist
   hagiographies, no evidence exists to support his claims. As we
   indicated in [64]section 9, the Makhnovists opposed anti-Semitism and
   did not conduct pogroms. Equally, [65]section 12 proves that the
   Makhnovists did not collaborate with the Whites in any way (although
   this did not stop the Bolshevik press deliberately spreading the lie
   that they had).

   More recently, the UK Leninist Revolutionary Communist Group asserted
   in their paper that the Makhnovists "joined with counter-revolutionary
   White and imperialist armies against socialist Russia. This band of
   brigands also carried out pogroms against Jewish communities in the
   Ukraine." [Fight Racism! Fight Imperialism!, issue no. 174, p. 12] No
   evidence for such a claim was presented in the original review article.
   When an anarchist pointed out their assertion was "falling back on a
   long tradition of Stalinist lies" and asked for "any historical
   references" to support it, the paper replied by stating that while
   there were "several" references, it would give two: "E.H. Carr refers
   to it in his history of the civil war. Also the anarchist historian
   Paul Avrich mentions it in his work The anarchists in the Russian
   Revolution." [Op. Cit., no. 175, p. 15]

   In reality, neither work says any such thing. Looking at the first
   (unnamed) one, assuming it is E.H. Carr's The Bolshevik Revolution
   there is no reference to pogroms carried out by the Makhnovists
   (looking in the index for "Makhno"). Which, perhaps, explains why the
   paper refused to provide a book title and page number. As far as the
   second reference goes, Avrich made no such claim in The Anarchists in
   the Russian Revolution. He did address the issue in his Anarchist
   Portraits, concluding such charges are false.

   And the name of the original article? Ironically, it was entitled "The
   anarchist school of falsification"!

   However, more sophisticated slanders, lies and distortions have been
   levelled at the Makhnovists by the supporters of Bolshevism. This is to
   be expected, as the experience of the Makhnovists effectively refute
   the claim that the Bolsheviks had no choice but to act as they did. It
   is hard to maintain a position that "objective conditions"
   made the Bolsheviks act as they did when another mass revolutionary
   army, operating in the same environment, did not act in the same way.
   This means that the Makhnovists are strong evidence that Bolshevik
   politics played a key role in the degeneration of the Russian
   Revolution. Clearly such a conclusion is dangerous to Bolshevism and so
   the Maknovist movement must be attacked, regardless of the facts.

   A recent example of this is John Rees' essay "In Defence of October"
   (International Socialism, no. 52, pp. 3-82). Rees, a member of the UK
   Socialist Workers' Party (SWP) is at pains to downplay the role of
   Bolshevik ideology in the degeneration of the Russian Revolution. He
   argues that "objective factors"
   ensured that the Bolsheviks acted as they did. The "subjective factor"
   was simply a choice between defeat and defence against the Whites:
   "Within these limits Bolshevik policy was decisive." [Op. Cit., p. 30]
   This explains his attack on the Makhnovist movement. Faced with the
   same "objective factors" as the Bolsheviks, the Makhnovists did not act
   in the same way. As such, the "subjective factor" amounts to more than
   Rees' stark choice and so objective conditions cannot explain
   everything.

   Clearly, then, the Makhnovists undermine his basic thesis. As such, we
   would expect a less than honest account of the movement and Rees does
   not disappoint. He talks about the "muddled anarchism" of Makhno,
   dismissing the whole movement as offering no alternative to Bolshevism
   and being without "an articulated political programme." Ultimately, for
   Rees, Makhno's "anarchism was a thin veneer on peasant rebellion" and
   while "on paper" the Makhnovists "appeared to have a more democratic
   programme" there were "frauds." [p. 57, p. 58, p. 61 and p. 70]

   The reality of the situation is totally different. Ignoring the obvious
   contradiction (i.e. how can the Makhnovists have the appearance of a
   "democratic programme" and, simultaneously, not articulate it?) we
   shall analyse his account of the Makhnovist movement in order to show
   exactly how low the supporters of Bolshevism will go to distort the
   historical record for their own aims (see the appendix [66]"What was
   the Kronstadt uprising?" for Rees's distortions about the Kronstadt
   revolt). Once the selective and edited quotations provided by Rees are
   corrected, the picture that clearly emerges is that rather than the
   Makhnovists being "frauds," it is Rees' account which is the fraud
   (along with the political tradition which inspired it).

   Rees presents two aspects of his critique of the Makhnovists. The first
   is a history of the movement and its relationships (or lack of them)
   with the Bolsheviks. The second is a discussion of the ideas which the
   Makhnovists tried to put into practice. Both aspects of his critique
   are extremely flawed. Indeed, the errors in his history of the movement
   are so fundamental (and, indeed, so at odds with his references) that
   it suggests that ideology overcame objectivity (to be polite). The best
   that can be said of his account is that at least he does not raise the
   totally discredited accusation that the Makhnovists were anti-Semitic
   or "kulaks." However, he more than makes up for this by distorting the
   facts and references he uses (it would be no exaggeration to argue that
   the only information Rees gets correct about his sources is the page
   number).

   Rees starts by setting the tone, stating that the "methods used by
   Makhno and Antonov [a leader of the "Greens" in Tambov] in their fight
   against the Red Army often mirrored those used by the Whites." [Op.
   Cit., p. 57] Strangely enough, while he lists some for Antonov, he
   fails to specify any against Makhno. However, the scene is set. His
   strongest piece of evidence as regards Makhno's "methods" against the
   Red Army come from mid-1920 after, it should be noted, the Bolsheviks
   had engineered the outlawing of the Makhnovist movement and needlessly
   started the very conflict Rees uses as evidence against Makhno. In
   other words, he is attacking the Makhnovists for defending themselves
   against Bolshevik aggression!

   He quotes reports from the Ukrainian Front to blacken the Makhnovists,
   using them to confirm the picture he extracts from "the diary of
   Makhno's wife." These entries, from early 1920, he claims "betray the
   nature of the movement" (i.e. after, as we shall see, the Bolsheviks
   had engineered the outlawing of the Makhnovists). [Op. Cit., p. 58] The
   major problem for Rees' case is the fact that this diary is a fake and
   has been known to be a fake since Arshinov wrote his classic account of
   the Makhnovists in 1923:

     "After 1920, the Bolsheviks wrote a great deal about the personal
     defects of Makhno, basing their information on the diary of his
     so-called wife, a certain Fedora Gaenko .. . . But Makhno's wife is
     Galina Andreevna Kuz'menko. She has lived with him since 1918. She
     never kept, and therefore never lost, a diary. Thus the
     documentation of the Soviet authorities is based on a fabrication,
     and the picture these authorities draw from such a diary is an
     ordinary lie." [Arshinov, History of the Makhnovist Movement, p.
     226f]

   Ironically enough, Rees implicitly acknowledges this by lamely
   admitting (in an end note) that "Makhno seems to have had two 'wives'"
   [Op. Cit., p. 78] And we should note that the source Rees uses for the
   fake diary entries (W.H. Chamberlin's The Russian Revolution) uses as
   his source the very Bolshevik documentation that Arshinov quite
   correctly denounced over 70 years before Rees put pen to paper. Little
   wonder Michael Palij, in his detailed account of the movement (The
   Anarchism of Nestor Makhno, 1918-1921), fails to use it. So, in
   summary, a major part of his account is based on falsehoods, falsehoods
   exposed as such decades ago. This indicates well the quality of his
   case against the Makhnovist movement.

   As regards the "evidence" he extracts from this fake diary and Red Army
   reports, it simply shows that Bolsheviks were shot by Makhno's troops
   and Red Army troops died in combat. This went both ways, of course. In
   "military operations the Bolsheviks shot all prisoners. The Makhnovists
   shot all captured officers unless the Red rank and file strongly
   interceded for them. The rank and file were usually sent home, though a
   number volunteered for service with the Insurgents." Equally, "[o]n the
   occupation of a village by the Red Army the Cheka would hunt out and
   hang all active Makhnovite supporters; an amenable Soviet would be set
   up; officials would be appointed or imported to organise the poor
   peasants . . . and three or four Red militia men left as armed support
   for the new village bosses." [David Footman, Op. Cit., pp. 292-3] As
   such, Rees' account of Makhnovist "terror" against the Bolsheviks seems
   somewhat hypocritical. We can equally surmise that the methods used by
   the Bolsheviks against the Makhnovists also "often mirrored those used
   by the Whites"! And Rees lambastes socialist Samuel Farber for
   mentioning the "Red Terror, but not the Green Terror" in Farber's
   discussion of the Tambov revolt! All in all, pretty pathetic.

   Rees' concern for the truth can be seen from the fact that he asserts
   that Makhno's "rebellion" was "smaller" than the Tambov uprising and
   distinguished from it "only by the muddled anarchism of its leader."
   [Op. Cit., p. 58] In fact, the Makhnovist movement was the bigger of
   the two. As Michael Malet notes:

     "The differences between them explain why the Makhnovshchina lasted
     over four years, the Antonovshchina less than one year. The initial
     area of the Makhno movement was larger, and later expanded, whereas
     the Antonov region was restricted to the southern half of one
     province throughout its existence. The Makhno movement became
     established earlier, and was well-known before its break with the
     soviet regime. A crucial factor was the period of peace between the
     Bolsheviks and Makhno during the first half of 1919, something
     Antonov never had. It allowed for political and social development
     as well as military build-up. It followed from this that Makhno
     attracted much more support, which was increased and deepened by the
     positive ideology of Makhno and the anarchists who came to help him.
     This was not a matter of being anti-State and anti-town -- all the
     Greens, including Antonov, shared this view in a less sophisticated
     form -- but a positive land policy and a realisation of the need to
     link up with the towns on a federal basis in the post-revolutionary
     society." [Op. Cit., p. 155]

   Even in terms of troops, the Makhno movement was larger. The Antonov
   rebellion had "a peak of around 20,000" troops. [Read, Op. Cit., p.
   268] Makhno, in comparison, had a peak of about 40,000 in late 1919
   [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 112] (Read states a peak of around 30,000 [Op.
   Cit., p. 264]). Even by the end of 1920, a few months into the Tambov
   rebellion (it started in August of that year), the Makhnovists still
   had 10 to 15 thousand troops. [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 237]

   In summary, the movement which lasted longer, covered a larger area and
   involved more troops is classed by Rees as the smaller of the two!
   Incredible -- but it does give a flavour of the scholarship involved in
   his essay. Perhaps by "smaller" Rees simply meant that Makhno was
   physically shorter than Antonov?

   After getting such minor details as size wrong, Rees turns to the
   actual history of the movement. He looks at the relations between the
   Makhnovists and the Bolsheviks, accurately stating that they "were
   chequered." However, he is wrong when he tries to explain what happened
   by stating they "reflect[ed] the fast changing military situation in
   the Ukraine throughout the civil war." [Op. Cit., p. 58] In fact, as we
   will prove, the relationships between the two forces reflected the
   military situation refracted through the ideology and needs of
   Bolshevik power. To ignore the ideological factor in the
   Makhnovist-Bolshevik relationships cannot be justified as the military
   situation does not fully explain what happened.

   The Makhnovists co-operated with the Red Army three times. Only two of
   these periods were formal alliances (the first and last). Discussing
   the first two pacts, Rees alleges that the Makhnovists broke with the
   Bolsheviks. The truth is the opposite -- the Bolsheviks turned on the
   Makhnovists and betrayed them in order to consolidate their power.
   These facts are hardly unknown to Rees as they are contained in the
   very books he quotes from as evidence for his rewritten history.

   The first pact between the Makhnovists and the Red Army ended June
   1918. According to Rees, "[c]o-operation continued until June 1919 when
   the Insurgent Army broke from the Red Army" and quotes Michael Palij's
   book The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno as follows: "as soon as Makhno left
   the front he and his associates began to organise new partisan
   detachments in the Bolsheviks' rear, which subsequently attacked
   strongholds, troops, police, trains and food collectors." [Op. Cit., p.
   58] Rees is clearly implying that Makhno attacked the Bolsheviks,
   apparently for no reason. The truth is totally different. It is easy to
   show this -- all we need to do is look at the book he uses as evidence.

   Rees quotes Palij on page 177. This page is from chapter 16, which is
   called "The Bolsheviks Break with Makhno." As this was not enough of a
   clue, Palij presents some necessary background for this Bolshevik
   break. He notes that before the break, "the Bolsheviks renewed their
   anti-Makhno propaganda. Trotsky, in particular, led a violent campaign
   against the Makhno movement." He also mentions that "[a]t the same
   time, the supplies of arms and other war materials to Makhno were
   stopped, thus weakening the Makhno forces vis-a-vis the Denikin
   troops." In this context, the Makhnovists Revolutionary Military
   Council "decided to call a fourth congress of peasants, workers, and
   partisans" for June 15th, 1919, which Trotsky promptly banned, warning
   the population that "participation in the Congress shall be considered
   an act of state treason against the Soviet Republic and the front."
   [Op. Cit., p. 175 and p. 176]

   The Bolsheviks had, of course, tried to ban the third congress in April
   but had been ignored. This time, they made sure that they were not.
   Makhno and his staff were not informed of Trotsky's dictatorial order
   and learned of it three days later. On June 9th, Makhno sent a telegram
   informing the Bolsheviks that he was leaving his post as leader of the
   Makhnovists. He "handed over his command and left the front with a few
   of his close associates and a cavalry detachment" while calling upon
   the partisans to "remain at the front to hold off Denikin's forces."
   Trotsky ordered his arrest, but Makhno was warned in advance and
   escaped. On June 15-16th, members of Makhno's staff "were captured and
   executed the next day." Now Palij recounts how "[a]s soon as Makhno
   left the front he and his associates began to organise new partisan
   detachments in the Bolsheviks' rear, which subsequently attacked
   strongholds, troops, police, trains and food collectors." [Op. Cit., p.
   177]

   Palij "subsequently" refers to Makhno after Denikin's breakthrough and
   his occupation of the Ukraine. "The oppressive policy of the Denikin
   regime," he notes, "convinced the population that it was as bad as the
   Bolshevik regime, and brought a strong reaction that led able young men
   . . . to leave their homes and join Makhno and other partisan groups."
   [Op. Cit., p. 190] As Makhno put it, "[w]hen the Red Army in south
   Ukraine began to retreat . . . as if to straighten the front line, but
   in reality to evacuate Ukraine . . . only then did my staff and I
   decide to act." [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 190] After trying to
   fight Denikin's troops, Makhno retreated and called upon his troops to
   leave the Red Army and rejoin the fight against Denikin. He "sent
   agents amongst the Red troops" to carry out propaganda urging them to
   stay and fight Denikin with the Makhnovists, which they did in large
   numbers. This propaganda was "combined with sabotage." Between these
   two events, Makhno had entered the territory of pogromist warlord
   Hryhoryiv (which did not contain Red troops as they were in conflict)
   and assassinated him. [Op. Cit., p. 191 and p. 173]

   It should also be noted that Palij states that it was the Whites who
   "were the main enemy that Makhno fought, stubbornly and
   uncompromisingly, from the end of 1918 to the end of 1919." [Op. Cit.,
   p. 177]

   Clearly, Rees's summary leaves a lot to be desired! Rather than Makhno
   attacking the Bolsheviks, it was they who broke with him -- as Palij,
   Rees's source, makes clear. Indeed, Makhno made no attempt to undermine
   the Red Army's campaign against Denikin (after all, that would have
   placed his troops and region in danger). Rather, he waited until the
   Bolsheviks showed that they would not defend the Ukraine against the
   Whites before he acted. As such, Rees misuses his source material and
   used Palij as evidence for a viewpoint which is the exact opposite of
   the one he recounts. The dishonesty is obvious. But, then again, it is
   understandable, as Trotsky banning a worker, peasant and partisan
   congress would hardly fit into Rees' attempt to portray the Bolsheviks
   as democratic socialists overcome by objective circumstances! Given
   that the Makhnovists had successfully held three such congresses to
   discuss the war against reaction, how could objective circumstances be
   blamed for the dictatorial actions of Trotsky and other leading Red
   Army officers in the Ukraine? Better not to mention this and instead
   rewrite history by making Makhno break with the Bolsheviks and attack
   them for no reason!

   Rees moves onto the period of co-operation between the insurgents and
   the Bolsheviks. His version of what happened is that "Denikin's advance
   against Makhno's territory in autumn 1919 quickly forced a renewal of
   the treaty with the Bolsheviks. Makhno harassed Denikin's troops from
   the rear, making their advance more difficult." [Op. Cit., p. 58]

   A more accurate account of what happened would be that Makhno
   reorganised his troops after the Bolsheviks had retreated and evacuated
   the Ukraine. These troops included those that had been left in the Red
   Army in June, who now left to rejoin him (and brought a few Red Army
   units along too). After conducting quick and demoralising raids against
   Denikin's forces, the Makhnovists were forced to retreat to the West
   (followed by White forces). In late September, near Peregonovka, Makhno
   inflicted a major defeat against the following Whites and allowed the
   Makhnovists to attack across Denikin's supply lines (which stopped his
   attack on Moscow thus, ironically, saving the Bolshevik regime).
   Makhno's swift attack on the rear of the Whites ensured their defeat.
   As the correspondent of Le Temps observed:

     "There is no doubt that Denikin's defeat is explained more by the
     uprising of the peasants who brandished Makhno's black flag, then by
     the success of Trotsky's regular army. The partisan bands of 'Batko'
     tipped the scales in favour of the Reds." [quoted by Palij, Op.
     Cit., p. 208]

   Palij argues that it was the "rapidly changing military situation
   [which] soon caused a change in the Bolsheviks' attitude toward
   Makhno." The two forces meet up on December 24th, 1919. However,
   "[a]lthough the Bolsheviks fraternised with the Makhno troops and the
   commander even offered co-operation, they distrusted Makhno, fearing
   the popularity he had gained as a result of his successful fight
   against Denikin." [Op. Cit., p. 209] It should also be stressed that no
   formal treaty was signed.

   Clearly, Rees' summary leaves a lot to be desired!

   This is not the end of it. Rees even attempts to blame the Makhnovists
   for the attack of General Wrangel. He argues that "by the end of 1919
   the immediate White threat was removed. Makhno refused to move his
   troops to the Polish front to meet the imminent invasion and
   hostilities with the Red Army began again on an even more widespread
   scale." [Op. Cit., p. 58]

   This, needless to say, is a total distortion of the facts. Firstly, it
   should be noted that the "imminent" invasion by Poland Rees mentions
   did not, in fact, occur until "the end of April" (the 26th, to be
   precise). The break with Makhno occurred as a result of an order issued
   in early January (the 8th, to be precise). [Michael Palij, Op. Cit., p.
   219 and p. 210] Clearly, the excuse of "imminent" invasion was a cover,
   as recognised by a source Rees himself uses, namely Palij's work:

     "The author of the order realised at that time there was no real war
     between the Poles and the Bolsheviks at that time and he also knew
     that Makhno would not abandon his region .. . . Uborevich [the
     author] explained that 'an appropriate reaction by Makhno to this
     order would give us the chance to have accurate grounds for our next
     steps' . . . [He] concluded: 'The order is a certain political
     manoeuvre and, at the very least, we expect positive results from
     Makhno's realisation of this.'" [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 210]

   This is confirmed by Rees' other references. David Footman, whom Rees
   also uses for evidence against the Makhnovist movement, notes that
   while it was "true there were military reasons for reinforcing" the
   Polish frontier (although he also notes the significant fact that the
   war "was not to break out for another four months"), it was "admitted
   on the Soviet side that this order was primarily 'dictated by the
   necessity' of liquidating Makhnovshchina as an independent movement.
   Only when he was far removed from his home country would it be possible
   to counteract his influence, and to split up and integrate his
   partisans into various Red Army formations." He notes that there were
   "other occasions (notably in Siberia) of the Soviet authorities solving
   the problem of difficult partisan leaders by sending them off to fight
   on distant fronts" and, of course, that "Makhno and his staff . . .
   were perfectly aware of the underlying Soviet motives." Footman
   recounts how the Makhnovist staff sent a "reasoned reply" to the
   Bolsheviks, that there "was no immediate response" from them and in
   "mid-January the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party
   declared Makhno and his force to be outside the law, and the Red Army
   attacked." [The Russian Civil War, pp. 290-1]

   In other words, according to the sources Rees himself selects, the
   Bolsheviks started the conflict in order to eliminate opposition to
   their power!

   Needless to say, the Makhnovists did realise the political motivations
   behind the order. As Arshinov notes, "[s]ending the insurrectionary
   army to the Polish front meant removing from the Ukraine the main nerve
   centre of the revolutionary insurrection. This was precisely what the
   Bolsheviks wanted: they would then be absolute masters of the
   rebellious region, and the Makhnovists were perfectly aware of this."
   In addition, "neither the 14th Corps nor any other unit of the Red Army
   had any ties with the Makhnovist army; least of all were they in a
   position to give orders to the insurrectionary army." Nor does Rees
   mention that the Makhnovists considered the move "physically
   impossible" as "half the men, the entire staff and the commander
   himself were in hospital with typhus." [Op. Cit., p. 163]

   Consider what Rees is (distortedly) accounting. The beginning of 1920
   was a time of peace. The Civil War looked like it was over. The White
   Generals had been defeated. Now the Bolsheviks turn on their allies
   after issuing an ultimatum which they knew would never be obeyed. Under
   the circumstances, a stupider decision cannot be easily found!
   Moreover, the very logic of the order was a joke. Would be it wise to
   leave the Ukraine undefended? Of course not and if Red Army units were
   to stay to defend the region, why not the Makhnovists who actually came
   from the area in question? Why provoke a conflict when it was possible
   to transfer Red Army units to the Polish front? Simply put, Rees
   presents a distorted picture of what was happening in the Ukraine at
   the time simply so he can whitewash the Bolshevik regime and blacken
   the Makhnovists. As he himself later notes, the Bolshevik-Makhnovist
   conflict gave the White General Wrangel the space required to restart
   the Civil War. Thus the Bolshevik decision to attack the Makhnovists
   helped prolong the Civil War -- the very factor Rees blames the
   degeneration of the Russian Revolution and Bolshevik ideology and
   practice on!

   It is now that Rees presents his evidence of Makhnovist violence
   against the Bolsheviks (the Red Army reports and entries from the fake
   diary of Makhno's wife). Arguing that the entries from the fake diary
   "betray the nature of the movement in this period," he tries to link
   them with Makhnovist theory. "These actions," he argues, "were
   consistent with an earlier resolution of the Insurgent Army which
   declared that it was 'the actions of the Bolshevik regime which cause a
   real danger to the worker-peasant revolution." [Op. Cit., p. 59]

   Firstly, given a true account of the second break between the
   Makhnovists and Bolsheviks, it would be fair to conclude that the
   resolution was, in fact, correct! However, such facts are not mentioned
   by Rees, so the reader is left in ignorance.

   Secondly, to correct another of Rees' causal mistakes, it should be
   noted that this resolution was not passed by the Insurgent Army. Rather
   it was passed at the Second Regional Congress of Peasants, Workers and
   Insurgents held at Hulyai Pole on February 12th, 1919. This congress
   had 245 delegates, representing 350 districts and was one of four
   organised by the Makhnovists. Unsurprisingly, these regional congresses
   are not even mentioned by Rees in his account. This is for obvious
   reasons -- if the Makhnovists could organise congresses of workers,
   peasants and insurgents to discuss the progress of the revolution, then
   why could the Bolsheviks not manage it? Equally, to mention them would
   also mean mentioning that the Bolsheviks tried to ban one and succeeded
   in banning another.

   Thirdly, the tone of the congress was anti-Bolshevik simply because the
   Ukraine had had a taste of Bolshevik rule. As Rees himself acknowledges
   in a roundabout way, the Bolsheviks had managed to alienate the
   peasantry by their agricultural policies.

   Fourthly, the Bolsheviks had engineered the outlawing of the
   Makhnovists. Thus the actions of the Makhnovists were not "consistent"
   with the earlier resolution. They were, in fact, "consistent" with
   self-defence against a repressive state which had attacked them first!

   Looking at the congress where the resolution was passed, we find that
   the list of "real dangers" was, quite simply, sensible and, in fact, in
   line with Leninist rhetoric. The resolution acknowledged the fact that
   the Bolshevik party was "demanding a monopoly of the Revolution." As we
   discussed in [67]section 14, it was during this period that the
   Bolsheviks explicitly started to argue that the "dictatorship of the
   party" was the "dictatorship of the proletariat." The resolution also
   stated:

     "With deep regret the Congress must also declare that apart from
     external enemies a perhaps even greater danger, arising from its
     internal shortcomings, threatens the Revolution of the Russian and
     Ukrainian peasants and workers. The Soviet Governments of Russia and
     of the Ukraine, by their orders and decrees, are making efforts to
     deprive local soviets of peasants and workers' deputies of their
     freedom and autonomy." [quoted by Footman, Op. Cit., p. 267]

   It also stated:

     "the political commissars are watching each step of the local
     soviets and dealing ruthlessly with those friends of peasants and
     workers who act in defence of peoples' freedom from the agency of
     the central government . . . The Bolshevik regime arrested left
     Socialist Revolutionaries and anarchists, closing their newspapers,
     stifling any manifestation of revolutionary expression."

   Delegates also complained that the Bolshevik government had not been
   elected, that it was "imposing upon us its party dictatorship" and
   "attempting to introduce its Bolshevik monopoly over the soviets."
   [quoted by Palij, [Op. Cit., p. 154]

   The resolution noted that the current situation was "characterised by
   the seizure of power by the political party of Communists-Bolsheviks
   who do not balk at anything in order to preserve and consolidate their
   political power by armed force acting from the centre. The party is
   conducting a criminal policy in regard to the social revolution and in
   regard to the labouring masses." To top it off, point number three
   read:

     "We protest against the reactionary habits of Bolshevik rulers,
     commissars, and agents of the Cheka, who are shooting workers,
     peasants, and rebels, inventing all kinds of excuses . . . The Cheka
     which were supposed to struggle with counterrevolution . . . have
     turned in the Bolsheviks' hands into an instrument for the
     suppression of the will of the people. They have grown in some cases
     into detachments of several hundred armed men with a variety of
     arms. We demand that all these forces be dispatched to the front."
     [quoted by Vladimir N. Brovkin, Behind the Front Lines of the Civil
     War, pp. 109-10]

   We should also point out that Rees selectively quotes the resolution to
   distort its meaning. The resolution, in fact, "urges the peasants and
   workers to watch vigilantly the actions of the Bolshevik regime that
   cause a real danger to the worker-peasant revolution." [quoted by
   Palij, Op. Cit., p. 154] We have listed some of the actions of the
   Bolsheviks that the congress considered as a "real danger." Considering
   the truth of these complaints, only someone blinded by Bolshevik
   ideology would consider it strange that worker and peasant delegates
   should agree to "watch vigilantly" those actions of the Bolsheviks
   which were a "real danger" to their revolution!

   Lenin (before taking power, of course) had argued that elections and
   recall to soviets were essential to ensure that the workers control the
   "workers' state" and that socialism required the elimination of
   "special bodies of armed men" by an armed population. To this day, his
   followers parrot his claims (while, simultaneously, justifying the
   exact opposite in Lenin's Russia). Now, is Rees really arguing that the
   Bolshevik monopoly of power, the creation of a secret police and the
   clamping down on working people's freedom were not dangers to the
   Russian Revolution and should not be watched "vigilantly"? If so, then
   his conception of revolution includes the strange notion that
   dictatorship by a party does not threaten a revolution! Then again,
   neither did the Bolsheviks (indeed, they thought calling worker,
   peasant and partisan congresses to discuss the development of the
   revolution as the real danger to it!). If not, then he cannot fault the
   regional congress resolution for pointing out the obvious. As such,
   Rees' misquoting of the resolution backfires on him.

   Significantly, Rees fails to mention that during this period (the first
   half of 1920), the Bolsheviks "shot ordinary soldiers as well as their
   commanders, destroying their houses, confiscating their properties, and
   persecuting their families. Moreover the Bolsheviks conducted mass
   arrests of innocent peasants who were suspected of collaborating in
   some way with the partisans. It is impossible to determine the
   casualties involved." The hypocrisy is clear. While Rees presents
   information (some of it, we stress, from a fake source) on Makhnovist
   attacks against the Bolshevik dictatorship, he remains silent on the
   Bolshevik tactics, violence and state terrorism. Given that the
   Bolsheviks had attacked the Makhnovists, it seems strange that that
   Rees ignores the "merciless methods" of the Bolsheviks (to use Palij's
   phrase) and concentrates instead on the acts of self-defence forced
   onto the Makhnovists. Perhaps this is because it would provide too
   strong a "flavour" of the Bolshevik regime? [Op. Cit., pp. 212-3 and p.
   213]

   Rees makes great play of the fact that White forces took advantage of
   the conflict between the Makhnovists and the Bolsheviks, as would be
   expected. However, it seems like an act of ideological faith to blame
   the victims of this conflict for it! In his attempts to demonise the
   Makhnovists, he argues that "[i]n fact it was Makhno's actions against
   the Red Army which made 'a brief return of the Whites possible.'" In
   defence of his claims, Rees quotes from W. Bruce Lincoln's Red Victory.
   However, looking at Lincoln's work we discover that Lincoln is well
   aware who is to blame for the return of the Whites. Unsurprisingly, it
   is not the Makhnovists:

     "Once Trotsky's Red Army had crushed Iudenich and Kolchak and driven
     Deniken's forces back upon their bases in the Crimea and the Kuban,
     it turned upon Makhno's partisan forces with a vengeance . . . [I]n
     mid-January 1920, after a typhus epidemic had decimated his forces,
     a re-established Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party
     declared Makhno an outlaw. Yet the Bolsheviks could not free
     themselves from Makhno's grasp so easily, and it became one of the
     supreme ironies of the Russian Civil War that his attacks against
     the rear of the Red Army made it possible for the resurrected White
     armies . . . to return briefly to the southern Ukraine in 1920."
     [Red Victory, p. 327]

   Ignoring the fact that Rees does not bother to give the correct quote
   (a problem that re-occurs frequently in his essay), it can be seen that
   he does paraphrase the last sentence of Lincoln's work correctly.
   Strange, then, that he ignores the rest of his account which clearly
   indicates that the Bolsheviks "turned upon" the Makhnovists and
   "declared Makhno an outlaw." Obviously such trivial facts as the
   initial Bolshevik attacks against the Makhnovists are unimportant to
   understanding what actually happened in this period. Informing his
   readers that it was the Bolsheviks' betrayal of the Makhnovists which
   provoked the resistance that "made it possible for . . . the White
   armies . . . to return briefly" would confuse them with facts and so it
   goes unmentioned.

   Lincoln, it must be stressed, concurs with Rees's other main sources
   (Palij and Footman) on the fact that the Bolsheviks betrayed the
   Makhnovists! Clearly, Rees has rewritten history and distorted all of
   his main references on the Makhnovist movement. After reading the same
   fact in three different sources, you would think that the Bolshevik
   betrayal of the Makhnovists which provoked their resistance against
   them would warrant some mention, but no! In true Stalinist fashion,
   Rees managed to turn a Bolshevik betrayal of the Makhnovists into a
   stick with which to beat them with! Truly amazing.

   Simply put, if the Bolsheviks had not wanted to impose their rule over
   the Ukraine, then the conflict with the Makhnovists need not have taken
   place and Wrangel would not have been in a position to invade the
   Ukraine. Why did the Bolsheviks act in this way? There was no
   "objective factor" for this action and so we must turn to Bolshevik
   ideology.

   As we proved in [68]section 14, Bolshevik ideology by this time
   identified Bolshevik party dictatorship as the only expression of "the
   dictatorship of the proletariat." Does Rees really believe that such
   perspectives had no impact on how the Bolsheviks acted during the
   Revolution? The betrayal of the Makhnovists can only be understood in
   terms of the "subjective factor" Rees seeks to ignore. If you think, as
   the Bolsheviks clearly did, that the dictatorship of the proletariat
   equalled the dictatorship of the party (and vice versa) then anything
   which threatened the rule of the party had to be destroyed. Whether
   this was soviet democracy or the Makhnovists did not matter. The
   Makhnovist idea of worker and peasant self-management, like soviet
   democracy, could not be reconciled with the Bolshevik ideology. As
   such, Bolshevik policy explains the betrayals of the Makhnovists.

   Not satisfied with distorting his source material to present the
   Makhnovists as the guilty party in the return of Wrangel, he decides to
   blame the initial success of Wrangel on them as well. He quotes Michael
   Palij as follows: "As Wrangel advanced . . . Makhno retreated north . .
   . leaving behind small partisan units in the villages and towns to
   carry out covert destruction of the Bolshevik administrative apparatus
   and supply bases." [Op. Cit., p. 59] He again sources Palij's work on
   the "effective" nature of these groups, stating that White Colonel Noga
   reported to headquarters that Makhno was critical to Wrangel's advance.

   As regards the claims that Makhno was "critical" to Wrangel's advance,
   Colonal Noga actually states that it was "peasant uprisings under
   Makhno and many other partisan detachments" which gave "the Reds no
   rest." [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 214] However, what Rees fails to
   mention is that Palij argues that it was the Bolshevik "policy of
   terror and exploitation" which had "turned almost all segments of
   Ukrainian society against the Bolsheviks, substantially strengthened
   the Makhno movement, and consequently facilitated the advance of the
   reorganised anti-Bolshevik force of General Wrangel from the Crimea
   into South Ukraine, the Makhno region." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 214]
   Again, Makhno is blamed for the inevitable results of Bolshevik
   policies and actions!

   It should also be reported that Noga's comments are dated 25th March
   1920, while Palij's summary of Makhno's activities retreating from
   Wrangel was about June 1920 -- 2 months later! As regards this advance
   by Wrangel, Palij argues that it was the "outbreak of the
   Polish-Bolshevik war at the end of April" which "benefited Wrangel" and
   "enabled him to launch an offensive against the Bolsheviks in Tavriia
   on June 6th." Indeed, it was after a "series of battles" that Wrangel
   "penetrated north, forcing a general Bolshevik retreat." Now, "[a]s
   Wrangel advanced deeper into the Left Bank, Makhno retreated north to
   the Kharkiv region, leaving behind small partisan units in the villages
   and towns to carry on covert destruction of the Bolshevik
   administrative apparatus and supply bases." [Op. Cit., p. 219] Again,
   Rees' account has little bearing to reality or the source material he
   uses.

   Rees continues to re-write history by arguing that "Makhno did not
   fight with the Reds again until October 1920 when Wrangel advanced on
   Makhno's base." [Op. Cit., p. 59] In fact, it was the Makhnovists who
   contacted the Bolsheviks in July and August in 1920 with a view to
   suspending hostilities and co-operating in the fight against Wrangel.
   This decision was made at a mass assembly of insurgents. Sadly, the
   Bolsheviks made no response. Only in September, after Wrangel had
   occupied many towns, did the Bolsheviks enter into negotiations.
   [Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 176-7] This is confirmed by Footman, who
   states that it is "agreed that the initiative for joint action against
   Wrangel came from the Makhnovists" [Op. Cit., p. 294], as well as by
   Palij, who notes that "Makhno was compelled to seek an understanding
   with the Bolsheviks" but "no reply was received." It was "Wrangel's
   success [which] caused the Bolshevik leaders to reconsider Makhno's
   earlier proposal." [Op. Cit., pp. 222-3] Obviously indicating that the
   Makhnovists placed the struggle against the White counter-revolution
   above their own politics would place the Bolsheviks in a bad light, and
   so Rees fails to give the details behind the agreement of joint action
   against Wrangel.

   As regards this third and final break, Rees states that it was
   ("unsurprisingly") a "treaty of convenience on the part of both sides
   and as soon as Wrangel was defeated at the end of the year the Red Army
   fought Makhno until he have up the struggle." [Op. Cit., p. 59] Which,
   as far as it goes, is true. Makhno, however, "assumed [that] the
   forthcoming conflict with the Bolsheviks could be limited to the realm
   of ideas" and that they "would not attack his movement immediately."
   [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 231] He was wrong. Instead the Bolsheviks attacked
   the Makhnovists without warning and, unlike the other breaks, without
   pretext (although leaflets handed out to the Red Army stated that
   Makhno had "violat[ed] the agreement"! [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 236]).

   It would be a good idea to reproduce the agreement which the Bolsheviks
   ripped up. There were two parts, a military and a political one. The
   military one is pretty straight forward (although the clause on the
   Makhnovists refusing to accept Red Army detachments or deserters
   suggests that the Makhnovists' democratic army was seen by many Red
   Army soldiers as a better alternative to Trotsky's autocratic
   structure). The political agreement was as follows:

     "1. Immediate release, and an end to the persecution of all Makhno
     men and anarchists in the territories of the Soviet Republics,
     except those who carry on armed resistance against Soviet
     authorities.

     "2. Makhno men and anarchists were to have complete freedom of
     expression of their ideas and principles, by speech and the press,
     provided that nothing was expressed that tended to a violent
     overthrow of Soviet government, and on condition that military
     censorship be respected. . .

     "3. Makhno men and anarchists were to enjoy full rights of
     participation in elections to the soviets, including the right to be
     elected, and free participation in the organisation of the
     forthcoming Fifth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets . . ."
     [cited by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 224]

   Needless to say, the Bolsheviks delayed the publication of the
   political agreement several until several days after the military one
   was published -- "thus blurring its real meaning." [Palij, Op. Cit., p.
   225] Clearly, as it stands, the agreement just gave the Makhnovists and
   anarchists the rights they should have had according to the Soviet
   Constitution! Little wonder the Bolsheviks ignored it -- they also
   ignored their own constitution. However, it is the fourth point of the
   political agreement which gives the best insight into the nature of
   Bolshevism. This last point was never ratified by the Bolsheviks as it
   was "absolutely unacceptable to the dictatorship of the proletariat."
   [quoted by Palij, Ibid.] This clause was:

     "One of the basic principles of the Makhno movement being the
     struggle for the self-administration of the toilers, the Partisan
     Army brings up a fourth point: in the region of the Makhno movement,
     the worker and peasant population is to organise and maintain its
     own free institutions for economic and political
     self-administration; this region is subsequently federated with
     Soviet republics by means of agreements freely negotiated with the
     appropriate Soviet governmental organ." [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit.,
     p. 224]

   Clearly, this idea of worker and peasant self-management, like soviet
   democracy, could not be reconciled with the Bolshevik support for party
   dictatorship as the expression of "the dictatorship of the proletariat"
   which had become a Bolshevik ideological truism by that time. Little
   wonder the Bolsheviks failed to ratify the fourth clause and violated
   the other agreements. Simply put, a libertarian alternative to
   Bolshevism would give the Russian and Ukrainian working masses hope of
   freedom and make them harder to control. It is unsurprising that Rees
   fails to discuss the treaty -- it would, yet again, undermine his case
   that the Bolsheviks were forced by objective circumstances to be
   dictatorial.

   And, of course, let us not forget the circumstances in which this
   betrayal took place. The country was, as Rees reminds us, in a state of
   economic disruption and collapse. Indeed, Rees blames the anti-working
   class and dictatorial actions and policies of the Bolsheviks on the
   chaos caused by the civil war. Yet here are the Bolsheviks prolonging
   this very Civil War by turning (yet again!) on their allies. After the
   defeat of the Whites, the Bolsheviks preferred to attack the
   Makhnovists rather than allow them the freedom they had been fighting
   for. Resources which could have been used to aid the economic
   rebuilding of Russia and the Ukraine were used to attack their former
   allies. The talents and energy of the Makhnovists were either killed or
   wasted in a pointless conflict. Should we be surprised? After all, the
   Bolsheviks had preferred to compound their foes during the Civil War
   (and, indirectly, aid the very Whites they were fighting) by betraying
   their Makhnovist allies on two previous occasions (once, because the
   Makhnovists had dared call a conference of working people to discuss
   the civil war being fought in their name). Clearly, Bolshevik politics
   and ideology played a key role in all these decisions. They were not
   driven by terrible objective circumstances (indeed, they made them
   worse).

   Rees obviously distorted the truth about the first two agreements
   between the Makhnovists and the Bolsheviks. He portrayed the
   Makhnovists as the guilty party, "breaking" with the Bolsheviks when in
   fact it was (in both cases) the Bolsheviks who broke with and betrayed
   the Makhnovists. That explains why he fails to present any information
   on why the first break happened and why he distorts the events of the
   second. It cannot be said that he was unaware of these facts -- they
   are in the very books he himself references! As such, we have a clear
   and intended desire to deceive the reader. As regards the third
   agreement, while he makes no pretence that the Makhnovists were the
   guilty party however, he implies that the Bolsheviks had to act as they
   did before the Makhnovists turned on them. Little wonder, then, that he
   does not provide the details of the agreement made between the
   Bolsheviks and Makhnovists -- to do so would have been to expose the
   authoritarianism of the Bolsheviks. Simply put, Rees'distortions of the
   source material he uses comes as no surprise. It undermines his basic
   argument and so cannot be used in its original form. Hence the
   cherry-picking of quotations to support his case.

   After distorting Makhnovist relations with the Bolsheviks, Rees moves
   on to distorting the socio-political ideas and practice of the
   Makhnovists. As would be expected from his hatchet-job on the military
   history of the movement, his account of its social ideas leaves much to
   be desired. However, both aspects of his critique have much in common.
   His account of its theoretical ideas and its attempts to apply them
   again abuse the source material in disgraceful ways.

   For example, Rees states that under the Makhnovists "[p]apers could be
   published, but the Bolshevik and Left Socialist Revolutionary press
   were not allowed to call for revolution" and references Michael Palij's
   book. [Op. Cit., p. 60] Looking at the page in question, we discover a
   somewhat different account. According to Palij's work, what the
   Makhnovists actually "prohibited" was that these parties should
   "propagate armed uprisings against the Makhnovist movement." A clear
   rewriting of the source material and an indication of how low Leninists
   will sink. Significantly, Palij also notes that this "freedom of
   speech, press, assembly and association" was implemented "[i]n contrast
   to the Bolshevik regime" and its policy of crushing such liberties.
   [Op. Cit. pp. 152-3] Ironically, the military-political agreement of
   late 1920 between the Reds and Makhnovists included a similar clause,
   banning expression that "tended to a violent overthrow of the Soviet
   government." [quoted by Palij, OP. Cit., p. 224] Which means, to use
   Rees' distorted terminology, that the Bolsheviks banned calls for
   revolution!

   However, this distortion of the source material does give us an insight
   into the mentality of Leninism. After all, according to Palij, when the
   Makhnovists entered a city or town they "immediately announced to the
   population that the army did not intend to exercise political
   authority." The workers and peasants were to set up soviets "that would
   carry out the will and orders of their constituents" as well as
   "organis[e] their own self-defence force against counter-revolution and
   banditry." These political changes were matched in the economic sphere
   as well, as the "holdings of the landlords, the monasteries and the
   state, including all livestocks and goods, were to be transferred to
   the peasants" and "all factories, plants, mines, and other means of
   production were to become property of all the workers under control of
   their professional unions." [Op. Cit., p. 151]

   In such an environment, a call for "revolution" (or, more correctly,
   "armed uprisings against the Makhno movement") could only mean a
   Bolshevik coup to install a Bolshevik party dictatorship. As the
   Makhnovists were clearly defending working- class and peasant
   self-government, then a Bolshevik call for "armed uprisings" against
   them also meant the end of such free soviets and their replacement with
   party dictatorship. Little wonder Rees distorts his source! Arshinov
   makes the situation clear:

     "The only restriction that the Makhnovists considered necessary to
     impose on the Bolsheviks, the left Socialist Revolutionaries and
     other statists was a prohibition on the formation of those
     'revolutionary committees' which sought to impose a dictatorship
     over the people. In Aleksandrovsk and Ekaterinoslav, right after the
     occupation of these cities by the Makhnovists, the Bolsheviks
     hastened to organise Revkoms (Revolutionary Committees ) seeking to
     organise their political power and govern the population . . .
     Makhno advised them to go and take up some honest trade instead of
     seeking to impose their will on the workers . . . In this context
     the Makhnovists' attitude was completely justified and consistent.
     To protect the full freedom of speech, press, and organisation, they
     had to take measures against formations which sought to stifle this
     freedom, to suppress other organisations, and to impose their will
     and dictatorial authority on the workers." [Op. Cit., p. 154]

   Little wonder Rees distorts the issues and transforms a policy to
   defend the real revolution into one which banned a "call for
   revolution"! We should be grateful that he distorted the Makhnovist
   message for it allows us to indicate the dictatorial nature of the
   regime and politics Rees is defending.

   All of which disproves Rees' assertion that "the movement never had any
   real support from the working class. Neither was it particularly
   interested in developing a programme which would appeal to the
   workers." [Op. Cit., p. 59] Now, Rees had obviously read Palij's
   summary of Makhnovist ideas. Is he claiming that workers'
   self-management and the socialisation of the means of production do not
   "appeal" to workers? After all, most Leninists pay lip-service to these
   ideas. Is Rees arguing that the Bolshevik policies of the time (namely
   one-man management and the militarisation of labour) "appealed" to the
   workers more than workers' self-management of production? Equally, the
   Makhnovists argued that the workers should form their own free soviets
   which would "carry out the will and orders of their constituents."
   [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 151] Is Rees really arguing that the Bolshevik
   policy of party dictatorship "appealed" to the workers more than soviet
   democracy? If so, then heaven help us if the SWP ever get into power!

   Luckily, as Jonathan Aves' book Workers Against Lenin proves, this was
   not the case. Working-class resistance to Bolshevik policies was
   extremely widespread and was expressed by strikes. It should be noted
   that the wave of strikes all across Russia which preceded the Kronstadt
   revolt also raised the demand for soviet democracy. The call for "free
   soviets" was raised by the Kronstadt revolt itself and during the
   "mini-Kronstadt" in Katerinoslav in June 1921 where the demands of the
   workers "were very similar in content with the resolutions of the
   Kronstadt rebels" and telegraph operators sent "messages throughout the
   Soviet Republic calling for 'free soviets.'" [Jonathan Aves, Workers
   Against Lenin, p. 172 and p. 173]

   Clearly, the Makhnovists did create a "programme that would appeal to
   the workers." However, it is true that the Makhnovists did fail win
   over more than a minority of workers. This may have been due to the
   fact that the Makhnovists only freed two cities, both for short periods
   of time. As Paul Avrich notes, "he found little time to implement his
   economic programs."
   [Anarchist Portraits, p. 121] Given how Rees bends over backwards to
   justify Bolshevik policies in terms of "objective factors," it is
   significant that in his discussion of the Makhnovists such "objective
   factors" as time fail to get a mention!

   Thus Rees's attempt to paint the Makhnovists as anti-working class
   fails. While this is the core of his dismissal of them as a possible
   "libertarian alternative to the Bolsheviks," the facts do not support
   his assertions. He gives the example of Makhno's advice to railway
   workers in Aleksandrovsk "who had not been paid for many weeks" that
   they should "simply charge passengers a fair price and so generate
   their own wages." He states that this "advice aimed at reproducing the
   petit-bourgeois patterns of the countryside." [Op. Cit., p. 59] Two
   points can be raised to this argument.

   Firstly, we should highlight the Bolshevik (and so, presumably,
   "proletarian") patterns imposed on the railway workers. Trotsky simply
   "plac[ed] the railwaymen and the personnel of the repair workshops
   under martial law" and "summarily ousted" the leaders of the
   railwaymen's trade union when they objected."
   The Central Administrative Body of Railways (Tsektran) he created was
   run by him "along strictly military and bureaucratic lines." In other
   words, he applied his ideas on the "militarisation of labour" in full.
   [M. Brinton, The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control, p. 67] Compared to
   the Bolshevik pattern, only an ideologue could suggest that Makhno's
   advice (and it was advice, not a decree imposed from above, as was
   Trotsky's) can be considered worse. Indeed, by being based on workers'
   self-management it was infinitely more socialist than the militarised
   Bolshevik state capitalist system.

   Secondly, Rees fails to understand the nature of anarchism. Anarchism
   argues that it is up to working class people to organise their own
   activities. This meant that, ultimately, it was up to the railway
   workers themselves (in association with other workers) to organise
   their own work and industry. Rather than being imposed by a few
   leaders, real socialism can only come from below, built by working
   people, through their own efforts and own class organisations.
   Anarchists can suggest ideas and solutions, but ultimately its up to
   workers (and peasants) to organise their own affairs. Thus, rather than
   being a source of condemnation, Makhno's comments should be considered
   as praiseworthy as they were made in a spirit of equality and were
   based on encouraging workers' self-management.

   Ultimately, the best reply to Rees is simply the fact that after
   holding a "general conference of the workers of the city" at which it
   was "proposed that the workers organise the life of the city and the
   functioning of the factories with their own forces and their own
   organisations" based on "the principles of self-management," the
   "[r]ailroad workers took the first step in this direction" by
   "form[ing] a committee charged with organising the railway network of
   the region." [Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 149]

   Even more amazing (if that is possible) is Rees' account of the
   revolution in the countryside. Rees argues that the "real basis of
   Makhno's support was not his anarchism, but his opposition to grain
   requisitioning and his determination not to disturb the peasant
   economy" [Op. Cit., p. 59] and quotes Palij as follows:

     "Makhno had not put an end to the agricultural inequalities. His aim
     was to avoid conflicts with the villages and to maintain a sort of
     united front of the entire peasantry." [M. Palij, Op. Cit., p. 214]

   However, here is the actual context of the (corrected) quote:

     "Peasants' economic conditions in the region of the Makhno movement
     were greatly improved at the expense of the estates of the
     landlords, the church, monasteries, and the richest peasants, but
     Makhno had not put an end to the agricultural inequalities. His aim
     was to avoid conflicts within the villages and to maintain a sort of
     united front of the entire peasantry." [M. Palij, Op. Cit., p. 214]

   Clearly, Rees has distorted the source material, conveniently missing
   out the information that Makhno had most definitely "disturbed"
   the peasant economy at the expense of the rich! And, we are sure that
   Rees would have a fit if it were suggested that the real basis of
   Bolshevik support was not their socialism, but their opposition to the
   war and the Whites!

   Amazingly, Rees also somehow manages to forget to mention the peasant
   revolution which had started in 1917 in his attack against Makhno:

     "Makhno and his associates brought socio-political issues into the
     daily life of the people, who in turn supported the expropriation of
     large estates . . . On the eve of open conflict [in late 1917],
     Makhno assembled all the landowners and rich peasants (kulaks) of
     the area and took from them all official documents relating to their
     land, livestock, and equipment. Subsequently an inventory of this
     property was taken and reported to the people at the session of the
     local soviet, and then at the regional meeting, It was decided to
     allow the landlords to share the land, livestock, and tools equally
     with the peasants." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 71]

   Obviously, Rees considers the expropriating of the landlords and kulaks
   as an act which "did not disturb the age-old class structure of the
   countryside"!

   Let us not forget that the official Makhnovist position was that the
   "holdings of the landlords, the monasteries, and the state, including
   all livestock and goods, were to be transferred to the peasants."
   [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 151] At the second congress of workers, peasants
   and insurgents held in February, 1919, it was resolved that "all land
   be transferred to the hands of toiling peasants . . . according to the
   norm of equal distribution." [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 155] This
   meant that every peasant family had as much land as they could
   cultivate without the use of hired labour. The Makhnovists argued with
   regards to the kulaks:

     "We are sure that . . . the kulak elements of the village will be
     pushed to one side by the very course of events. The toiling
     peasantry will itself turn effortlessly on the kulaks, first by
     adopting the kulak's surplus land for general use, then naturally
     drawing the kulak elements into the social organisation." [cited by
     Michael Malet, Op. Cit., pp. 118-9]

   Thus, just to stress the point, the Makhnovists did "disturb" the
   "age-old class structure of the countryside."

   Clearly, Rees is simply taking nonsense. When he states that Makhnovist
   land policies "did not disturb the age-old class structure of the
   countryside," he is simply showing his utter and total disregard for
   the truth. As the Bolsheviks themselves found out, no mass movement
   could possibly exist among the peasants without having a positive and
   levelling land policy. The Makhnovists were no exception.

   Rees then states that "[i]n 1919 the local Bolshevik authorities made
   mistakes which played into Makhno's hands." Unsurprisingly enough, he
   argues that this was because they "tried to carry through the
   socialisation of the land, rather than handing it over to the
   peasants." [Op. Cit., p. 60] In fact, the Bolsheviks did not try to
   implement the "socialisation" of land. Rather, they tried to
   nationalise the land and place it under state control -- a radically
   different concept. Indeed, it was the Makhnovists who argued that the
   "land, the factories, the workshops, the mines, the railroads and the
   other wealth of the people must belong to the working people
   themselves, to those who work in them, that is to say, they must be
   socialised." [contained in Arshinov, Op. Cit., p. 273] The Bolsheviks,
   in contrast, initially "decreed that all lands formerly belonging to
   the landlords should be expropriated and transformed into state farms."
   [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 156] The peasants quite rightly thought that this
   just replaced one set of landlords with another, stealing the land
   which rightfully belonged to them.

   After distorting the source material by selective quoting, Rees does it
   again when he argues that "by the spring of 1920 they [the Bolsheviks]
   had reversed the policy towards the peasants and instituted Committees
   of Poor Peasants, these 'hurt Makhno . . . his heart hardened and he
   sometimes ordered executions.' This policy helped the Bolshevik
   ascendancy." [Op. Cit., p. 60]

   Rees quotes Palij as evidence. To refute his argument we need simply
   quote the same pages:

     "Although they [the Bolsheviks] modified their agricultural policy
     by introducing on February 5, 1920, a new land law, distributing the
     former landlords', state and church lands among the peasants, they
     did not succeed in placating them because of the requisitions, which
     the peasants considered outright robbery . . . Subsequently the
     Bolsheviks decided to introduce class warfare into the villages. A
     decree was issued on May 19, 1920, establishing 'Committees of the
     Poor' . . . Authority in the villages was delegated to the
     committees, which assisted the Bolsheviks in seizing the surplus
     grain . . . The establishment of Committees of the Poor was painful
     to Makhno because they became not only part of the Bolshevik
     administrative apparatus the peasants opposed, but also informers
     helping the Bolshevik secret police in its persecution of the
     partisans, their families and supporters, even to the extent of
     hunting down and executing wounded partisans . . . Consequently,
     Makhno's 'heart hardened and he sometimes ordered executions where
     some generosity would have bestowed more credit upon him and his
     movement. That the Bolsheviks preceded him with the bad example was
     no excuse. For he claimed to be fighting for a better cause.'
     Although the committees in time gave the Bolsheviks a hold on every
     village, their abuse of power disorganised and slowed down
     agricultural life . . . This policy of terror and exploitation
     turned almost all segments of Ukrainian society against the
     Bolsheviks, substantially strengthened the Makhno movement, and
     consequently facilitated the advance of the reorganised
     anti-Bolshevik force of General Wrangel from the Crimea into South
     Ukraine, the Makhno region." [M. Palij, Op. Cit., pp. 213-4]

   Amazing what a ". . ." can hide, is it not! Rees turns an account which
   clearly shows the Bolshevik policy was based on informers, secret
   police and the murder of rebels as well as being a total disaster into
   a victory. Moreover, he also transforms it so that the victims are
   portrayed as the villains. Words cannot do this re-writing of history
   justice. Yes, indeed, an organisation of informers to the secret police
   in every village can aid the "ascendancy" of a one-party dictatorship
   (aided, of course, by overwhelming military force), but it cannot aid
   the ascendancy of freedom, equality and socialism.

   Given the actual record of the Bolsheviks' attempts to break up what
   they considered the "age-old class structure" of the villages with the
   "Committees of the Poor," it is clear why Rees distorts his source.

   It does seem ironic that Rees attacks the Makhnovists for not pursuing
   Bolshevik peasant policies. Considering the absolute failure of those
   policies, the fact that Makhno did not follow them is hardly cause for
   condemnation! Indeed, given the numerous anti-Bolshevik uprisings and
   large-scale state repression they provoked, attacking the Makhnovists
   for not pursuing such insane policies is equally insane. After all,
   who, in the middle of a Civil War, makes matters worse for themselves
   by creating more enemies? Only the insane -- or the Bolsheviks!

   That Makhnovist land policy was correct and the Bolshevik one wrong can
   be seen from the fact that the latter changed their policies and
   brought them into line with the Makhnovist ones. As Palij notes, the
   Bolsheviks "modified their agricultural policy by introducing on
   February 5, 1920, a new land law, distributing the formers landlords',
   state, and church lands among the peasants." This, of course, was a
   vindication of Makhnovist policy (which dated from 1917!). Makhno
   "initiated the peasants' movement, confiscating and distributing
   landlords' land and goods" (and, unlike the Bolsheviks, "encouraging
   the workers to take over factories and workshops"). As regards the
   Bolsheviks attempts to break up what they considered the "age- old
   class structure" of the villages with the "Committees of the Poor," it
   was, as noted above, a complete disaster and counter-productive. [Op.
   Cit., p. 213 and p. 250] All in all, the Makhnovist policies were
   clearly the most successful as regards the peasantry. They broke up the
   class system in the countryside by expropriating the ruling class and
   did not create new conflicts by artificially imposing themselves onto
   the villages.

   Lastly, we must also wonder just how sensible it is to "disturb" the
   economy that produces the food you eat. Given that Rees, in part,
   blames Bolshevik tyranny on the disruption of the economy, it seems
   incredible that he faults Makhno for not adding to the chaos by failing
   to "disrupt the peasant economy"! However, why let logic get in the way
   of a good rant!

   As well as ignoring the wealth of information on Makhnovist land
   policy, Rees turns to their attempts to form free agrarian communes. He
   argues that Makhno's attempts "to go beyond the traditional peasant
   economy were doomed" and quotes Makhno's memoirs which state "the mass
   of the people did not go over" to his peasant communes, which only
   involved a few hundred families. [Op. Cit., p. 59]

   Looking at Makhno's memoirs a somewhat different picture appears.
   Firstly, Makhno states that there were "four such agricultural communes
   within a three- or four-mile radius of Hulyai-Pole," but in the whole
   district "there were many" in 1918 (the period being discussed in his
   memoirs). Makhno recounts how each "commune consisted of ten families
   of peasants and workers, totalling a hundred, two hundred or three
   hundred members" and the "management of each commune was conducted by a
   general meeting of all its members." He does state that "the mass of
   people did not go over to it" but, significantly, he argues that this
   was because of "the advance of the German and Austrian armies, their
   own lack of organisation, and their inability to defend this order
   against the new 'revolutionary' and counter-revolutionary authorities.
   For this reason the toiling population of the district limited their
   real revolutionary activity to supporting in every way those bold
   spirits among them who had settled on the old estates [of the
   landlords] and organised their personal and economic life on free
   communal lines." [quoted by Paul Avrich, The Anarchists in the Russian
   Revolution, pp. 130-2]

   Of course, failing to mention the time period Makhno was recounting
   does distort the success of the communes. The Bolsheviks were
   evacuating the Ukraine as part of their treaty with German and Austrian
   Imperialism when the communes were being set up. This left them in a
   dangerous position, needless to say. By July, 1918, the area was
   occupied by Austrian troops and it was early 1919 before the situation
   was stable enough to allow their reintroduction. One commune was named
   "Rosa Luxemburg" (after the Marxist revolutionary martyr) and was
   mostly destroyed by the Bolsheviks in June 1919 and completely
   destroyed by the Whites a few days later. In such circumstances, can it
   be surprising that only a minority of peasants got involved in them?
   Rather than praise the Makhnovists for positive social experimentation
   in difficult circumstances, Rees shows his ignorance of the objective
   conditions facing the revolution. Perhaps if the peasants did not have
   to worry about the Bolsheviks as well as the Whites, they would have
   had more members?

   All in all, Rees account of Makhnovist ideas on the peasant economy
   are, to put it mildly, incorrect. They paint a radically different
   picture of the reality of both Makhnovist ideas and practice as regards
   the peasantry. Ironically, the soundness of Makhnovist policy in this
   area can be seen from the fact that the Bolsheviks changed their land
   policy to bring it into line with it. Not, of course, that you would
   know that from Rees' account. Nor would you know what the facts of the
   Bolsheviks' land policy were either. Indeed, Rees uses Michael Palij's
   book to create a picture of events which is the exact opposite of that
   contained in it! Very impressive!

   Intent on driving the final nail into the coffin, he tries to apply
   "class analysis" to the Makhnovists. Rees actually states that "given
   this social base [i.e the Makhnovists' peasant base] . . . much of
   Makhno's libertarianism amounted to little more than paper decrees."
   [Op. Cit., p. 60]

   Ironically enough, the list of "paper decrees" Rees presents (when not
   false or distorted) are also failings associated with the Bolsheviks
   (and taken to even more extreme measures by the Bolsheviks)! As such,
   his lambasting of the Makhnovists seems deeply hypocritical. Moreover,
   his attempt to ground the few deviations that exist between Makhnovist
   practice and Makhnovist theory in the peasant base of the army seems an
   abuse of class analysis. After all, these deviations were also shared
   by the Bolsheviks. As such, how can Rees justify the Bolshevik
   deviations from socialist theory in terms of "objective factors" yet
   blame Makhnovist ones on their "social base"? Do "objective factors"
   only afflict Leninists?

   Take for example his first "paper" decree, namely the election of
   commanders. He states that "in practice the most senior commanders were
   appointed by Makhno." In other words, the Makhnovists applied this
   principle extensively but not completely. The Bolsheviks abolished it
   by decree (and did not blame it on "exceptional circumstances" nor
   consider it as a "retreat", as Rees asserts). Now, if Rees' "class
   analysis" of the limitations of the Makhnovists were true, does this
   mean that an army of a regime with a proletarian base (as he considers
   the Bolshevik regime) cannot have elected commanders? This is the
   logical conclusion of his argument.

   Equally, his attempt to "give a flavour of the movement" by quoting one
   of the resolutions adopted by a mass meeting of partisans also
   backfires (namely, "to obey the orders of the commanders if the
   commanders are sober enough to give them"). Firstly, it should be noted
   that this was, originally, from a Red Army source. Secondly,
   drunkenness was a big problem during the civil war (as in any war). It
   was one of the easiest ways of forgetting reality at a time when life
   was often unpleasant and sometimes short. As such, the "objective
   factor" of civil war explains this resolution rather than the social
   base of the movement! Thirdly, Rees himself quotes a Central Committee
   member's comment to the Eighth Party Congress that there were so many
   "horrifying facts about drunkenness, debauchery, corruption, robbery
   and irresponsible behaviour of many party members that one's hair
   stands on end." [Op. Cit., p. 66] The Eighth Congress was in 1919. Does
   this comment give a "flavour" of the Bolshevik regime under Lenin?
   Obviously not, as Rees defends it and blames this list of horrors on
   the objective factors facing the Bolsheviks. Why does the drunkenness
   of the Makhnovists come from their "social base" while that of the
   Bolsheviks from "objective factors"? Simply put, Rees is insulting the
   intelligence of his readers.

   The Makhnovist resolution was passed by a mass assembly of partisans,
   suggesting a fundamentally democratic organisation. Rees argues that
   the civil war resulted in the Bolshevik vices becoming
   institutionalised in the power of the bureaucracy. However, as can be
   seen, the Makhnovists practised democracy during the civil war,
   suggesting that the objective factors Rees tries to blame for the
   Bolshevik vices simply cannot explain everything. As such, his own
   example (yet again) backfires on his argument.

   Rees claims that "Makhno held elections, but no parties were allowed to
   participate in them." [Op. Cit., p. 60] This is probably derived from
   Palij's comment that the free soviets would "carry out the will and
   orders of their constituents" and "[o]nly working people, not
   representatives of political parties, might join the soviets." [Op.
   Cit., p. 151] This, in turn, derives from a Makhnovist proclamation
   from January 1920 which stated:

     "Only labourers who are contributing work necessary to the social
     economy should participate in the soviets. Representatives of
     political organisations have no place in worker-peasant soviets,
     since their participation in a workers' soviet will transform the
     latter into deputies of the party and can lead to the downfall of
     the soviet system." [contained in Peter Arshinov's History of the
     Makhnovist Movement, p. 266]

   Rees' comments indicate that he is not familiar with the make-up of the
   Russian Soviets of 1917. Unlike the soviets from the 1905 revolution,
   those in 1917 allowed "various parties and other organisations to
   acquire voting representation in the soviet executive committees."
   Indeed, this was "often how high party leaders became voting delegates
   to" such bodies. It should "be underlined that these party delegates
   were selected by the leadership of each political organisation, and not
   by the soviet assembly itself. In other words, these executive
   committee members were not directly elected by the representatives of
   the producers" (never mind by the producers themselves). [Samuel
   Farber, Before Stalinism, p. 31]

   In addition, Russian Anarchists had often attacked the use of "party
   lists" in soviet elections, which turned the soviets from working-class
   organs into talking-shops. [Paul Avrich, The Russian Anarchists, p.
   190] This use of party lists meant that soviet delegates could be
   anyone. For example, the leading left-wing Menshevik Martov recounts
   that in early 1920 a chemical factory "put up Lenin against me as a
   candidate [to the Moscow soviet]. I received seventy-six votes he-eight
   (in an open vote)." [quoted by Israel Getzler, Martov, p. 202] How
   would either of these two intellectuals actually know and reflect the
   concerns and interests of the workers they would be "delegates" of? If
   the soviets were meant to be the delegates of working people, then why
   should non-working class members of political parties be elected to a
   soviet?

   Given that the people elected to the free soviets would be delegates
   and not representatives, this would mean that they would reflect the
   wishes of their workmates rather than the decisions of the party's
   central committee. As such, if a worker who was a member of a political
   party could convince their workmates of their ideas, the delegate would
   reflect the decisions of the mass assembly. As such, the input of
   political parties would not be undermined in any way (although their
   domination would be!).

   As such, the Makhnovist ideas on soviets did not, in fact, mean that
   workers and peasants could not elect or send delegates who were members
   of political parties. They had no problems as such with delegates who
   happened to be working- class party members. They did have problems
   with delegates representing only political parties, delegates who were
   not workers and soviets being mere ciphers covering party rule.

   That this was the case can be seen from a few facts. Firstly, the
   February 1919 congress resolution "was written by the anarchists, left
   Socialist Revolutionaries, and the chairman." [Palij, Op. Cit., p. 155]
   Similarly, the Makhnovist Revolutionary Military Soviet created at the
   Aleksandrovsk congress in late 1919 had three Communists elected to it.
   There were 18 delegates from workers at that congress, six were
   Mensheviks and the remaining 12 included Communists [Malet, Op. Cit.,
   p. 111, p. 124] Clearly, members of political parties were elected to
   both the congresses and the Revolutionary Military Soviet. As such, the
   idea that free soviets excluded members of political parties is false
   -- they simply were not dominated by them (for example, having
   executives made up of members of a single party or delegating their
   power to a government as per the national soviet in Russia). This
   could, of course, change. In the words of the Makhnovist reply to
   Bolshevik attempts to ban one of their congresses:

     "The Revolutionary Military Council . . . holds itself above the
     pressure and influence of all parties and only recognises the people
     who elected it. Its duty is to accomplish what the people have
     instructed it to do, and to create no obstacles to any left
     socialist party in the propagation of ideas. Consequently, if one
     day the Bolshevik idea succeeds among the workers, the Revolutionary
     Military Council . . . will necessarily be replaced by another
     organisation, 'more revolutionary' and more Bolshevik." [quoted by
     Arshinov, Op. Cit., pp. 103-4]

   As such, the Makhnovists supported the right of working- class
   self-determination, as expressed by one delegate to Hulyai Pole
   conference in February 1919:

     "No party has a right to usurp governmental power into its hands . .
     . We want life, all problems, to be decided locally, not by order
     from any authority above; and all peasants and workers should decide
     their own fate, while those elected should only carry out the
     toilers' wish." [quoted by Palij, Op. Cit., p. 154]

   Thus, Rees fails to present an accurate account of Makhnovist theory
   and practice as regards "free soviets." Rather than oppose party
   participation within their soviets and congresses, the Makhnovists
   opposed the domination of soviets and congresses by political parties,
   a radically different concept. Like the Kronstadt rebels, they argued
   for all power to the soviets and not to parties.

   Lastly, Rees attacks the Makhnovists for having two security forces,
   the Cheka-like razvedka and the Punitive Commission. How this is an
   expression of the Makhnovist "social base" is hard to explain, as both
   the Bolsheviks and Whites also had their security forces and
   counter-intelligence agencies.

   While Rees quotes Footman's statement that "we can safely assume [!]
   these services were responsible for frequent injustices and
   atrocities," he fails to mention that Footman does not provide any
   examples (hence his comment that we can "assume" they occurred!).
   Footman himself notes that "[o]f the Makhnovite security services . . .
   we know very little." [David Footman, Op. Cit., p. 288] Rees himself
   only lists one, namely the summary shooting of a Bolshevik cell
   discovered in the Army. Given the bloody record of the Bolshevik Cheka
   (which, again, Rees defends as necessary to defend against the
   Whites!), this suggests that the crimes of the Makhnovist
   counter-intelligence pale in comparison.

   Rees also quotes the historian Chamberlin that "Makhno's private Cheka
   . . . quickly disposed of anyone who was suspected of plotting against
   his life." [Op. Cit., 60] Strangely enough, Rees fails to mention the
   Bolshevik attempts to assassinate Makhno, including the one in the
   latter part of May 1919 when, it should be noted, the Makhnovists and
   Bolsheviks were meant to be in alliance. Nor does he mention that the
   Cheka "would hunt out and hang all active Makhnovites." [David Footman,
   Civil War in Russia, p. 271 and p. 293]

   As regards the last conflict with the Red Army, it should be noted that
   while "generalised accusations of Makhnovist atrocities are common" the
   facts are it was "the Makhnovists who stood to gain by liberating
   prisoners, the Bolsheviks by shooting them." This was because "the Red
   Army soldiers had been conscripted from elsewhere to do work they
   neither liked nor understood" and the "insurgents had their own homes
   to defend." [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 130] Thus, while Rees quotes Footman's
   opinion that "Makhno's later campaigns [were] among the most bloody and
   vindictive," these facts suggest that we cannot "safely assume that
   these [security] services were responsible for frequent injustices and
   atrocities." Clearly, if the Makhnovists were releasing Red Army
   prisoners (and many of whom were joining Makhno), the picture of an
   atrocity inflicting army can hardly be a valid picture.

   And it should be stressed that Bolshevik terror and violence against
   the Makhnovists is strangely absent from Rees's account.

   Rees presents just one concrete example of Makhnovist "Cheka-like"
   violence, namely, the execution of a Bolshevik cell in December, 1919.
   It should be noted that the Bolsheviks had been explicitly arguing for
   Party dictatorship for some time by then. The reason why the Bolsheviks
   had been "denied an open trial" was because they had already been shot.
   Unfortunately, Makhno gave two contradictory reasons why the Bolsheviks
   had been killed. This led to the Makhnovist Revolutionary Military
   Soviet setting up a commission of three to investigate the issue.
   Perhaps unsurprisingly, the commission exonerated Makhno although
   Voline, out of the members, seemed to have been genuinely embarrassed
   by the affair. [Malet, Op. Cit., pp. 51-2] Needless to say, Rees fails
   to comment on the Bolshevik summary killing of Makhnovist staff in June
   1919 or, indeed, any other summary executions conducted by the
   Bolsheviks against the Makhnovists (including the shooting of
   prisoners).

   Given the summary justice handed out by the Bolshevik Cheka, it seems
   strange that Rees dismisses the Makhnovist movement on assumptions and
   one event, yet he does. Obviously, the large-scale and continuous
   Bolshevik killings of political enemies (including Makhnovists) is
   irrelevant compared to this one event.

   All in all, Rees' attempts to blame the few deviations the Makhnovists
   had from anarchist theory on the "social base" of the movement are a
   joke. While justifying the far more extreme deviations of Bolshevik
   theory and practice in terms of "objective factors," he refuses to
   consider this possibility for the Makhnovists. The hypocrisy is clear,
   if not unexpected.

   One last point. Taking Rees' "class analysis" of the Makhnovists
   seriously, the logical conclusion of his argument is clear. For Rees, a
   movement which compromises slightly with its principles in the face of
   extreme "objective factors" is "petty bourgeois." However, a movement
   which compromises totally (indeed introduces and justifies the exact
   opposite of its original claims) in face of the same "objective
   factors" is "proletarian." As such, his pathetic attempt at "class
   analysis" of the Makhnovists simply shows up the dictatorial nature of
   the Bolsheviks. If trying to live up to libertarian/democratic ideals
   but not totally succeeding signifies being "petty-bourgeois" while
   dismissing those ideals totally in favour of top-down, autocratic
   hierarchies is "proletarian" then sane people would happily be labelled
   "petty-bourgeois"!

   And Rees states that "[n]either Makhno's social programme nor his
   political regime could provide an alternative to the Bolsheviks"! [Op.
   Cit., p. 60] Little wonder he distorts that social programme and
   political regime -- an honest account of both would see that Rees is
   wrong. The Makhnovist movement clearly shows that not only did
   Bolshevik policies have a decisive impact on the development of the
   Russian Revolution, there was a clear alternative to Bolshevik
   authoritarianism and party dictatorship.

   In summary, Rees' attack on the Makhnovists fails. It can be faulted on
   both factual and logical grounds. His article is so riddled with
   errors, selective quoting and downright lies that it is factually
   unreliable. Similarly, his attempt to attack the Makhnovist political
   theory and practice is equally factually incorrect. His attempt to
   explain the deviations of Makhnovist practice from its theory in terms
   of the "social base" is simply an insult to the intelligence of the
   reader and an abuse of class analysis.

   A far more compelling analysis would recognise that the Makhnovists
   were not a perfect social movement but that the deviations of its
   practice from its theory can be explained by the objective factors it
   faced. Equally, the example of the Makhnovists shows the weakness of
   Rees' main argument, namely that the objective factors that Bolshevism
   faced can solely explain its authoritarian politics. That the
   Makhnovists, facing the same objective factors, did not act in the same
   manner as the Bolsheviks shows that Bolshevik ideology played a key
   role in the failure of the revolution. This explains Rees' clumsy
   attempts to rewrite the history and theory of the Makhnovshchina.

16 What lessons can be learned from the Makhnovists?

   The Makhnovist movement was one of the most important events of the
   Russian Revolution. It was a mass movement of working people who tried
   and succeeded to implement libertarian ideas in extremely difficult
   circumstances.

   As such, the most important lesson gained from the experience of the
   Makhno movement is simply that "objective factors" cannot and do not
   explain the degeneration of the Russian Revolution or Bolshevik
   authoritarianism. Here was a movement which faced the same terrible
   circumstances as the Bolsheviks faced (White counter-revolution,
   economic disruption, and so on) and yet did not act in the same manner
   as the Bolsheviks. Where the Bolsheviks completely abolished army
   democracy, the Makhnovists extensively applied it. Where the Bolsheviks
   implemented party dictatorship over the soviets, the Makhnovists
   encouraged and practised soviet self-management. While the Bolsheviks
   eliminated freedom of speech, press, assembly, the Makhnovists defended
   and implemented them. The list is endless (see [69]section 14).

   This means that one of the key defences of the Bolshevik Myth, namely
   that the Bolsheviks had no choice but to act as they did due to
   "objective factors" or "circumstances" is totally undermined. As such,
   it points to the obvious conclusion: Bolshevik ideology influenced the
   practice of the party, as did their position within the "workers'
   state," and so influenced the outcome of the Revolution. This means
   that to play down Bolshevik ideology or practice in favour of
   "objective factors", one fails to understand that the actions and ideas
   generated during the revolution were not "objectively" determined but
   were themselves important and sometimes decisive factors in the
   outcome.

   Take, for example, the Bolshevik decision to betray the Makhnovists in
   1920. Neither betrayal was "objectively determined" before- hand.
   However, it did make perfect sense from a perspective which equated the
   revolution with the "dictatorship of the party." That the first
   betrayal undoubtedly extended the length of the Civil War by allowing
   the Whites the space to reorganise under Wrangel also had its impact on
   Bolshevik theory and practice as well as the "objective factors" it had
   to face.

   As such, the Makhnovists give a counter-example to the common
   pro-Bolshevik argument that the horrors of the Civil War were
   responsible for the degeneration of the Bolshevik Party and the
   revolution. In the words of one historian:

     "[The] Insurgent Army . . . was organised on a voluntary basis and
     respected the principle of election of commanders and staff. The
     regulations governing conduct were drawn up by commissions of
     soldiers and approved by general meetings of the units concerned. In
     other words, it embodied the principles of the soldiers' movement of
     1917, principles rejected by the Bolsheviks when they set up the Red
     Army, supposedly because of their harmful effects on fighting
     efficiency, a characteristic of them discovered by the Bolsheviks
     only after they had come to power on the basis of promoting them.
     But the Insurgent Army, given its size and equipment, was very
     effective. Some have even credited it with greater responsibility
     than the Red Army for the defeat of Denikin. It took enormous
     efforts by the Bolsheviks, including the arrest or shooting of
     thousands of people, in order to pacify the region . . . even after
     the Insurgent Army was militarily broken, it took six months to mop
     up the remnants. . . Within its area of operations, which consisted
     of only two to three per cent of the total population of European
     Russia, the Insurgent Army was undoubtedly highly effective. While
     one can never know how history might have turned out had things been
     different, the Insurgent Army gives plenty of grounds for thinking
     that a people's revolutionary war of the kind it represented might
     have been at least as effective on a national scale with nationwide
     resources at its disposal as Trotsky and the Red Army's ruthless
     centralisation. It would not, however, have been compatible with the
     imposition from above of the Bolshevik leadership's vision of
     revolution. When the Insurgent Army drove the enemy out of an area
     they encouraged the local population to solve their own problems.
     Where the Red Army took over, the Cheka quickly followed. The
     Bolsheviks themselves were energetically snuffing out the ideals of
     1917.

     "Given such considerations it may be, though it cannot be logically
     proven one way or the other, that the Bolsheviks' deeply rooted
     authoritarianism rather than the civil war itself led to the
     construction of a highly centralised system that aimed at 'complete
     control' over political and many other aspects of social life. It
     could even be argued, though it is equally unprovable, that the
     tendency to authoritarianism, far from ensuring victory, nearly led
     to catastrophe. For one thing, it helped alienate many workers who
     felt cheated by the outcome of the revolution, and support for the
     regime was . . . far from even in this core group . . . [It] may,
     indeed, have been becoming more alienated as a result of Bolshevik
     measures depriving it of the means of expression of its growing
     catalogue of grievances. . . Far from being 'necessary' or even
     functional, the Bolshevik leadership's obsession with externally
     imposed discipline and authority might even have made the task of
     victory in the war more difficult and more costly. If the
     counter-example of Makhno is anything to go by then it certainly
     did."
     [Christopher Read, From Tsar to Soviets, pp. 264-5]

   As such, another key lesson to be learned from the Makhno movement is
   the importance of practising during a revolution the ideas you preach
   before it. Means and ends are linked, with the means shaping the ends
   and the ends inspiring the means. As such, if you argue for
   working-class power and freedom, you cannot dump these aims during a
   revolution without ensuring that they are never applied after it. As
   the Makhnovist movement showed, even the most difficult situations need
   not hinder the application of revolutionary ideas.

   The importance of encouraging working-class autonomy also shines
   through the Makhnovist experience. The problems facing a social
   revolution are many, as are the problems involved in constructing a new
   society. The solutions to these problems cannot be found without the
   active and full participation of the working class. As the Makhnovist
   congresses and soviets show, free debate and meaningful meetings are
   the only means, firstly, to ensure that working-class people are "the
   masters of their own lives," that "they themselves are making the
   revolution," that they "have gained freedom." "Take that faith away,"
   stressed Alexander Berkman, "deprive the people of power by setting up
   some authority over them, be it a political party or military
   organisation, and you have dealt a fatal blow to the revolution. You
   will have robbed it of its main source of strength, the masses." [ABC
   of Anarchism, p. 82]

   Secondly, it allows the participation of all in solving the problems of
   the revolution and of constructing the new society. Without this input,
   real socialism cannot be created and, at best, some form of oppressive
   state capitalist regime would be created (as Bolshevism shows). A new
   society needs the freedom of experimentation, to adapt freely to the
   problems it faces, to adjust to the needs and hopes of those making it.
   Without working-class freedom and autonomy, public life becomes
   impoverished, miserable and rigid as the affairs of all are handed over
   to a few leaders at the top of a social hierarchy, who cannot
   possibility understand, let alone solve, the problems affecting
   society. Freedom allows the working class to take an active part in the
   revolution. Restricting working-class freedom means the
   bureaucratisation of the revolution as a few party leaders cannot hope
   to direct and rule the lives of millions without a strong state
   apparatus. Simply put, the emancipation of the working class is the
   task of the working class itself. Either working class people create
   socialism (and that needs workers' autonomy and freedom as its basis),
   or some clique will and the result will not be a socialist society.

   As the experience of the Makhnovist movement shows, working- class
   freedom can be applied during a revolution and when it is faced with
   the danger of counter-revolution.

   Another key lesson from the Makhnovist movement is that of the need for
   effective anarchist organisation. The Makhnovists did not become
   anarchist-influenced by chance. The hard effort by the local anarchists
   in Hulyai Pole before and during 1917 paid off in terms of political
   influence afterwards. Therefore, anarchists need to take a leading role
   in the struggles of working people (as we indicated in [70]section
   I.8.2, this was how the Spanish anarchists gained influence as well).
   As Voline noted, one of the advantages the Makhnovist movement had was
   "the activity of . . . libertarian elements in the region . . . [and
   the] rapidity with which the peasant masses and the insurgents, despite
   unfavourable circumstances, became acquainted with libertarian ideas
   and sought to apply them." [Op. Cit., p. 570]

   Arshinov expands on this issue in a chapter of his history ("The
   Makhnovshchina and Anarchism"), arguing that many Russian anarchists
   "suffered from the disease of disorganisation," which led to
   "impoverished ideas and futile practice." Moreover, most did not join
   the Makhnovist movement, "remained in their circles and slept through a
   mass movement of paramount importance." [Op. Cit., p. 244 and p. 242]

   Indeed, it was only in May 1919 that the "Nabat" Ukrainian anarchist
   confederation was organised. This federation worked closely with the
   Makhnovists and gained influence in the villages, towns and cities
   within and around the Makhnovist region. In such circumstances, the
   anarchists were at a disadvantage compared to the Bolsheviks,
   Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who had been organised far
   longer and so had more influence within the urban workers.

   While many anarchists did participate effectively and organisationally
   within many areas of Russia and the Ukraine (gaining influence in
   Moscow and Petrograd, for example), they were much weaker than the
   Bolsheviks. This meant that the Bolshevik idea of revolution gained
   influence (by, it should be noted, appropriating anarchist slogans and
   tactics). Once in power, the Bolsheviks turned against their rivals,
   using state repression to effectively destroy the anarchist movement in
   Russia in April 1918 (see [71]section 24 of the appendix [72]"What
   happened during the Russian Revolution?" for details). This,
   incidentally, led to many anarchists coming to the Ukraine to escape
   repression and many joined the Makhnovists. As Arshinov notes, the
   Bolsheviks "knew perfectly well that . . . anarchism in Russia, lacking
   any contact with a mass movement as important as the Makhnovshchina,
   did not have a base and could not threaten nor endanger them." [Op.
   Cit., p. 248] Waiting till after a revolution starts to build such a
   base is a dangerous tactic, as the experience of the Russian anarchists
   shows. As the experience of the Moscow anarchists active in the bakers'
   union shows, organised working-class support can be an effective
   deterrent to state repression (the Moscow bakers' union continued to
   have anarchists active in it until 1921).

   It should be noted that this lesson was recognised by the main
   anarchists associated with the Makhnovists. In exile, Voline argued for
   the need to build a "synthesis" anarchist federation (see [73]section
   J.3.2) while Arshinov and Makhno both associated themselves with the
   Platform (see [74]section J.3.3).

   Another key lesson is the need to combine rural and urban organisation.
   As Voline argued, the "absence of a vigorous organised workers'
   movement which could support that of the peasant insurgents" was a
   major disadvantage for the Makhno movement. [Voline, Op. Cit., p. 571]
   If there had been a workers' movement influenced by anarchist or
   syndicalist ideas within the Ukrainian towns during the Russian
   Revolution, the possibilities of constructive work would have been
   increased immensely. Take the example of when the Makhnovists liberated
   Aleksandrovsk and organised two workers' conferences. It was only at
   the insurgents' insistence that the unions agreed to send delegates,
   but for information only. This was undoubtedly due to the fact that
   Mensheviks had some influence in the unions and Bolshevik influence was
   increasing. Both parties may have preferred the Makhnovists to the
   Whites, but neither accepted anarchist ideas of workers'
   self-management and so constructive work was limited to the railway
   workers. In contrast, when Katerinoslav was liberated, the bakers set
   themselves to preparing the socialisation of their industry and drawing
   up plans to feed both the army and the civilian population.
   Unsurprisingly, the bakers had long been under anarcho-syndicalist
   influence. [Malet, Op. Cit., p. 123 and p. 124]

   As the Makhnovists themselves realised, their movement had to be
   complemented by urban working-class self-activity and
   self-organisations. While they did all they could to encourage it, they
   lacked a base within the workers' movement and so their ideas had to
   overcome the twin barriers of workers' unfamiliarity with both them and
   their ideas and Marxist influence. With a strong working- class
   movement influenced by anarchist ideas, the possibilities for
   constructive work between city and village would have been helped
   immensely (this can be seen from the example of the Spanish Revolution
   of 1936, where rural and urban collectives and unions made direct links
   with each other).

   Lastly, there is the lesson to be gained from Makhnovist co-operation
   with the Bolsheviks. Simply put, the experience shows the importance of
   being wary towards Bolshevism. As Voline put it, another disadvantage
   of the Makhnovists was a "certain casualness, a lack of necessary
   distrust, towards the Communists." [Op. Cit., p. 571] The Makhnovists
   were betrayed three times by the Bolsheviks, who continually placed
   maintaining their own power above the needs of the revolution. The
   anarchists were simply used as cannon fodder against the Whites and
   once their utility had ended, the Bolsheviks turned their guns on them.

   Thus a lesson to be learned is that co-operation between anarchists and
   Bolsheviks is fraught with danger. As many activists are aware,
   modern-day supporters of Bolshevism constantly urge everyone to unite
   "against the common enemy" and not to be "sectarian" (although, somehow
   this appeal to non-sectarianism does not stop them printing lying
   accounts of anarchism!). The Makhnovists took them at their word in
   early 1919 and soon found out that "unity" meant "follow our orders."
   When the Makhnovists continued to apply their ideas of working-class
   self-management, the Bolsheviks turned on them. Similarly, in early
   1920 the Bolsheviks outlawed the Makhnovists in order to break their
   influence in the Ukraine. The Makhnovist contribution to the defeat of
   Denikin (the common enemy) was ignored. Lastly, in mid-1920 the
   Makhnovists placed the need of the revolution first and suggested an
   alliance to defeat the common enemy of Wrangel. Once Wrangel had been
   defeated, the Bolsheviks ripped up the agreement they had signed and,
   yet again, turned on the Makhnovists. Simply put, the Bolsheviks
   continually placed their own interests before that of the revolution
   and their allies. This is to be expected from an ideology based on
   vanguardism (see [75]section H.5 for further discussion).

   This does not mean that anarchists and Leninists should not work
   together. In some circumstances and in some social movements, this may
   be essential. However, it would be wise to learn from history and not
   ignore it and, as such, modern activists should be wary when conducting
   such co-operation. Ultimately, for Leninists, social movements are
   simply a means to their end (the seizing of state power by them on
   behalf of the working class) and anarchists should never forget it.

   Thus the lessons of the Makhnovist movement are exceedingly rich.
   Simply put, the Makhnovshchina show that anarchism is a viable form of
   revolutionary ideas and can be applied successfully in extremely
   difficult circumstances. They show that social revolutions need not
   consist of changing one set of bosses for another. The Makhnovist
   movement clearly shows that libertarian ideas can be successfully
   applied in a revolutionary situation.

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