               F.2 What do "anarcho"-capitalists mean by freedom?

   For "anarcho"-capitalists, the concept of freedom is limited to the
   idea of "freedom from." For them, freedom means simply freedom from the
   "initiation of force," or the "non-aggression against anyone's person
   and property." [Murray Rothbard, For a New Liberty, p. 23] The notion
   that real freedom must combine both freedom "to" and freedom "from" is
   missing in their ideology, as is the social context of the so-called
   freedom they defend.

   Before continuing, it is useful to quote Alan Haworth when he notes
   that "[i]n fact, it is surprising how little close attention the
   concept of freedom receives from libertarian writers. Once again
   Anarchy, State, and Utopia is a case in point. The word 'freedom'
   doesn't even appear in the index. The word 'liberty' appears, but only
   to refer the reader to the 'Wilt Chamberlain' passage. In a supposedly
   'libertarian' work, this is more than surprising. It is truly
   remarkable." [Anti-Libertarianism, p. 95] Why this is the case can be
   seen from how the right-"libertarian" defines freedom.

   In right-"libertarian" and "anarcho"-capitalist ideology, freedom is
   considered to be a product of property. As Murray Rothbard puts it,
   "the libertarian defines the concept of 'freedom' or 'liberty'. . .[as
   a] condition in which a person's ownership rights in his body and his
   legitimate material property rights are not invaded, are not aggressed
   against. . . . Freedom and unrestricted property rights go hand in
   hand." [Op. Cit., p.41]

   This definition has some problems, however. In such a society, one
   cannot (legitimately) do anything with or on another's property if the
   owner prohibits it. This means that an individual's only guaranteed
   freedom is determined by the amount of property that he or she owns.
   This has the consequence that someone with no property has no
   guaranteed freedom at all (beyond, of course, the freedom not to be
   murdered or otherwise harmed by the deliberate acts of others). In
   other words, a distribution of property is a distribution of freedom,
   as the right-"libertarians" themselves define it. It strikes anarchists
   as strange that an ideology that claims to be committed to promoting
   freedom entails the conclusion that some people should be more free
   than others. Yet this is the logical implication of their view, which
   raises a serious doubt as to whether "anarcho"-capitalists are actually
   interested in freedom at all.

   Looking at Rothbard's definition of "liberty" quoted above, we can see
   that freedom is actually no longer considered to be a fundamental,
   independent concept. Instead, freedom is a derivative of something more
   fundamental, namely the "legitimate rights" of an individual, which are
   identified as property rights. In other words, given that
   "anarcho"-capitalists and right-"libertarians" in general consider the
   right to property as "absolute," it follows that freedom and property
   become one and the same. This suggests an alternative name for the
   right Libertarian, namely "Propertarian." And, needless to say, if we
   do not accept the right-libertarians' view of what constitutes
   "legitimate rights," then their claim to be defenders of liberty is
   weak.

   Another important implication of this "liberty as property" concept is
   that it produces a strangely alienated concept of freedom. Liberty, as
   we noted, is no longer considered absolute, but a derivative of
   property -- which has the important consequence that you can "sell"
   your liberty and still be considered free by the ideology. This concept
   of liberty is usually termed "self-ownership." But, to state the
   obvious, I do not "own" myself, as if were an object somehow separable
   from my subjectivity -- I am myself (see [1]section B.4.2). However,
   the concept of "self-ownership" is handy for justifying various forms
   of domination and oppression -- for by agreeing (usually under the
   force of circumstances, we must note) to certain contracts, an
   individual can "sell" (or rent out) themselves to others (for example,
   when workers sell their labour power to capitalists on the "free
   market"). In effect, "self-ownership" becomes the means of justifying
   treating people as objects -- ironically, the very thing the concept
   was created to stop! As anarchist L. Susan Brown notes, "[a]t the
   moment an individual 'sells' labour power to another, he/she loses
   self-determination and instead is treated as a subjectless instrument
   for the fulfilment of another's will." [The Politics of Individualism,
   p. 4]

   Given that workers are paid to obey, you really have to wonder which
   planet Murray Rothbard was on when he argued that a person's "labour
   service is alienable, but his will is not" and that he "cannot alienate
   his will, more particularly his control over his own mind and body." He
   contrasts private property and self-ownership by arguing that "[a]ll
   physical property owned by a person is alienable . . . I can give away
   or sell to another person my shoes, my house, my car, my money, etc.
   But there are certain vital things which, in natural fact and in the
   nature of man, are inalienable . . . [his] will and control over his
   own person are inalienable." [The Ethics of Liberty, p. 40, p. 135 and
   pp. 134-5] Yet "labour services" are unlike the private possessions
   Rothbard lists as being alienable. As we argued in [2]section B.1 a
   person's "labour services" and "will" cannot be divided -- if you sell
   your labour services, you also have to give control of your body and
   mind to another person. If a worker does not obey the commands of her
   employer, she is fired. That Rothbard denied this indicates a total
   lack of common-sense. Perhaps Rothbard would have argued that as the
   worker can quit at any time she does not really alienate their will
   (this seems to be his case against slave contracts -- see [3]section
   F.2.2). But this ignores the fact that between the signing and breaking
   of the contract and during work hours (and perhaps outside work hours,
   if the boss has mandatory drug testing or will fire workers who attend
   union or anarchist meetings or those who have an "unnatural" sexuality
   and so on) the worker does alienate his will and body. In the words of
   Rudolf Rocker, "under the realities of the capitalist economic form . .
   . there can . . . be no talk of a 'right over one's own person,' for
   that ends when one is compelled to submit to the economic dictation of
   another if he does not want to starve." [Anarcho-Syndicalism, p. 10]

   Ironically, the rights of property (which are said to flow from an
   individual's self-ownership of themselves) becomes the means, under
   capitalism, by which self-ownership of non-property owners is denied.
   The foundational right (self-ownership) becomes denied by the
   derivative right (ownership of things). "To treat others and oneself as
   property," argues L. Susan Brown, "objectifies the human individual,
   denies the unity of subject and object and is a negation of individual
   will . . . [and] destroys the very freedom one sought in the first
   place. The liberal belief in property, both real and in the person,
   leads not to freedom but to relationships of domination and
   subordination." [Op. Cit., p. 3] Under capitalism, a lack of property
   can be just as oppressive as a lack of legal rights because of the
   relationships of domination and subjection this situation creates. That
   people "consent" to this hierarchy misses the point. As Alexander
   Berkman put it:

     "The law says your employer does not steal anything from you,
     because it is done with your consent. You have agreed to work for
     your boss for certain pay, he to have all that you produce . . .

     "But did you really consent?

     "When the highway man holds his gun to your head, you turn your
     valuables over to him. You 'consent' all right, but you do so
     because you cannot help yourself, because you are compelled by his
     gun.

     "Are you not compelled to work for an employer? Your need compels
     you just as the highwayman's gun. You must live . . . You can't work
     for yourself . . . The factories, machinery, and tools belong to the
     employing class, so you must hire yourself out to that class in
     order to work and live. Whatever you work at, whoever your employer
     may be, it always comes to the same: you must work for him. You
     can't help yourself. You are compelled."
     [What is Anarchism?, p. 11]

   Due to this class monopoly over the means of life, workers (usually)
   are at a disadvantage in terms of bargaining power -- there are more
   workers than jobs (see [4]section C.9). Within capitalism there is no
   equality between owners and the dispossessed, and so property is a
   source of power. To claim that this power should be "left alone" or is
   "fair" is "to the anarchists. . . preposterous. Once a State has been
   established, and most of the country's capital privatised, the threat
   of physical force is no longer necessary to coerce workers into
   accepting jobs, even with low pay and poor conditions. To use
   [right-"libertarian"] Ayn Rand's term, 'initial force' has already
   taken place, by those who now have capital against those who do not. .
   . . In other words, if a thief died and willed his 'ill-gotten gain' to
   his children, would the children have a right to the stolen property?
   Not legally. So if 'property is theft,' to borrow Proudhon's quip, and
   the fruit of exploited labour is simply legal theft, then the only
   factor giving the children of a deceased capitalist a right to inherit
   the 'booty' is the law, the State. As Bakunin wrote, 'Ghosts should not
   rule and oppress this world, which belongs only to the living.'" [Jeff
   Draughn, Between Anarchism and Libertarianism]

   Or, in other words, right-Libertarianism fails to "meet the charge that
   normal operations of the market systematically places an entire class
   of persons (wage earners) in circumstances that compel them to accept
   the terms and conditions of labour dictated by those who offer work.
   While it is true that individuals are formally free to seek better jobs
   or withhold their labour in the hope of receiving higher wages, in the
   end their position in the market works against them; they cannot live
   if they do not find employment. When circumstances regularly bestow a
   relative disadvantage on one class of persons in their dealings with
   another class, members of the advantaged class have little need of
   coercive measures to get what they want." [Stephen L. Newman,
   Liberalism at Wit's End, p. 130] Eliminating taxation does not end
   oppression, in other words. As Tolstoy put it:

     "in Russia serfdom was only abolished when all the land had been
     appropriated. When land was granted to the peasants, it was burdened
     with payments which took the place of the land slavery. In Europe,
     taxes that kept the people in bondage began to be abolished only
     when the people had lost their land, were unaccustomed to
     agricultural work, and . . . quite dependent on the capitalists . .
     . [They] abolish the taxes that fall on the workers . . . only
     because the majority of the people are already in the hands of the
     capitalists. One form of slavery is not abolished until another has
     already replaced it." [The Slavery of Our Times, p. 32]

   So Rothbard's argument (as well as being contradictory) misses the
   point (and the reality of capitalism). Yes, if we define freedom as
   "the absence of coercion" then the idea that wage labour does not
   restrict liberty is unavoidable, but such a definition is useless. This
   is because it hides structures of power and relations of domination and
   subordination. As Carole Pateman argues, "the contract in which the
   worker allegedly sells his labour power is a contract in which, since
   he cannot be separated from his capacities, he sells command over the
   use of his body and himself . . . To sell command over the use of
   oneself for a specified period . . . is to be an unfree labourer. The
   characteristics of this condition are captured in the term wage slave."
   [The Sexual Contract, p. 151]

   In other words, contracts about property in the person inevitably
   create subordination. "Anarcho"-capitalism defines this source of
   unfreedom away, but it still exists and has a major impact on people's
   liberty. For anarchists freedom is better described as
   "self-government" or "self-management" -- to be able to govern ones own
   actions (if alone) or to participate in the determination of join
   activity (if part of a group). Freedom, to put it another way, is not
   an abstract legal concept, but the vital concrete possibility for every
   human being to bring to full development all their powers, capacities,
   and talents which nature has endowed them. A key aspect of this is to
   govern one own actions when within associations (self-management). If
   we look at freedom this way, we see that coercion is condemned but so
   is hierarchy (and so is capitalism for during working hours people are
   not free to make their own plans and have a say in what affects them.
   They are order takers, not free individuals).

   It is because anarchists have recognised the authoritarian nature of
   capitalist firms that they have opposed wage labour and capitalist
   property rights along with the state. They have desired to replace
   institutions structured by subordination with institutions constituted
   by free relationships (based, in other words, on self-management) in
   all areas of life, including economic organisations. Hence Proudhon's
   argument that the "workmen's associations . . . are full of hope both
   as a protest against the wage system, and as an affirmation of
   reciprocity" and that their importance lies "in their denial of the
   rule of capitalists, money lenders and governments." [The General Idea
   of the Revolution, pp. 98-99]

   Unlike anarchists, the "anarcho"-capitalist account of freedom allows
   an individual's freedom to be rented out to another while maintaining
   that the person is still free. It may seem strange that an ideology
   proclaiming its support for liberty sees nothing wrong with the
   alienation and denial of liberty but, in actual fact, it is
   unsurprising. After all, contract theory is a "theoretical strategy
   that justifies subjection by presenting it as freedom" and has "turned
   a subversive proposition [that we are born free and equal] into a
   defence of civil subjection." Little wonder, then, that contract
   "creates a relation of subordination" and not of freedom [Carole
   Pateman, Op. Cit., p. 39 and p. 59] Little wonder, then, that Colin
   Ward argued that, as an anarchist, he is "by definition, a socialist"
   and that "[w]orkers' control of industrial production" is "the only
   approach compatible with anarchism." [Talking Anarchy, p. 25 and p. 26]

   Ultimately, any attempt to build an ethical framework starting from the
   abstract individual (as Rothbard does with his "legitimate rights"
   method) will result in domination and oppression between people, not
   freedom. Indeed, Rothbard provides an example of the dangers of
   idealist philosophy that Bakunin warned about when he argued that while
   "[m]aterialism denies free will and ends in the establishment of
   liberty; idealism, in the name of human dignity, proclaims free will,
   and on the ruins of every liberty founds authority." [God and the
   State, p. 48] That this is the case with "anarcho"-capitalism can be
   seen from Rothbard's wholehearted support for wage labour, landlordism
   and the rules imposed by property owners on those who use, but do not
   own, their property. Rothbard, basing himself on abstract
   individualism, cannot help but justify authority over liberty. This,
   undoubtedly, flows from the right-liberal and conservative roots of his
   ideology. Individualist anarchist Shawn Wilbar once defined Wikipedia
   as "the most successful modern experiment in promoting obedience to
   authority as freedom." However, Wikipedia pales into insignificance
   compared to the success of liberalism (in its many forms) in doing
   precisely that. Whether politically or economically, liberalism has
   always rushed to justify and rationalise the individual subjecting
   themselves to some form of hierarchy. That "anarcho"-capitalism does
   this under the name "anarchism" is deeply insulting to anarchists.

   Overall, we can see that the logic of the right-"libertarian"
   definition of "freedom" ends up negating itself because it results in
   the creation and encouragement of authority, which is an opposite of
   freedom. For example, as Ayn Rand pointed out, "man has to sustain his
   life by his own effort, the man who has no right to the product of his
   effort has no means to sustain his life. The man who produces while
   others dispose of his product, is a slave." [The Ayn Rand Lexicon:
   Objectivism from A to Z, pp. 388-9] But, as was shown in [5]section
   C.2, capitalism is based on, as Proudhon put it, workers working "for
   an entrepreneur who pays them and keeps their products," and so is a
   form of theft. Thus, by "libertarian" capitalism's own logic,
   capitalism is based not on freedom, but on (wage) slavery; for
   interest, profit and rent are derived from a worker's unpaid labour,
   i.e. "others dispose of his [sic] product."

   Thus it is debatable that a right-"libertarian" or "anarcho" capitalist
   society would have less unfreedom or authoritarianism in it than
   "actually existing" capitalism. In contrast to anarchism,
   "anarcho"-capitalism, with its narrow definitions, restricts freedom to
   only a few areas of social life and ignores domination and authority
   beyond those aspects. As Peter Marshall points out, their "definition
   of freedom is entirely negative. It calls for the absence of coercion
   but cannot guarantee the positive freedom of individual autonomy and
   independence." [Demanding the Impossible, p. 564] By confining freedom
   to such a narrow range of human action, "anarcho"-capitalism is clearly
   not a form of anarchism. Real anarchists support freedom in every
   aspect of an individual's life.

   In short, as French anarchist Elisee Reclus put it there is "an abyss
   between two kinds of society," one of which is "constituted freely by
   men of good will, based on a consideration of their common interests"
   and another which "accepts the existence of either temporary or
   permanent masters to whom [its members] owe obedience." [quoted by
   Clark and Martin, Anarchy, Geography, Modernity, p. 62] In other words,
   when choosing between anarchism and capitalism, "anarcho"-capitalists
   pick the latter and call it the former.

F.2.1 How does private property affect freedom?

   The right-"libertarian" either does not acknowledge or dismisses as
   irrelevant the fact that the (absolute) right of private property may
   lead to extensive control by property owners over those who use, but do
   not own, property (such as workers and tenants). Thus a free-market
   capitalist system leads to a very selective and class-based protection
   of "rights" and "freedoms." For example, under capitalism, the
   "freedom" of employers inevitably conflicts with the "freedom" of
   employees. When stockholders or their managers exercise their "freedom
   of enterprise" to decide how their company will operate, they violate
   their employee's right to decide how their labouring capacities will be
   utilised and so under capitalism the "property rights" of employers
   will conflict with and restrict the "human right" of employees to
   manage themselves. Capitalism allows the right of self-management only
   to the few, not to all. Or, alternatively, capitalism does not
   recognise certain human rights as universal which anarchism does.

   This can be seen from Austrian Economist W. Duncan Reekie's defence of
   wage labour. While referring to "intra-firm labour markets" as
   "hierarchies", Reekie (in his best ex cathedra tone) states that
   "[t]here is nothing authoritarian, dictatorial or exploitative in the
   relationship. Employees order employers to pay them amounts specified
   in the hiring contract just as much as employers order employees to
   abide by the terms of the contract." [Markets, Entrepreneurs and
   Liberty, p. 136 and p. 137]. Given that "the terms of contract" involve
   the worker agreeing to obey the employers orders and that they will be
   fired if they do not, its pretty clear that the ordering that goes on
   in the "intra-firm labour market" is decidedly one way. Bosses have the
   power, workers are paid to obey. And this begs the question: if the
   employment contract creates a free worker, why must she abandon her
   liberty during work hours?

   Reekie actually recognises this lack of freedom in a "round about" way
   when he notes that "employees in a firm at any level in the hierarchy
   can exercise an entrepreneurial role. The area within which that role
   can be carried out increases the more authority the employee has." [Op.
   Cit., p. 142] Which means workers are subject to control from above
   which restricts the activities they are allowed to do and so they are
   not free to act, make decisions, participate in the plans of the
   organisation, to create the future and so forth within working hours.
   And it is strange that while recognising the firm as a hierarchy,
   Reekie tries to deny that it is authoritarian or dictatorial -- as if
   you could have a hierarchy without authoritarian structures or an
   unelected person in authority who is not a dictator. His confusion is
   shared by Austrian guru Ludwig von Mises, who asserted that the
   "entrepreneur and capitalist are not irresponsible autocrats" because
   they are "unconditionally subject to the sovereignty of the consumer"
   while, on the next page, admitting there was a "managerial hierarchy"
   which contains "the average subordinate employee." [Human Action, p.
   809 and p. 810] It does not enter his mind that the capitalist may be
   subject to some consumer control while being an autocrat to their
   subordinated employees. Again, we find the right-"libertarian"
   acknowledging that the capitalist managerial structure is a hierarchy
   and workers are subordinated while denying it is autocratic to the
   workers! Thus we have "free" workers within a relationship distinctly
   lacking freedom -- a strange paradox. Indeed, if your personal life
   were as closely monitored and regulated as the work life of millions of
   people across the world, you would rightly consider it the worse form
   of oppression and tyranny.

   Somewhat ironically, right-wing liberal and "free market" economist
   Milton Friedman contrasted "central planning involving the use of
   coercion -- the technique of the army or the modern totalitarian state"
   with "voluntary co-operation between individuals -- the technique of
   the marketplace" as two distinct ways of co-ordinating the economic
   activity of large groups ("millions") of people. [Capitalism and
   Freedom, p. 13] However, this misses the key issue of the internal
   nature of the company. As right-"libertarians" themselves note, the
   internal structure of a capitalist company is hierarchical. Indeed, the
   capitalist company is a form of central planning and so shares the same
   "technique" as the army. As Peter Drucker noted in his history of
   General Motors, "[t]here is a remarkably close parallel between General
   Motors' scheme of organisation and those of the two institutions most
   renowned for administrative efficiency: that of the Catholic Church and
   that of the modern army." [quoted by David Engler, Apostles of Greed,
   p. 66] Thus capitalism is marked by a series of totalitarian
   organisations. Dictatorship does not change much -- nor does it become
   less fascistic -- when discussing economic structures rather than
   political ones. To state the obvious, "the employment contract (like
   the marriage contract) is not an exchange; both contracts create social
   relations that endure over time - social relations of subordination."
   [Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract, p. 148]

   Perhaps Reekie (like most right-"libertarians") will maintain that
   workers voluntarily agree ("consent") to be subject to the bosses
   dictatorship (he writes that "each will only enter into the contractual
   agreement known as a firm if each believes he will be better off
   thereby. The firm is simply another example of mutually beneficial
   exchange." [Op. Cit., p. 137]). However, this does not stop the
   relationship being authoritarian or dictatorial (and so exploitative as
   it is highly unlikely that those at the top will not abuse their
   power). Representing employment relations as voluntary agreement simply
   mystifies the existence and exercise of power within the organisation
   so created.

   As we argue further in the [6]section F.3, in a capitalist society
   workers have the option of finding a job or facing abject poverty
   and/or starvation. Little wonder, then, that people "voluntarily" sell
   their labour and "consent" to authoritarian structures! They have
   little option to do otherwise. So, within the labour market workers can
   and do seek out the best working conditions possible, but that does not
   mean that the final contract agreed is "freely" accepted and not due to
   the force of circumstances, that both parties have equal bargaining
   power when drawing up the contract or that the freedom of both parties
   is ensured.

   Which means to argue (as right-"libertarians" do) that freedom cannot
   be restricted by wage labour because people enter into relationships
   they consider will lead to improvements over their initial situation
   totally misses the point. As the initial situation is not considered
   relevant, their argument fails. After all, agreeing to work in a
   sweatshop 14 hours a day is an improvement over starving to death --
   but it does not mean that those who so agree are free when working
   there or actually want to be there. They are not and it is the
   circumstances, created and enforced by the law (i.e., the state), that
   have ensured that they "consent" to such a regime (given the chance,
   they would desire to change that regime but cannot as this would
   violate their bosses property rights and they would be repressed for
   trying).

   So the right-wing "libertarian" right is interested only in a narrow
   concept of freedom (rather than in freedom or liberty as such). This
   can be seen in the argument of Ayn Rand that "Freedom, in a political
   context, means freedom from government coercion. It does not mean
   freedom from the landlord, or freedom from the employer, or freedom
   from the laws of nature which do not provide men with automatic
   prosperity. It means freedom from the coercive power of the state --
   and nothing else!" [Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, p. 192] By arguing
   in this way, right-"libertarians" ignore the vast number of
   authoritarian social relationships that exist in capitalist society
   and, as Rand does here, imply that these social relationships are like
   "the laws of nature." However, if one looks at the world without
   prejudice but with an eye to maximising freedom, the major coercive
   institutions are the state and capitalist social relationships (and the
   latter relies on the former). It should also be noted that, unlike
   gravity, the power of the landlord and boss depends on the use of force
   -- gravity does not need policemen to make things fall!

   The right "libertarian," then, far from being a defender of freedom, is
   in fact a keen defender of certain forms of authority. As Kropotkin
   argued against a forerunner of right-"libertarianism":

     "The modern Individualism initiated by Herbert Spencer is, like the
     critical theory of Proudhon, a powerful indictment against the
     dangers and wrongs of government, but its practical solution of the
     social problem is miserable -- so miserable as to lead us to inquire
     if the talk of 'No force' be merely an excuse for supporting
     landlord and capitalist domination." [Act For Yourselves, p. 98]

   To defend the "freedom" of property owners is to defend authority and
   privilege -- in other words, statism. So, in considering the concept of
   liberty as "freedom from," it is clear that by defending private
   property (as opposed to possession) the "anarcho"-capitalist is
   defending the power and authority of property owners to govern those
   who use "their" property. And also, we must note, defending all the
   petty tyrannies that make the work lives of so many people frustrating,
   stressful and unrewarding.

   Anarchism, by definition, is in favour of organisations and social
   relationships which are non-hierarchical and non-authoritarian.
   Otherwise, some people are more free than others. Failing to attack
   hierarchy leads to massive contradiction. For example, since the
   British Army is a volunteer one, it is an "anarchist" organisation!
   Ironically, it can also allow a state to appear "libertarian" as that,
   too, can be considered voluntary arrangement as long as it allows its
   subjects to emigrate freely. So equating freedom with (capitalist)
   property rights does not protect freedom, in fact it actively denies
   it. This lack of freedom is only inevitable as long as we accept
   capitalist private property rights. If we reject them, we can try and
   create a world based on freedom in all aspects of life, rather than
   just in a few.

F.2.2 Do "libertarian"-capitalists support slavery?

   Yes. It may come as a surprise to many people, but
   right-"Libertarianism" is one of the few political theories that
   justifies slavery. For example, Robert Nozick asks whether "a free
   system would allow [the individual] to sell himself into slavery" and
   he answers "I believe that it would." [Anarchy, State and Utopia, p.
   371] While some right-"libertarians" do not agree with Nozick, there is
   no logical basis in their ideology for such disagreement.

   This can be seen from "anarcho"-capitalist Walter Block, who, like
   Nozick, supports voluntary slavery. As he puts it, "if I own something,
   I can sell it (and should be allowed by law to do so). If I can't sell,
   then, and to that extent, I really don't own it." Thus agreeing to sell
   yourself for a lifetime "is a bona fide contract" which, if "abrogated,
   theft occurs." He critiques those other right-wing "libertarians" (like
   Murray Rothbard) who oppose voluntary slavery as being inconsistent to
   their principles. Block, in his words, seeks to make "a tiny
   adjustment" which "strengthens libertarianism by making it more
   internally consistent." He argues that his position shows "that
   contract, predicated on private property [can] reach to the furthest
   realms of human interaction, even to voluntary slave contracts."
   ["Towards a Libertarian Theory of Inalienability: A Critique of
   Rothbard, Barnett, Smith, Kinsella, Gordon, and Epstein," pp. 39-85,
   Journal of Libertarian Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, p. 44, p. 48, p. 82 and
   p. 46]

   So the logic is simple, you cannot really own something unless you can
   sell it. Self-ownership is one of the cornerstones of laissez-faire
   capitalist ideology. Therefore, since you own yourself you can sell
   yourself.

   This defence of slavery should not come as a surprise to any one
   familiar with classical liberalism. An elitist ideology, its main
   rationale is to defend the liberty and power of property owners and
   justify unfree social relationships (such as government and wage
   labour) in terms of "consent." Nozick and Block just takes it to its
   logical conclusion. This is because his position is not new but, as
   with so many other right-"libertarian" ones, can be found in John
   Locke's work. The key difference is that Locke refused the term
   "slavery" and favoured "drudgery" as, for him, slavery mean a
   relationship "between a lawful conqueror and a captive" where the
   former has the power of life and death over the latter. Once a
   "compact" is agreed between them, "an agreement for a limited power on
   the one side, and obedience on the other . . . slavery ceases." As long
   as the master could not kill the slave, then it was "drudgery." Like
   Nozick, he acknowledges that "men did sell themselves; but, it is
   plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery: for, it is evident,
   the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power:
   for the master could not have power to kill him, at any time, whom, at
   a certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his service."
   [Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Section 24] In other words,
   voluntary slavery was fine but just call it something else.

   Not that Locke was bothered by involuntary slavery. He was heavily
   involved in the slave trade. He owned shares in the "Royal Africa
   Company" which carried on the slave trade for England, making a profit
   when he sold them. He also held a significant share in another slave
   company, the "Bahama Adventurers." In the "Second Treatise", Locke
   justified slavery in terms of "Captives taken in a just war," a war
   waged against aggressors. [Section 85] That, of course, had nothing to
   do with the actual slavery Locke profited from (slave raids were
   common, for example). Nor did his "liberal" principles stop him
   suggesting a constitution that would ensure that "every freeman of
   Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his Negro
   slaves." The constitution itself was typically autocratic and
   hierarchical, designed explicitly to "avoid erecting a numerous
   democracy." [The Works of John Locke, vol. X, p. 196]

   So the notion of contractual slavery has a long history within
   right-wing liberalism, although most refuse to call it by that name. It
   is of course simply embarrassment that stops many right-"libertarians"
   calling a spade a spade. They incorrectly assume that slavery has to be
   involuntary. In fact, historically, voluntary slave contracts have been
   common (David Ellerman's Property and Contract in Economics has an
   excellent overview). Any new form of voluntary slavery would be a
   "civilised" form of slavery and could occur when an individual would
   "agree" to sell their lifetime's labour to another (as when a starving
   worker would "agree" to become a slave in return for food). In
   addition, the contract would be able to be broken under certain
   conditions (perhaps in return for breaking the contract, the former
   slave would have pay damages to his or her master for the labour their
   master would lose -- a sizeable amount no doubt and such a payment
   could result in debt slavery, which is the most common form of
   "civilised" slavery. Such damages may be agreed in the contract as a
   "performance bond" or "conditional exchange."

   In summary, right-"libertarians" are talking about "civilised" slavery
   (or, in other words, civil slavery) and not forced slavery. While some
   may have reservations about calling it slavery, they agree with the
   basic concept that since people own themselves they can sell
   themselves, that is sell their labour for a lifetime rather than
   piecemeal.

   We must stress that this is no academic debate. "Voluntary" slavery has
   been a problem in many societies and still exists in many countries
   today (particularly third world ones where bonded labour -- i.e. where
   debt is used to enslave people -- is the most common form). With the
   rise of sweat shops and child labour in many "developed" countries such
   as the USA, "voluntary" slavery (perhaps via debt and bonded labour)
   may become common in all parts of the world -- an ironic (if not
   surprising) result of "freeing" the market and being indifferent to the
   actual freedom of those within it.

   Some right-"libertarians" are obviously uneasy with the logical
   conclusion of their definition of freedom. Murray Rothbard, for
   example, stressed the "unenforceability, in libertarian theory, of
   voluntary slave contracts." Of course, other "libertarian" theorists
   claim the exact opposite, so "libertarian theory" makes no such claim,
   but never mind! Essentially, his objection revolves around the
   assertion that a person "cannot, in nature, sell himself into slavery
   and have this sale enforced -- for this would mean that his future will
   over his own body was being surrendered in advance" and that if a
   "labourer remains totally subservient to his master's will voluntarily,
   he is not yet a slave since his submission is voluntary." However, as
   we noted in [7]section F.2, Rothbard emphasis on quitting fails to
   recognise the actual denial of will and control over ones own body that
   is explicit in wage labour. It is this failure that pro-slave contract
   "libertarians" stress -- they consider the slave contract as an
   extended wage contract. Moreover, a modern slave contract would likely
   take the form of a "performance bond," on which Rothbard laments about
   its "unfortunate suppression" by the state. In such a system, the slave
   could agree to perform X years labour or pay their master substantial
   damages if they fail to do so. It is the threat of damages that
   enforces the contract and such a "contract" Rothbard does agree is
   enforceable. Another means of creating slave contracts would be
   "conditional exchange" which Rothbard also supports. As for debt
   bondage, that too, seems acceptable. He surreally notes that paying
   damages and debts in such contracts is fine as "money, of course, is
   alienable" and so forgets that it needs to be earned by labour which,
   he asserts, is not alienable! [The Ethics of Liberty, pp. 134-135, p.
   40, pp. 136-9, p. 141 and p. 138]

   It should be noted that the slavery contract cannot be null and void
   because it is unenforceable, as Rothbard suggests. This is because the
   doctrine of specific performance applies to all contracts, not just to
   labour contracts. This is because all contracts specify some future
   performance. In the case of the lifetime labour contract, then it can
   be broken as long as the slave pays any appropriate damages. As
   Rothbard puts it elsewhere, "if A has agreed to work for life for B in
   exchange for 10,000 grams of gold, he will have to return the
   proportionate amount of property if he terminates the arrangement and
   ceases to work." [Man, Economy, and State, vol. I , p. 441] This is
   understandable, as the law generally allows material damages for
   breached contracts, as does Rothbard in his support for the
   "performance bond" and "conditional exchange." Needless to say, having
   to pay such damages (either as a lump sum or over a period of time)
   could turn the worker into the most common type of modern slave, the
   debt-slave.

   And it is interesting to note that even Murray Rothbard is not against
   the selling of humans. He argued that children are the property of
   their parents who can (bar actually murdering them by violence) do
   whatever they please with them, even sell them on a "flourishing free
   child market." [The Ethics of Liberty, p. 102] Combined with a whole
   hearted support for child labour (after all, the child can leave its
   parents if it objects to working for them) such a "free child market"
   could easily become a "child slave market" -- with entrepreneurs making
   a healthy profit selling infants and children or their labour to
   capitalists (as did occur in 19th century Britain). Unsurprisingly,
   Rothbard ignores the possible nasty aspects of such a market in human
   flesh (such as children being sold to work in factories, homes and
   brothels). But this is besides the point.

   Of course, this theoretical justification for slavery at the heart of
   an ideology calling itself "libertarianism" is hard for many
   right-"libertarians" to accept and so they argue that such contracts
   would be very hard to enforce. This attempt to get out of the
   contradiction fails simply because it ignores the nature of the
   capitalist market. If there is a demand for slave contracts to be
   enforced, then companies will develop to provide that "service" (and it
   would be interesting to see how two "protection" firms, one defending
   slave contracts and another not, could compromise and reach a peaceful
   agreement over whether slave contracts were valid). Thus we could see a
   so-called "free" society producing companies whose specific purpose was
   to hunt down escaped slaves (i.e. individuals in slave contracts who
   have not paid damages to their owners for freedom). Of course, perhaps
   Rothbard would claim that such slave contracts would be "outlawed"
   under his "general libertarian law code" but this is a denial of market
   "freedom". If slave contracts are "banned" then surely this is
   paternalism, stopping individuals from contracting out their "labour
   services" to whom and however long they "desire". You cannot have it
   both ways.

   So, ironically, an ideology proclaiming itself to support "liberty"
   ends up justifying and defending slavery. Indeed, for the
   right-"libertarian" the slave contract is an exemplification, not the
   denial, of the individual's liberty! How is this possible? How can
   slavery be supported as an expression of liberty? Simple,
   right-"libertarian" support for slavery is a symptom of a deeper
   authoritarianism, namely their uncritical acceptance of contract
   theory. The central claim of contract theory is that contract is the
   means to secure and enhance individual freedom. Slavery is the
   antithesis to freedom and so, in theory, contract and slavery must be
   mutually exclusive. However, as indicated above, some contract
   theorists (past and present) have included slave contracts among
   legitimate contracts. This suggests that contract theory cannot provide
   the theoretical support needed to secure and enhance individual
   freedom.

   As Carole Pateman argues, "contract theory is primarily about a way of
   creating social relations constituted by subordination, not about
   exchange." Rather than undermining subordination, contract theorists
   justify modern subjection -- "contract doctrine has proclaimed that
   subjection to a master -- a boss, a husband -- is freedom." [The Sexual
   Contract, p. 40 and p. 146] The question central to contract theory
   (and so right-Libertarianism) is not "are people free" (as one would
   expect) but "are people free to subordinate themselves in any manner
   they please." A radically different question and one only fitting to
   someone who does not know what liberty means.

   Anarchists argue that not all contracts are legitimate and no free
   individual can make a contract that denies his or her own freedom. If
   an individual is able to express themselves by making free agreements
   then those free agreements must also be based upon freedom internally
   as well. Any agreement that creates domination or hierarchy negates the
   assumptions underlying the agreement and makes itself null and void. In
   other words, voluntary government is still government and a defining
   characteristic of an anarchy must be, surely, "no government" and "no
   rulers."

   This is most easily seen in the extreme case of the slave contract.
   John Stuart Mill stated that such a contract would be "null and void."
   He argued that an individual may voluntarily choose to enter such a
   contract but in so doing "he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any
   future use of it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his
   own case, the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him
   to dispose of himself. . .The principle of freedom cannot require that
   he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to
   alienate his freedom." He adds that "these reasons, the force of which
   is so conspicuous in this particular case, are evidently of far wider
   application." [quoted by Pateman, Op. Cit., pp. 171-2]

   And it is such an application that defenders of capitalism fear (Mill
   did in fact apply these reasons wider and unsurprisingly became a
   supporter of a market syndicalist form of socialism). If we reject
   slave contracts as illegitimate then, logically, we must also reject
   all contracts that express qualities similar to slavery (i.e. deny
   freedom) including wage slavery. Given that, as David Ellerman points
   out, "the voluntary slave . . . and the employee cannot in fact take
   their will out of their intentional actions so that they could be
   'employed' by the master or employer" we are left with "the rather
   implausible assertion that a person can vacate his or her will for
   eight or so hours a day for weeks, months, or years on end but cannot
   do so for a working lifetime." [Property and Contract in Economics, p.
   58] This is Rothbard's position.

   The implications of supporting voluntary slavery is quite devastating
   for all forms of right-wing "libertarianism." This was proven by
   Ellerman when he wrote an extremely robust defence of it under the
   pseudonym "J. Philmore" called The Libertarian Case for Slavery (first
   published in The Philosophical Forum, xiv, 1982). This classic rebuttal
   takes the form of "proof by contradiction" (or reductio ad absurdum)
   whereby he takes the arguments of right-libertarianism to their logical
   end and shows how they reach the memorably conclusion that the "time
   has come for liberal economic and political thinkers to stop dodging
   this issue and to critically re-examine their shared prejudices about
   certain voluntary social institutions . . . this critical process will
   inexorably drive liberalism to its only logical conclusion:
   libertarianism that finally lays the true moral foundation for economic
   and political slavery." Ellerman shows how, from a right-"libertarian"
   perspective there is a "fundamental contradiction" in a modern liberal
   society for the state to prohibit slave contracts. He notes that there
   "seems to be a basic shared prejudice of liberalism that slavery is
   inherently involuntary, so the issue of genuinely voluntary slavery has
   received little scrutiny. The perfectly valid liberal argument that
   involuntary slavery is inherently unjust is thus taken to include
   voluntary slavery (in which case, the argument, by definition, does not
   apply). This has resulted in an abridgement of the freedom of contract
   in modern liberal society." Thus it is possible to argue for a
   "civilised form of contractual slavery." ["J. Philmore,", Op. Cit.]

   So accurate and logical was Ellerman's article that many of its readers
   were convinced it was written by a right-"libertarian" (including, we
   have to say, us!). One such writer was Carole Pateman, who correctly
   noted that "[t]here is a nice historical irony here. In the American
   South, slaves were emancipated and turned into wage labourers, and now
   American contractarians argue that all workers should have the
   opportunity to turn themselves into civil slaves." [Op. Cit., p. 63]).

   The aim of Ellerman's article was to show the problems that employment
   (wage labour) presents for the concept of self-government and how
   contract need not result in social relationships based on freedom. As
   "Philmore" put it, "[a]ny thorough and decisive critique of voluntary
   slavery or constitutional non-democratic government would carry over to
   the employment contract -- which is the voluntary contractual basis for
   the free-market free-enterprise system. Such a critique would thus be a
   reductio ad absurdum." As "contractual slavery" is an "extension of the
   employer-employee contract," he shows that the difference between wage
   labour and slavery is the time scale rather than the principle or
   social relationships involved. [Op. Cit.] This explains why the early
   workers' movement called capitalism "wage slavery" and why anarchists
   still do. It exposes the unfree nature of capitalism and the poverty of
   its vision of freedom. While it is possible to present wage labour as
   "freedom" due to its "consensual" nature, it becomes much harder to do
   so when talking about slavery or dictatorship (and let us not forget
   that Nozick also had no problem with autocracy -- see [8]section B.4).
   Then the contradictions are exposed for all to see and be horrified by.

   All this does not mean that we must reject free agreement. Far from it!
   Free agreement is essential for a society based upon individual dignity
   and liberty. There are a variety of forms of free agreement and
   anarchists support those based upon co-operation and self-management
   (i.e. individuals working together as equals). Anarchists desire to
   create relationships which reflect (and so express) the liberty that is
   the basis of free agreement. Capitalism creates relationships that deny
   liberty. The opposition between autonomy and subjection can only be
   maintained by modifying or rejecting contract theory, something that
   capitalism cannot do and so the right-wing "libertarian" rejects
   autonomy in favour of subjection (and so rejects socialism in favour of
   capitalism).

   So the real contrast between genuine libertarians and
   right-"libertarians" is best expressed in their respective opinions on
   slavery. Anarchism is based upon the individual whose individuality
   depends upon the maintenance of free relationships with other
   individuals. If individuals deny their capacities for self-government
   through a contract the individuals bring about a qualitative change in
   their relationship to others -- freedom is turned into mastery and
   subordination. For the anarchist, slavery is thus the paradigm of what
   freedom is not, instead of an exemplification of what it is (as
   right-"libertarians" state). As Proudhon argued:

     "If I were asked to answer the following question: What is slavery?
     and I should answer in one word, It is murder, my meaning would be
     understood at once. No extended argument would be required to show
     that the power to take from a man his thought, his will, his
     personality, is a power of life and death; and that to enslave a man
     is to kill him." [What is Property?, p. 37]

   In contrast, the right-"libertarian" effectively argues that "I support
   slavery because I believe in liberty." It is a sad reflection of the
   ethical and intellectual bankruptcy of our society that such an
   "argument" is actually proposed by some people under the name of
   liberty. The concept of "slavery as freedom" is far too Orwellian to
   warrant a critique -- we will leave it up to right-"libertarians" to
   corrupt our language and ethical standards with an attempt to prove it.

   From the basic insight that slavery is the opposite of freedom, the
   anarchist rejection of authoritarian social relations quickly follows:

     "Liberty is inviolable. I can neither sell nor alienate my liberty;
     every contract, every condition of a contract, which has in view the
     alienation or suspension of liberty, is null: the slave, when he
     plants his foot upon the soil of liberty, at that moment becomes a
     free man . . . Liberty is the original condition of man; to renounce
     liberty is to renounce the nature of man: after that, how could we
     perform the acts of man?" [P.J. Proudhon, Op. Cit., p. 67]

   The employment contract (i.e. wage slavery) abrogates liberty. It is
   based upon inequality of power and "exploitation is a consequence of
   the fact that the sale of labour power entails the worker's
   subordination." [Carole Pateman, Op. Cit., p. 149] Hence Proudhon's
   support for self-management and opposition to capitalism -- any
   relationship that resembles slavery is illegitimate and no contract
   that creates a relationship of subordination is valid. Thus in a truly
   anarchistic society, slave contracts would be unenforceable -- people
   in a truly free (i.e. non-capitalist) society would never tolerate such
   a horrible institution or consider it a valid agreement. If someone was
   silly enough to sign such a contract, they would simply have to say
   they now rejected it in order to be free -- such contracts are made to
   be broken and without the force of a law system (and private defence
   firms) to back it up, such contracts will stay broken.

   The right-"libertarian" support for slave contracts (and wage slavery)
   indicates that their ideology has little to do with liberty and far
   more to do with justifying property and the oppression and exploitation
   it produces. Their theoretical support for permanent and temporary
   voluntary slavery and autocracy indicates a deeper authoritarianism
   which negates their claims to be libertarians.

References

   1. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secB4.html#secb42
   2. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secB1.html
   3. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF2.html#secf22
   4. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secC9.html
   5. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secC2.html
   6. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF3.html
   7. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF2.html
   8. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secB4.html
