 A response to a Response to "Left-Anarchist" Criticisms of Anarcho-Capitalism

   This is a reply to the anti-anti-"anarcho"-capitalist FAQ which used to
   be found at http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/7895 by Chris
   Wilson (it no longer is and, in fact, Mr. Wilson now considers himself
   an anarchist and "anarcho"-capitalism an oxymoron!). It aims to
   "correct the misrepresentations of anarcho-capitalism (and 'right-wing'
   libertarianism in general) made by the anarcho-socialists [sic!] who
   run the Anarchist FAQ webpage, and to counter the criticisms the
   authors make which happen to be legitimate" which are claimed to be in
   old section F of our FAQ.

   The author claims that "[m]uch of the anarcho-socialist FAQ is severely
   distortive of the position that the authors wish to refute, and the
   authors provide little textual evidence in support of their
   preconceived notions of anarcho-capitalism." This has been the first
   such attempt since the FAQ went on-line in early 1996. If we did
   produce "mostly strawmen arguments which do not truly address the
   actual positions that anarcho-capitalists hold" then no
   "anarcho"-capitalist before Wilson thought it worthwhile to let us
   know.

   The author claims that his "FAQ aims to correct these errors, and to
   set the record straight for once." That is his right. However, when he
   first approached us with his criticism we said that we were in the
   process of revising that section and that we would like to hear his
   comments in order to correct any mistakes or strawmen we may have
   accidentally placed in our FAQ (after all, this section contains some
   of the oldest work on the FAQ and it came from our experiences of
   discussing with "anarcho"-capitalists on-line so mistakes could easily
   creep in). Instead of providing us with feedback, he decided to place
   his critique on-line (which again is his right). Here we reply is his
   criticism's of the old section F.

   The new [1]section F should also be consulted, which was being revised
   as Wilson created his critique of the old section F.

           Section F.1 (Are "Anarcho"-Capitalists Really Anarchists?)

   This section of the FAQ has been extensively revised and so much of the
   comments made are to text now found in other sections. The new section
   [2]F.1 is far more explicit on why "anarcho"-capitalism is not part of
   the anarchist tradition. However, it is worthwhile to discuss the old
   version.

   Mr Wilson starts off by noting us "that this FAQ does not begin by
   giving a general explanation of what anarcho-capitalism is. The authors
   instead decided to launch right into their rebuttal, without first
   informing the reader of their opposition's position." Yes, very true.
   We assumed that the reader would be familiar enough with the concept so
   that such a general explanation would not be required. In section [3]B,
   for example, we discuss general capitalist attitudes towards, say,
   property, wage labour and so as "anarcho"-capitalism bases itself on
   these concepts it would be unnecessary to repeat them again.

   He then quotes our FAQ:

     So-called "anarcho"-capitalists only oppose the centralised state,
     not the hierarchical-authoritarian capitalist workplace. Thus it is
     absurd for them to call themselves anarchists, because the
     capitalist workplace is where the majority of people have their most
     frequent, direct, personal, and unpleasant experiences of
     authoritarianism.

   And comments:

     "More accurately, anarcho-capitalists oppose the governing of a
     person's behaviour by other persons without that first person's
     prior consent. A-C'ers do not support the centralised state because
     it holds a geographical monopoly upon the use of force, which
     infringes upon the individual sovereignty of those living within
     that area. Regardless of whether the state is a representative
     democracy or a dictatorship, it necessarily violates the conditions
     that make consent a possibility. Specifically, the state thrives on
     a policy of coercion, which consists of initiating interference with
     the actions and will of individuals and benefiting at their
     expense."

   So, in other words, "consent" is required and that makes
   authoritarianism okay. Thus capitalist hierarchy is fine because
   workers agree to it but state hierarchy is bad because citizens do not
   "consent". But as we argue in the new section F.2.3 ([4]Can
   "anarcho"-capitalist theory justify the state?) in a liberal or
   democratic state citizens are free to move to another state. They can
   withdraw their "consent" just as a worker can withdraw their "consent"
   and look for another job. If consent is the key aspect of whether
   something is evil or not then the modern state is not an evil as it is
   based upon consent. No one forces you to stay in a given state. Thus
   "consent" is not enough in itself to justify hierarchy.

   In addition, we should not that the boss also interferes with the
   actions and will of individuals and benefits at their expense. Indeed,
   Murray Rothbard actually states that if the state legitimately owned
   the land it claims then it would be perfectly justified in
   "interfering" with those lived on its property in exactly the same way
   that any other property does! (see section [5]F.2.3). His opposition to
   the state is simply that the property it claims was unjustly acquired,
   not that it restricts individual freedom.

   Thus, for "anarcho"-capitalists, the difference between restrictions on
   freedom created by property and those created by statism is that the
   former are caused by a "just" history (and so are fine) while the later
   are caused by an "unjust" history (and so are bad). However, given that
   the property regime we live in is deeply affected by past state actions
   (see section [6]F.8), this criteria is phoney as capitalism shares a
   history of violence with the state. If state hierarchy is wrong, so is
   capitalist hierarchy -- if "history" is actually to account for
   anything rather than just as rhetoric to justify capitalist oppression.

   Wilson goes on to state that "anarcho"-capitalists "do not wish to
   abolish the 'hierarchical-authoritarian capitalist workplace', because
   of the fact that doing so would place a restriction upon the number of
   alternatives people can choose to improve their situations without
   violating the liberty of others."

   Sounds lovely and freedom enhancing does it not? Until you think about
   it more deeply. Then you realise that such glorification of choice is
   just a "dismal politics", where most of the choices are bad. After all,
   in "actually existing" capitalism the percentage of non-wage slaves in
   the workforce is around 10% (and this figure includes bosses and not
   just self-employed workers). The percentage of self-employed has
   steadily decreased from the dawn of capitalism which means that
   capitalism itself restricts the number of alternatives people have to
   choose from!

   And let us see what the "hierarchical-authoritarian capitalist
   workplace" involves. It is based upon the worker selling their liberty
   to gain entry to it. Why do they do that? Because the circumstances
   they face means that they have little choice but to do so. And these
   circumstances are created by the rights framework within society; in
   other words capitalist property rights. Wilson assumes that abolishing
   capitalist property rights will involve "violating the liberty of
   others" but it is clear that that maintaining these rights results in
   people "voluntarily" selling their liberty due to the circumstances
   created by these property rights. In other words, the enforcement of
   property rights involves the violation of liberty of those subject to
   the rules and regulations of the property owner. For example, the boss
   can ban numerous free actions, agreements and exchanges on his property
   -- the joining of a union, free speech, freedom to wear what you like
   and so on.

   Wilson goes on to argue that "a person enters into a bilateral exchange
   with another person out of an expectation that the benefits of the
   exchange will exceed its costs. . . . He [the capitalist] underwent the
   expense involved in purchasing and/or producing these capital goods,
   and if he does not consent to give them up to the workers, any forceful
   appropriation of them on behalf of the workers would be a violation of
   his autonomy."

   So, just to be clear, if the worker has the option of selling her
   labour and starving to death then the worker "freely" sells her
   liberty. Any attempt to change the rights framework of society is a
   "violation" of the capitalist's "autonomy". The same could be said of
   the state. After all, the state has went to the expense of acquiring
   and protecting the land it claims. But, of course, this initial claim
   was invalid and so the state is to be opposed. But the capitalist class
   has profited from the state's use of force many a time and the economic
   circumstances it has helped create. After all, it was state enforcement
   of the "land monopoly" that created a pool of landless workers who had
   no choice but to enter into wage slavery. The capitalists enriched
   themselves at the expense of desperate people with no other options,
   with state aid to repress strikes and unions.

   If the state's claims of ownership are phoney, then so are the claims
   of capitalists.

   Wilson then laments that:

     "A worker who does not possess the same amount of wealth as an
     entrepreneur will often consent to what anarcho-socialists would
     call an 'unequal exchange' because of the fact that he forecasts
     that an improvement in his situation will result from it. To prevent
     this type of exchange from occurring would be to constrain the
     number of options available that one can choose to improve one's
     lot."

   As noted above, it is capitalism that constrains the number of options
   available to "improve one's lot". But Wilson seems to be assuming that
   anarchists desire to somehow "ban" wage labour. But we made no such
   claim. We argued that we need to change the rights framework of society
   and take back that which has been stolen from us. After all,
   capitalists have used the state to enrich themselves at our expense for
   hundreds of years (indeed, as we argue in section [7]F.8 the state
   played a key role in the development of capitalism in the first place).

   As Nozick argues in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, only "justly" acquired
   property can be legitimately transferred. But under capitalism,
   property was not justly acquired (indeed, even Nozick's conceptual
   theory of land acquisition does not justify land ownership -- see
   [8]section B.3.4). Thus we are not violating the liberty of capitalists
   if we take their property and modify the rights framework because it
   was not their property to begin with!

   Wilson goes on to argue that "[d]espite the unpleasant rules that a
   worker may have to follow when on the job, the worker does it for the
   purpose of securing something greater in the end."

   The same logic has been used to justify the state. Despite the
   unpleasant rules that a citizen may have to follow, they do it for the
   purpose of securing something greater in the end -- security, liberty,
   whatever. That is hardly a convincing argument and seems more to do
   with justifying and rationalising unfreedom than anything else.

   So what is the "something greater"? Usually to have enough money to buy
   food, shelter and so on. Most workers are a pay packet away from
   poverty. As the "something greater" is to be able to live, that
   suggests that workers do not "consent" freely to become a wage slave.
   They have little choice.

   Wilson goes on:

     "This is why anarcho-capitalists do not wish to abolish consensual
     hierarchy or a mutual acceptance of rules (which is what the
     anarcho-socialists call 'authoritarian' in this case). If people
     consent to such relationships, it's for the purpose of acquiring a
     higher degree of freedom that will exceed the degree of sacrifice
     that the transaction involves. They value the projected outcomes of
     the exchanges they make more than they value the result of not
     making the exchange at all."

   And what is the result of not making the exchange? Poverty, starvation.
   Wow, some "choice". But anarchists do not wish to abolish consensual
   hierarchy. We wish to give people a real choice. This real choice is
   impossible under capitalism and so the vast majority sell their
   liberty. That Wilson ignores the circumstances that force people to
   wage labour says a lot.

   Now, anarchists have no problem with the "mutual acceptance of rules".
   This does not need to be "authoritarian" (no matter what Wilson claims
   we think). For example, in a co-operative the members create their own
   rules by mutual agreement and debate. That is not authoritarian. What
   is authoritarian is when one person says "I make the rules round here
   and you can love it or leave it". That is what the state does and it is
   what the capitalist does. It is authoritarian because the rules are
   imposed on the rest -- who then have the choice of following these
   rules or leaving. Thus the capitalist workplace is a dictatorship and
   so authoritarian.

   Moving on, Wilson disagrees with anarchist claims that capitalism is
   based upon exploitation and oppression. He states that "[w]hat this FAQ
   does not mention (in this particular section) is that exploitation
   doctrine is based upon an economic theory of value, which is, shall we
   say, less than universally accepted by political theorists and
   economists today. This is the labour theory of value (LTV). . . "

   Yes, it is true that most economists and political theorists do not
   accept the Labour Theory of Value. Most do not understand it and
   present strawmen arguments against it. But small but significant
   groupings of economists and political theorists do accept it (for
   example, individualist anarchists, Marxists, many social anarchists,
   many post-keynesianists). But the question arises, why is the LTV
   rejected? Simply because it argues that capitalism is based upon
   exploitation and that non-labour income is usury. Unsurprisingly, when
   it comes to supporting economic theories, the wealthy will pick those
   which justify their incomes and riches, not those which argue that they
   are illegitimate. Thus the LTV along with Henry George's ideas would
   not be selected within the "free marketplace of ideas" -- indeed the
   followers of George argue that neo-classical economics was deliberately
   funded by the wealthy to marginalise their ideas.

   So, to state that the LTV is a "less than universally accepted" is like
   arguing that because democratic theory was "less than universally
   accepted" in Nazi Germany there must be something wrong with it. Wilson
   falls into the common fallacy that economic ideas are value free and do
   not reflect class interests.

   He goes on to state "anarcho"-capitalists do not "accept that theory"
   (which comes as no surprise as they do not like to think about what
   goes on at the point of production that much) and even if we do accept
   the LTV that it is "still not obvious that the 'profits = exploitation'
   conclusion follows from it. In his book Hidden Order, David Friedman
   makes an interesting point that 'the laws of physics tell us that the
   sum total of energy can neither be increased, nor reduced. What we call
   'production' is the rearrangement of matter and energy from less useful
   to more useful (to us) forms.' [David Friedman, Hidden Order, p 128]
   Production managers, just like manual labourers, do precisely this.
   They produce by rearranging matter through time and space, but rather
   than rearranging constituent parts to produce a good, they rearrange
   the goods themselves into the hands of customers (which manual
   labourers do not do)."

   Funnily enough, the FAQ does not deny the importance of management and
   administration skills. No anarchist has ever maintained that workplaces
   do not need to be managed. Nor did we argue that "manual labour" was
   the only form of labour that added value. Quite the reverse in fact.
   What we did argue was that in a dictatorship those at the top will
   consider that their contribution added most value to a product and
   reward themselves appropriately. We argued that the higher up the
   management structure you go, the less value the labour adds to output.
   Indeed, the basic function of management is to organise labour in such
   a way as to maximise profits. That is why the hierarchical workplace
   exists. In the words of one economist:

     "Managers of a capitalist enterprise are not content simply to
     respond to the dictates of the market by equating the wage to the
     value of the marginal product of labour. Once the worker has entered
     the production process, the forces of the market have, for a time at
     least, been superseded. The effort-pay relation will depend not only
     on market relations of exchange but also. . . on the hierarchical
     relations of production - on the relative power of managers and
     workers within the enterprise." [William Lazonick, Business
     Organisation and the Myth of the Market Economy, pp. 184-5]

   Thus profits are maximised by maximising the labour workers do while
   minimising the amount paid to them. That is what the management
   structure exists for. That Wilson denies this suggests that he views
   the firm as some kind of "black-box" within which human social
   relationships and action are irrelevant. But this is not the case --
   what does on in production is the key to profitability. As the early
   socialist Thomas Hodgskin put it:

     "Fixed capital does not derive its utility from previous, but
     present labour; and does not bring its owner a profit because it has
     been stored up, but because it is a means of obtaining a command
     over labour."

   And nothing has changed. As Proudhon long ago argued, only labour is
   productive. Without labour capital would rust away. Thus the LTV is far
   more applicable that Wilson would like us to believe.

   Now, Wilson claims that "manual labourers" do not "rearrange the goods
   themselves into the hands of customers" but in a co-operative the
   workforce does just that. They elect managers and take part in the
   management structure. Wilson fails to notice that workers do not do
   that in capitalist firms because the management structure is top-down
   and is designed to disempower workers. So if workers do not do these
   tasks it is because management has the monopoly of (official) power and
   decides that it adds most value and deserves a higher reward. So, in
   other words, capitalist property rights create dictatorship and those
   in the dictatorship enrich themselves. Not a surprising outcome.

   Wilson then argues that "anarcho"-capitalists "reject the labour theory
   of value in favour of marginal utility theory, which holds that prices
   are determined by the subjective preferences and plans of individuals."

   Of course, the LTV also argues that prices are determined by the
   subjective preferences of individuals. In order to have exchange value,
   a commodity must have a use value to a customer. And, of course,
   exchange value does not equal price but is instead an abstraction of
   the fact that when a commodity is produced a specific set of costs have
   been spent on it. These costs are objective facts and determine whether
   a commodity makes a profit or not. In the long term, commodities would
   exchange at a price equivalent to the abstract exchange value but in
   the short term they vary according to supply and demand. As we argue in
   [9]section C, the marginal utility theory ignores the fact that a
   commodity has an objective cost associated with it which is its
   exchange value. When it boils down to it, the profit which a product
   generates is what capitalists "subjectively value" and these profits
   are dependent on the productivity of labour (i.e. the more workers make
   in a given period for the same wage, the higher potential profits will
   be).

   Wilson goes on to state that "[i]t's obvious that the author has little
   respect for the reasoned arguments published by free-market economists
   and political theorists in the last century. It's pretty insulting when
   somebody responds to a reasoned argument by scoffing at it and
   referring to it as 'apologetics' or 'rationalisation', rather than
   giving it serious consideration." But, strangely enough, we discussed
   why we think the LTV is a better way of analysing capitalism that than
   those provided by "free-market economists and political theorists" and
   in our humble opinion, it is apologetics and rationalisations. Sorry if
   Mr Wilson does not agree, but then again he would not. For example,
   most of "anarcho"-capitalism seems to involve apologetics and
   rationalisations for the restrictions of individual liberty associated
   with capitalism. See, for example, section [10]F.2.1 in which Murray
   Rothbard rationalises away capitalist oppression even when it clearly
   has similarities with statist oppression. Similarly, many Stalinists
   and supporters of Nazism provided many "reasoned arguments" to indicate
   why the fact of dictatorship was essential. Just because currently
   capitalist ideology is widely accepted does not make it any less
   apologetics than these "reasoned arguments." Again, Wilson assumes that
   economic theory is value free rather than being the [11]"economics of
   the rich" to use Edward Herman's cutting phrase.

   Wilson then states that "[t]his paragraph is both a form of argument
   from intimidation and argument ad hominem, and hence we shall let it
   pass without further comment." Well, having discussed in [12]section C
   why we think that capitalism is exploitative we did not think we really
   had to repeat ourselves. And as far as arguments from intimidation and
   arguments ad hominem go, Wilson indulges himself in this later with his
   "parasite", "dictator" and other comments.

   He then quotes the FAQ:

     "Anarcho"-capitalists, however, believe that capitalist companies
     will necessarily remain hierarchical even if the public state has
     been dissolved. This is because only hierarchical workplaces are
     "efficient" enough to survive in a 'free' market. This belief
     reveals the priority of their values: "efficiency" (the bottom line)
     is considered more important than eliminating the domination,
     coercion, and exploitation of workers. In addition, such hierarchies
     will need "defending" from those oppressed by them; and hence, due
     to its support of private property (and thus authority),
     "anarcho"-capitalism ends up retaining a state in its "anarchy,"
     namely a private state whose existence its proponents attempt to
     deny simply by refusing to call it a state, like an ostrich hiding
     its head in the sand (see section F.6 for more on this and why
     "anarcho"-capitalism is better described as "private state"
     capitalism).

   And argues that "[t]his is rhetoric, not argument. Apparently, the
   authors would rather rave on about their own beliefs, rather than give
   a fair representation of anarcho-capitalism. Notice that no assertion
   in the above quote is defended--not the assertion that capitalist
   production involves 'domination, coercion, or exploitation', nor the
   assertion that ownership of private property is 'authoritarian'. Nor do
   we receive a definition for any of these slippery concepts. Nor do they
   bother to give a fair explanation as to why anarcho-capitalists
   disagree with them on these issues."

   Now, lets see about these claims. Now, the reason why anarchists think
   that capitalist production involves "domination, coercion, and
   exploitation" of workers was discussed at great length in sections
   [13]B and [14]C of the FAQ. Indeed, it is mentioned in passing in
   [15]section A on why anarchists are socialists and why anarchists
   support direct democracy. Apparently we should have repeated all our
   arguments again in order to meet Wilson's inability to look at the rest
   of the FAQ. Of course, perhaps, we should have placed links to the
   appropriate sections but given that we doubted that anyone would jump
   straight into section F.1 we did not. Now as far as a "fair
   explanation" as to why "anarcho"-capitalists disagree with real
   anarchists on these issues we indicate why capitalistic property is
   wrong (and we argued in section [16]B.3 and [17]B.1 why private
   property is "authoritarian" -- something, we should note, that
   "anarcho"-capitalists do not actually disagree with. They just argue
   that "consent" ensures that the authoritarian relationships it creates
   are not a restriction of liberty). Now, the aim of [18]section F of the
   FAQ was to explain why "anarcho"-capitalism was not a form of
   anarchism. And this is what we did. Hence Wilson's comments are
   misplaces, to say the least.

   Wilson then does on to argue that capitalist production "does involve
   hierarchy, considering that the owners of the means of production must
   direct the disposal of their resources so that they don't go to waste."
   So, as noted, he agrees that capitalist private property is
   authoritarian (how could hierarchy be anything else?). Thus his laments
   that we just "assert" this fact is somewhat strange. He then tries to
   get out of this by noting that:

   "the same situation will accrue under worker ownership. All production
   strategies and guidelines would be established by a system of majority
   vote, and so it's doubtful that any single individual will have a much
   greater influence in determining them than one would under a under an
   hierarchical capitalist corporation."

   Really? But a key aspect of anarchist ideas of self-management is that
   capitalist corporations must be broken up and replaced by a
   confederation of self-managed workplaces. The workers in a given
   workplace would have extensive control over what affects them directly
   and the possibility of influencing the decisions of the wider issues
   that affect their industry. So it is nonsense to say that individuals
   will not have a greater influence than in a hierarchical capitalist
   firm. Unlike in a capitalist firm they are not just order takers (and
   lets not forget that this is what the worker is under capitalism). They
   can and do have control over many important aspects of their work. This
   can be seen when limited workers control is introduced into capitalist
   firms, so Wilson's claims are just an attempt to justify factory
   fascism.

   Talking of which, he celebrates this when he argues that:

     "The only difference that might possibly accrue as a result of
     worker ownership would be a higher degree of gridlock involved in
     determining company policy. With respect to a political institution,
     gridlock is good; it prevents any single individual from having too
     much power and from subsequently passing a great deal of tyrannical
     statute law. With respect to a business, gridlock is bad, because it
     prevents business from adapting to constantly changing market
     conditions."

   Which is, of course, a fascist argument transferred from the political
   to the economic regime (which, of course, is something fascists also
   do). And, as Bob Black argued in [19]The Libertarian as Conservative,
   it is also an argument put forward by Marx, Engels and Lenin. What
   strange bed-fellows right-libertarians have! Now, Wilson is attacking
   economic democracy because it creates "grid lock" (although, as all
   co-operatives indicate, it does nothing of the kind) which, he claims,
   is good in politics because "it prevents any single individual from
   having too much power". What "logic". Economic dictatorship does place
   "too much power" in the hands of the boss, that is why anarchists have
   always recognised that (to use Proudhon's words) that "property is
   despotism".

   How strange. Identical social relationships switch from being bad to
   good purely on whether it is a capitalist that has power or a state
   official. Such is the power of "consent"!

   Wilson then moves onto bigger and better claims:

     "Some 'anarchists' claim that there will not be any competition
     between worker-owned firms under their version of 'anarchy', because
     all individual firms will be subordinated to the direction of a
     larger system of worker management. Of course, what this 'larger
     system of worker management' amounts to is an institution that falls
     neatly under the Weberian definition of a state. That isn't to say,
     of course, that the 'anarchists' who advocate this social
     arrangement aren't opposed to statism. On the contrary, they're
     vehemently opposed to the state provided that they and their
     comrades aren't in charge of it."

   Yes, anarchists who favour workplace self-management really want to be
   "in charge" of a new state! What wonderful logic! Using this logic it
   would be simple to prove that Hitler was an anarchist (he argued for
   dictatorship but obviously he favoured anarchy just as the anarchists
   who argue for self-management desire dictatorship). Moreover, Wilson
   totally misrepresents anarchist ideas of workplace confederation. The
   "larger system of worker management" is based upon freely joining a
   confederation and the individual workplaces within it have as much
   autonomy as they agree they need. To claim that this is statist is just
   plain silly -- it is clearly an agreement between groups to work
   together.

   Now, let us look at the capitalist workplace or corporation. Within
   these the boss bans all competition within his/her property he/she does
   not desire. So if the anarchist system of confederation meets the
   Weberian definition of a state so does the capitalist firm! Indeed, as
   we argue in section [20]F.6.4, the property owner can "ban" workers
   from, say, joining a union or subscribing to specific "defence" firms.
   In other words, the "anarcho"-capitalist are vehemently opposed to the
   state provided that the capitalists are not in charge of it.

   So Wilson highlights the central fallacy of "anarcho"-capitalism,
   namely that private property some how does not meet the Weberian
   definition of the state. But, in fact, it clearly does. Something, a
   may note that Murray Rothbard (in his own way) recognised but did not
   consider important enough to draw the obvious conclusions from. Which
   presents us with the question: Is voluntary democracy more libertarian
   than voluntary dictatorship? Anarchists think that self-management has
   far more to do with liberty that hierarchy and so oppose capitalism.
   "Anarcho"-capitalists seem to think that dictatorship has no effect on
   liberty. Which is somewhat strange, to say the least.

   Wilson then goes on to state that "worker ownership and even communal
   ownership of the means of production would be perfectly legitimate
   under anarcho-capitalism, provided that nobody violates anybody else's
   consent."

   Which is ironic, as capitalism was created by violating the rights of
   working people to worker ownership/control and communal ownership (see
   section [21]F.8). How that the capitalists have the upper hand, they
   can embrace "free competition" knowing that their advantage on the
   market will ensure that workers control will not spread (see sections
   [22]J.5.10, [23]J.5.11 and [24]J.5.12). Kind of like the thief who
   argues that you can take back what was stolen from you as long as you
   do not violate his consent (which he is not going to give)!

   So Wilson is simply acknowledging that under capitalism you have to buy
   the freedom which should be your birth right from those who have stolen
   it! How generous.

   Wilson then goes to agree with the FAQ by stating that management "does
   set the terms of the use and disposal of company property (whoever the
   owners happen to be)" and so workers are subject to authoritarian
   social relationships and so are not free. But, he argues, "according to
   what standard would the workers have a right to forcibly seize the
   means of production out of dissatisfaction with the situation?" There
   are many answers to this (answers which Mr Wilson does not present
   which means, to paraphrase his good self, "nor does he bother to give a
   fair explanation as to why anarchists disagree with them on this
   issue").

   If we take a Stirnerite point of view, we could argue that workers need
   no "right" to take them over. They desire them and desire freedom. That
   is good enough in itself. As the capitalists have no "right" to
   restrict the liberty of workers, workers have no "right" to stop that
   restriction. They do it anyway. Or we could take a Proudhonist
   viewpoint which argues that the land cannot be appropriated and so
   capitalists have no right to their capital as the initial
   appropriations were illegitimate and they have enriched themselves by
   the labour of others who have been placed in evil circumstances by
   capitalist property rights. Or we could argue along Bakuninist lines
   that freedom is what we value most and so society should be
   re-organised so that unnecessary domination is eliminated, particularly
   the domination that flows from unpaid labour.

   Of course Wilson assumes that capitalist "rights" to their property are
   beyond question. Let us turn the question on its head. By what right do
   capitalists have of oppressing workers and barring people from their
   property? If we take Rothbard's "Homesteading" conceptual theory (see
   section [25]F.4.1) then it boils down to "finders keepers" and so
   humanity will always be enchained by the first people to appropriate
   land. So living people will see their liberty restricted because of
   past history.

   Wilson does present one "right", namely:

     "Because they use it while working on it? By this criterion, it's
     acceptable for one to seize anything that one is capable of using,
     without regard to those who already hold it in their possession. I
     would imagine that any anarcho-socialist who prefers an arrangement
     in which there is some form of peaceful social order would hold that
     certain predatory forms of behaviour are not acceptable, but to
     grant use-rights to anybody who is capable of using something is to
     encourage such forms of behaviour. If there are to be rights of
     usage at all, people must forgo the power involved in appropriating
     resources that are already in use by other people. If people do not
     forgo that particular freedom, then nobody will be able to secure
     access to the resources that they use, or to be able to exercise
     their freedom in relation to it. The physical objects and resources
     that one utilises for one's purposes would always be up for claim by
     the next person who comes along (and may the strongest man win!)."

   Well, where to start. Anarchists argue that use-rights will ensure that
   workers self-management is secured. This is because whoever is
   currently using a resource (as a factory) has the right to take part in
   the management of that resource. Now, it kind of goes without saying
   that use rights are based upon respecting other people's use of
   resources. Thus it is not a case of Hobbesian "anarchy" in which people
   do not respect others. Thus people will "forgo the power" of taking
   what other people are using (except in emergencies, of course). Thus
   the "strongest" would not be able to kick tenants out of the house they
   are living in. So, use-rights simply means that when using something
   people manage its use. Workers in a workplace manage its use and anyone
   who newly joins the co-operative gets to take part in decision making.
   Use rights are the way of restricting domination by promoting
   self-management.

   Wilson argues that granting "use-rights" will encourage Hobbesian
   behaviour, which suggests that he thinks that people cannot live
   together peacefully without police forces and laws (well, then again,
   he is an "anarcho"-capitalist). It seems strange to think that an
   anarchist society would develop in which people would have so little
   respect for others. Given that the whole point of the expropriation of
   the capitalists was to maximise individual freedom and dignity, it is
   doubtful that people would start to violate those values. But Wilson is
   assuming that without police forces humanity would turn into a
   Hobbesian war of all against all but this has never been the case of
   communities based upon use rights (see Kropotkin's Mutual Aid for
   extensive evidence).

   Wilson, after misrepresenting anarchist ideas, now moves on to
   justifying capitalist domination:

     "Abiding by the rules and codes enforced on the job may be
     irritating at times, but an exchange is a relationship that one
     enters into voluntarily."

   But the same could be said of the state. No one forces you to remain in
   any given state. There are plenty more to choose from. If you do not
   want to move then you have voluntarily consented to the social
   contract. So, abiding by the rules and codes enforced in the state may
   be irritating at times, but an exchange is a relationship that one
   enters into voluntarily. After all, as Rothbard himself argued, if the
   state had acquired its property "justly" then the "anarcho"-capitalist
   would have no problems with its laws, rules and codes (see section
   [26]F.2.3).

   By stressing "consent" and ignoring the relationships generated by the
   contract, "anarcho"-capitalism ends up justifying state-like
   structures. If the current system of states was replaced by, say, 500
   large companies, would that make the rules and codes any different from
   state laws? Of course not.

   Wilson argues that "if one does not think that the value offered by the
   other party is sufficient to cover the cost of the transaction, then
   one should not make the exchange in the first place."

   How true. The woman who agrees to sleep with her boss to keep her job,
   the drowning man who agrees to pay a passing boatman $5 million to be
   saved, the landless peasant who agrees to work in a sweatshop for 14
   hours a day all "freely" make an exchange. After all, if they do not
   what they face is even worse than the options of the "exchange". Who
   can deny that they all think that the "value" offered by the other
   party makes it worthwhile to enter into the exchange? And who but an
   "anarcho"-capitalist will deny that these exchanges are evil ones which
   violate the liberty and dignity of the party in unfortunate
   circumstances?

   To concentrate on "exchange" is simply to blind oneself to relations of
   domination and oppression.

   Wilson then goes on to wax-lyrical on the "mentality" of the strawman
   he has created above:

     "The opinion that one has the right to appropriate from others at
     whim without their consent whenever one is dissatisfied with one's
     situation is the doctrine of a thief or a dictator. He who accepts
     this doctrine possesses the mentality of a parasite and a
     free-rider, not the mentality of a person who is willing to respect
     the sovereignty of other people (i.e., a person fit to live in a
     civilised society)."

   Now, do anarchists say that we support appropriation from others "at
   whim"? No, anarchists argue that we support appropriations that stop
   unnecessary domination and oppression. Thus we argue for the
   appropriation of the capitalist class because, firstly, their goods are
   stolen property and, secondly, they create relations of domination and
   dictatorship between people. It was only a matter of time before Wilson
   started going on about "free-riders" and "parasites" and we are
   surprised it has taken this long for him to do so. It is somewhat
   ironic, to say the least, that supporters of capitalism argue that
   anarchists are "parasites". Far from it. Anarchists desire to end the
   system where capitalists are parasites upon the working class.
   Similarly, we desire to end capitalist property because it does not
   respect the sovereignty of other people (workers do not have the right
   of self-management within capitalist workplaces and circumstances force
   them to sell their liberty to others in order to survive).

   Actually, it is Wilson who expresses the mentality of a dictator when
   he attacks use-rights. You can just imagine a feudal lord or aristocrat
   arguing that just because someone lives on their land, it does not give
   them any right to determine the laws they are subject to. That rests
   with the owner, namely the lord or state. Indeed, we have shades of
   Locke in Wilson's argument. Locke argued that only the wealthy should
   pass laws within civil society. The poor, while being subject to them,
   do not have a say in them. They are included within, but not part of,
   civil society. Wilson's diatribe against use rights exposes the elitist
   roots of "anarcho"-capitalism and that this regime will universal
   monarchy and dictatorship in the name of "liberty" (after all, it will
   be the property owner who determines the laws and rules which those who
   just happen to work or life there are subject to).

   Now, as far as people able to "live in a civilised society" goes it is
   pretty clear that a rights system that can result in famine, hierarchy
   and extreme poverty is hardly "civilised". Indeed, until the rise of
   capitalism the idea that people had a right to life was a common one.
   All that changed and now we face the option "work or starve". How very
   civilised. And, of course, how "civilised" is a system which ensures
   that the majority has to sell their liberty to others? If civilisation
   is the progress of individual liberty, then capitalism is not a form of
   civilisation.

   Wilson then quotes the FAQ:

     And, of course, inequalities of power and wealth do not restrict
     themselves to workplaces nor is the damage of hierarchy upon
     individuals and their liberty limited to working hours. Both have a
     deep impact on the rest of society, expanding into all areas of life
     and restricting liberty everywhere.

   and asks:

     "Evidence? If people enter into relationships that they perceive as
     leading to improvements over their initial situation, it's difficult
     to see how liberty can be restricted as a result. One can make
     errors of judgement when making these decisions, but one of the
     conditions of living in a free society is that one possess the
     freedom to make mistakes (even disastrous ones!) and to learn from
     them."

   Evidence? Section [27]B.1 has evidence on the wider effects of
   capitalism. That inequalities of wealth and power have a deep impact on
   the rest of society is a truism (see section [28]F.3 for some
   discussion). Now Wilson claims that "people enter into relationships
   that they perceive as leading to improvements over their initial
   situation, it's difficult to see how liberty can be restricted as a
   result" which is wonderful!

   Let as see, workers enter into relationships they perceive as leading
   to improvements over their initial situation (their initial situation
   is that they will starve to death unless they get money; unsurprisingly
   they enter into the wage slave relationship). As a result of this
   relationship, profits accumulate in the hands of the few. This
   increases inequality within society and, after all, money is power.
   Thus "bilateral exchanges" can result in restrictions of liberty for
   those involved and externalities in terms of inequality which affect
   other people (see sections [29]F.2 and [30]F.3). Increasing inequality
   means that the few have increased clout and so can hang out longer then
   the less well off. This means that the less well off compromise faster
   and deeper than they would otherwise do. These compromises increase
   inequalities and so the process continues, with the few increasing
   their power within society and the amount of land/resources they own.

   Yes, indeed, people can make errors of judgement and the freedom to
   make mistakes is essential, but neither of these facts means that we
   should support capitalism. If making decisions is the thing we value
   then supporting a system which actively restricts decision making (for
   example, in work) is somewhat strange. Similarly, to support a system
   which promotes inequalities which end up restricting out options to
   (effectively) choosing which boss will govern us hardly promotes
   choice. So, in a free society, we must take responsibility for our
   decisions but capitalism so restricts these decisions as to make a
   mockery of freedom. That is why anarchists oppose it.

   Wilson then says that it is "interesting to note that the first person
   the FAQ quotes in its section on anarcho-capitalism is an
   anarcho-socialist who understands the position being critiqued about as
   well as the authors of the FAQ." Actually, Chomsky gets to the root of
   the problem with "anarcho"-capitalism, it is just "anarchism for the
   rich" and would soon result in extensive restrictions of liberty for
   the majority. It is clear that Wilson does not understand this basic
   point and so ignores it.

   He then states:

     "So much for providing textual evidence in support of the position
     being critiqued. But then again, fair representation of the
     opposition is obviously not one of the intentions behind the FAQ."

   But, as Wilson himself as indicated, we have not needed to provide
   textual support of the position being critiqued. He himself as
   acknowledged that "anarcho"-capitalism has no problem with capitalist
   hierarchy and has indeed went out of his way to justify factory
   fascism. Perhaps he will ask us to provide textual evidence that
   "anarcho"-capitalism supports capitalism? And the intention of the FAQ?
   To argue why "anarcho"-capitalism is not anarchist, something Wilson
   has done so in his critique.

   Wilson quotes the FAQ:

     It is clear, then, that "anarcho"-capitalists are not really
     anti-authoritarians, because they would allow authoritarianism to
     persist where it has the most direct impact on ordinary people: in
     the workplace.

   and comments:

     "It's not clear from the FAQ at all, considering that it doesn't
     once site a work written by an anarcho-capitalist in this section,
     nor does it give a considerate explication of anarcho-capitalist
     viewpoints."

   Well, why cite a work on "anarcho"-capitalism which states that they
   support capitalism? Perhaps we should also cite a work by Marxists
   which states they support Marxism? As Wilson himself makes clear, our
   argument that "anarcho"-capitalists are not anarchists because they
   support capitalist hierarchy is correct. He agrees that
   "anarcho"-capitalists are capitalists! Now, as far as a "considerate
   explication" of "anarcho"-capitalist viewpoints go we have argued that
   they are not anarchists because they support capitalist hierarchy. As
   Wilson agrees, they do support them. We discussed why we fought that
   capitalist claims that workers "consent" to wage labour were phoney in
   section [31]B.4 and so did not go into details here. Thus we did
   present the case that capitalist hierarchy was fine because workers
   "consent" to it (and that, after all, is Wilson's "defence" of
   capitalist hierarchy).

   In other words, Wilson "critique" is bogus as he fails to place the
   section he is critiquing in context.

   Wilson then states that:

     "It's much more clear that it would be authoritarian to prevent
     'capitalist acts among consenting adults' (Nozick's term), because
     people enter in these relations to improve their lot."

   But, as noted above, anarchists have no desire to prevent wage labour
   in an anarchist society. Thus Wilson totally misrepresents anarchist
   ideas. Moreover it is capitalism that actively restricts the number of
   relationships that people can enter into to improve their lot, not
   anarchism. Similarly, Nozick's argument fails to acknowledge that these
   "acts" generate authoritarian social relationships and creates
   circumstances in which the majority have little choice but to "consent"
   to capitalist acts (i.e. wage labour).

   Moreover, within the capitalist workplace the capitalist can and does
   prevent socialist acts among consenting adults (for example, the
   forming of a union, self-managed work, and so forth). So it is much
   more clear that capitalism is authoritarian simply because it creates
   relations of domination between the property owning class and the
   working class. Wilson fails to understand this because he makes an idol
   of "consent", an idol which can and has been used to define the state
   (after all, no one forces you to live in a given state).

   Thus Wilson's defence of "freedom" indicates a definition of freedom
   which is little more than the justification of relationships of
   domination and authority (see section [32]F.2 for more on this).

   He quotes the FAQ again:

     But anarchism is, by definition, anti-authoritarian (see sections
     A.1 and A.2.8). Thus "anarcho"-capitalists have illegitimately
     appropriated the prefix "anarcho" to describe themselves. In reality
     they are bogus anarchists.

   and states, "[i]n reality, the authors of the anarcho-socialist FAQ are
   offering no more than a bogus critique." Which is funny, as Wilson has
   agreed with our analysis. Yes, he acknowledges, capitalist workplaces
   are hierarchical. Yes, "anarcho"-capitalists have no problem with them
   because they are "voluntary". Of course, he fails to note the objective
   conditions facing those who "consent" and makes no attempt to discover
   whether "anarcho"-capitalism would reinforce these pressures or not
   (just as he fails to note we addressed this issue of "consent" in
   section [33]B.4 of the FAQ).

   So is this a "bogus critique"? No, far from it. While we have totally
   revised this section of the FAQ in order to make the differences
   between anarchism and "anarcho"-capitalism clearer, it cannot be said
   that it is "bogus". After all, Wilson has agreed with our analysis. He
   just thinks that "consent" makes unfreedom okay. But for anarchists the
   circumstances which we face are essential for determining whether
   something is truly consented to. As Wilson takes capitalism and
   capitalist property rights as given and unchangeable, his objections
   are question begging in the extreme.

   Thus, far from being a "bogus critique" Wilson indicates well why
   "anarcho"-capitalists are not anarchists. Indeed, their theory is
   little more than an attempt to justify capitalist domination and cloak
   it with the title "liberty". As Wilson himself shows.

A Critique of Section F.1.2 (How libertarian is right-Libertarian theory?)

   Wilson starts off by insults:

     "Unfortunately, the authors aren't in any position to assess whether
     or not libertarianism is based upon critical thought, considering
     that they themselves haven't exercised the critical thought
     necessary to understand the position they're attempting to
     critique."

   Strong words. The truth of this statement will be discussed below. He
   notes that "As for 'theory based upon assumptions', we will see during
   the course of this FAQ that once we look at these assumptions, they'll
   appear to be much more sound than the anarcho-socialists [sic!] have
   let on."

   Which, of course, is acknowledging that right-libertarianism is built
   upon assumptions! It is just that these assumptions are considered
   "sound" by "anarcho"-capitalists.

   He then states that:

     "As far as 'change and the ability to evolve' go, 'right' [sic!]
     libertarians do not have any problems with it in itself. There are
     many forms of changes that most anarcho-capitalists avidly support
     (such as technological development), but they do not advocate change
     for its own sake, nor do they advocate just any form of change.
     Change is not desirable if it somehow compromises the individual
     integrity and autonomy of individuals; that cannot be stressed
     enough."

   How true. "Anarcho"-capitalists do stress technological change. After
   all, that is one of needs of capitalism. But the point is that
   right-libertarians do not stress change within society's rights
   framework. They assume that capitalist property rights are
   unchangeable, regardless of how they compromise "individual integrity
   and autonomy of individuals." That Wilson starts off by using an
   example of technology (which has often been used to control workers and
   compromise their autonomy, by the way) is an example of this. As we
   will see, the assumption that capitalist property rights are
   unchangeable is one that is commonplace within right libertarianism
   (and we wonder why Wilson puts right in quotes. Does he not know that
   "libertarian" was first used by anarchists in the 1880s and that
   right-libertarianism has stolen the name?).

   He quotes the FAQ as follows:

     Right-Libertarianism is characterised by a strong tendency of
     creating theories based upon a priori theorems. Robert Nozick in
     Anarchy, State and Utopia makes no attempt to provide a
     justification of the property rights his whole theory is based upon.
     Indeed he states that "we shall not formulate [it] here." [Anarchy,
     State and Utopia, p. 150] Moreover, it is not formulated anywhere
     else by Nozick either. And if it is not formulated, what is there to
     defend? His whole theory is based upon assumptions.

   And argues that "[i]t's true that Nozick builds his argument upon
   certain starting 'assumptions' that go undefended within the course of
   the book. What the authors do not say is that Nozick's main
   'assumption' is that '[i]ndividuals have rights, and [that] there are
   certain things no person or group may do to them (without violating
   their rights).' [Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. ix] This 'assumption'
   isn't one that turns out to be all that implausible."

   Quite. And the question now becomes, what rights do we assume that they
   have? Do people have a right to be free? Not according to Nozick, as
   his self-ownership thesis ensures that people will be subject to
   authoritarian social relationships if they "consent" to them.
   Similarly, many people think that individuals should have a right to
   life but that is not one that Nozick accepts. From his perspective, if
   you are starving to death then it would be a worse evil to tax a
   millionaire $1 than to tax the millionarie and use that $1 to feed you
   (see [34]section F.4 for example, or the new [35]section F.1.2).

   Now, the assumption is "plausible" but that was not the assumption we
   focused upon. Nozick assumes his property rights system, the whole
   basis of his theory. Thus his theory of transfer is based upon his
   theory of appropriation of property, a theory which he clearly states
   he will not provide us with! Somewhat strange that the crux of his
   whole theory is just not provided. After all, if his argument for
   appropriating land is proven false then his whole entitlement theory
   also falls (indeed, as we argue in section [36]B.3.4, such a defence
   can be put together from Nozick's work and it does not provide such
   support). So to just assume its truth is amazing. That Wilson fails to
   even acknowledge the importance of this omission is not surprising,
   after all it would mean that our argument was correct -- Nozick assumed
   the key aspect of his theory and that his whole book is built upon an
   unproven assumption. Little wonder he does off on a tangent and does
   not address the point we make.

   Wilson then continues with Nozick's "rights" assumption by stating that
   "[t]hough this is a moral intuition that Nozick doesn't defend in ASU,
   it is a sufficiently broad-based intuition to be held securely by a
   rational person. Is the intuition that people have rights one that the
   authors of the FAQ would deny? If they don't accept the premise that
   there ought to be certain obligatory side-constraints upon human
   behaviour for the purpose of preserving the autonomy of people (i.e.,
   rights), that would seem to suggest that they have a rather weak
   commitment to the ideal of human freedom."

   Quite what to make of this is difficult to tell. After all, what (say)
   Marx, Hitler, J.S. Mill, Bakunin, Stirner and so on would consider as
   "intuitive" rights and what Nozick would consider as such is open to
   much debate. A rational person would, perhaps, consider the
   consequences of these rights and determine whether they actually did
   ensure a strong commitment of the ideal of human freedom. If, for
   example, Nozick's rights resulted in a society of large scale
   (voluntary) slavery due to minority control of resources then that
   society would hardly be based on a commitment to human freedom.

   Thus a rational person rather than following a train of logic which
   resulted in massive violations of human liberty would decide to change
   the rights framework they supported. Such a process could be seen at
   work in J.S. Mill who realised that under capitalism workers could be
   in a situation little than slavery. Thus an abstract commitment to
   liberty may result in circumstances that violated the liberty of the
   many. Thus to claim that anarchists have a "rather weak commitment to
   the ideal of human freedom" is nonsense. It is rather the right
   libertarian whose definition of freedom is such so weak as to make a
   mockery of freedom in practice.

   And notice that Wilson has still not addressed the issue of the
   assumption of capitalist property rights and instead decided to imply
   that anarchists are into violating the rights of others (these rights,
   of course, being undefined).

   Wilson then goes on:

     "Perhaps they reject Nozick's starting moral premise because it
     hasn't been rationally validated. The truth is: Neither has any
     basic moral premise. Hume's dictum that it is impossible to derive a
     normative statement from a set of descriptive statements (assuming
     that they're free of normative content) still holds, and I challenge
     the anarcho-socialists to demonstrate that their most basic
     normative premises can validated in a way that doesn't rely upon
     intuition."

   Or perhaps not. Perhaps we reject Nozick's starting premise because it
   cannot deliver what it promises, namely a free society of free
   individuals.

   Wilson continues:

     "It should also be mentioned that although Nozick assumes premises
     as basic as the one that people have rights, he does not simply
     assume the form they must take or their form of application. On the
     contrary, he argues for his libertarian conception of rights via a
     critical analysis of other political conceptions of justice as well
     as his own, and he does so rigorously and brilliantly."

   Actually, quote a lot of ink (and electrons) has been used to indicate
   that Nozick's "rigorous" and "brilliant" "critical analysis" is nothing
   of the kind. For example, his (in)famous "Wilt Chamberlain" argument
   that "liberty upsets patterns" is based on the very capitalist property
   rights he is defending. Thus his example is question begging in the
   extreme. Indeed, many authors have recognised that his analysis is
   little more than a justification of capitalist domination and that it
   fails to acknowledge that the consequences of his theory could result
   in a society in which the major have little or no option but to follow
   the orders of the few (for a decisive critique of Nozick which shows
   how weak his theory is see Will Kymlicka's Contemporary Political
   Philosophy).

   Wilson again:

     "Notice that the authors of the FAQ offer no criticisms of Nozick's
     actual arguments, but simply dismiss him as quickly as possible.
     They quote isolated sections of text for their own purposes of
     "refutation", and completely fail to engage the sections of ASU that
     really matter. Many political philosophers have expressed serious
     disagreement with Nozick over the past few decades, but unlike the
     authors of the anarcho-socialist FAQ, they have critically engaged
     Nozick's views because they recognised that if they were to advocate
     a non-libertarian political theory, Nozick's objections would have
     to be answered."

   Funnily enough, we have quoted Nozick and his arguments many times and
   have attempted to answer his "objections" (for example, sections B.3.4,
   J.5.11, J.5.12, F.2 and I.4.12). As for "criticisms" of his "actual
   arguments" you can find them there. What this section of the FAQ was
   discussing was the starting basis of Nozick's arguments, namely in
   assumptions. And as Wilson acknowledges, Nozick does build his system
   on assumptions. Now, given that Nozick's whole argument is based on
   providing a justification for property rights then this section "really
   matters". If he provides no arguments for private property then the
   rest of his system is nonsense (after all, as the initial appropriation
   was unjust, then all the other transfers are unjust as well). So for
   Nozick is state he will not provide it is important. That Wilson does
   not recognise this is strange to say the least.

   After presenting a list of other right-libertarian theorists (although
   see Will Kymlicka's Contemporary Political Philosophy for an
   excellently critique of many of these theories along with Nozick) he
   then states that "we will eventually arrive at section F.7, which does
   an excellent job demolishing a fictitious strawman of the admittedly
   elusive concept of 'natural law'. This FAQ will demonstrate why the
   anarcho-socialist FAQ doesn't actually refute a moral theory that many
   libertarians buy into" although section F.7 does not refute a strawman
   unless it is a strawman created by supporters of "Natural Law"
   themselves.

   Wilson then disagrees with Murray Bookchin's arguments against "the law
   of identity" arguing that identity "doesn't merely account for an
   entity's current state of being. The concept of 'identity' easily
   accounts for existential change by subsuming the attribute of
   potentiality. This criticism attacks Aristotle's first law of logic
   while ignoring his conception of the material cause."

   This is strange. If we assume "potentiality" then we are arguing that
   "A can potentially be A", not that "A is A". Water can "potentially" be
   both steam and ice, does that mean "water is steam" or "water is ice"?
   If you argue that "A is A" and then modify it to acknowledge that "A
   can perhaps be A sometime in the future" is somewhat strange. Either
   the law of identity states that "A is A" or it does not. Adding on
   "potentiality" just indicates how limited the law of identity actually
   is.

   He then quotes the FAQ:

     In other words, right-Libertarian theory is based upon ignoring the
     fundamental aspect of life - namely change and evolution.

   And argues that the authors "have in no way demonstrated this. They're
   simply pulling arguments out of a hat with out heed to whether or not
   they actually apply to the position they're trying to critique."

   Now, we argued that must of right-libertarian theory was built upon
   assumptions. Indeed, Wilson agrees with us. We argued that by using
   assumptions and deducing things from these assumptions means that you
   fail to take into account change (this can be clearly seen from
   Rothbard's claims on "Natural law" quoted in [37]section F.7). Thus,
   using "natural rights" as Nozick, Rand and Rothbard do is to use the
   law of identity and this, as Bookchin noted, fails to take into account
   change. Thus we are not "pulling arguments out of a hat" but trying to
   draw out the implications of the methodology used. Now, Wilson is free
   to consider that these points do not apply to the positions in
   question, but obviously we do not agree with him. If you start with
   certain assumptions about "Man" and then deduce conclusions from these
   assumptions then you fail to see now these assumptions can change in
   use. For example, the assumption of self-ownership is all fine and well
   but in practice it can become the means of denying liberty, not
   protecting it (see section [38]B.4 and [39]F.2). Also, to assume "Man's
   nature" is unchanging (as Rothbard et al do) is itself to force
   capitalist assumptions onto the history of the human race.

   Wilson then quotes the FAQ again:

     Unfortunately for right-Libertarians (and fortunately for the rest
     of humanity), human beings are not mechanical entities but instead
     are living, breathing, feeling, hoping, dreaming, changing living
     organisms.

   And states:

     "Where precisely have 'right' libertarians denied any of this, and
     how is this supposed to be a rebuttal to 'right' libertarian
     theory?"

   It is true that right-libertarians do pay lip service to human beings
   as living organisms but in much of their ideology they deny it. Thus
   Rothbard, for example, argues that "natural law" is unchanging, which
   is to state that human beings do not change. What inspires people
   changes. What people think is right and wrong changes. Thus a theory
   that uses the law of identity ("natural rights" and so forth) fails to
   take this into account and so there is a mechanical core to the theory.
   A core which can be seen from the mechanical attempts to justify
   capitalist property rights in ways that can create terrible
   consequences (see sections F.4, F.4.2, F.2.3 and F.2.7 for example).
   Indeed, Robert Anton Wilson in Natural Law makes a similar point,
   namely that right libertarianism is infected with "robot ideologists"
   and this undermines liberty with dogma.

   So a theory which mechanically argues, for example, that "slave
   contracts" are an expression of liberty is simply nonsense. That is how
   it is supposed to be a rebuttal to right-libertarian theory -- that it
   places the theory above common-sense and justifies extreme unfreedom in
   the name of liberty.

   Wilson goes on to argue that "[a]s of so far, the authors have only
   given a single short and out-of-context example of Nozick's as evidence
   that 'right' libertarians do not base their theory upon facts, and I
   have already shown how that example is utterly misleading. Right now,
   the authors are doing no more than shooting down imaginary positions
   and citing Bookchin quotes that give bad arguments against the law of
   identity."

   Now, was the Nozick example "out-of-context"? Wilson has not even
   addressed the example and instead concentrated on another assumption of
   Nozick's (namely that people have rights -- an intuitive argument which
   produces some very non-intuitive outcomes, we must note). As far as
   "bad arguments against the law of identity" goes we have indicated that
   this is not the case and that Rothbard and Rand base their arguments on
   said law. So, just to be clear, as "evidence" we presented Nozick, Rand
   and Rothbard as right-libertarian thinkers who base themselves on
   assumptions. Far more evidence than Wilson suggests we present.

   Wilson then quotes the FAQ again:

     From a wider viewpoint, such a rejection of liberty by
     right-libertarians is unsurprising. They do, after all, support
     capitalism. Capitalism produces an inverted set of ethics, one in
     which capital (dead labour) is more important that people (living
     labour).

   And argues that:

     "This makes very little sense. If a business owner both purchased
     capital and hired labours to help him produce, there is no economic
     reason why one would necessarily be more important than the other."

   Actually there is as capital investments are far more valuable than
   individual workers. You can easily fire a worker, it is somewhat harder
   to dismantle a workplace with millions of dollars of capital within it.
   It can also be seen when capitalists hire workers to labour in unsafe
   and dangerous conditions as it gives them a competitive edge that would
   be eroded if they invested in safe working conditions. So, there are
   plenty of economic reasons why capital is more important than labour --
   and history (and current practice) proves this argument again and
   again. That Wilson cannot see this says a lot about his ideology.

   Moving on Wilson argues:

     "The marginal utility of a capital good or a worker would depend
     upon its marginal product, i.e., the level of output that increases
     as a result of an additional input. Perhaps the authors find
     something vulgar about this because certain people are assigning
     'utility' to other people. But this means nothing more than that
     people obtain a measure of subjective value from the presence or
     activities of a person."

   Or to translate from marginalist speak, the capitalist employs a worker
   because he/she has a use value for the capitalist; namely that they
   produce more goods than they get paid for in wages (the exchange value
   of goods produces is higher than the exchange value of the worker). We
   have no problem with individual's subjectively valuing other
   individuals but we do have a problem with exploitation. And this is
   what the "marginal utility" theory was invented to deny. But it is
   clear that the capitalist will only "value" a worker who produces more
   than they get paid -- i.e. performs unpaid labour. If this condition is
   not meet, then they are fired.

   Wilson argues that "[t]his doesn't imply that people are necessarily
   being misused, and libertarians hold that they aren't, provided that
   the value one derives from the presence or activities of another
   doesn't entail that that person's actions are determined in a way that
   doesn't involve his/her consent."

   Which brings us straight back to "consent". So, if the state taxes you
   then this is wrong because you do not "consent" to it. However, as
   noted above, you are free to leave a state at any time and seek out a
   state closer to your desires -- just as the worker is free to seek out
   a new capitalist. Since the worker does not do this, "anarcho"
   capitalists assume that the worker "consents" to the rules and orders
   of her boss. That the same argument can be applied to the state is one
   that is hotly denied by "anarcho"-capitalists (see [40]section F.2.3).

   Now it could be argued that ordering people about is "misusing" them,
   after all you are subjecting them to your will. Similarly, when the
   boss orders the worker into dangerous conditions that too could be
   classed as "misuse". But "consent" is the key and for anarchists
   capitalism is marked by inequalities that make "consent" purely formal
   (just as the "consent" associated with the liberal state is purely
   formal). We discuss this in sections [41]F.2 and [42]F.3 and so will
   not do so here.

   Wilson continues and quotes the FAQ again:

     This can be seen when the Ford produced the Pinto. The Pinto had a
     flaw in it which meant that if it was hit in a certain way in a
     crash the fuel tank exploded. The Ford company decided it was more
     "economically viable" to produce that car and pay damages to those
     who were injured or the relatives of those who died than pay to
     change the invested capital. The needs of capital came before the
     needs of the living.

   He argues:

     "This is an invalid application of the odd statement the authors
     made above, as well as being an odd and nonsensical statement in its
     own right. Capital doesn't have needs. Only the living have needs,
     and the cited case is one in which one group of people perceived it
     as being to their advantage to sell unsafe automobiles to people
     willing to buy them. This means that sellers unethically endangered
     the lives of others for the sake of profit. Under no social
     arrangement will such a phenomenon always be avoided, but the fact
     is that there will necessarily be much less of it under an
     arrangement in which people are legally required to bear the full
     liability for the costs of their actions. This is the type of
     arrangement that anarcho-capitalists advocate."

   Which is an interesting argument. Under "no social arrangement will
   such a phenomenon always be avoided"? But it was the desire to make a
   profit and so survive on the market that prompted Ford's decision. Such
   "phenomenon" would have been avoided in a socialist society simply
   because competitive pressures would have been lacking and people would
   be placed before profits. And Ford was well aware that it would face
   "the costs of their actions" and did those actions anyway. Now as
   "anarcho"-capitalists support a market based law system it is not at
   all clear that a corporation would "bear full liability for the costs
   of their actions." After all, the law system will be marked by
   inequalities in the bargaining position and resources of the agents
   involved. It could be that Ford would be able to use its market power
   to undermine the legal system or skew it in its favour (see [43]section
   F.6.3) but the fact remains that Ford deliberately placed profits
   before human beings. The same occurs everyday in capitalism where
   workers are placed in unsafe working conditions.

   So our point remains. Capitalism does create an environment where
   people are used as resources by others and the needs of profit are
   placed before people. Wilson sees that this is the case but refuses to
   look at why it happens. If he did so then, perhaps, he would realise
   that capitalist ideology places property before/above liberty (as can
   be seen from their definitions of "freedom" -- see section [44]F.2) and
   so the actions of Ford as an expression of a deeper psychosis.

   He ends by arguing that:

     "It's unclear why the authors need to speak incoherently about 'the
     needs of capital' to prove a point. Perhaps it's to single out
     capitalism as the primary cause of the type of disaster that they
     speak of. Contrary to the false impression that the authors give,
     such incidents are more likely to occur under a socialistic economy
     in which the funding of industries are guaranteed, and in which
     workers have nothing to lose from performing the job in a
     irresponsible manner. Recently, there have been numerous train
     crashes in Italy, and many deaths have occurred as a result. Many of
     the engineers were reportedly drunk while operating the trains.
     These trains were a part of a socialised railroad scheme. The
     authors are arbitrarily and unjustly singling out the free market as
     a producer of defective products and services."

   Strange, we were not aware that Italy was a socialistic economy. Nor do
   we consider nationalised industries the same as "socialised" ones. But
   let us ignore these obvious points. Wilson presents the example of the
   drunk engineers as an example of how a "socialistic" economy would
   create more of the Ford Pinto type situations. Now, did the bosses of
   the nationalised railways deliberately decide to employ the drunk
   engineers? Did they do a cost-benefit analysis and decide that
   employing drunk engineers would be more profitable than sacking them?
   Of course not. What was a deliberate act on the part of Ford was not
   done with the nationalised Italian railways. If the managers of the
   railways had acted in the way that Ford did then Wilson would have had
   a point, but they did not. His example seems to be an arbitrary and
   unjust attempt to whitewash the actions prompted by free market
   pressures.

   It seems strange that Wilson does not consider the implications of
   Ford's acts. After all, most normal people would be horrified by these
   acts (like the actions of any capitalist firm that harms people in
   order to make a bit more profit) and seek a reason for them (i.e. in
   the system that created the pressures Ford and other employers face).
   However, rather than look at the pressures that resulted in this act,
   he seems to take them as unavoidable and isolated from the economic
   system he supports. How strange, but unsurprising.

Critique of Section F.1.3 (Is right-Libertarian theory scientific in nature?)

   Wilson starts by quoting the FAQ:

     Usually, no. The scientific approach is inductive, the
     right-Libertarian approach is deductive. The first draws
     generalisations from the data, the second applies preconceived
     generalisations to the data. A completely deductive approach is
     pre-scientific, however, which is why right-Libertarians cannot
     legitimately claim to use a scientific method. Deduction does occur
     in science, but the generalisations are primarily based on other
     data, not a priori assumptions.

   And states that:

     "This is partially true. It's not true that libertarians reject the
     method of drawing generalisations upon the basis of data. What
     libertarians do reject is the position that one can approach
     aggregate and statistical data with any hope of possibly
     understanding it if they have not previously laid down a reliable
     theoretical grounding for it's interpretation. Economic data are
     highly complex, and it's fallacious to believe that one can infer a
     causal relationship between two or more macroeconomic phenomena on
     the basis of observances of correlations. Too many elements play a
     role in constituting the identity of concepts such as 'GNP', 'GDP',
     'the money supply', 'consumption', etc., for one to be able to gain
     an understanding of them without the aid of 'preconceived
     generalisations'. This is why libertarians hold that it's necessary
     to apply a microeconomic theory founded upon generalisations made
     from simple facts to the study of macroeconomic data."

   Actually, the Austrian school of economics (which has inspired much of
   right-libertarianism) argue at great length that you cannot use past
   any data to test theories. Murray Rothbard states approvingly that:

     "Mises indeed held not only that economic theory does not need to be
     'tested' by historical fact but also that it cannot be so tested."
     ["Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics" in The
     Foundation of Modern Austrian Economics, p. 32]

   And this applies to all data. Including simple data. They argue, in
   effect (and misleadingly), that the econometrician is a historian not a
   theorist. Moreover, many economists would argue that using complex data
   should be taken with care. Now, the claim that it is "necessary to
   apply a microeconomic theory founded upon generalisations made from
   simple facts to the study of macroeconomic data" is false, at least
   from the viewpoint of the Austrian school. They explicitly argue that
   economic theory cannot be tested and that economic theory is not built
   upon generalisations from simple facts but rather from logical
   deductions from assumptions (perhaps these are the "simple facts" that
   Wilson is referring to but in that case his "simple facts" is the axiom
   that "humans act" and not, say, simple facts/data gathered from the
   studying specific events as might be imagined).

   Wilson continues by saying "[i]t certainly isn't surprising that the
   authors derived their (mis)information concerning Austrian economic
   theory through a secondary source written by an author more in their
   favour. In light of source of the authors (mis)information, it should
   be remembered that their (mis)representation of Austrian economics is
   no more than an interpretation of an interpretation."

   But as we will see, nothing could be further from the truth. In the new
   section [45]F.1.3 we provide more quotes from Austrian sources which
   state exactly the same thing as we argue here. The Rothbard quote above
   clearly indicates that our comments are correct. Let us not forget that
   Austrian economics is based upon deductions from the basic axiom
   "humans act".

   He states that "we arrive at a commonly made, and yet highly fallacious
   criticism of Austrian economics" namely that (quoting von Mises) that
   Austrian economics is based upon rejecting any data that conflicts with
   their theory. This, Wilson argues "constitutes a serious
   misunderstanding of the importance of Mises' method" and states that
   "[s]ince the authors do not even mention what Mises' theorems actually
   are, it's easy for the uneducated reader to dismiss Mises as a crackpot
   without first understanding him. The methodological individualism and
   methodological subjectivism of the Austrian school is predicated upon
   the simple and relatively uncontroversial premise that humans act."

   Is the assumptions of the methodology actually relevant to discussing
   the methodology itself? The assumptions may be "uncontroversial" but if
   the net result is that you dismiss data that contradicts your theory
   then the theory itself and its assumptions cannot be evaluated! As
   Rothbard makes clear, "since praxeology begins with a true axiom, A,
   all that can be deduced from this axiom must also be true. For if A
   implies be, and A is true, then B must also be true." [Op. Cit., pp.
   19-20] Now A is the premise "humans act" but upon this axiom is built a
   whole series of other axiom's, all claimed to be true because the first
   one is true. Given that this premise of one that Proudhon, Marx,
   Keynes, Kalecki and a host of non-free market economists would have
   agreed too it seems a very big leap of faith to claim that all the
   other axioms are true. Now, if the facts of reality are to be dismissed
   if your theory is logically consistent (after all, that is what von
   Mises is arguing, let us not forget that) then it is impossible to
   evaluate your theory and the axioms you have generated. Hence our
   comments. The methodology von Mises supports means that your theories
   can never be revised since A was correct. This is the opposite of the
   scientific method, as we argued.

   Wilson states that:

     "What the praxeologist methodology intends to do is to explain more
     holistic economic phenomenon--such as prices, firms, production,
     etc--through the analysis of the discrete components that give rise
     to them, namely individual actors purposefully pursuing their own
     plans and goals on the basis of the information they have access to.
     It's a microeconomic approach that seeks to inquire into the nature
     of complex entities by analysing the behaviour of it's simple
     components. Econometric methods discard human behaviour as
     irrelevant, and deal solely with aggregate data while attempting to
     draw inferences of causation through observation of statistical
     correlation. Too many variables have an influence upon aggregate
     data for a methodological holist procedure to yield conclusive
     results explaining human behaviour, and this is why Austrians reject
     this approach."

   But that may be what it intends, but that is not what it achieves. What
   it achieves is a mindset that prefers to reject facts in favour of
   theory. It also ignores the fact that the more holistic phenomenon has
   an important impact on discrete components and that by concentrating on
   these components important facts are ignored. As we argue in
   [46]section F.2, right-libertarians concentrate their analysis on the
   "discrete component" of contracts within capitalism. This effectively
   blinds them to the way the objective facts of a given society influence
   these contracts. For example, contracts made during periods of full
   employment have different impacts than those made during high
   unemployment. The human behaviour expressed in these contracts are
   influenced by aggregate facts which the Austrian analysis discards.
   Similarly, the aggregate outcome of these discrete acts may have a
   distinctly different impact than we would guess at if we looked at them
   in isolation and so aggregate analysis can provide us with insights the
   microeconomic approach fails to provide.

   Also, when deductively generating axioms from the "simple data" of
   "humans act", it is easy to discard or ignore forms of human behaviour
   which do have an impact on the final outcome. Dealing solely with
   deductive generation can also fail to take into account human
   behaviour.

   Wilson goes on to argue that:

     "If theory is grounded in one's knowledge of simple facts (like
     human action) and deductions made from those facts, yes, it would be
     silly to accept the validity of aggregate data that conflicts with
     one's theory. Data is composed of many elements and components, and
     is far too complex for one understand with a greater degree of
     certainty than basic facts about human behaviour (e.g. preference,
     choice, incentives, etc.). If a piece of statistical data yields
     conclusions that appear to conflict prima faciae with a theoretical
     framework grounded upon simple observations, it is completely
     reasonable to either [a] look to see how the statistical data might
     be misinterpreted, or [b] reject the data. Knowledge of simple data
     is more reliable than Knowledge of complex data, and without
     knowledge of simple data it is impossible to interpret complex data.
     It is always possible that one's theoretical analysis may be
     invalid, but within the context of the social sciences, it's unwise
     to determine the validity of one's theory by comparing it to complex
     data that seems to conflict. One can demonstrate the invalidity of
     one's theory through logic and conceptual analysis, however."

   But, as noted, Austrians think that all economic theories are
   untestable. Including those based upon "simple data" as opposed to
   "aggregate data" (and simple data is somewhat different than simple
   facts). However, by "simple data" Wilson is referring to the axioms
   derived from the first axiom "humans act". Thus he is arguing that if
   you base yourself on deductive logic from an initial axiom, then you
   will not be inclined to view experience as being very useful to
   evaluating. This approach is taken by most churches who can easily
   dismiss arguments against the existence of god as being irrelevant to
   the first axiom that "god exists". Wilson is essentially arguing that
   we perform a "leap of faith" and join the Austrian school in deductive
   logic and pre-scientific logic.

   Now, the Austrian approach is such that they reject the idea that data
   can be used to evaluate their claims. They argue even if the facts
   contradict one of their theories that does not mean that their theories
   are false, far from it. It just means that in this case their theory
   was not applicable (see the new section [47]F.1.3 for a quote on this)!
   Now Wilson seems to be trying to present this argument in the best
   possible light but it does not change the fact that von Mises and other
   Austrian's argue that their theories are true no matter what. They are
   essentially placing their economic ideas above analysis as all and any
   evidence can be ignored as not applicable in this case -- just, as we
   may note, religions do.

   In contrast to Wilson, we think it is "silly" to have a theory which is
   grounded in denying and/or rejecting empirical evidence or using
   empirical evidence to inform your theory. It seems "unwise" to accept a
   theory which major argument seems to be that it cannot be tested. After
   all, logic can lead us to many areas and it is only by seeing whether
   our chain of thought approximates reality can we evaluate the validity
   of our ideas. If econometric methods discard human behaviour as
   irrelevant, then so can the Austrian system -- for there are too many
   variables that can have an influence upon individual acts to yield
   conclusive results explaining human behaviour. Indeed, the deductive
   approach may ignore as irrelevant certain human motivations which have
   a decisive impact on an outcome (there could be a strong tendency to
   project "Austrian Man" onto the rest of society and history, for
   example).

   Wilson quotes the FAQ again:

     Such an approach makes the search for truth a game without rules.
     The Austrian economists (and other right-libertarians) by using this
     method are free to theorise anything they want, without such
     irritating constrictions as facts, statistics, data, history or
     experimental confirmation. Their only guide is logic. But this is no
     different from what religions do when they assert the logical
     existence of God (or Buddha or Mohammed or Gaia). Theories
     ungrounded in facts and data are easily spun into any belief a
     person wants. Starting assumptions and trains of logic may contain
     inaccuracies so small as to be undetectable, yet will yield entirely
     different conclusions.

   And argues that:

     "It is certainly the case that certain small and undetectable flaws
     in one's train of logic can result in horridly inaccurate
     conclusions, but precisely the same thing can be said concerning
     statistical and historical analysis. The problem is even more
     pervasive when dealing with statistical and historical analysis
     because of the phenomenon of incomplete information. Certain facts
     will always be unintentionally discarded from the equation, and
     certain factors responsible for the existence of complex facts and
     events will always go unaccounted for."

   But we are not arguing that we base our theories totally on historical
   data. Such extreme empiricism is just as false as von Mises method.
   What we in fact argued that statistical and historical data should be
   used to back-up any theory we have and if this data disproves our
   theory then modify the theory, not reject the data. Von Mises'
   methodology is such that this approach is dismissed (due to the
   untestability argument) and that is its problem. Without a founding in
   fact, Austrians are free to theorise about whatever they like, without
   such irritating constrains as facts, statistics, data, history and so
   forth. Wilson's arguments have not refuted our analysis, rather he has
   provided apologetics for von Mises' methodology (a methodology he
   admits "can result in horridly inaccurate conclusions"). As Austrians
   can dismiss evidence as "inapplicable" they are in no position to
   re-evaluate their ideas in the light of reality and so their ideas are
   little more than dogmas.

   Now, how logic chains deduced from axioms can also unintentionally
   discard certain facts and factors responsible for the existence of
   complex facts. And the question remains, how do you evaluate whether
   your logical chains are indeed correct? By evaluating them against
   reality (i.e. "complex facts"). A given chain of logic does not provide
   any idea on the relative strengths of certain derived factors (which
   empirical study can indicate). Nor can it indicate whether the chain is
   incomplete or missing essential factors. A given chain may be
   internally consistent but still miss out important factors or stress
   insignificant ones. So deductive logic has all the problems of
   statistical analysis and a few more as statistical analysis at least
   recognises that theories must be evaluated using experience rather than
   reason alone.

   Wilson argues that:

     "Most libertarians would find it reasonable to rethink the basic
     principles or derivations of one's theory if one found them to
     consistently fail to explain historical events or macroeconomic
     data, but those of the Austrian persuasion, and even to some extent
     those of the neoclassical persuasion, would say that the observance
     of historical and macroeconomic facts is never, in itself,
     sufficient to invalidate the conclusions of deductive and conceptual
     analysis."

   But let us not forgot that many right-libertarians follow the ideas of
   Murray Rothbard and Ayn Rand, both firm supporters of Austrian
   economics. Politically, the dangers of this approach are easily seen.
   For example, Wilson himself has indicated how his "basic principles"
   produce relations of domination and oppression which are identical to
   those created by the state and he sees nothing wrong with this.
   Similarly, macroeconomic data indicates that capitalism has done best
   under Keynesianism rather than laissez-faire and the current economic
   performance in the USA is dependent upon the state maintaining a
   "natural" rate of unemployment.

   Let us not forget that, as Wilson points out, von Mises' method if one
   used by more mainstream economics as well (as pointed out by Homa
   Katouzian who, it seems, is are fair more reliable guide than Wilson
   would like to admit). So, let us be clear, that the case for "free
   market" capitalism often involves theories which "the observance of
   historical and macroeconomic facts is never, in itself, sufficient to
   invalidate." That is some claim. No matter the evidence, capitalist
   theory cannot be disproved. That says a lot about capitalist economic
   ideology and its role in society.

   Moving on, Wilson again quotes the FAQ:

     So, von Mises, Hayek and most right-libertarians reject the
     scientific method in favour of ideological correctness and so deny
     the key aspect of both life (change and evolution) and liberty
     (critical analysis and thought). A true libertarian would approach a
     contradiction between reality and theory by changing the theory, not
     by ignoring reality. Right-Libertarian theory is neither libertarian
     nor scientific.

   He then states that:

     "Here, the authors demonstrate how ignorant they are of the position
     they're critiquing. If they had pained themselves to study the
     primary sources, they would have learned about how Mises and other
     Austrians were concerned with grounding their theory upon simple
     observable facts of reality so that they could enable themselves to
     understand the subjects of macroeconomics and history--two realms of
     complexity."

   Let us not forget that these "simple observable facts" is "humans act"
   and the axioms deduced from this fact. That is it. This is the "two"
   realms of complexity -- that individual acts and the resultant of these
   acts. Now, von Mises argues that (in the quote we provided) that no
   experience can disprove these derived axioms. If we look at the primary
   sources (such as these we quote in the new section [48]F.1.3) we find
   that Austrians are clear about the use of data and how it relates to
   their theories (which are all deduced from the axiom "humans act" and
   nothing else). This axiom ("humans act") is the "grounding" of the
   Austrian theory which Wilson talks about. Everything else flows from
   this. And anything else above this axiom (or derived axioms) is another
   "realm of complexity" -- so the actual workings and results of the
   capitalist system is another realm (which is true, reality is another
   realm than that of logic deductions within the mind).

   So, far from showing "ignorance" all we have done is to point out the
   implications and religious nature of these perspectives. Austrians
   "ground" themselves on the axiom "humans act" and argue that simple
   and/or complex observable facts cannot be used to evaluate the axioms
   they derive from this initial axiom. Hence our comments and analysis
   are painfully accurate. Austrian economics is more like a "free market"
   religion than a scientific analysis of capitalism.

   So the primary sources argue that because Austrian economics is based
   upon the axiom "humans act" all its other axioms and arguments are
   correct and that these cannot be disproven by experience. Thus our
   comments on von Mises seem appropriate and the rationale for this
   rejection of experience seems inappropriate.

   Wilson goes on to state that:

     "The implication of the views being espoused by the authors above is
     that it's inappropriate to learn about the world via the application
     of a methodology. If the authors would alter their methodology (if
     they have one) every time they stumble across a series of facts that
     that appear, prima faciae, to conflict with it, then it would appear
     that the authors see no need for methodology at all, and would
     prefer to rush headlong into the complex realm of the social
     sciences, unequipped with any reliable means of interpretation. Now
     which approach is more closely connected to reality?"

   But such an "implication" is so radically false as to be a
   misrepresentation of our argument. We argued that any analysis or
   theory we have should be grounded in facts and that if a set of facts
   contradict our theory then, assuming that the facts are correct of
   course, change the theory, not deny reality. Quite simple really and a
   methodology which most people would consider as sensible (assuming that
   you are not an Austrian economist of course). For example, Proudhon
   argued that competition tends to undermine competition. That is a
   theory which can be tested against facts. The facts indicate that, over
   time, capitalist markets evolve towards oligopoly and that this market
   power results in super-profits (see sections [49]C.4 and [50]C.5). Now,
   if the facts indicate that a market does not become dominated by a few
   firms then we would be inclined to reject that theory. But, if we were
   Austrians, we could just argue that our theory is true but that it has
   not been applicable! Now, which approach is more closely connected to
   reality?

   Then, as an aside, Wilson argues that:

     "(To accuse Hayek, of all people, of denying change and evolution is
     simply astounding. When one considers all of his writings on his
     principle of 'spontaneous order', and on the dispersed evolution of
     customs within a society, this charge becomes as absurd as one
     claiming that Noam Chomsky doesn't report upon international
     politics. The authors are ignoring the primary subject matter of
     most of Hayek's popular works.)"

   Now, unlike Kropotkin who also studied evolution, von Hayek used the
   example of "evolved" or "spontaneous" order to justify "free market"
   capitalism rather than to analyse how society itself was evolving and
   changing. Because (according to von Hayek) the "market" is a
   "spontaneous order" you should not mess with it. But such an analysis
   is false as the "order" on the market is dependent on the state
   determining the rights framework in which this order to generated.
   Thus, rather than supporting change and evolution, von Hayek's work is
   about stopping change and evolution (i.e. the change and evolution of
   society into a different, non-capitalist, form). He supported the state
   and the capitalist rights it enforces and, moreover, desired to ensure
   that capitalist property rights were unchangeable by modifying
   democracy as to place effective power into the hands of a few people
   (for example, his schemes for using age as a determining, and
   restricting, factor in voting and being able to occupy a seat in
   Parliament).

   Similarly, his "analysis" of the evolution of customs just assumes that
   those customs he dislikes (as socialistic or tribal) have been made
   irrelevant by evolution. However, that is the thing about evolution,
   you just do not know which of these social customs are required to
   progress the species. It could be that the social customs von Hayek
   approves off have been generated within society by state action and
   would not survive in a truly free society.

   And, as the history of capitalism shows, it is very far from an
   "evolved" order -- state action played a key role in creating it. Thus
   Hayek's claims are somewhat strange, unless you realise his motivation
   for them -- namely to counter any attempt to change capitalism into
   something better.

   Thus von Hayek, unlike Kropotkin, can be said to deny change and
   evolution simply because he assumes that we have reached the "end of
   history" (to coin a phrase). Just because von Hayek talks about
   evolution and change does not mean that he supports it. In fact, quite
   the reverse -- he uses the concepts to try and stop change and
   evolution.

   Wilson concludes as follows:

     The real question is why are such theories taken seriously and
     arouse such interest. Why are they not simply dismissed out of hand,

     "Because more honest and responsible people bothered to first come
     to an understanding of them before passing judgement."

   Really? But as we have indicated our comments on right-libertarianism
   are accurate. That Wilson does not like the way we have presented then,
   but that does not make them false. Indeed, his "critique" of our
   account has not found anything incorrect about them, which seems
   strange for "dishonest" and "irresponsible" people. His comments that
   we, for example, ignore Nozick's assumption that "individuals have
   rights" ignores the point we made that Nozick assumes the property
   rights that are the basis of his system. Instead Wilson discusses
   something else altogether. Similarly, Wilson's attempt to justify the
   axiomatic methodology of von Mises fails to appreciate that this
   methodology cannot be evaluated from looking at the starting axiom as
   it ensures that its logical chains cannot be tested. Moreover, he
   attempts to discredit the strawman of extreme empiricism rather than
   truly addressing the issue that von Mises methodology presents a
   dogmatic, pre-scientific attitude which has more of a religious feel
   than anything else. If anything, his comments actually show that we
   were correct in our analysis -- after all, he has indicated that
   "anarcho"-capitalists have no problem with capitalist hierarchy, the
   right-libertarians do based their ideas of assumptions and deductions
   from these without regard for consequences and that the Austrian school
   rejects the use of empirical evidence to test their theories.

   How strange. Could it be that we have just informed people of a few
   home truths about right-libertarianism that its supporters prefer to
   keep quiet about?

References

   1. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secFcon.html
   2. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF1.html
   3. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secBcon.html
   4. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF2.html#secf23
   5. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF2.html#secf23
   6. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF8.html
   7. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF8.html
   8. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secB3.html#secb34
   9. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secCcon.html
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  11. http://204.181.81.182/zmag/articles/hermanjuly97.html
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  16. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secB3.html
  17. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secB1.html
  18. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secFcon.html
  19. http://www.unicorn.com//lib/libertarian.html
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  47. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF1.html#secf13
  48. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF1.html#secf13
  49. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secC4.html
  50. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secC5.html
