           E.4 Can laissez-faire capitalism protect the environment?

   In a word, no. Here we explain why using as our example the arguments
   of a leading right-"libertarian."

   As discussed in the [1]last section, there is plenty of reason to doubt
   the claim that private property is the best means available to protect
   the environment. Even in its own terms, it does not do so and this is
   compounded once we factor in aspects of any real capitalist system
   which are habitually ignored by supporters of that system (most
   obviously, economic power derived from inequalities of wealth and
   income). Rather than the problem being too little private property, our
   environmental problems have their source not in a failure to apply
   market principles rigorously enough, but in their very spread into more
   and more aspects of our lives and across the world.

   That capitalism simply cannot have an ecological nature can be seen
   from the work of right-"libertarian" Murray Rothbard, an advocate of
   extreme laissez-faire capitalism. His position is similar to that of
   other free market environmentalists. As pollution can be considered as
   an infringement of the property rights of the person being polluted
   then the solution is obvious. Enforce "absolute" property rights and
   end pollution by suing anyone imposing externalities on others.
   According to this perspective, only absolute private property (i.e. a
   system of laissez-faire capitalism) can protect the environment.

   This viewpoint is pretty much confined to the right-"libertarian"
   defenders of capitalism and those influenced by them. However, given
   the tendency of capitalists to appropriate right-"libertarian" ideas to
   bolster their power much of Rothbard's assumptions and arguments have a
   wider impact and, as such, it is useful to discuss them and their
   limitations. The latter is made extremely easy as Rothbard himself has
   indicated why capitalism and the environment simply do not go together.
   While paying lip-service to environmental notions, his ideas (both in
   theory and in practice) are inherently anti-green and his solutions, as
   he admitted himself, unlikely to achieve their (limited) goals.

   Rothbard's argument seems straight forward enough and, in theory,
   promises the end of pollution. Given the problems of externalities, of
   companies polluting our air and water resources, he argued that their
   root lie not in capitalist greed, private property or the market
   rewarding anti-social behaviour but by the government refusing to
   protect the rights of private property. The remedy is simple: privatise
   everything and so owners of private property would issue injunctions
   and pollution would automatically stop. For example, if there were
   "absolute" private property rights in rivers and seas their owners
   would not permit their pollution:

     "if private firms were able to own the rivers and lakes . . . then
     anyone dumping garbage . . . would promptly be sued in the courts
     for their aggression against private property and would be forced by
     the courts to pay damages and to cease and desist from any further
     aggression. Thus, only private property rights will insure an end to
     pollution-invasion of resources. Only because rivers are unowned is
     there no owner to rise up and defend his precious resource from
     attack." [For a New Liberty, p. 255]

   The same applies to air pollution:

     "The remedy against air pollution is therefore crystal clear . . .
     The remedy is simply for the courts to return to their function of
     defending person and property rights against invasion, and therefore
     to enjoin anyone from injecting pollutants into the air . . . The
     argument against such an injunctive prohibition against pollution
     that it would add to the costs of industrial production is as
     reprehensible as the pre-Civil War argument that the abolition of
     slavery would add to the costs of growing cotton, and therefore
     abolition, however morally correct, was 'impractical.' For this
     means that the polluters are able to impose all of the high costs of
     pollution upon those whose lungs and property rights they have been
     allowed to invade with impunity." [Op. Cit., p. 259]

   This is a valid point. Regulating or creating markets for emissions
   means that governments tolerate pollution and so allows capitalists to
   impose its often high costs onto others. The problem is that Rothbard's
   solution cannot achieve this goal as it ignores economic power.
   Moreover, this argument implies that the consistent and intellectually
   honest right-"libertarian" would support a zero-emissions environmental
   policy. However, as we discuss in the [2]next section, Rothbard (like
   most right-"libertarians") turned to various legalisms like "provable
   harm" and ideological constructs to ensure that this policy would not
   be implemented. In fact, he argued extensively on how polluters could
   impose costs on other people under his system. First, however, we need
   to discuss the limitations of his position before discussing how he
   later reprehensibly refuted his own arguments. Then in [3]section E.4.2
   we will indicate how his own theory cannot support the privatisation of
   water or the air nor the preservation of wilderness areas. Needless to
   say, much of the critique presented in [4]section E.3 is also
   applicable here and so we will summarise the key issues in order to
   reduce repetition.

   As regards the issue of privatising natural resources like rivers, the
   most obvious issue is that Rothbard ignores one major point: why would
   the private owner be interested in keeping it clean? What if the
   rubbish dumper is the corporation that owns the property? Why not just
   assume that the company can make more money turning the lakes and
   rivers into dumping sites, or trees into junk mail? This scenario is no
   less plausible. In fact, it is more likely to happen in many cases as
   there is a demand for such dumps by wealthy corporations who would be
   willing to pay for the privilege.

   So to claim that capitalism will protect the environment is just
   another example of free market capitalists trying to give the reader
   what he or she wants to hear. In practice, the idea that extending
   property rights to rivers, lakes and so forth (if possible) will stop
   ecological destruction all depends on the assumptions used. Thus, for
   example, if it is assumed that ecotourism will produce more income from
   a wetland than draining it for cash crops, then, obviously, the
   wetlands are saved. If the opposite assumption is made, the wetlands
   are destroyed.

   But, of course, the supporter of capitalism will jump in and say that
   if dumping were allowed, this would cause pollution, which would affect
   others who would then sue the owner in question. "Maybe" is the answer
   to this claim, for there are many circumstances where a lawsuit would
   be unlikely to happen. For example, what if the locals are slum
   dwellers and cannot afford to sue? What if they are afraid that their
   landlords will evict them if they sue (particularly if the landlords
   also own the polluting property in question)? What if many members of
   the affected community work for the polluting company and stand to lose
   their jobs if they sue? All in all, this argument ignores the obvious
   fact that resources are required to fight a court case and to make and
   contest appeals. In the case of a large corporation and a small group
   of even average income families, the former will have much more time
   and resources to spend in fighting any lawsuit. This is the case today
   and it seems unlikely that it will change in any society marked by
   inequalities of wealth and power. In other words, Rothbard ignores the
   key issue of economic power:

     "Rothbard appears to assume that the courts will be as accessible to
     the victims of pollution as to the owner of the factory. Yet it is
     not unlikely that the owner's resources will far exceed those of his
     victims. Given this disparity, it is not at all clear that persons
     who suffer the costs of pollution will be able to bear the price of
     relief.

     "Rothbard's proposal ignores a critical variable: power. This is not
     surprising. Libertarians [sic!] are inclined to view 'power' and
     'market' as antithetical terms . . . In Rothbard's discussion, the
     factor owner has no power over those who live near the factory. If
     we define power as comparative advantage under restricted
     circumstances, however, we can see that he may. He can exercise that
     power by stretching out the litigation until his opponent's
     financial resources are exhausted. In what is perhaps a worst case
     example, though by no means an unrealistic scenario, the owner of an
     industry on which an entire community depends for its livelihood may
     threaten to relocate unless local residents agree to accept high
     levels of pollution. In this instance, the 'threat' is merely an
     announcement by the owner that he will move his property, as is his
     right, unless the people of the community 'freely' assent to his
     conditions . . . There is no reason to believe that all such persons
     would seek injunctive relief . . . Some might be willing to tolerate
     the pollution if the factory owner would provide compensation. In
     short, the owner could pay to pollute. This solution . . . ignores
     the presence of power in the market. It is unlikely that the
     'buyers' and 'sellers' of pollution will be on an equal footing."
     [Stephen L. Newman, Liberalism at wits' end, pp. 121-2]

   There is strong reason to believe that some people may tolerate
   pollution in return for compensation (as, for example, a poor person
   may agree to let someone smoke in their home in return for $100 or
   accept a job in a smoke filled pub or bar in order to survive in the
   short term regardless of the long-term danger of lung cancer). As such,
   it is always possible that, due to economic necessity in an unequal
   society, that a company may pay to be able to pollute. As we discussed
   in [5]section E.3.2, the demand for the ability to pollute freely has
   seen a shift in industries from the west to developing nations due to
   economic pressures and market logic:

     "Questions of intergenerational equity and/or justice also arise in
     the context of industrial activity which is clearly life threatening
     or seriously diminishes the quality of life. Pollution of the air,
     water, soil and food in a way that threatens human health is
     obviously not sustainable, yet it is characteristic of much
     industrial action. The greatest burden of the life and health
     threatening by-products of industrial processes falls on those least
     able to exercise options that provide respite. The poor have risks
     to health imposed on them while the wealthy can afford to purchase a
     healthy lifestyle. In newly industrialising countries the poorest
     people are often faced with no choice in living close to plants
     which present a significant threat to the local population . . .
     With the international trend toward moving manufacturing industry to
     the cheapest sources of labour, there is an increasing likelihood
     that standards in occupational health and safety will decline and
     damage to human and environmental health will increase." [Glenn
     Albrecht, "Ethics, Anarchy and Sustainable Development", pp. 95-118,
     Anarchist Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 107-8]

   The tragedy at Bhopal in India is testimony to this process. This
   should be unsurprising, as there is a demand for the ability to pollute
   from wealthy corporations and this has resulted in many countries
   supplying it. This reflects the history of capitalism within the
   so-called developed countries as well. As Rothbard laments:

     "[F]actory smoke and many of its bad effects have been known ever
     since the Industrial Revolution, known to the extent that the
     American courts, during the late -- and as far back as the early --
     19th century made the deliberate decision to allow property rights
     to be violated by industrial smoke. To do so, the courts had to --
     and did -- systematically change and weaken the defences of property
     rights embedded in Anglo-Saxon common law . . . the courts
     systematically altered the law of negligence and the law of nuisance
     to permit any air pollution which was not unusually greater than any
     similar manufacturing firm, one that was not more extensive than the
     customary practice of polluters." [Op. Cit., p. 257]

   Left-wing critic of right-"libertarianism" Alan Haworth points out the
   obvious by stating that "[i]n this remarkably -- wonderfully --
   self-contradictory passage, we are invited to draw the conclusion that
   private property must provide the solution to the pollution problem
   from an account of how it clearly did not." In other words 19th-century
   America -- which for many right-"libertarians" is a kind of "golden
   era" of free-market capitalism -- saw a move "from an initial situation
   of well-defended property rights to a later situation where greater
   pollution was tolerated." This means that private property cannot
   provide a solution the pollution problem. [Anti-Libertarianism, p. 113]

   It is likely, as Haworth points out, that Rothbard and other free
   marketeers will claim that the 19th-century capitalist system was not
   pure enough, that the courts were motivated to act under pressure from
   the state (which in turn was pressured by powerful industrialists). But
   can it be purified by just removing the government and privatising the
   courts, relying on a so-called "free market for justice"? The pressure
   from the industrialists remains, if not increases, on the privately
   owned courts trying to make a living on the market. Indeed, the whole
   concept of private courts competing in a "free market for justice"
   becomes absurd once it is recognised that those with the most money
   will be able to buy the most "justice" (as is largely the case now).
   Also, this faith in the courts ignores the fact suing would only occur
   after the damage has already been done. It's not easy to replace
   ecosystems and extinct species. And if the threat of court action had a
   "deterrent" effect, then pollution, murder, stealing and a host of
   other crimes would long ago have disappeared.

   To paraphrase Haworth, the characteristically "free market" capitalist
   argument that if X were privately owned, Y would almost certainly
   occur, is just wishful thinking.

   Equally, it would be churlish to note that this change in the law (like
   so many others) was an essential part of the creation of capitalism in
   the first place. As we discuss in [6]section F.8, capitalism has always
   been born of state intervention and the toleration of pollution was one
   of many means by which costs associated with creating a capitalist
   system were imposed on the general public. This is still the case
   today, with (for example) the Economist magazine happily arguing that
   the migration of dirty industries to the third world is "desirable" as
   there is a "trade-off between growth and pollution control." Inflicting
   pollution on the poorest sections of humanity is, of course, in their
   own best interests. As the magazine put it, "[i]f clean growth means
   slower growth, as it sometimes will, its human cost will be lives
   blighted by a poverty that would otherwise have been mitigated. That is
   why it is wrong for the World Bank or anybody else to insist upon
   rich-country standards of environmental practices in developing
   countries . . . when a trade off between cleaner air and less poverty
   has to be faced, most poor countries will rightly want to tolerate more
   pollution than rich countries do in return for more growth."
   ["Pollution and the Poor", The Economist, 15/02/1992] That "poor
   countries" are just as state, class and hierarchy afflicted as
   "rich-country" ones and so it is not the poor who will be deciding to
   "tolerate" pollution in return for higher profits (to use the correct
   word rather than the economically correct euphemism). Rather, it will
   be inflicted upon them by the ruling class which runs their country.
   That members of the elite are willing to inflict the costs of
   industrialisation on the working class in the form of pollution is
   unsurprising to anyone with a grasp of reality and how capitalism
   develops and works (it should be noted that the magazine expounded this
   particular argument to defend the infamous Lawrence Summers memo
   discussed in [7]section E.3.2).

   Finally, let us consider what would happen is Rothbard's schema could
   actually be applied. It would mean that almost every modern industry
   would be faced with law suits over pollution. This would mean that the
   costs of product would soar, assuming production continued at all. It
   is likely that faced with demands that industry stop polluting, most
   firms would simply go out of business (either due to the costs involved
   in damages or simply because no suitable non-polluting replacement
   technology exists) As Rothbard here considers all forms of pollution as
   an affront to property rights, this also applies to transport. In other
   words, "pure" capitalism would necessitate the end of industrial
   society. While such a prospect may be welcomed by some deep ecologists
   and primitivists, few others would support such a solution to the
   problems of pollution.

   Within a decade of his zero-emissions argument, however, Rothbard had
   changed his position and presented a right-"libertarian" argument which
   essentially allowed the polluters to continue business as usual,
   arguing for a system which, he admitted, would make it nearly
   impossible for individuals to sue over pollution damage. As usual,
   given a choice between individual freedom and capitalism Rothbard
   choose the latter. As such, as Rothbard himself proves beyond
   reasonable doubt, the extension of private property rights will be
   unable to protect the environment. We discuss this in the [8]next
   section.

E.4.1 Will laissez-faire capitalism actually end pollution?

   No, it will not. In order to show why, we need only quote Murray
   Rothbard's own arguments. It is worth going through his arguments to
   see exactly why "pure" capitalism simply cannot solve the ecological
   crisis.

   As noted in the [9]last section, Rothbard initially presented an
   argument that free market capitalism would have a zero-emissions
   policy. Within a decade, he had substantially changed his tune in an
   article for the right-"libertarian" think-tank the Cato Institute.
   Perhaps this change of heart is understandable once you realise that
   most free market capitalist propagandists are simply priests of a
   religion convenient to the interests of the people who own the
   marketplace. Rothbard founded the think-tank which published this
   article along with industrialist Charles Koch in 1977. Koch companies
   are involved in the petroleum, chemicals, energy, minerals, fertilisers
   industries as well as many others. To advocate a zero-pollution policy
   would hardly be in the Institute's enlightened self-interest as its
   backers would soon be out of business (along with industrial capitalism
   as a whole).

   Rothbard's defence of the right to pollute is as ingenious as it is
   contradictory to his original position. As will be discussed in
   [10]section F.4, Rothbard subscribes to a "homesteading" theory of
   property and he utilises this not only to steal the actual physical
   planet (the land) from this and future generations but also our (and
   their) right to a clean environment. He points to "more sophisticated
   and modern forms of homesteading" which can be used to "homestead"
   pollution rights. If, for example, a firm is surrounded by unowned land
   then it can pollute to its hearts content. If anyone moves to the area
   then the firm only becomes liable for any excess pollution over this
   amount. Thus firms "can be said to have homesteaded a pollution
   easement of a certain degree and type." He points to an "exemplary"
   court case which rejected the argument of someone who moved to an
   industrial area and then sued to end pollution. As the plaintiff had
   voluntarily moved to the area, she had no cause for complaint. In other
   words, polluters can simply continue to pollute under free market
   capitalism. This is particularly the case as clean air acts would not
   exist in libertarian legal theory, such an act being "illegitimate and
   itself invasive and a criminal interference with the property rights of
   noncriminals." ["Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution," pp. 55-99,
   Cato Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 77, p. 79 and p. 89]

   In the [11]last section, we showed how Rothbard had earlier argued that
   the solution to pollution was to privatise everything. Given that
   rivers, lakes and seas are currently unowned this implies that the
   current levels of pollution would be the initial "homesteaded" level
   and so privatisation will not, in fact, reduce pollution at all. At
   best, it may stop pollution getting worse but even this runs into the
   problem that pollution usually increases slowly over time and would be
   hard to notice and much harder to prove which incremental change
   produced the actual quantitative change.

   Which leads to the next, obvious, problem. According to Rothbard you
   can sue provided that "the polluter has not previously established a
   homestead easement," "prove strict causality from the actions of the
   defendant. . . beyond a reasonable doubt" and identify "those who
   actually commit the deed" (i.e. the employees involved, not the
   company). [Op. Cit., p. 87] Of course, how do you know and prove that a
   specific polluter is responsible for a specific environmental or
   physical harm? It would be near impossible to identify which company
   contributed which particles to the smog which caused pollution related
   illnesses. Polluters, needless to say, have the right to buy-off a suit
   which would be a handy tool for wealthy corporations in an unequal
   society to continue polluting as economic necessity may induce people
   to accept payment in return for tolerating it.

   Turning to the pollution caused by actual products, such as cars,
   Rothbard argues that "libertarian [sic!] principle" requires a return
   to privity, a situation where the manufacturers of a product are not
   responsible for any negative side-effects when it is used. In terms of
   transport pollution, the "guilty polluter should be each individual car
   owner and not the automobile manufacturer, who is not responsible for
   the actual tort and the actual emission." This is because the
   manufacturer does not know how the car will be used (Rothbard gives an
   example that it may not be driven but was bought "mainly for aesthetic
   contemplation by the car owner"!). He admits that "the situation for
   plaintiffs against auto emissions might seem hopeless under libertarian
   law." Rest assured, though, as "the roads would be privately owned"
   then the owner of the road could be sued for the emissions going "into
   the lungs or airspace of other citizens" and so "would be liable for
   pollution damage." This would be "much more feasible than suing each
   individual car owner for the minute amount of pollutants he might be
   responsible for." [Op. Cit., p. 90 and p. 91]

   The problems with this argument should be obvious. Firstly, roads are
   currently "unowned" under the right-"libertarian" perspective (they are
   owned by the state which has no right to own anything). This means, as
   Rothbard has already suggested, any new road owners would have already
   created a "homesteading" right to pollute (after all, who would buy a
   road if they expected to be sued by so doing?). Secondly, it would be
   extremely difficult to say that specific emissions from a specific road
   caused the problems and Rothbard stresses that there must be "proof
   beyond reasonable doubt." Road-owners as well as capitalist firms which
   pollute will, like the tobacco industry, be heartened to read that
   "statistical correlation . . . cannot establish causation, certainly
   not for a rigorous legal proof of guilt or harm." After all, "many
   smokers never get lung cancer" and "many lung cancer sufferers have
   never smoked." [Op. Cit., p. 92 and p. 73] So if illnesses cluster
   around, say, roads or certain industries then this cannot be considered
   as evidence of harm caused by the pollution they produce.

   Then there is the question of who is responsible for the damage
   inflicted. Here Rothbard runs up against the contradictions within wage
   labour. Capitalism is based on the notion that a person's
   liberty/labour can be sold/alienated to another who can then use it as
   they see fit. This means that, for the capitalist, the worker has no
   claim on the products and services that labour has produced. Strangely,
   according to Rothbard, this alienation of responsibility suddenly is
   rescinded when that sold labour commits an action which has negative
   consequences for the employer. Then it suddenly becomes nothing to do
   with the employer and the labourer becomes responsible for their labour
   again.

   Rothbard is quite clear that he considers that the owners of businesses
   are not responsible for their employee's action. He gives the example
   of an employer who hires an incompetent worker and suffers the lost of
   his wages as a result. However, "there appears to be no legitimate
   reason for forcing the employer to bear the additional cost of his
   employee's tortious behaviour." For a corporation "does not act; only
   individuals act, and each must be responsible for his own actions and
   those alone." He notes that employers are sued because they "generally
   have more money than employees, so that it becomes more convenient . .
   . to stick the wealthier class with the liability." [Op. Cit., p. 76
   and p. 75]

   This ignores the fact that externalities are imposed on others in order
   to maximise the profits of the corporation. The stockholders directly
   benefit from the "tortious behaviour" of their wage slaves. For
   example, if a manager decides to save 1,000,000 by letting toxic waste
   damage to occur to then the owners benefit by a higher return on their
   investment. To state that is the manager who must pay for any damage
   means that the owners of a corporation or business are absolved for any
   responsibility for the actions of those hired to make money for them.
   In other words, they accumulate the benefits in the form of more income
   but not the risks or costs associated with, say, imposing externalities
   onto others. That the "wealthier class" would be happy to see such a
   legal system should go without saying.

   The notion that as long as "the tort is committed by the employee in
   the course of furthering, even only in part, his employer's business,
   then the employer is also liable" is dismissed as "a legal concept so
   at war with libertarianism, individualism, and capitalism, and suited
   only to a precapitalist society." [Op. Cit., p. 74 and p. 75] If this
   principle is against "individualism" then it is simply because
   capitalism violates individualism. What Rothbard fails to appreciate is
   that the whole basis of capitalism is that it is based on the worker
   selling his time/liberty to the boss. As Mark Leier puts it in his
   excellent biography of Bakunin:

     "The primary element of capitalism is wage labour It is this that
     makes capitalism what it is . . . The employer owns and controls the
     coffee shop or factory where production takes place and determines
     who will be hired and fired and how things will be produced; that's
     what it means to be a 'boss.' Workers produce goods or services for
     their employer. Everything they produce on the job belongs to the
     capitalist: workers have no more right to the coffee or cars they
     produce than someone off the street. Their employer, protected by
     law and by the apparatus of the state, owns all they produce. The
     employer then sells the goods that have been produced and gives the
     workers a portion of the value they have created. Capitalists and
     workers fight over the precise amounts of this portion, but the
     capitalist system is based on the notion that the capitalist owns
     everything that is produced and controls how everything is
     produced." [Bakunin: The Creative Passion, p. 26]

   This is clearly the case when a worker acts in a way which increases
   profits without externalities. The most obvious case is when workers'
   produce more goods than they receive back in wages (i.e. the
   exploitation at the heart of capitalism -- see [12]section C.2). Why
   should that change when the action has an externality? While it may
   benefit the boss to argue that he should gain the profits of the
   worker's actions but not the costs it hardly makes much logical sense.
   The labour sold becomes the property of the buyer who is then entitled
   to appropriate the produce of that labour. There is no reason for this
   to suddenly change when the product is a negative rather than a
   positive. It suggests that the worker has sold both her labour and its
   product to the employer unless it happens to put her employer in court,
   then it suddenly becomes her's again!

   And we must note that it is Rothbard's arguments own arguments which
   are "suited only to a precapitalist society." As David Ellerman notes,
   the slave was considered a piece of property under the law unless he or
   she committed a crime. Once that had occurred, the slave became an
   autonomous individual in the eyes of the law and, as a result, could be
   prosecuted as an individual rather than his owner. This exposed a
   fundamental inconsistency "in a legal system that treats the same
   individual as a thing in normal work and legally as a person when
   committing a crime." Much the same applies to wage labour as well. When
   an employee commits a negligent tort then "the tortious servant emerges
   from the cocoon of non-responsibility metamorphosed into a responsible
   human agent." In other words, "the employee is said to have stepped
   outside the employee's role." [Property and Contract in Economics, p.
   125, p. 128 and p. 133] Rothbard's argument is essentially the same as
   that of the slave-owner, with the boss enjoying the positive fruits of
   their wage slaves activities but not being responsible for any negative
   results.

   So, to summarise, we have a system which will allow pollution to
   continue as this right has been "homesteaded" while, at the same,
   making it near impossible to sue individual firms for their
   contribution to the destruction of the earth. Moreover, it rewards the
   owners of companies for any externalities inflicted while absolving
   them of any responsibility for the actions which enriched them. And
   Rothbard asserts that "private ownership" can solve "many 'externality'
   problems"! The key problem is, of course, that for Rothbard the
   "overriding factor in air pollution law, as in other parts of the law,
   should be libertarian and property rights principles" rather than, say,
   stopping the destruction of our planet or even defending the right of
   individual's not to die of pollution related diseases. [Op. Cit., p. 91
   and p. 99] Rothbard shows that for the defender of capitalism, given a
   choice between property and planet/people the former will always win.

   To conclude, Rothbard provides more than enough evidence to disprove
   his own arguments. This is not a unique occurrence. As discussed in the
   [13]next section he does the same as regards owning water and air
   resources.

E.4.2 Can wilderness survive under laissez-faire capitalism?

   No. This conclusion comes naturally from the laissez-faire capitalist
   defence of private property as expounded by Murray Rothbard. Moreover,
   ironically, he also destroys his own arguments for ending pollution by
   privatising water and air.

   For Rothbard, labour is the key to turning unowned natural resources
   into private property. As he put it, "before the homesteader, no one
   really used and controlled -- and hence owned -- the land. The pioneer,
   or homesteader, is the man who first brings the valueless unused
   natural objects into production and use." [The Ethics of Liberty, p.
   49]

   Starting with the question of wilderness (a topic close to many
   eco-anarchists' and other ecologists' hearts) we run into the usual
   problems and self-contradictions which befalls right-"libertarian"
   ideology. Rothbard states clearly that "libertarian theory must
   invalidate [any] claim to ownership" of land that has "never been
   transformed from its natural state" (he presents an example of an owner
   who has left a piece of his "legally owned" land untouched). If another
   person appears who does transform the land, it becomes "justly owned by
   another" and the original owner cannot stop her (and should the
   original owner "use violence to prevent another settler from entering
   this never-used land and transforming it into use" they also become a
   "criminal aggressor"). Rothbard also stresses that he is not saying
   that land must continually be in use to be valid property. [Op. Cit.,
   pp. 63-64] This is unsurprising, as that would justify landless workers
   seizing the land from landowners during a depression and working it
   themselves and we cannot have that now, can we?

   Now, where does that leave wilderness? In response to ecologists who
   oppose the destruction of the rainforest, many supporters of capitalism
   suggest that they put their money where their mouth is and buy
   rainforest land. In this way, it is claimed, rainforest will be
   protected (see [14]section B.5 for why such arguments are nonsense). As
   ecologists desire the rainforest because it is wilderness they are
   unlikely to "transform" it by human labour (its precisely that they
   want to stop). From Rothbard's arguments it is fair to ask whether
   logging companies have a right to "transform" the virgin wilderness
   owned by ecologists, after all it meets Rothbard's criteria (it is
   still wilderness). Perhaps it will be claimed that fencing off land
   "transforms" it (hardly what you imagine "mixing labour" with to mean,
   but never mind) -- but that allows large companies and rich individuals
   to hire workers to fence in vast tracks of land (and recreate the land
   monopoly by a "libertarian" route). But as discussed in [15]section
   F.4.1, fencing off land does not seem to imply that it becomes property
   in Rothbard's theory. And, of course, fencing in areas of rainforest
   disrupts the local eco-system -- animals cannot freely travel, for
   example -- which, again, is what ecologists desire to stop. Would
   Rothbard have accepted a piece of paper as "transforming" land? We
   doubt it (after all, in his example the wilderness owner did legally
   own it) -- and so most ecologists will have a hard time in pure
   capitalism (wilderness is just not an option).

   Moreover, Rothbard's "homesteading" theory actually violates his
   support for unrestricted property rights. What if a property owner
   wants part of her land to remain wilderness? Their desires are violated
   by the "homesteading" theory (unless, of course, fencing things off
   equals "transforming" them, which it apparently does not). How can
   companies provide wilderness holidays to people if they have no right
   to stop settlers (including large companies) "homesteading" that
   wilderness? Then there is the question of wild animals. Obviously, they
   can only become owned by either killing them or by domesticating them
   (the only possible means of "mixing your labour" with them). Does it
   mean that someone only values, say, a polar bear when they kill it or
   capture it for a zoo?

   At best, it could be argued that wilderness would be allowed if the
   land was transformed first then allowed to return to the wild. This
   flows from Rothbard's argument that there is no requirement that land
   continue to be used in order for it to continue to be a person's
   property. As he stresses, "our libertarian [sic!] theory holds that
   land needs only be transformed once to pass into private ownership."
   [Op. Cit., p. 65] This means that land could be used and then allowed
   to fall into disuse for the important thing is that once labour is
   mixed with the natural resources, it remains owned in perpetuity.
   However, destroying wilderness in order to recreate it is simply an
   insane position to take as many eco-systems are extremely fragile and
   will not return to their previous state. Moreover, this process takes a
   long time during which access to the land will be restricted to all but
   those the owner consents to.

   And, of course, where does Rothbard's theory leave hunter-gatherer or
   nomad societies. They use the resources of the wilderness, but they do
   not "transform" them (in this case you cannot easily tell if virgin
   land is empty or being used). If a group of nomads find its
   traditionally used, but natural, oasis appropriated by a homesteader
   what are they to do? If they ignore the homesteaders claims he can call
   upon the police (public or private) to stop them -- and then, in true
   Rothbardian fashion, the homesteader can refuse to supply water to them
   unless they pay for the privilege. And if the history of the United
   States and other colonies are anything to go by, such people will
   become "criminal aggressors" and removed from the picture.

   As such, it is important to stress the social context of Rothbard's
   Lockean principles. As John O'Neill notes, Locke's labour theory of
   property was used not only to support enclosing common land in England
   but also as a justification for stealing the land of indigenous
   population's across the world. For example, the "appropriation of
   America is justified by its being brought into the world of commence
   and hence cultivation . . . The Lockean account of the 'vast
   wilderness' of America as land uncultivated and unshaped by the
   pastoral activities of the indigenous population formed part of the
   justification of the appropriation of native land." [Markets,
   Deliberation and Environment, p. 119] That the native population was
   using the land was irrelevant as Rothbard himself noted. As he put it,
   the Indians "laid claim to vast reaches of land which they hunted but
   which they did not transform by cultivation." [Conceived in Liberty,
   vol. 1, p. 187]. This meant that "the bulk of Indian-claimed land was
   not settled and transformed by the Indians" and so settlers were "at
   least justified in ignoring vague, abstract claims." The Indian hunting
   based claims were "dubious." [Op. Cit., vol. 2, p. 54 and p. 59] The
   net outcome, of course, was that the "vague, abstract" Indian claims to
   hunting lands were meet with the concrete use of force to defend the
   newly appropriated (i.e. stolen) land (force which quickly reached the
   level of genocide).

   So unless people bestowed some form of transforming labour over the
   wilderness areas then any claims of ownership are unsubstantiated. At
   most, tribal people and nomads could claim the wild animals they killed
   and the trails that they cleared. This is because a person would "have
   to use the land, to 'cultivate' it in some way, before he could be
   asserted to own it." This cultivation is not limited to "tilling the
   soil" but also includes clearing it for a house or pasture or caring
   for some plots of timber. [Man, Economy, and State, with Power and
   Market, p. 170] Thus game preserves or wilderness areas could not exist
   in a pure capitalist society. This has deep ecological implications as
   it automatically means the replacement of wild, old-growth forests
   with, at best, managed ones. These are not an equivalent in ecological
   terms even if they have approximately the same number of trees. As
   James C. Scott stresses:

     "Old-growth forests, polycropping, and agriculture with
     open-pollinated landraces may not be as productive, in the short
     run, as single-species forests and fields or identical hybrids. But
     they are demonstrably more stable, more self-sufficient, and less
     vulnerable to epidemics and environmental stress . . . Every time we
     replace 'natural capital' (such as wild fish stocks or old-growth
     forests) with what might be termed 'cultivated natural capital'
     (such as fish farms or tree plantations), we gain ease of
     appropriation and in immediate productivity, but at the cost of more
     maintenance expenses and less 'redundancy, resiliency, and
     stability' . . . Other things being equal . . . the less diverse the
     cultivated natural capital, the more vulnerable and nonsustainable
     it becomes. The problem is that in most economic systems, the
     external costs (in water or air pollution, for example, or the
     exhaustion of non-renewable resources, including a reduction in
     biodiversity) accumulate long before the activity becomes
     unprofitable in a narrow profit-and-loss sense." [Seeing like a
     State, p. 353]

   Forests which are planned as a resource are made ecologically
   simplistic in order to make them economically viable (i.e., to reduce
   the costs involved in harvesting the crop). They tend to be
   monocultures of one type of tree and conservationists note that placing
   all eggs in one basket could prompt an ecological disaster. A palm oil
   monoculture which replaces rainforest to produce biofuel, for example,
   would be unable to support the rich diversity of wildlife as well as
   leaving the environment vulnerable to catastrophic disease. Meanwhile,
   local people dependent on the crop could be left high and dry if it
   fell out of favour on the global market.

   To summarise, capitalism simply cannot protect wilderness and, by
   extension, the planet's ecology. Moreover, it is no friend to the
   indigenous population who use but do not "transform" their local
   environment.

   It should also be noted that underlying assumption behind this and
   similar arguments is that other cultures and ways of life, like many
   eco-systems and species, are simply not worth keeping. While
   lip-service is made to the notion of cultural diversity, the
   overwhelming emphasis is on universalising the capitalist model of
   economic activity, property rights and way of life (and a corresponding
   ignoring of the role state power played in creating these as well as
   destroying traditional customs and ways of life). Such a model for
   development means the replacement of indigenous customs and
   communitarian-based ethics by a commercial system based on an abstract
   individualism with a very narrow vision of what constitutes
   self-interest. These new converts to the international order would be
   forced, like all others, to survive on the capitalist market. With vast
   differences in wealth and power such markets have, it is likely that
   the net result would simply be that new markets would be created out of
   the natural 'capital' in the developing world and these would soon be
   exploited.

   As an aside, we must note that Rothbard fails to realise -- and this
   comes from his worship of capitalism and his "Austrian economics" -- is
   that people value many things which do not, indeed cannot, appear on
   the market. He claims that wilderness is "valueless unused natural
   objects" for it people valued them, they would use -- i.e. transform --
   them. But unused things may be of considerable value to people,
   wilderness being a classic example. And if something cannot be
   transformed into private property, does that mean people do not value
   it? For example, people value community, stress-free working
   environments, meaningful work -- if the market cannot provide these,
   does that mean they do not value them? Of course not (see Juliet
   Schor's The Overworked American on how working people's desire for
   shorter working hours was not transformed into options on the market).

   So it should be remembered that in valuing impacts on nature, there is
   a difference between use values (i.e. income from commodities produced
   by a resource) and non-use values (i.e., the value placed on the
   existence of a species or wilderness). The former are usually
   well-defined, but often small while the latter are often large, but
   poorly defined. For example, the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska
   resulted in losses to people who worked and lived in the affected area
   of an estimated $300 million. However, the existence value of the area
   to the American population was $9 billion. In other words, the amount
   that American households were reportedly willing to pay to prevent a
   similar oil spill in a similar area was 30 times larger. Yet this
   non-use value cannot be taken into account in Rothbard's schema as
   nature is not considered a value in itself but merely a resource to be
   exploited.

   Which brings us to another key problem with Rothbard's argument: he
   simply cannot justify the appropriation of water and atmosphere by
   means of his own principles. To show why, we need simply consult
   Rothbard's own writings on the subject.

   Rothbard has a serious problem here. As noted above, he subscribed to a
   Lockean vision of property. In this schema, property is generated by
   mixing labour with unowned resources. Yet you simply cannot mix your
   labour with water or air. In other words, he is left with a system of
   property rights which cannot, by their very nature, be extended to
   common goods like water and air. Let us quote Rothbard on this subject:

     "it is true that the high seas, in relation to shipping lanes, are
     probably inappropriable, because of their abundance in relation to
     shipping routes. This is not true, however, of fishing rights. Fish
     are definitely not available in unlimited quantities, relatively to
     human wants. Therefore, they are appropriable . . . In a free [sic!]
     society, fishing rights to the appropriate areas of oceans would be
     owned by the first users of these areas and then useable or saleable
     to other individuals. Ownership of areas of water that contain fish
     is directly analogous to private ownership of areas of land or
     forests that contain animals to be hunted . . . water can definitely
     be marked off in terms of latitudes and longitudes. These
     boundaries, then would circumscribe the area owned by individuals,
     in the full knowledge that fish and water can move from one person's
     property to another." [Man, Economy, and State, with Power and
     Market, pp. 173-4]

   In a footnote to this surreal passage, he added that it "is rapidly
   becoming evident that air lanes for planes are becoming scare and, in a
   free [sic!] society, would be owned by first users."

   So, travellers crossing the sea gain no property rights by doing so but
   those travelling through the air do. Why this should be the case is
   hard to explain as, logically, both acts "transform" the commons by
   "labour" in exactly the same manner (i.e. not at all). Why should
   fishing result in absolute property rights in oceans, seas, lakes and
   rivers? Does picking a fruit give you property rights in the tree or
   the forest it stands in? Surely, at best, it gives you a property right
   in the fish and fruit? And what happens if area of water is so polluted
   that there are no fish? Does that mean that this body of water is
   impossible to appropriate? How does it become owned? Surely it cannot
   and so it will always remain a dumping ground for waste?

   Looking at the issue of land and water, Rothbard asserts that owning
   water is "directly analogous" to owning land for hunting purposes. Does
   this mean that the landowner who hunts cannot bar travellers from their
   land? Or does it mean that the sea-owner can bar travellers from
   crossing their property? Ironically, as shown above, Rothbard later
   explicitly rejected the claims of Native Americans to own their land
   because they hunted animals on it. The same, logically, applies to his
   arguments that bodies of water can be appropriated.

   Given that Rothbard is keen to stress that labour is required to
   transform land into private property, his arguments are
   self-contradictory and highly illogical. It should also be stressed
   that here Rothbard nullifies his criteria for appropriating private
   property. Originally, only labour being used on the resource can turn
   it into private property. Now, however, the only criteria is that it is
   scare. This is understandable, as fishing and travelling through the
   air cannot remotely be considered "mixing labour" with the resource.

   It is easy to see why Rothbard produced such self-contradictory
   arguments over the years as each one was aimed at justifying and
   extending the reach of capitalist property rights. Thus the Indians'
   hunting claims could be rejected as these allowed the privatising of
   the land while the logically identical fishing claims could be used to
   allow the privatisation of bodies of water. Logic need not bother the
   ideologue when he seeking ways to justify the supremacy of the ideal
   (capitalist private property, in this case).

   Finally, since Rothbard (falsely) claims to be an anarchist, it is
   useful to compare his arguments to that of Proudhon's. Significantly,
   in the founding work of anarchism Proudhon presented an analysis of
   this issue directly opposite to Rothbard's. Let us quote the founding
   father of anarchism on this important matter:

     "A man who should be prohibited from walking in the highways, from
     resting in the fields, from taking shelter in caves, from lighting
     fires, from picking berries, from gathering herbs and boiling them
     in a bit of baked clay, -- such a man could not live. Consequently
     the earth -- like water, air, and light -- is a primary object of
     necessity which each has a right to use freely, without infringing
     another's right. Why, then, is the earth appropriated? . . . [An
     economist] assures us that it is because it is not INFINITE. The
     land is limited in amount. Then . . . it ought to be appropriated.
     It would seem, on the contrary, that he ought to say, Then it ought
     not to be appropriated. Because, no matter how large a quantity of
     air or light any one appropriates, no one is damaged thereby; there
     always remains enough for all. With the soil, it is very different.
     Lay hold who will, or who can, of the sun's rays, the passing
     breeze, or the sea's billows; he has my consent, and my pardon for
     his bad intentions. But let any living man dare to change his right
     of territorial possession into the right of property, and I will
     declare war upon him, and wage it to the death!" [What is Property?,
     p. 106]

   Unlike Locke who at least paid lip-service to the notion that the
   commons can be enclosed when there is enough and as good left for
   others to use, Rothbard turn this onto its head. In his "Lockean"
   schema, a resource can be appropriated only when it is scare (i.e.
   there is not enough and as good left for others). Perhaps it comes as
   no surprise that Rothbard rejects the "Lockean proviso" (and
   essentially argues that Locke was not a consistent Lockean as his work
   is "riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies" and have been
   "expanded and purified" by his followers. [The Ethics of Liberty, p.
   22]).

   Rothbard is aware of what is involved in accepting the Lockean Proviso
   -- namely the existence of private property ("Locke's proviso may lead
   to the outlawry of all private property of land, since one can always
   say that the reduction of available land leaves everyone else . . .
   worse off" [Op. Cit., p. 240]). The Proviso does imply the end of
   capitalist property rights which is why Rothbard, and other
   right-"libertarians", reject it while failing to note that Locke
   himself simply assumed that the invention of money transcended this
   limitation. [C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Individualism,
   pp. 203-20] As we discussed in [16]section B.3.4, it should be stressed
   that this limitation is considered to be transcended purely in terms of
   material wealth rather than its impact on individual liberty or dignity
   which, surely, should be of prime concern for someone claiming to
   favour "liberty." What Rothbard failed to understand that Locke's
   Proviso of apparently limiting appropriation of land as long as there
   was enough and as good for others was a ploy to make the destruction of
   the commons palatable to those with a conscience or some awareness of
   what liberty involves. This can be seen from the fact this limitation
   could be transcended at all (in the same way, Locke justified the
   exploitation of labour by arguing that it was the property of the
   worker who sold it to their boss -- see [17]section B.4.2 for details).
   By getting rid of the Proviso, Rothbard simply exposes this theft of
   our common birthright in all its unjust glory.

   It is simple. Either you reject the Proviso and embrace capitalist
   property rights (and so allow one class of people to be dispossessed
   and another empowered at their expense) or you take it seriously and
   reject private property in favour of possession and liberty.
   Anarchists, obviously, favour the latter option. Thus Proudhon:

     "Water, air, and light are common things, not because they are
     inexhaustible, but because they are indispensable; and so
     indispensable that for that very reason Nature has created them in
     quantities almost infinite, in order that their plentifulness might
     prevent their appropriation. Likewise the land is indispensable to
     our existence, -- consequently a common thing, consequently
     unsusceptible of appropriation; but land is much scarcer than the
     other elements, therefore its use must be regulated, not for the
     profit of a few, but in the interest and for the security of all.

     "In a word, equality of rights is proved by equality of needs. Now,
     equality of rights, in the case of a commodity which is limited in
     amount, can be realised only by equality of possession . . . From
     whatever point we view this question of property -- provided we go
     to the bottom of it -- we reach equality."
     [Op. Cit., p. 107]

   To conclude, it would be unfair to simply quote Keynes evaluation of
   one work by von Hayek, another leading "Austrian Economist," namely
   that it "is an extraordinary example of how, starting with a mistake, a
   remorseless logician can end up in bedlam." This is only partly true as
   Rothbard's account of property rights in water and air is hardly
   logical (although it is remorseless once we consider its impact when
   applied in an unequal and hierarchical society). That this nonsense is
   in direct opposition to the anarchist perspective on this issue should
   not come as a surprise any more than its incoherence. As we discuss in
   [18]section F, Rothbard's claims to being an "anarchist" are as
   baseless as his claim that capitalism will protect the environment.

References

   1. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secE3.html
   2. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secE4.html#sece41
   3. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secE4.html#sece42
   4. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secE3.html
   5. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secE3.html#sece32
   6. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF8.html
   7. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secE3.html#sece32
   8. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secE4.html#sece41
   9. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secE4.html
  10. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF4.html
  11. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secE4.html
  12. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secC2.html
  13. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secE4.html#sece42
  14. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secB5.html
  15. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF4.html#secf41
  16. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secB3.html#secb34
  17. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secB4.html#secb42
  18. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secFcon.html
