                 F.6 Is "anarcho"-capitalism against the state?

   No. Due to its basis in private property, "anarcho"-capitalism implies
   a class division of society into bosses and workers. Any such division
   will require a state to maintain it. However, it need not be the same
   state as exists now. Regarding this point, "anarcho"-capitalism plainly
   advocates "defence associations" to protect property. For the
   "anarcho"-capitalist these private companies are not states. For
   anarchists, they most definitely. As Bakunin put it, the state "is
   authority, domination, and force, organised by the property-owning and
   so-called enlightened classes against the masses." [The Basic Bakunin,
   p. 140] It goes without saying that "anarcho"-capitalism has a state in
   the anarchist sense.

   According to Murray Rothbard [Society Without A State, p. 192], a state
   must have one or both of the following characteristics:

   1) The ability to tax those who live within it.
       2) It asserts and usually obtains a coerced monopoly of the
       provision of defence over a given area.

   He makes the same point elsewhere. [The Ethics of Liberty, p. 171]
   Significantly, he stresses that "our definition of anarchism" is a
   system which "provides no legal sanction" for aggression against person
   and property rather than, say, being against government or authority.
   [Society without a State, p. 206]

   Instead of this, the "anarcho"-capitalist thinks that people should be
   able to select their own "defence companies" (which would provide the
   needed police) and courts from a free market in "defence" which would
   spring up after the state monopoly has been eliminated. These companies
   "all . . . would have to abide by the basic law code," [Op. Cit., p.
   206] Thus a "general libertarian law code" would govern the actions of
   these companies. This "law code" would prohibit coercive aggression at
   the very least, although to do so it would have to specify what counted
   as legitimate property, how said can be owned and what actually
   constitutes aggression. Thus the law code would be quite extensive.

   How is this law code to be actually specified? Would these laws be
   democratically decided? Would they reflect common usage (i.e. custom)?
   "Supply and demand"? "Natural law"? Given the strong dislike of
   democracy shown by "anarcho"-capitalists, we think we can safely say
   that some combination of the last two options would be used. Murray
   Rothbard argued for "Natural Law" and so the judges in his system would
   "not [be] making the law but finding it on the basis of agreed-upon
   principles derived either from custom or reason." [Op. Cit., p. 206]
   David Friedman, on the other hand, argues that different defence firms
   would sell their own laws. [The Machinery of Freedom, p. 116] It is
   sometimes acknowledged that non-"libertarian" laws may be demanded (and
   supplied) in such a market although the obvious fact that the rich can
   afford to pay for more laws (either in quantity or in terms of being
   more expensive to enforce) is downplayed.

   Around this system of "defence companies" is a free market in
   "arbitrators" and "appeal judges" to administer justice and the "basic
   law code." Rothbard believes that such a system would see "arbitrators
   with the best reputation for efficiency and probity" being "chosen by
   the various parties in the market" and "will come to be given an
   increasing amount of business." Judges "will prosper on the market in
   proportion to their reputation for efficiency and impartiality." [Op.
   Cit., p. 199 and p. 204] Therefore, like any other company, arbitrators
   would strive for profits with the most successful ones would "prosper",
   i.e. become wealthy. Such wealth would, of course, have no impact on
   the decisions of the judges, and if it did, the population (in theory)
   are free to select any other judge. Of course, the competing judges
   would also be striving for profits and wealth -- which means the choice
   of character may be somewhat limited! -- and the laws which they were
   using to guide their judgements would be enforcing capitalist rights.

   Whether or not this system would work as desired is discussed in the
   following sections. We think that it will not. Moreover, we will argue
   that "anarcho"-capitalist "defence companies" meet not only the
   criteria of statehood we outlined in [1]section B.2, but also
   Rothbard's own criteria for the state. As regards the anarchist
   criterion, it is clear that "defence companies" exist to defend private
   property; that they are hierarchical (in that they are capitalist
   companies which defend the power of those who employ them); that they
   are professional coercive bodies; and that they exercise a monopoly of
   force over a given area (the area, initially, being the property of the
   person or company who is employing the company). Not only that, as we
   discuss in [2]section F.6.4 these "defence companies" also matches the
   right-libertarian and "anarcho"-capitalist definition of the state. For
   this (and other reasons), we should call the "anarcho"-capitalist
   defence firms "private states" -- that is what they are -- and
   "anarcho"-capitalism "private state" capitalism.

F.6.1 What's wrong with this "free market" justice?

   It does not take much imagination to figure out whose interests
   prosperous arbitrators, judges and defence companies would defend:
   their own as well as those who pay their wages -- which is to say,
   other members of the rich elite. As the law exists to defend property,
   then it (by definition) exists to defend the power of capitalists
   against their workers. Rothbard argued that the "judges" would "not
   [be] making the law but finding it on the basis of agreed-upon
   principles derived either from custom or reason." [Society without a
   State, p. 206] However, this begs the question: whose reason? whose
   customs? Do individuals in different classes share the same customs?
   The same ideas of right and wrong? Would rich and poor desire the same
   from a "basic law code"? Obviously not. The rich would only support a
   code which defended their power over the poor.

   Rothbard does not address this issue. He stated that
   "anarcho"-capitalism would involve "taking the largely libertarian
   common law, and correcting it by the use of man's reason, before
   enshrining it as a permanently fixed libertarian law code." ["On
   Freedom and the Law", New Individualist Review, Winter 1962, p. 40]
   Needless to say, "man" does not exist -- it is an abstraction (and a
   distinctly collectivist one, we should note). There are only individual
   men and women and so individuals and their reason. By "man's reason"
   Rothbard meant, at best, the prejudices of those individuals with whom
   he agreed with or, at worse, his own value judgements. Needless to say,
   what is considered acceptable will vary from individual to individual
   and reflect their social position. Similarly, as Kropotkin stressed,
   "common law" does not develop in isolation of class struggles and so is
   a mishmash of customs genuinely required by social life and influences
   imposed by elites by means of state action. [Anarchism, pp. 204-6] This
   implies what should be "corrected" from the "common law" will also
   differ based on their class position and their general concepts of what
   is right and wrong. History is full of examples of lawyers, jurists and
   judges (not to mention states) "correcting" common law and social
   custom in favour of a propertarian perspective which, by strange
   co-incidence, favoured the capitalists and landlords, i.e. those of the
   same class as the politicians, lawyers, jurists and judges (see
   [3]section F.8 for more details). We can imagine the results of similar
   "correcting" of common law by those deemed worthy by Rothbard and his
   followers of representing both "man" and "natural law."

   Given these obvious points, it should come as no surprise that Rothbard
   solves this problem by explicitly excluding the general population from
   deciding which laws they will be subject to. As he put it, "it would
   not be a very difficult task for Libertarian lawyers and jurists to
   arrive at a rational and objective code of libertarian legal principles
   and procedures . . . This code would then be followed and applied to
   specific cases by privately-competitive and free-market courts and
   judges, all of whom would be pledged to abide by the code." ["The
   Spooner-Tucker Doctrine: An Economist's View", pp. 5-15, Journal of
   Libertarian Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1, p. 7] By jurist Rothbard means a
   professional or an expert who studies, develops, applies or otherwise
   deals with the law, i.e. a lawyer or a judge. That is, law-making by
   privately-competitive judges and lawyers. And not only would the law be
   designed by experts, so would its interpretation:

     "If legislation is replaced by such judge-made law fixity and
     certainty . . . will replace the capriciously changing edicts of
     statutory legislation. The body of judge-made law changes very
     slowly . . . decisions properly apply only to the particular case,
     judge-made law -- in contrast to legislation -- permits a vast body
     of voluntary, freely-adapted rules, bargains, and arbitrations to
     proliferate as needed in society. The twin of the free market
     economy, then, is . . . a proliferation of voluntary rules
     interpreted and applied by experts in the law." ["On Freedom and the
     Law", Op. Cit. p. 38]

   In other words, as well as privatising the commons in land he also
   seeks to privatise "common law." This will be expropriated from the
   general population and turned over to wealthy judges and libertarian
   scholars to "correct" as they see fit. Within this mandatory legal
   regime, there would be "voluntary" interpretations yet it hardly taxes
   the imagination to see how economic inequality would shape any
   "bargains" made on it. So we have a legal system created and run by
   judges and jurists within which specific interpretations would be
   reached by "bargains" conducted between the rich and the poor. A fine
   liberation indeed!

   So although only "finding" the law, the arbitrators and judges still
   exert an influence in the "justice" process, an influence not impartial
   or neutral. As the arbitrators themselves would be part of a
   profession, with specific companies developing within the market, it
   does not take a genius to realise that when "interpreting" the "basic
   law code," such companies would hardly act against their own interests
   as companies. As we noted in [4]section F.3.2, the basic class interest
   of keeping the current property rights system going will still remain
   -- a situation which wealthy judges would be, to say the least, happy
   to see continue. In addition, if the "justice" system was based on "one
   dollar, one vote," the "law" would best defend those with the most
   "votes" (the question of market forces will be discussed in [5]section
   F.6.3). Moreover, even if "market forces" would ensure that "impartial"
   judges were dominant, all judges would be enforcing a very partial law
   code (namely one that defended capitalist property rights).
   Impartiality when enforcing partial laws hardly makes judgements less
   unfair.

   Thus, due to these three pressures -- the interests of
   arbitrators/judges, the influence of money and the nature of the law --
   the terms of "free agreements" under such a law system would be tilted
   in favour of lenders over debtors, landlords over tenants, employers
   over employees, and in general, the rich over the poor just as we have
   today. This is what one would expect in a system based on
   "unrestricted" property rights and a (capitalist) free market.

   Some "anarcho"-capitalists, however, claim that just as cheaper cars
   were developed to meet demand, so cheaper defence associations and
   "people's arbitrators" would develop on the market for the working
   class. In this way impartiality will be ensured. This argument
   overlooks a few key points.

   Firstly, the general "libertarian" law code would be applicable to all
   associations, so they would have to operate within a system determined
   by the power of money and of capital. The law code would reflect,
   therefore, property not labour and so "socialistic" law codes would be
   classed as "outlaw" ones. The options then facing working people is to
   select a firm which best enforced the capitalist law in their favour.
   And as noted above, the impartial enforcement of a biased law code will
   hardly ensure freedom or justice for all. This means that saying the
   possibility of competition from another judge would keep them honest
   becomes meaningless when they are all implementing the same capitalist
   law!

   Secondly, in a race between a Jaguar and a Volkswagen Beetle, who is
   more likely to win? The rich would have "the best justice money can
   buy," even more than they do now. Members of the capitalist class would
   be able to select the firms with the best lawyers, best private cops
   and most resources. Those without the financial clout to purchase
   quality "justice" would simply be out of luck -- such is the "magic" of
   the marketplace.

   Thirdly, because of the tendency toward concentration, centralisation,
   and oligopoly under capitalism (due to increasing capital costs for new
   firms entering the market, as discussed in [6]section C.4), a few
   companies would soon dominate the market -- with obvious implications
   for "justice." Different firms will have different resources and in a
   conflict between a small firm and a larger one, the smaller one is at a
   disadvantage. They may not be in a position to fight the larger company
   if it rejects arbitration and so may give in simply because, as the
   "anarcho"-capitalists so rightly point out, conflict and violence will
   push up a company's costs and so they would have to be avoided by
   smaller ones (it is ironic that the "anarcho"-capitalist implicitly
   assumes that every "defence company" is approximately of the same size,
   with the same resources behind it and in real life this would clearly
   not the case). Moreover, it seems likely that a Legal-Industrial
   complex would develop, with other companies buying shares in "defence"
   firms as well as companies which provide lawyers and judges (and vice
   versa). We would also expect mergers to develop as well as
   cross-ownership between companies, not to mention individual judges and
   security company owners and managers having shares in other capitalist
   firms. Even if the possibility that the companies providing security
   and "justice" have links with other capitalism firms is discounted then
   the fact remains that these firms would hardly be sympathetic to
   organisations and individuals seeking to change the system which makes
   them rich or, as property owners and bosses, seeking to challenge the
   powers associated with both particularly if the law is designed from a
   propertarian perspective.

   Fourthly, it is very likely that many companies would make subscription
   to a specific "defence" firm or court a requirement of employment and
   residence. Just as today many (most?) workers have to sign no-union
   contracts (and face being fired if they change their minds), it does
   not take much imagination to see that the same could apply to "defence"
   firms and courts. This was/is the case in company towns (indeed, you
   can consider unions as a form of "defence" firm and these companies
   refused to recognise them). As the labour market is almost always a
   buyer's market, it is not enough to argue that workers can find a new
   job without this condition. They may not and so have to put up with
   this situation. And if (as seems likely) the laws and rules of the
   property-owner will take precedence in any conflict, then workers and
   tenants will be at a disadvantage no matter how "impartial" the judges.

   Ironically, some "anarcho"-capitalists (like David Friedman) have
   pointed to company/union negotiations as an example of how different
   defence firms would work out their differences peacefully. Sadly for
   this argument, union rights under "actually existing capitalism" were
   hard fought for, often resulting in strikes which quickly became
   mini-wars as the capitalists used the full might associated with their
   wealth to stop them getting a foothold or to destroy them if they had.
   In America the bosses usually had recourse to private defence firms
   like the Pinkertons to break unions and strikes. Since 1935 in America,
   union rights have been protected by the state in direct opposition to
   capitalist "freedom of contract." Before the law was changed (under
   pressure from below, in the face of business opposition and violence),
   unions were usually crushed by force -- the companies were better
   armed, had more resources and had the law on their side (Rothbard
   showed his grasp of American labour history by asserting that union
   "restrictions and strikes" were the "result of government privilege,
   notably in the Wagner Act of 1935." [The Logic of Action II, p. 194]).
   Since the 1980s and the advent of the free(r) market, we can see what
   happens to "peaceful negotiation" and "co-operation" between unions and
   companies when it is no longer required and when the resources of both
   sides are unequal. The market power of companies far exceeds those of
   the unions and the law, by definition, favours the companies. As an
   example of how competing "protection agencies" will work in an
   "anarcho"-capitalist society, it is far more insightful than originally
   intended!

   Now let us consider Rothbard's "basic law code" itself. For Rothbard,
   the laws in the "general libertarian law code" would be unchangeable,
   selected by those considered as "the voice of nature" (with obvious
   authoritarian implications). David Friedman, in contrast, argues that
   as well as a market in defence companies, there will also be a market
   in laws and rights. However, there will be extensive market pressure to
   unify these differing law codes into one standard one (imagine what
   would happen if ever CD manufacturer created a unique CD player, or
   every computer manufacturer different sized floppy-disk drivers --
   little wonder, then, that over time companies standardise their
   products). Friedman himself acknowledges that this process is likely
   (and uses the example of standard paper sizes to illustrate it). Which
   suggests that competition would be meaningless as all firms would be
   enforcing the same (capitalist) law.

   In any event, the laws would not be decided on the basis of "one
   person, one vote"; hence, as market forces worked their magic, the
   "general" law code would reflect vested interests and so be very hard
   to change. As rights and laws would be a commodity like everything else
   in capitalism, they would soon reflect the interests of the rich --
   particularly if those interpreting the law are wealthy professionals
   and companies with vested interests of their own. Little wonder that
   the individualist anarchists proposed "trial by jury" as the only basis
   for real justice in a free society. For, unlike professional
   "arbitrators," juries are ad hoc, made up of ordinary people and do not
   reflect power, authority, or the influence of wealth. And by being able
   to judge the law as well as a conflict, they can ensure a populist
   revision of laws as society progresses.

   Rothbard, unsurprisingly, is at pains to dismiss the individualist
   anarchist idea of juries judging the law as well as the facts, stating
   it would give each free-market jury "totally free rein over judicial
   decisions" and this "could not be expected to arrive at just or even
   libertarian decisions." ["The Spooner-Tucker Doctrine: An Economist's
   View", Op. Cit., p.7] However, the opposite is the case as juries made
   up of ordinary people will be more likely to reach just decisions which
   place genuinely libertarian positions above a law dedicated to
   maintaining capitalist property and power. History is full of examples
   of juries acquitting people for so-called crimes against property which
   are the result of dire need or simply reflect class injustice. For
   example, during the Great Depression unemployed miners in Pennsylvania
   "dug small mines on company property, mined coal, trucked it to cities
   and sold it below the commercial rate. By 1934, 5 million tons of this
   'bootleg' coal were produced by twenty thousand men using four thousand
   vehicles. When attempts were made to prosecute, local juries would not
   convict, local jailers would not imprison." [Howard Zinn, A People's
   History of the United States, pp. 385-6] It is precisely this outcome
   which causes Rothbard to reject that system.

   Thus Rothbard postulated a judge directed system of laws in stark
   contrast to individualist anarchism's jury directed system. It is
   understandable that Rothbard would seek to replace juries with judges,
   it is the only way he can exclude the general population from having a
   say in the laws they are subjected to. Juries allow the general public
   to judge the law as well as any crime and so this would allow those
   aspects "corrected" by right-"libertarians" to seep back into the
   "common law" and so make private property and power accountable to the
   general public rather than vice versa. Moreover, concepts of right and
   wrong evolve over time and in line with changes in socio-economic
   conditions. To have a "common law" which is unchanging means that
   social evolution is considered to have stopped when Murray Rothbard
   decided to call his ideology "anarcho"-capitalism.

   In a genuinely libertarian system, social customs (common law) would
   evolve based on what the general population thought was right and wrong
   based on changing social institutions and relationships between
   individuals. That is why ruling classes have always sought to replace
   it with state determined and enforced laws. Changing social norms and
   institutions can be seen from property. As Proudhon noted, property
   "changed its nature" over time. Originally, "the word property was
   synonymous with . . . individual possession" but it became more
   "complex" and turned into private property -- "the right to use it by
   his neighbour's labour." [What is Property?, p. 395] The changing
   nature of property created relations of domination and exploitation
   between people absent before. For the capitalist, however, both the
   tools of the self-employed artisan and the capital of a transnational
   corporation are both forms of "property" and so basically identical.
   Changing social relations impact on society and the individuals who
   make it up. This would be reflected in any genuinely libertarian
   society, something right-"libertarians" are aware of. They, therefore,
   seek to freeze the rights framework and legal system to protect
   institutions, like property, no matter how they evolve and come to
   replace whatever freedom enhancing features they had with oppression.
   Hence we find Rothbard's mentor, Ludwig von Mises asserting that
   "[t]here may possibly be a difference of opinion about whether a
   particular institution is socially beneficial or harmful. But once it
   has been judged [by whom?] beneficial, one can no longer contend that,
   for some inexplicable reason, it must be condemned as immoral."
   [Liberalism, p. 34] Rothbard's system is designed to ensure that the
   general population cannot judge whether a particular institution has
   changed is social impact. Thus a system of "defence" on the capitalist
   market will continue to reflect the influence and power of property
   owners and wealth and not be subject to popular control beyond choosing
   between companies to enforce the capitalist laws.

   Ultimately, such an "anarcho"-capitalist system would be based on
   simple absolute principles decided in advance by a small group of
   ideological leaders. We are then expected to live with the consequences
   as best we can. If people end up in a worse condition than before then
   that is irrelevant as that we have enforced the eternal principles they
   have proclaimed as being in our best interests.

F.6.2 What are the social consequences of such a system?

   The "anarcho" capitalist imagines that there will be police agencies,
   "defence associations," courts, and appeals courts all organised on a
   free-market basis and available for hire. As David Wieck points out,
   however, the major problem with such a system would not be the
   corruption of "private" courts and police forces (although, as
   suggested above, this could indeed be a problem):

     "There is something more serious than the 'Mafia danger', and this
     other problem concerns the role of such 'defence' institutions in a
     given social and economic context.

     "[The] context . . . is one of a free-market economy with no
     restraints upon accumulation of property. Now, we had an American
     experience, roughly from the end of the Civil War to the 1930's, in
     what were in effect private courts, private police, indeed private
     governments. We had the experience of the (private) Pinkerton police
     which, by its spies, by its agents provocateurs, and by methods that
     included violence and kidnapping, was one of the most powerful tools
     of large corporations and an instrument of oppression of working
     people. We had the experience as well of the police forces
     established to the same end, within corporations, by numerous
     companies . . . (The automobile companies drew upon additional
     covert instruments of a private nature, usually termed vigilante,
     such as the Black Legion). These were, in effect, private armies,
     and were sometimes described as such. The territories owned by coal
     companies, which frequently included entire towns and their
     environs, the stores the miners were obliged by economic coercion to
     patronise, the houses they lived in, were commonly policed by the
     private police of the United States Steel Corporation or whatever
     company owned the properties. The chief practical function of these
     police was, of course, to prevent labour organisation and preserve a
     certain balance of 'bargaining.' . . . These complexes were a law
     unto themselves, powerful enough to ignore, when they did not
     purchase, the governments of various jurisdictions of the American
     federal system. This industrial system was, at the time, often
     characterised as feudalism."
     [Anarchist Justice, pp. 223-224]

   For a description of the weaponry and activities of these private
   armies, the Marxist economic historian Maurice Dobb presents an
   excellent summary in Studies in Capitalist Development. [pp. 353-357]
   According to a report on "Private Police Systems" quoted by Dobb, in a
   town dominated by Republican Steel the "civil liberties and the rights
   of labour were suppressed by company police. Union organisers were
   driven out of town." Company towns had their own (company-run) money,
   stores, houses and jails and many corporations had machine-guns and
   tear-gas along with the usual shot-guns, rifles and revolvers. The
   "usurpation of police powers by privately paid 'guards and 'deputies',
   often hired from detective agencies, many with criminal records" was "a
   general practice in many parts of the country."

   The local (state-run) law enforcement agencies turned a blind-eye to
   what was going on (after all, the workers had broken their contracts
   and so were "criminal aggressors" against the companies) even when
   union members and strikers were beaten and killed. The workers own
   defence organisations (unions) were the only ones willing to help them,
   and if the workers seemed to be winning then troops were called in to
   "restore the peace" (as happened in the Ludlow strike, when strikers
   originally cheered the troops as they thought they would defend them;
   needless to say, they were wrong).

   Here we have a society which is claimed by many "anarcho"-capitalists
   as one of the closest examples to their "ideal," with limited state
   intervention, free reign for property owners, etc. What happened? The
   rich reduced the working class to a serf-like existence, capitalist
   production undermined independent producers (much to the annoyance of
   individualist anarchists at the time), and the result was the emergence
   of the corporate America that "anarcho"-capitalists (sometimes) say
   they oppose.

   Are we to expect that "anarcho"-capitalism will be different? That,
   unlike before, "defence" firms will intervene on behalf of strikers?
   Given that the "general libertarian law code" will be enforcing
   capitalist property rights, workers will be in exactly the same
   situation as they were then. Support of strikers violating property
   rights would be a violation of the law and be costly for profit making
   firms to do (if not dangerous as they could be "outlawed" by the rest).
   This suggests that "anarcho"-capitalism will extend extensive rights
   and powers to bosses, but few if any rights to rebellious workers. And
   this difference in power is enshrined within the fundamental
   institutions of the system. This can easily be seen from Rothbard's
   numerous anti-union tirades and his obvious hatred of them, strikes and
   pickets (which he habitually labelled as violent). As such it is not
   surprising to discover that Rothbard complained in the 1960s that,
   because of the Wagner Act, the American police "commonly remain
   'neutral' when strike-breakers are molested or else blame the
   strike-breakers for 'provoking' the attacks on them . . . When unions
   are permitted to resort to violence, the state or other enforcing
   agency has implicitly delegated this power to the unions. The unions,
   then, have become 'private states.'" [The Logic of Action II, p. 41]
   The role of the police was to back the property owner against their
   rebel workers, in other words, and the state was failing to provide the
   appropriate service (of course, that bosses exercising power over
   workers provoked the strike is irrelevant, while private police
   attacking picket lines is purely a form of "defensive" violence and is,
   likewise, of no concern).

   In evaluating "anarcho"-capitalism's claim to be a form of anarchism,
   Peter Marshall notes that "private protection agencies would merely
   serve the interests of their paymasters." [Demanding the Impossible, p.
   653] With the increase of private "defence associations" under "really
   existing capitalism" today (associations that many
   "anarcho"-capitalists point to as examples of their ideas), we see a
   vindication of Marshall's claim. There have been many documented
   experiences of protesters being badly beaten by private security
   guards. As far as market theory goes, the companies are only supplying
   what the buyer is demanding. The rights of others are not a factor (yet
   more "externalities," obviously). Even if the victims successfully sue
   the company, the message is clear -- social activism can seriously
   damage your health. With a reversion to "a general libertarian law
   code" enforced by private companies, this form of "defence" of
   "absolute" property rights can only increase, perhaps to the levels
   previously attained in the heyday of US capitalism, as described above
   by Wieck.

F.6.3 But surely market forces will stop abuses by the rich?

   Unlikely. The rise of corporations within America indicates exactly how
   a "general libertarian law code" would reflect the interests of the
   rich and powerful. The laws recognising corporations as "legal persons"
   were not primarily a product of "the state" but of private lawyers
   hired by the rich. As Howard Zinn notes:

     "the American Bar Association, organised by lawyers accustomed to
     serving the wealthy, began a national campaign of education to
     reverse the [Supreme] Court decision [that companies could not be
     considered as a person]. . . . By 1886, they succeeded . . . the
     Supreme Court had accepted the argument that corporations were
     'persons' and their money was property protected by the process
     clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . The justices of the Supreme
     Court were not simply interpreters of the Constitution. They were
     men of certain backgrounds, of certain [class] interests." [A
     People's History of the United States, p. 255]

   Of course it will be argued that the Supreme Court is chosen by the
   government and is a state enforced monopoly and so our analysis is
   flawed. Yet this is not the case. As Rothbard made clear, the "general
   libertarian law code" would be created by lawyers and jurists and
   everyone would be expected to obey it. Why expect these lawyers and
   jurists to be any less class conscious then those in the 19th century?
   If the Supreme Court "was doing its bit for the ruling elite" then why
   would those creating the law system be any different? "How could it be
   neutral between rich and poor," argues Zinn, "when its members were
   often former wealthy lawyers, and almost always came from the upper
   class?" [Op. Cit., p. 254] Moreover, the corporate laws came about
   because there was a demand for them. That demand would still have
   existed in "anarcho"-capitalism. Now, while there may nor be a Supreme
   Court, Rothbard does maintain that "the basic Law Code . . . would have
   to be agreed upon by all the judicial agencies" but he maintains that
   this "would imply no unified legal system"! Even though "[a]ny agencies
   that transgressed the basic libertarian law code would be open outlaws"
   and soon crushed this is not, apparently, a monopoly. [The Ethics of
   Liberty, p. 234] So, you either agree to the law code or you go out of
   business. And that is not a monopoly! Therefore, we think, our comments
   on the Supreme Court are valid (see also [7]section F.7.2).

   If all the available defence firms enforce the same laws, then it can
   hardly be called "competitive"! And if this is the case (and it is)
   "when private wealth is uncontrolled, then a police-judicial complex
   enjoying a clientele of wealthy corporations whose motto is
   self-interest is hardly an innocuous social force controllable by the
   possibility of forming or affiliating with competing 'companies.'"
   [Wieck, Op. Cit., p. 225] This is particularly true if these companies
   are themselves Big Business and so have a large impact on the laws they
   are enforcing. If the law code recognises and protects capitalist
   power, property and wealth as fundamental any attempt to change this is
   "initiation of force" and so the power of the rich is written into the
   system from the start!

   (And, we must add, if there is a general libertarian law code to which
   all must subscribe, where does that put customer demand? If people
   demand a non-libertarian law code, will defence firms refuse to supply
   it? If so, will not new firms, looking for profit, spring up that will
   supply what is being demanded? And will that not put them in direct
   conflict with the existing, pro-general law code ones? And will a
   market in law codes not just reflect economic power and wealth? David
   Friedman, who is for a market in law codes, argues that "[i]f almost
   everyone believes strongly that heroin addiction is so horrible that it
   should not be permitted anywhere under any circumstances
   anarcho-capitalist institutions will produce laws against heroin. Laws
   are being produced on the market, and that is what the market wants."
   And he adds that "market demands are in dollars, not votes. The
   legality of heroin will be determined, not by how many are for or
   against but how high a cost each side is willing to bear in order to
   get its way." [The Machinery of Freedom, p. 127] And, as the market is
   less than equal in terms of income and wealth, such a position will
   mean that the capitalist class will have a higher effective demand than
   the working class and more resources to pay for any conflicts that
   arise. Thus any law codes that develop will tend to reflect the
   interests of the wealthy.)

   Which brings us nicely on to the next problem regarding market forces.

   As well as the obvious influence of economic interests and differences
   in wealth, another problem faces the "free market" justice of
   "anarcho"-capitalism. This is the "general libertarian law code"
   itself. Even if we assume that the system actually works like it should
   in theory, the simple fact remains that these "defence companies" are
   enforcing laws which explicitly defend capitalist property (and so
   social relations). Capitalists own the means of production upon which
   they hire wage-labourers to work and this is an inequality established
   prior to any specific transaction in the labour market. This inequality
   reflects itself in terms of differences in power within (and outside)
   the company and in the "law code" of "anarcho"-capitalism which
   protects that power against the dispossessed.

   In other words, the law code within which the defence companies work
   assumes that capitalist property is legitimate and that force can
   legitimately be used to defend it. This means that, in effect,
   "anarcho"-capitalism is based on a monopoly of law, a monopoly which
   explicitly exists to defend the power and capital of the wealthy. The
   major difference is that the agencies used to protect that wealth will
   be in a weaker position to act independently of their pay-masters.
   Unlike the state, the "defence" firm is not remotely accountable to the
   general population and cannot be used to equalise even slightly the
   power relationships between worker and capitalist (as the state has, on
   occasion done, due to public pressure and to preserve the system as a
   whole). And, needless to say, it is very likely that the private police
   forces will give preferential treatment to their wealthier customers
   (which business does not?) and that the law code will reflect the
   interests of the wealthier sectors of society (particularly if
   prosperous judges administer that code) in reality, even if not in
   theory. Since, in capitalist practice, "the customer is always right,"
   the best-paying customers will get their way in "anarcho"-capitalist
   society.

   For example, in chapter 29 of The Machinery of Freedom, David Friedman
   presents an example of how a clash of different law codes could be
   resolved by a bargaining process (the law in question is the death
   penalty). This process would involve one defence firm giving a sum of
   money to the other for them accepting the appropriate (anti/pro capital
   punishment) court. Friedman claims that "[a]s in any good trade,
   everyone gains" but this is obviously not true. Assuming the
   anti-capital punishment defence firm pays the pro one to accept an
   anti-capital punishment court, then, yes, both defence firms have made
   money and so are happy, so are the anti-capital punishment consumers
   but the pro-death penalty customers have only (perhaps) received a cut
   in their bills. Their desire to see criminals hanged (for whatever
   reason) has been ignored (if they were not in favour of the death
   penalty, they would not have subscribed to that company). Friedman
   claims that the deal, by allowing the anti-death penalty firm to cut
   its costs, will ensure that it "keep its customers and even get more"
   but this is just an assumption. It is just as likely to loose customers
   to a defence firm that refuses to compromise (and has the resources to
   back it up). Friedman's assumption that lower costs will automatically
   win over people's passions is unfounded as is the assumption that both
   firms have equal resources and bargaining power. If the pro-capital
   punishment firm demands more than the anti can provide and has larger
   weaponry and troops, then the anti defence firm may have to agree to
   let the pro one have its way. So, all in all, it is not clear that
   "everyone gains" -- there may be a sizeable percentage of those
   involved who do not "gain" as their desire for capital punishment is
   traded away by those who claimed they would enforce it. This may, in
   turn, produce a demand for defence firms which do not compromise with
   obvious implications for public peace.

   In other words, a system of competing law codes and privatised rights
   does not ensure that all individual interests are meet. Given unequal
   resources within society, it is clear that the "effective demand" of
   the parties involved to see their law codes enforced is drastically
   different. The wealthy head of a transnational corporation will have
   far more resources available to him to pay for his laws to be enforced
   than one of his employees on the assembly line. Moreover, as we noted
   in [8]section F.3.1, the labour market is usually skewed in favour of
   capitalists. This means that workers have to compromise to get work and
   such compromises may involve agreeing to join a specific "defence" firm
   or not join one at all (just as workers are often forced to sign
   non-union contracts today in order to get work). In other words, a
   privatised law system is very likely to skew the enforcement of laws in
   line with the skewing of income and wealth in society. At the very
   least, unlike every other market, the customer is not guaranteed to get
   exactly what they demand simply because the product they "consume" is
   dependent on others within the same market to ensure its supply. The
   unique workings of the law/defence market are such as to deny customer
   choice (we will discuss other aspects of this unique market shortly).
   Wieck summed by pointing out the obvious:

     "any judicial system is going to exist in the context of economic
     institutions. If there are gross inequalities of power in the
     economic and social domains, one has to imagine society as strangely
     compartmentalised in order to believe that those inequalities will
     fail to reflect themselves in the judicial and legal domain, and
     that the economically powerful will be unable to manipulate the
     legal and judicial system to their advantage. To abstract from such
     influences of context, and then consider the merits of an abstract
     judicial system. . . is to follow a method that is not likely to
     take us far. This, by the way, is a criticism that applies. . .to
     any theory that relies on a rule of law to override the tendencies
     inherent in a given social and economic system" [Op. Cit., p. 225]

   There is another reason why "market forces" will not stop abuse by the
   rich, or indeed stop the system from turning from private to public
   statism. This is due to the nature of the "defence" market (for a
   similar analysis of the "defence" market see right-"libertarian"
   economist Tyler Cowen's "Law as a Public Good: The Economics of
   Anarchy" [Economics and Philosophy, no. 8 (1992), pp. 249-267] and
   "Rejoinder to David Friedman on the Economics of Anarchy" [Economics
   and Philosophy, no. 10 (1994), pp. 329-332]). In "anarcho"-capitalist
   theory it is assumed that the competing "defence companies" have a
   vested interest in peacefully settling differences between themselves
   by means of arbitration. In order to be competitive on the market,
   companies will have to co-operate via contractual relations otherwise
   the higher price associated with conflict will make the company
   uncompetitive and it will go under. Those companies that ignore
   decisions made in arbitration would be outlawed by others, ostracised
   and their rulings ignored. By this process, it is argued, a system of
   competing "defence" companies will be stable and not turn into a civil
   war between agencies with each enforcing the interests of their clients
   against others by force.

   However, there is a catch. Unlike every other market, the businesses in
   competition in the "defence" industry must co-operate with its fellows
   in order to provide its services for its customers. They need to be
   able to agree to courts and judges, agree to abide by decisions and law
   codes and so forth. In economics there are other, more accurate, terms
   to describe co-operative activity between companies: collusion and
   cartels. These are when companies in a specific market agree to work
   together (co-operate) to restrict competition and reap the benefits of
   monopoly power by working to achieve the same ends in partnership with
   each other. By stressing the co-operative nature of the "defence"
   market, "anarcho"-capitalists are implicitly acknowledging that
   collusion is built into the system. The necessary contractual relations
   between agencies in the "protection" market require that firms
   co-operate and, by so doing, to behave (effectively) as one large firm
   (and so resemble a normal state even more than they already do).
   Quoting Adam Smith seems appropriate here: "People of the same trade
   seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the
   conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some
   contrivance to raise prices." [The Wealth of Nations, p. 117] Having a
   market based on people of the same trade co-operating seems, therefore,
   an unwise move.

   For example, when buying food it does not matter whether the
   supermarkets visited have good relations with each other. The goods
   bought are independent of the relationships that exist between
   competing companies. However, in the case of private states this is not
   the case. If a specific "defence" company has bad relationships with
   other companies in the market then it is against a customer's
   self-interest to subscribe to it. Why subscribe to a private state if
   its judgements are ignored by the others and it has to resort to
   violence to be heard? This, as well as being potentially dangerous,
   will also push up the prices that have to be paid. Arbitration is one
   of the most important services a defence firm can offer its customers
   and its market share is based upon being able to settle interagency
   disputes without risk of war or uncertainty that the final outcome will
   not be accepted by all parties. Lose that and a company will lose
   market share.

   Therefore, the market set-up within the "anarcho"-capitalist "defence"
   market is such that private states have to co-operate with the others
   (or go out of business fast) and this means collusion can take place.
   In other words, a system of private states will have to agree to work
   together in order to provide the service of "law enforcement" to their
   customers and the result of such co-operation is to create a cartel.
   However, unlike cartels in other industries, the "defence" cartel will
   be a stable body simply because its members have to work with their
   competitors in order to survive.

   Let us look at what would happen after such a cartel is formed in a
   specific area and a new "defence company" desired to enter the market.
   This new company will have to work with the members of the cartel in
   order to provide its services to its customers (note that
   "anarcho"-capitalists already assume that they "will have to" subscribe
   to the same law code). If the new defence firm tries to under-cut the
   cartel's monopoly prices, the other companies would refuse to work with
   it. Having to face constant conflict or the possibility of conflict,
   seeing its decisions being ignored by other agencies and being
   uncertain what the results of a dispute would be, few would patronise
   the new "defence company." The new company's prices would go up and it
   would soon face either folding or joining the cartel. Unlike every
   other market, if a "defence company" does not have friendly,
   co-operative relations with other firms in the same industry then it
   will go out of business.

   This means that the firms that are co-operating have simply to agree
   not to deal with new firms which are attempting to undermine the cartel
   in order for them to fail. A "cartel busting" firm goes out of business
   in the same way an outlaw one does -- the higher costs associated with
   having to solve all its conflicts by force, not arbitration, increases
   its production costs much higher than the competitors and the firm
   faces insurmountable difficulties selling its products at a profit
   (ignoring any drop of demand due to fears of conflict by actual and
   potential customers). Even if we assume that many people will happily
   join the new firm in spite of the dangers to protect themselves against
   the cartel and its taxation (i.e. monopoly profits), enough will remain
   members of the cartel so that co-operation will still be needed and
   conflict unprofitable and dangerous (and as the cartel will have more
   resources than the new firm, it could usually hold out longer than the
   new firm could). In effect, breaking the cartel may take the form of an
   armed revolution -- as it would with any state.

   The forces that break up cartels and monopolies in other industries
   (such as free entry -- although, of course the "defence" market will be
   subject to oligopolistic tendencies as any other and this will create
   barriers to entry) do not work here and so new firms have to co-operate
   or loose market share and/or profits. This means that "defence
   companies" will reap monopoly profits and, more importantly, have a
   monopoly of force over a given area.

   It is also likely that a multitude of cartels would develop, with a
   given cartel operating in a given locality. This is because law
   enforcement would be localised in given areas as most crime occurs
   where the criminal lives (few criminals would live in Glasgow and
   commit crimes in Paris). However, as defence companies have to
   co-operate to provide their services, so would the cartels. Few people
   live all their lives in one area and so firms from different cartels
   would come into contact, so forming a cartel of cartels. This cartel of
   cartels may (perhaps) be less powerful than a local cartel, but it
   would still be required and for exactly the same reasons a local one
   is. Therefore "anarcho"-capitalism would, like "actually existing
   capitalism," be marked by a series of public states covering given
   areas, co-ordinated by larger states at higher levels. Such a set up
   would parallel the United States in many ways except it would be run
   directly by wealthy shareholders without the sham of "democratic"
   elections. Moreover, as in the USA and other states there will still be
   a monopoly of rules and laws (the "general libertarian law code").

   Hence a monopoly of private states will develop in addition to the
   existing monopoly of law and this is a de facto monopoly of force over
   a given area (i.e. some kind of public state run by share holders). New
   companies attempting to enter the "defence" industry will have to work
   with the existing cartel in order to provide the services it offers to
   its customers. The cartel is in a dominant position and new entries
   into the market either become part of it or fail. This is exactly the
   position with the state, with "private agencies" free to operate as
   long as they work to the state's guidelines. As with the monopolist
   "general libertarian law code", if you do not toe the line, you go out
   of business fast.

   "Anarcho"-capitalists claim that this will not occur, but that the
   co-operation needed to provide the service of law enforcement will
   somehow not turn into collusion between companies. However, they are
   quick to argue that renegade "agencies" (for example, the so-called
   "Mafia problem" or those who reject judgements) will go out of business
   because of the higher costs associated with conflict and not
   arbitration. Yet these higher costs are ensured because the firms in
   question do not co-operate with others. If other agencies boycott a
   firm but co-operate with all the others, then the boycotted firm will
   be at the same disadvantage -- regardless of whether it is a cartel
   buster or a renegade. So the "anarcho"-capitalist is trying to have it
   both ways. If the punishment of non-conforming firms cannot occur, then
   "anarcho"-capitalism will turn into a war of all against all or, at the
   very least, the service of social peace and law enforcement cannot be
   provided. If firms cannot deter others from disrupting the social peace
   (one service the firm provides) then "anarcho"-capitalism is not stable
   and will not remain orderly as agencies develop which favour the
   interests of their own customers and enforce their own law codes at the
   expense of others. If collusion cannot occur (or is too costly) then
   neither can the punishment of non-conforming firms and
   "anarcho"-capitalism will prove to be unstable.

   So, to sum up, the "defence" market of private states has powerful
   forces within it to turn it into a monopoly of force over a given area.
   From a privately chosen monopoly of force over a specific (privately
   owned) area, the market of private states will turn into a monopoly of
   force over a general area. This is due to the need for peaceful
   relations between companies, relations which are required for a firm to
   secure market share. The unique market forces that exist within this
   market ensure collusion and the system of private states will become a
   cartel and so a public state - unaccountable to all but its
   shareholders, a state of the wealthy, by the wealthy, for the wealthy.

F.6.4 Why are these "defence associations" states?

   It is clear that "anarcho"-capitalist defence associations meet the
   criteria of statehood outlined in section B.2 ([9]"Why are anarchists
   against the state"). They defend property and preserve authority
   relationships, they practice coercion, and are hierarchical
   institutions which govern those under them on behalf of a "ruling
   elite," i.e. those who employ both the governing forces and those they
   govern. Thus, from an anarchist perspective, these "defence
   associations" are most definitely states.

   What is interesting, however, is that by their own definitions a very
   good case can be made that these "defence associations" are states in
   the "anarcho"-capitalist sense too. Capitalist apologists usually
   define a "government" (or state) as something which has a monopoly of
   force and coercion within a given area. Relative to the rest of the
   society, these defence associations would have a monopoly of force and
   coercion of a given piece of property: thus, by the
   "anarcho"-capitalists' own definition of statehood, these associations
   would qualify!

   If we look at Rothbard's definition of statehood, which requires (a)
   the power to tax and/or (b) a "coerced monopoly of the provision of
   defence over a given area", "anarcho"-capitalism runs into trouble.

   In the first place, the costs of hiring defence associations will be
   deducted from the wealth created by those who use, but do not own, the
   property of capitalists and landlords. Let us not forget that a
   capitalist will only employ a worker or rent out land and housing if
   they make a profit from so doing. Without the labour of the worker,
   there would be nothing to sell and no wages to pay for rent and so a
   company's or landlord's "defence" firm will be paid from the revenue
   gathered from the capitalists power to extract a tribute from those who
   use, but do not own, a property. In other words, workers would pay for
   the agencies that enforce their employers' authority over them via the
   wage system and rent -- taxation in a more insidious form.

   In the second, under capitalism most people spend a large part of their
   day on other people's property -- that is, they work for capitalists
   and/or live in rented accommodation. Hence if property owners select a
   "defence association" to protect their factories, farms, rental
   housing, etc., their employees and tenants will view it as a "coerced
   monopoly of the provision of defence over a given area." For certainly
   the employees and tenants will not be able to hire their own defence
   companies to expropriate the capitalists and landlords. So, from the
   standpoint of the employees and tenants, the owners do have a monopoly
   of "defence" over the areas in question. Of course, the
   "anarcho"-capitalist will argue that the tenants and workers "consent"
   to all the rules and conditions of a contract when they sign it and so
   the property owner's monopoly is not "coerced." However, the "consent"
   argument is so weak in conditions of inequality as to be useless (see
   [10]section F.3.1, for example) and, moreover, it can and has been used
   to justify the state. In other words, "consent" in and of itself does
   not ensure that a given regime is not statist. So an argument along
   these lines is deeply flawed and can be used to justify regimes which
   are little better than "industrial feudalism" (such as, as indicated in
   [11]section B.4, company towns, for example -- an institution which
   right-"libertarians" have no problem with). Even the "general
   libertarian law code," could be considered a "monopoly of government
   over a particular area," particularly if ordinary people have no real
   means of affecting the law code, either because it is market-driven and
   so is money-determined, or because it will be "natural" law and so
   unchangeable by mere mortals.

   In other words, if the state "arrogates to itself a monopoly of force,
   of ultimate decision-making power, over a given area territorial area"
   then its pretty clear that the property owner shares this power. As we
   indicated in [12]section F.1, Rothbard agrees that the owner is, after
   all, the "ultimate decision-making power" in their workplace or on
   their land. If the boss takes a dislike to you (for example, you do not
   follow their orders) then you get fired. If you cannot get a job or
   rent the land without agreeing to certain conditions (such as not
   joining a union or subscribing to the "defence firm" approved by your
   employer) then you either sign the contract or look for something else.
   Rothbard fails to draw the obvious conclusion and instead refers to the
   state "prohibiting the voluntary purchase and sale of defence and
   judicial services." [The Ethics of Liberty, p. 170 and p. 171] But just
   as surely as the law of contract allows the banning of unions from a
   property, it can just as surely ban the sale and purchase of defence
   and judicial services (it could be argued that market forces will stop
   this happening, but this is unlikely as bosses usually have the
   advantage on the labour market and workers have to compromise to get a
   job). After all, in the company towns, only company money was legal
   tender and company police the only law enforcers.

   Therefore, it is obvious that the "anarcho"-capitalist system meets the
   Weberian criteria of a monopoly to enforce certain rules in a given
   area of land. The "general libertarian law code" is a monopoly and
   property owners determine the rules that apply on their property.
   Moreover, if the rules that property owners enforce are subject to
   rules contained in the monopolistic "general libertarian law code" (for
   example, that they cannot ban the sale and purchase of certain products
   -- such as defence -- on their own territory) then "anarcho"-capitalism
   definitely meets the Weberian definition of the state (as described by
   Ayn Rand as an institution "that holds the exclusive power to enforce
   certain rules of conduct in a given geographical area" [Capitalism: The
   Unknown Ideal, p. 239]) as its "law code" overrides the desires of
   property owners to do what they like on their own property.

   Therefore, no matter how you look at it, "anarcho"-capitalism and its
   "defence" market promotes a "monopoly of ultimate decision making
   power" over a "given territorial area". It is obvious that for
   anarchists, the "anarcho"-capitalist system is a state system. And, as
   we note, a reasonable case can be made for it also being a state in the
   "anarcho"-capitalist sense as well. So, in effect, "anarcho"-capitalism
   has a different sort of state, one in which bosses hire and fire the
   policeman. As anarchist Peter Sabatini notes:

     "Within [right] Libertarianism, Rothbard represents a minority
     perspective that actually argues for the total elimination of the
     state. However Rothbard's claim as an anarchist is quickly voided
     when it is shown that he only wants an end to the public state. In
     its place he allows countless private states, with each person
     supplying their own police force, army, and law, or else purchasing
     these services from capitalist vendors . . . Rothbard sees nothing
     at all wrong with the amassing of wealth, therefore those with more
     capital will inevitably have greater coercive force at their
     disposal, just as they do now." [Libertarianism: Bogus Anarchy]

   Far from wanting to abolish the state, then, "anarcho"-capitalists only
   desire to privatise it - to make it solely accountable to capitalist
   wealth. Their "companies" perform the same services as the state, for
   the same people, in the same manner. However, there is one slight
   difference. Property owners would be able to select between competing
   companies for their "services." Because such "companies" are employed
   by the boss, they would be used to reinforce the totalitarian nature of
   capitalist firms by ensuring that the police and the law they enforce
   are not even slightly accountable to ordinary people. Looking beyond
   the "defence association" to the defence market itself (as we argued in
   the [13]last section), this will become a cartel and so become some
   kind of public state. The very nature of the private state, its need to
   co-operate with others in the same industry, push it towards a monopoly
   network of firms and so a monopoly of force over a given area. Given
   the assumptions used to defend "anarcho"-capitalism, its system of
   private statism will develop into public statism -- a state run by
   managers accountable only to the share-holding elite.

   To quote Peter Marshall again, the "anarcho"-capitalists "claim that
   all would benefit from a free exchange on the market, it is by no means
   certain; any unfettered market system would most likely sponsor a
   reversion to an unequal society with defence associations perpetuating
   exploitation and privilege." [Demanding the Impossible, p. 565]
   History, and current practice, prove this point.

   In short, "anarcho"-capitalists are not anarchists at all, they are
   just capitalists who desire to see private states develop -- states
   which are strictly accountable to their paymasters without even the
   sham of democracy we have today. Hence a far better name for
   "anarcho"-capitalism would be "private-state" capitalism. At least that
   way we get a fairer idea of what they are trying to sell us. Bob Black
   put it well: "To my mind a right-wing anarchist is just a minarchist
   who'd abolish the state to his own satisfaction by calling it something
   else . . . They don't denounce what the state does, they just object to
   who's doing it." ["The Libertarian As Conservative", The Abolition of
   Work and Other Essays, p. 144]

References

   1. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secB2.html
   2. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF6.html#secf64
   3. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF8.html
   4. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF3.html#secf32
   5. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF6.html#secf63
   6. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secC4.html
   7. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF7.html#secf72
   8. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF3.html#secf31
   9. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secB2.html
  10. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF3.html#secf31
  11. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secB4.html
  12. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF1.html
  13. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF6.html#secf63
