F.7 How does the history of "anarcho"-capitalism show that it is not anarchist?

   Of course, "anarcho"-capitalism does have historic precedents and
   "anarcho"-capitalists spend considerable time trying to co-opt various
   individuals into their self-proclaimed tradition of "anti-statist"
   liberalism. That, in itself, should be enough to show that anarchism
   and "anarcho"-capitalism have little in common as anarchism developed
   in opposition to liberalism and its defence of capitalism.
   Unsurprisingly, these "anti-state" liberals tended to, at best, refuse
   to call themselves anarchists or, at worse, explicitly deny they were
   anarchists.

   One "anarcho"-capitalist overview of their tradition is presented by
   David M. Hart. His perspective on anarchism is typical of the school,
   noting that in his essay anarchism or anarchist "are used in the sense
   of a political theory which advocates the maximum amount of individual
   liberty, a necessary condition of which is the elimination of
   governmental or other organised force." ["Gustave de Molinari and the
   Anti-statist Liberal Tradition: Part I", pp. 263-290, Journal of
   Libertarian Studies, vol. V, no. 3, p. 284] Yet anarchism has never
   been solely concerned with abolishing the state. Rather, anarchists
   have always raised economic and social demands and goals along with
   their opposition to the state. As such, anti-statism may be a necessary
   condition to be an anarchist, but not a sufficient one to count a
   specific individual or theory as anarchist.

   Specifically, anarchists have turned their analysis onto private
   property noting that the hierarchical social relationships created by
   inequality of wealth (for example, wage labour) restricts individual
   freedom. This means that if we do seek "the maximum of individual
   liberty" then our analysis cannot be limited to just the state or
   government. Thus a libertarian critique of private property is an
   essential aspect of anarchism. Consequently, to limit anarchism as Hart
   does requires substantial rewriting of history, as can be seen from his
   account of William Godwin.

   Hart tries to co-opt of William Godwin into the ranks of "anti-state"
   liberalism, arguing that he "defended individualism and the right to
   property." [Op. Cit., p. 265] He, of course, quotes from Godwin to
   support his claim yet strangely truncates Godwin's argument to exclude
   his conclusion that "[w]hen the laws of morality shall be clearly
   understood, their excellence universally apprehended, and themselves
   seen to be coincident with each man's private advantage, the idea of
   property in this sense will remain, but no man will have the least
   desire, for purposes of ostentation or luxury, to possess more than his
   neighbours." In other words, personal property (possession) would still
   exist but not private property in the sense of capital or inequality of
   wealth. For Godwin, "it follows, upon the principles of equal and
   impartial justice, that the good things of the world are a common
   stock, upon which one man has a valid a title as another to draw for
   what he wants." [An Enquiry into Political Justice, p. 199 and p. 703]
   Rather than being a liberal Godwin moved beyond that limited ideology
   to provide the first anarchist critique of private property and the
   authoritarian social relationships it created. His vision of a free
   society would, to use modern terminology, be voluntary (libertarian)
   communism.

   This analysis is confirmed in book 8 of Godwin's classic work, entitled
   "On Property." Needless to say, Hart fails to mention this analysis,
   unsurprisingly as it was later reprinted as a socialist pamphlet.
   Godwin thought that the "subject of property is the key-stone that
   completes the fabric of political justice." Like Proudhon, he subjected
   property as well as the state to an anarchist analysis. For Godwin,
   there were "three degrees" of property. The first is possession of
   things you need to live. The second is "the empire to which every man
   is entitled over the produce of his own industry." The third is "that
   which occupies the most vigilant attention in the civilised states of
   Europe. It is a system, in whatever manner established, by which one
   man enters into the faculty of disposing of the produce of another
   man's industry." He notes that it is "clear therefore that the third
   species of property is in direct contradiction to the second." [Op.
   Cit., p. 701 and p. 710-2] The similarities with Proudhon's classic
   analysis of private property are obvious (and it should be stressed
   that the two founders of the anarchist tradition independently reached
   the same critique of private property).

   Godwin, unlike classical liberals, saw the need to "point out the evils
   of accumulated property," arguing that the "spirit of oppression, the
   spirit of servility, and the spirit of fraud . . . are the immediate
   growth of the established administration of property. They are alike
   hostile to intellectual and moral improvement." Thus private property
   harms the personality and development those subjected to the
   authoritarian social relationships it produces, for "accumulation
   brings home a servile and truckling spirit" and such accumulated
   property "treads the powers of thought in the dust, extinguishes the
   sparks of genius, and reduces the great mass of mankind to be immersed
   in sordid cares." This meant that the "feudal spirit still survives
   that reduced the great mass of mankind to the rank of slaves and cattle
   for the service of a few." Like the socialist movement he inspired,
   Godwin argued that "it is to be considered that this injustice, the
   unequal distribution of property, the grasping and selfish spirit of
   individuals, is to be regarded as one of the original sources of
   government, and, as it rises in its excesses, is continually demanding
   and necessitating new injustice, new penalties and new slavery." He
   stressed, "let it never be forgotten that accumulated property is
   usurpation" and considered the evils produced by monarchies, courts,
   priests, and criminal laws to be "imbecile and impotent compared to the
   evils that arise out of the established administration of property."
   [Op. Cit., p. 732, p. 725, p. 730, p. 726, pp. 717-8, p. 718 and p.
   725]

   Unsurprisingly given this analysis, Godwin argued against the current
   system of property and in favour of "the justice of an equal
   distribution of the good things of life." This would be based on
   "[e]quality of conditions, or, in other words, an equal admission to
   the means of improvement and pleasure" as this "is a law rigorously
   enjoined upon mankind by the voice of justice." [Op. Cit., p. 725 and
   p. 736] Thus his anarchist ideas were applied to private property,
   noting like subsequent anarchists that economic inequality resulted in
   the loss of liberty for the many and, consequently, an anarchist
   society would see a radical change in property and property rights. As
   Kropotkin noted, Godwin "stated in 1793 in a quite definite form the
   political and economic principle of Anarchism." Little wonder he, like
   so many others, argued that Godwin was "the first theoriser of
   Socialism without government -- that is to say, of Anarchism."
   [Environment and Evolution, p. 62 and p. 26] For Kropotkin, anarchism
   was by definition not restricted to purely political issues but also
   attacked economic hierarchy, inequality and injustice. As Peter
   Marshall confirms, "Godwin's economics, like his politics, are an
   extension of his ethics." [Demanding the Impossible, p. 210]

   Godwin's theory of property is significant because it prefigured what
   was to become standard nineteenth century socialist thought on the
   matter. In Britain, his ideas influenced Robert Owen and, as a result,
   the early socialist movement in that country. His analysis of property,
   as noted, was identical to and predated Proudhon's classic anarchist
   analysis. As such, to state, as Hart did, that Godwin simply "concluded
   that the state was an evil which had to be reduced in power if not
   eliminated completely" while not noting his analysis of property gives
   a radically false presentation of his ideas. [Op. Cit., p. 265]
   However, it does fit into his flawed assertion that anarchism is purely
   concerned with the state. Any evidence to the contrary is simply
   ignored.

F.7.1 Are competing governments anarchism?

   No, of course not. Yet according to "anarcho"-capitalism, it is. This
   can be seen from the ideas of Gustave de Molinari.

   Hart is on firmer ground when he argues that the 19th century French
   economist Gustave de Molinari is the true founder of
   "anarcho"-capitalism. With Molinari, he argues, "the two different
   currents of anarchist thought converged: he combined the political
   anarchism of Burke and Godwin with the nascent economic anarchism of
   Adam Smith and Say to create a new forms of anarchism" that has been
   called "anarcho-capitalism, or free market anarchism." [Op. Cit., p.
   269] Of course, Godwin (like other anarchists) did not limit his
   anarchism purely to "political" issues and so he discussed "economic
   anarchism" as well in his critique of private property (as Proudhon
   also did). As such, to artificially split anarchism into political and
   economic spheres is both historically and logically flawed. While some
   dictionaries limit "anarchism" to opposition to the state, anarchists
   did and do not.

   The key problem for Hart is that Molinari refused to call himself an
   anarchist. He did not even oppose government, as Hart himself notes
   Molinari proposed a system of insurance companies to provide defence of
   property and "called these insurance companies 'governments' even
   though they did not have a monopoly within a given geographical area."
   As Hart notes, Molinari was the sole defender of such free-market
   justice at the time in France. [David M. Hart, "Gustave de Molinari and
   the Anti-statist Liberal Tradition: Part II", pp. 399-434, Journal of
   Libertarian Studies, vol. V, no. 4, p. 415 and p. 411] Molinari was
   clear that he wanted "a regime of free government," counterpoising
   "monopolist or communist governments" to "free governments." This would
   lead to "freedom of government" rather than its abolition (i.e., not
   freedom from government). For Molinari the future would not bring "the
   suppression of the state which is the dream of the anarchists . . . It
   will bring the diffusion of the state within society. That is . . . 'a
   free state in a free society.'" [quoted by Hart, Op. Cit., p. 429, p.
   411 and p. 422] As such, Molinari can hardly be considered an
   anarchist, even if "anarchist" is limited to purely being against
   government.

   Moreover, in another sense Molinari was in favour of the state. As we
   discuss in [1]section F.6, these companies would have a monopoly within
   a given geographical area -- they have to in order to enforce the
   property owner's power over those who use, but do not own, the property
   in question. The key contradiction can be seen in Molinari's advocating
   of company towns, privately owned communities (his term was a
   "proprietary company"). Instead of taxes, people would pay rent and the
   "administration of the community would be either left in the hands of
   the company itself or handled special organisations set up for this
   purpose." Within such a regime "those with the most property had
   proportionally the greater say in matters which affected the
   community." If the poor objected then they could simply leave. [Op.
   Cit., pp. 421-2 and p. 422]

   Given this, the idea that Molinari was an anarchist in any form can be
   dismissed. His system was based on privatising government, not
   abolishing it (as he himself admitted). This would be different from
   the current system, of course, as landlords and capitalists would be
   hiring police directly to enforce their decisions rather than relying
   on a state which they control indirectly. This system would not be
   anarchist as can be seen from American history. There capitalists and
   landlords created their own private police forces and armies, which
   regularly attacked and murdered union organisers and strikers. As an
   example, there is Henry Ford's Service Department (private police
   force):

     "In 1932 a hunger march of the unemployed was planned to march up to
     the gates of the Ford plant at Dearborn. . . The machine guns of the
     Dearborn police and the Ford Motor Company's Service Department
     killed [four] and wounded over a score of others. . . Ford was
     fundamentally and entirely opposed to trade unions. The idea of
     working men questioning his prerogatives as an owner was outrageous
     . . . [T]he River Rouge plant. . . was dominated by the autocratic
     regime of Bennett's service men. Bennett . . organise[d] and
     train[ed] the three and a half thousand private policemen employed
     by Ford. His task was to maintain discipline amongst the work force,
     protect Ford's property [and power], and prevent unionisation. . .
     Frank Murphy, the mayor of Detroit, claimed that 'Henry Ford employs
     some of the worst gangsters in our city.' The claim was well based.
     Ford's Service Department policed the gates of his plants,
     infiltrated emergent groups of union activists, posed as workers to
     spy on men on the line. . . Under this tyranny the Ford worker had
     no security, no rights. So much so that any information about the
     state of things within the plant could only be freely obtained from
     ex-Ford workers." [Huw Beynon, Working for Ford, pp. 29-30]

   The private police attacked women workers handing out pro-union
   leaflets and gave them "a severe beating." At Kansas and Dallas
   "similar beatings were handed out to the union men." This use of
   private police to control the work force was not unique. General Motors
   "spent one million dollars on espionage, employing fourteen detective
   agencies and two hundred spies at one time [between 1933 and 1936]. The
   Pinkerton Detective Agency found anti-unionism its most lucrative
   activity." [Op. Cit., p. 34 and p. 32] We must also note that the
   Pinkerton's had been selling their private police services for decades
   before the 1930s. For over 60 years the Pinkerton Detective Agency had
   "specialised in providing spies, agent provocateurs, and private armed
   forces for employers combating labour organisations." By 1892 it "had
   provided its services for management in seventy major labour disputes,
   and its 2,000 active agents and 30,000 reserves totalled more than the
   standing army of the nation." [Jeremy Brecher, Strike!, p. 55] With
   this force available, little wonder unions found it so hard to survive
   in the USA.

   Only an "anarcho"-capitalist would deny that this is a private
   government, employing private police to enforce private power. Given
   that unions could be considered as "defence" agencies for workers, this
   suggests a picture of how "anarcho"-capitalism may work in practice
   radically different from than that produced by its advocates. The
   reason is simple, it does not ignore inequality and subjects property
   to an anarchist analysis. Little wonder, then, that Proudhon stressed
   that it "becomes necessary for the workers to form themselves into
   democratic societies, with equal conditions for all members, on pain of
   a relapse into feudalism." Anarchism, in other words, would see
   "[c]apitalistic and proprietary exploitation stopped everywhere, the
   wage system abolished" and so "the economic organisation [would]
   replac[e] the governmental and military system." [The General Idea of
   the Revolution, p. 227 and p. 281] Clearly, the idea that Proudhon
   shared the same political goal as Molinari is a joke. He would have
   dismissed such a system as little more than an updated form of
   feudalism in which the property owner is sovereign and the workers
   subjects (also see [2]section B.4).

   Unsurprisingly, Molinari (unlike the individualist anarchists) attacked
   the jury system, arguing that its obliged people to "perform the duties
   of judges. This is pure communism." People would "judge according to
   the colour of their opinions, than according to justice." [quoted by
   Hart, Op. Cit., p. 409] As the jury system used amateurs (i.e. ordinary
   people) rather than full-time professionals it could not be relied upon
   to defend the power and property rights of the rich. As we noted in
   [3]section F.6.1, Rothbard criticised the individualist anarchists for
   supporting juries for essentially the same reasons.

   But, as is clear from Hart's account, Molinari had little concern that
   working class people should have a say in their own lives beyond
   consuming goods and picking bosses. His perspective can be seen from
   his lament that in those "colonies where slavery has been abolished
   without the compulsory labour being replaced with an equivalent
   quantity of free [sic!] labour [i.e., wage labour], there has occurred
   the opposite of what happens everyday before our eyes. Simple workers
   have been seen to exploit in their turn the industrial entrepreneurs,
   demanding from them wages which bear absolutely no relation to the
   legitimate share in the product which they ought to receive. The
   planters were unable to obtain for their sugar a sufficient price to
   cover the increase in wages, and were obliged to furnish the extra
   amount, at first out of their profits, and then out of their very
   capital. A considerable number of planters have been ruined as a result
   . . . It is doubtless better that these accumulations of capital should
   be destroyed than that generations of men should perish [Marx: 'how
   generous of M. Molinari'] but would it not be better if both survived?"
   [quoted by Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, p. 937f]

   So workers exploiting capital is the "opposite of what happens everyday
   before our eyes"? In other words, it is normal that entrepreneurs
   "exploit" workers under capitalism? Similarly, what is a "legitimate
   share" which workers "ought to receive"? Surely that is determined by
   the eternal laws of supply and demand and not what the capitalists (or
   Molinari) thinks is right? And those poor former slave drivers, they
   really do deserve our sympathy. What horrors they face from the
   impositions subjected upon them by their ex-chattels -- they had to
   reduce their profits! How dare their ex-slaves refuse to obey them in
   return for what their ex-owners think was their "legitimate share in
   the produce"! How "simple" these workers were, not understanding the
   sacrifices their former masters suffer nor appreciating how much more
   difficult it is for their ex-masters to create "the product" without
   the whip and the branding iron to aid them! As Marx so rightly
   comments: "And what, if you please, is this 'legitimate share', which,
   according to [Molinari's] own admission, the capitalist in Europe daily
   neglects to pay? Over yonder, in the colonies, where the workers are so
   'simple' as to 'exploit' the capitalist, M. Molinari feels a powerful
   itch to use police methods to set on the right road that law of supply
   and demand which works automatically everywhere else." [Op. Cit., p.
   937f]

   An added difficulty in arguing that Molinari was an anarchist is that
   he was a contemporary of Proudhon, the first self-declared anarchist,
   and lived in a country with a vigorous anarchist movement. Surely if he
   was really an anarchist, he would have proclaimed his kinship with
   Proudhon and joined in the wider movement. He did not, as Hart notes as
   regards Proudhon:

     "their differences in economic theory were considerable, and it is
     probably for this reason that Molinari refused to call himself an
     anarchist in spite of their many similarities in political theory.
     Molinari refused to accept the socialist economic ideas of Proudhon
     . . . in Molinari's mind, the term 'anarchist' was intimately linked
     with socialist and statist economic views." [Op. Cit., p. 415]

   Yet Proudhon's economic views, like Godwin's, flowed from his anarchist
   analysis and principles. They cannot be arbitrarily separated as Hart
   suggests. So while arguing that "Molinari was just as much an anarchist
   as Proudhon," Hart forgets the key issue. Proudhon was aware that
   private property ensured that the proletarian did not exercise
   "self-government" during working hours, i.e. that he was ruled by
   another. As for Hart claiming that Proudhon had "statist economic
   views" it simply shows how far an "anarcho"-capitalist perspective is
   from genuine anarchism. Proudhon's economic analysis, his critique of
   private property and capitalism, flowed from his anarchism and was an
   integral aspect of it.

   By restricting anarchism purely to opposition to the state, Hart is
   impoverishing anarchist theory and denying its history. Given that
   anarchism was born from a critique of private property as well as
   government, this shows the false nature of Hart's claim that "Molinari
   was the first to develop a theory of free-market, proprietary anarchism
   that extended the laws of the market and a rigorous defence of property
   to its logical extreme." [Op. Cit., p. 415 and p. 416] Hart shows how
   far from anarchism Molinari was as Proudhon had turned his anarchist
   analysis to property, showing that "defence of property" lead to the
   oppression of the many by the few in social relationships identical to
   those which mark the state. Moreover, Proudhon, argued the state would
   always be required to defend such social relations. Privatising it
   would hardly be a step forward.

   Unsurprisingly, Proudhon dismissed the idea that the laissez faire
   capitalists shared his goals. "The school of Say," Proudhon argued, was
   "the chief focus of counter-revolution next to the Jesuits" and "has
   for ten years past seemed to exist only to protect and applaud the
   execrable work of the monopolists of money and necessities, deepening
   more and more the obscurity of a science [economics] naturally
   difficult and full of complications" (much the same can be said of
   "anarcho"-capitalists, incidentally). For Proudhon, "the disciples of
   Malthus and of Say, who oppose with all their might any intervention of
   the State in matters commercial or industrial, do not fail to avail
   themselves of this seemingly liberal attitude, and to show themselves
   more revolutionary than the Revolution. More than one honest searcher
   has been deceived thereby." However, this apparent "anti-statist"
   attitude of supporters of capitalism is false as pure free market
   capitalism cannot solve the social question, which arises because of
   capitalism itself. As such, it was impossible to abolish the state
   under capitalism. Thus "this inaction of Power in economic matters was
   the foundation of government. What need should we have of a political
   organisation, if Power once permitted us to enjoy economic order?"
   Instead of capitalism, Proudhon advocated the "constitution of Value,"
   the "organisation of credit," the elimination of interest, the
   "establishment of workingmen's associations" and "the use of a just
   price." [The General Idea of the Revolution, p. 225, p. 226 and p. 233]

   Clearly, then, the claims that Molinari was an anarchist fail as he,
   unlike his followers, was aware of what anarchism actually stood for.
   Hart, in his own way, acknowledges this:

     "In spite of his protestations to the contrary, Molinari should be
     considered an anarchist thinker. His attack on the state's monopoly
     of defence must surely warrant the description of anarchism. His
     reluctance to accept this label stemmed from the fact that the
     socialists had used it first to describe a form of non-statist
     society which Molinari definitely opposed. Like many original
     thinkers, Molinari had to use the concepts developed by others to
     describe his theories. In his case, he had come to the same
     political conclusions as the communist anarchists although he had
     been working within the liberal tradition, and it is therefore not
     surprising that the terms used by the two schools were not
     compatible. It would not be until the latter half of the twentieth
     century that radical, free-trade liberals would use the word
     'anarchist' to describe their beliefs." [Op. Cit., p. 416]

   It should be noted that Proudhon was not a communist-anarchist, but the
   point remains (as an aside, Rothbard also showed his grasp of anarchism
   by asserting that "the demented Bakunin" was a "leading
   anarcho-communist," who "emphasised [the lumpenproletariat] in the
   1840s." [The Logic of Action II, p. 388 and p. 381] Which would have
   been impressive as not only did Bakunin become an anarchist in the
   1860s, anarcho-communism, as anyone with even a basic knowledge of
   anarchist history knows, developed after his death nor did Bakunin
   emphasise the lumpenproletariat as the agent of social change,
   Rothbardian and Marxian inventions not withstanding). The aims of
   anarchism were recognised by Molinari as being inconsistent with his
   ideology. Consequently, he (rightly) refused the label. If only his
   self-proclaimed followers in the "latter half of the twentieth century"
   did the same then anarchists would not have to bother with them!

   It does seem ironic that the founder of "anarcho"-capitalism should
   have come to the same conclusion as modern day anarchists on the
   subject of whether his ideas are a form of anarchism or not!

F.7.2 Is government compatible with anarchism?

   Of course not, but ironically this is the conclusion arrived at by
   Hart's analyst of the British "voluntaryists," particularly Auberon
   Herbert. Voluntaryism was a fringe part of the right-wing individualist
   movement inspired by Herbert Spencer, a leading spokesman for free
   market capitalism in the later half of the nineteenth century. Like
   Hart, leading "anarcho"-capitalist Hans-Hermann Hoppe believes that
   Herbert "develop[ed] the Spencerian idea of equal freedom to its
   logically consistent anarcho-capitalist end." [Anarcho-Capitalism: An
   Annotated Bibliography]

   Yet, as with Molinari, there is a problem with presenting this ideology
   as anarchist, namely that its leading light, Herbert, explicitly
   rejected the label "anarchist" and called for both a government and a
   democratic state. Thus, apparently, both state and government are
   "logically consistent" with "anarcho"-capitalism and vice versa!

   Herbert was clearly aware of individualist anarchism and distanced
   himself from it. He argued that such a system would be "pandemonium."
   He thought that we should "not direct our attacks - as the anarchists
   do - against all government , against government in itself" but "only
   against the overgrown, the exaggerated, the insolent, unreasonable and
   indefensible forms of government, which are found everywhere today."
   Government should be "strictly limited to its legitimate duties in
   defence of self-ownership and individual rights." He stressed that "we
   are governmentalists . . . formally constituted by the nation,
   employing in this matter of force the majority method." Moreover,
   Herbert knew of, and rejected, individualist anarchism, considering it
   to be "founded on a fatal mistake." [Essay X: The Principles Of
   Voluntaryism And Free Life] He repeated this argument in other words,
   stating that anarchy was a "contradiction," and that the Voluntaryists
   "reject the anarchist creed." He was clear that they "believe in a
   national government, voluntary supported . . . and only entrusted with
   force for protection of person and property." He called his system of a
   national government funded by non-coerced contributions "the Voluntary
   State." ["A Voluntaryist Appeal", Herbert Spencer and the Limits of the
   State, Michael W. Taylor (ed.), p. 239 and p. 228] As such, claims that
   Herbert was an anarchist cannot be justified.

   Hart is aware of this slight problem, quoting Herbert's claim that he
   aimed for "regularly constituted government, generally accepted by all
   citizens for the protection of the individual." [quoted by Hart, Op.
   Cit., p. 86] Like Molinari, Herbert was aware that anarchism was a form
   of socialism and that the political aims could not be artificially
   separated from its economic and social aims. As such, he was right not
   to call his ideas anarchism as it would result in confusion
   (particularly as anarchism was a much larger movement than his). As
   Hart acknowledges, "Herbert faced the same problems that Molinari had
   with labelling his philosophy. Like Molinari, he rejected the term
   'anarchism,' which he associated with the socialism of Proudhon and . .
   . terrorism." While "quite tolerant" of individualist anarchism, he
   thought they "were mistaken in their rejections of 'government.'"
   However, Hart knows better than Herbert about his own ideas, arguing
   that his ideology "is in fact a new form of anarchism, since the most
   important aspect of the modern state, the monopoly of the use of force
   in a given area, is rejected in no uncertain terms by both men." [Op.
   Cit., p. 86] He does mention that Benjamin Tucker called Herbert a
   "true anarchist in everything but name," but Tucker denied that
   Kropotkin was an anarchist suggesting that he was hardly a reliable
   guide. [quoted by Hart, Op. Cit., p. 87] As it stands, it seems that
   Tucker (unlike other anarchists) was mistaken in his evaluation of
   Herbert's politics.

   While there were similarities between Herbert's position and
   individualist anarchism, "the gulf" between them "in other respects was
   unbridgeable" notes historian Matthew Thomas. "The primary concern of
   the individualists was with the preservation of existing property
   relations and the maintenance of some form of organisation to protect
   these relations. . . Such a vestigial government was obviously
   incompatible with the individualist anarchist desire to abolish the
   state. The anarchists also demanded sweeping changes in the structure
   of property relations through the destruction of the land and currency
   monopolies. This they argued, would create equal opportunities for all.
   The individualists however rejected this and sought to defend the
   vested interests of the property-owning classes. The implications of
   such differences prevented any real alliance." [Anarchist Ideas and
   Counter-Cultures in Britain, 1880-1914, p. 20] Anarchist William R.
   McKercher, in his analysis of the libertarian (socialist) movement of
   late 19th century Britain, concludes (rightly) that Herbert "was often
   mistakenly taken as an anarchist" but "a reading of Herbert's work will
   show that he was not an anarchist." [Freedom and Authority, p. 199fn
   and p. 73fn] The leading British social anarchist journal of the time
   noted that the "Auberon Herbertites in England are sometimes called
   Anarchists by outsiders, but they are willing to compromise with the
   inequity of government to maintain private property." [Freedom, Vol.
   II, No. 17, 1888]

   Some non-anarchists did call Herbert an anarchist. For example, J. A.
   Hobson, a left-wing liberal, wrote a critique of Herbert's politics
   called "A Rich Man's Anarchism." Hobson argued that Herbert's support
   for exclusive private property would result in the poor being enslaved
   to the rich. Herbert, "by allowing first comers to monopolise without
   restriction the best natural supplies" would allow them "to thwart and
   restrict the similar freedom of those who come after." Hobson gave the
   "extreme instance" of an island "the whole of which is annexed by a few
   individuals, who use the rights of exclusive property and transmission
   . . . to establish primogeniture." In such a situation, the bulk of the
   population would be denied the right to exercise their faculties or to
   enjoy the fruits of their labour, which Herbert claimed to be the
   inalienable rights of all. Hobson concluded: "It is thus that the
   'freedom' of a few (in Herbert's sense) involves the 'slavery' of the
   many." [quoted by M. W. Taylor, Men Versus the State, pp. 248-9] M. W.
   Taylor notes that "of all the points Hobson raised . . . this argument
   was his most effective, and Herbert was unable to provide a
   satisfactory response." [Op. Cit., p. 249]

   The ironic thing is that Hobson's critique simply echoed the anarchist
   one and, moreover, simply repeated Proudhon's arguments in What is
   Property?. As such, from an anarchist perspective, Herbert's inability
   to give a reply was unsurprising given the power of Proudhon's
   libertarian critique of private property. In fact, Proudhon used a
   similar argument to Hobson's, presenting "a colony . . . in a wild
   district" rather than an island. His argument and conclusions are the
   same, though, with a small minority becoming "proprietors of the whole
   district" and the rest "dispossessed" and "compelled to sell their
   birthright." He concluded by saying "[i]n this century of bourgeois
   morality . . . the moral sense is so debased that I should not be at
   all surprised if I were asked, by many a worthy proprietor, what I see
   in this that is unjust and illegitimate? Debased creature! galvanised
   corpse! how can I expect to convince you, if you cannot tell robbery
   when I show it to you?" [What is Property?, pp. 125-7] Which shows how
   far Herbert's position was from genuine anarchism -- and how far
   "anarcho"-capitalism is.

   So, economically, Herbert was not an anarchist, arguing that the state
   should protect Lockean property rights. Of course, Hart may argue that
   these economic differences are not relevant to the issue of Herbert's
   anarchism but that is simply to repeat the claim that anarchism is
   solely concerned with government, a claim which is hard to support.
   This position cannot be maintained, particularly given that both
   Herbert and Molinari defended the right of capitalists and landlords to
   force their employees and tenants to follow their orders. Their
   "governments" existed to defend the capitalist from rebellious workers,
   to break unions, strikes and occupations. In other words, they were a
   monopoly of the use of force in a given area to enforce the monopoly of
   power in a given area (namely, the wishes of the property owner). While
   they may have argued that this was "defence of liberty," in reality it
   is defence of power and authority.

   What about if we just look at the political aspects of his ideas? Did
   Herbert actually advocate anarchism? No, far from it. He clearly
   demanded a minimal state based on voluntary taxation. The state would
   not use force of any kind, "except for purposes of restraining force."
   He argued that in his system, while "the state should compel no
   services and exact no payments by force," it "should be free to conduct
   many useful undertakings . . . in competition with all voluntary
   agencies . . . in dependence on voluntary payments." [Herbert, Essay X:
   The Principles Of Voluntaryism And Free Life] As such, "the state"
   would remain and unless he is using the term "state" in some highly
   unusual way, it is clear that he means a system where individuals live
   under a single elected government as their common law maker, judge and
   defender within a given territory.

   This becomes clearer once we look at how the state would be organised.
   In his essay "A Politician in Sight of Haven," Herbert does discuss the
   franchise, stating it would be limited to those who paid a voluntary
   "income tax" and anyone "paying it would have the right to vote; those
   who did not pay it would be -- as is just -- without the franchise.
   There would be no other tax." The law would be strictly limited, of
   course, and the "government . . . must confine itself simply to the
   defence of life and property, whether as regards internal or external
   defence." In other words, Herbert was a minimal statist, with his
   government elected by a majority of those who choose to pay their
   income tax and funded by that (and by any other voluntary taxes they
   decided to pay). Whether individuals and companies could hire their own
   private police in such a regime is irrelevant in determining whether it
   is an anarchy.

   This can be best seen by comparing Herbert with Ayn Rand. No one would
   ever claim Rand was an anarchist, yet her ideas were extremely similar
   to Herbert's. Like Herbert, Rand supported laissez-faire capitalism and
   was against the "initiation of force." Like Herbert, she extended this
   principle to favour a government funded by voluntary means ["Government
   Financing in a Free Society," The Virtue of Selfishness, pp. 116-20]
   Moreover, like Herbert, she explicitly denied being an anarchist and,
   again like Herbert, thought the idea of competing defence agencies
   ("governments") would result in chaos. The similarities with Herbert
   are clear, yet no "anarcho"-capitalist would claim that Rand was an
   anarchist, yet some do claim that Herbert was.

   This position is, of course, deeply illogical and flows from the
   non-anarchist nature of "anarcho"-capitalism. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
   when Rothbard discusses the ideas of the "voluntaryists" he fails to
   address the key issue of who determines the laws being enforced in
   society. For Rothbard, the key issue was who is enforcing the law, not
   where that law comes from (as long, of course, as it is a law code he
   approved of). The implications of this is significant, as it implies
   that "anarchism" need not be opposed to either the state nor
   government! This can be clearly seen from Rothbard's analysis of
   Herbert's voluntary taxation position.

   Rothbard, correctly, notes that Herbert advocated voluntary taxation as
   the means of funding a state whose basic role was to enforce Lockean
   property rights. The key point of his critique was not who determines
   the law but who enforces it. For Rothbard, it should be privatised
   police and courts and he suggests that the "voluntary taxationists have
   never attempted to answer this problem; they have rather stubbornly
   assumed that no one would set up a competing defence agency within a
   State's territorial limits." If the state did bar such firms, then that
   system is not a genuine free market. However, "if the government did
   permit free competition in defence service, there would soon no longer
   be a central government over the territory. Defence agencies, police
   and judicial, would compete with one another in the same uncoerced
   manner as the producers of any other service on the market." [Power and
   Market, p. 122 and p. 123]

   Obviously this misses the point totally. What Rothbard ignores is who
   determines the laws which these private "defence" agencies would
   enforce. If the laws are made by a central government then the fact
   that citizen's can hire private police and attend private courts does
   not stop the regime being statist. We can safely assume Rand, for
   example, would have had no problem with companies providing private
   security guards or the hiring of private detectives within the context
   of her minimal state. Ironically, Rothbard stresses the need for such a
   monopoly legal system:

     "While 'the government' would cease to exist, the same cannot be
     said for a constitution or a rule of law, which, in fact, would take
     on in the free society a far more important function than at
     present. For the freely competing judicial agencies would have to be
     guided by a body of absolute law to enable them to distinguish
     objectively between defence and invasion. This law, embodying
     elaborations upon the basic injunction to defend person and property
     from acts of invasion, would be codified in the basic legal code.
     Failure to establish such a code of law would tend to break down the
     free market, for then defence against invasion could not be
     adequately achieved." [Op. Cit., p. 123-4]

   So if you violate the "absolute law" defending (absolute) property
   rights then you would be in trouble. The problem now lies in
   determining who sets that law. For Rothbard, as we noted in [4]section
   F.6.1, his system of monopoly laws would be determined by judges,
   Libertarian lawyers and jurists. The "voluntaryists" proposed a
   different solution, namely a central government elected by the majority
   of those who voluntarily decided to pay an income tax. In the words of
   Herbert:

     "We agree that there must be a central agency to deal with crime --
     an agency that defends the liberty of all men, and employs force
     against the uses of force; but my central agency rests upon
     voluntary support, whilst Mr. Levy's central agency rests on
     compulsory support." [quoted by Carl Watner, "The English
     Individualists As They Appear In Liberty," pp. 191-211, Benjamin R.
     Tucker and the Champions of Liberty, p. 194]

   And all Rothbard is concerned over private cops would exist or not!
   This lack of concern over the existence of the state and government
   flows from the strange fact that "anarcho"-capitalists commonly use the
   term "anarchism" to refer to any philosophy that opposes all forms of
   initiatory coercion. Notice that government does not play a part in
   this definition, thus Rothbard can analyse Herbert's politics without
   commenting on who determines the law his private "defence" agencies
   enforce. For Rothbard, "an anarchist society" is defined "as one where
   there is no legal possibility for coercive aggression against the
   person and property of any individual." He then moved onto the state,
   defining that as an "institution which possesses one or both (almost
   always both) of the following properties: (1) it acquires its income by
   the physical coercion known as 'taxation'; and (2) it acquires and
   usually obtains a coerced monopoly of the provision of defence service
   (police and courts) over a given territorial area." [Society without a
   State, p. 192]

   This is highly unusual definition of "anarchism," given that it utterly
   fails to mention or define government. This, perhaps, is understandable
   as any attempt to define it in terms of "monopoly of decision-making
   power" results in showing that capitalism is statist (see [5]section
   F.1 for a summary). The key issue here is the term "legal possibility."
   That suggestions a system of laws which determine what is "coercive
   aggression" and what constitutes what is and what is not legitimate
   "property." Herbert is considered by some "anarcho"-capitalists as one
   of them. Which brings us to a strange conclusion that, for
   "anarcho"-capitalists you can have a system of "anarchism" in which
   there is a government and state -- as long as the state does not impose
   taxation nor stop private police forces from operating!

   As Rothbard argues "if a government based on voluntary taxation permits
   free competition, the result will be the purely free-market system . .
   . The previous government would now simply be one competing defence
   agency among many on the market." [Power and Market, p. 124] That the
   government is specifying what is and is not legal does not seem to
   bother him or even cross his mind. Why should it, when the existence of
   government is irrelevant to his definition of anarchism and the state?
   That private police are enforcing a monopoly law determined by the
   government seems hardly a step in the right direction nor can it be
   considered as anarchism. Perhaps this is unsurprising, for under his
   system there would be "a basic, common Law Code" which "all would have
   to abide by" as well as "some way of resolving disputes that will gain
   a majority consensus in society . . . whose decision will be accepted
   by the great majority of the public." ["Society without a State,", p.
   205]

   That this is simply a state under a different name can be seen from
   looking at other right-wing liberals. Milton Friedman, for example,
   noted (correctly) that the "consistent liberal is not an anarchist." He
   stated that government "is essential" for providing a "legal framework"
   and provide "the definition of property rights." In other words, to
   "determine, arbitrate and enforce the rules of the game." [Capitalism
   and Freedom, p. 34, p. 15, p. 25, p. 26 and p. 27] For Ludwig von Mises
   "liberalism is not anarchism, nor has it anything whatsoever to do with
   anarchism." Liberalism "restricts the activity of the state in the
   economic sphere exclusively to the protection of property."
   [Liberalism, p. 37 and p. 38] The key difference between these liberals
   and Rothbard's brand of liberalism is that rather than an elected
   parliament making laws, "anarcho"-capitalism would have a general law
   code produced by "libertarian" lawyers, jurists and judges. Both would
   have laws interpreted by judges. Rothbard's system is also based on a
   legal framework which would both provide a definition of property
   rights and determine the rules of the game. However, the means of
   enforcing and arbitrating those laws would be totally private. Yet even
   this is hardly a difference, as it is doubtful if Friedman or von Mises
   (like Rand or Herbert) would have barred private security firms or
   voluntary arbitration services as long as they followed the law of the
   land. The only major difference is that Rothbard's system explicitly
   excludes the general public from specifying or amending the laws they
   are subject to and allows (prosperous) judges to interpret and add to
   the (capitalist) law. Perhaps this dispossession of the general public
   is the only means by which the minimal state will remain minimal (as
   Rothbard claimed) and capitalist property, authority and property
   rights remain secure and sacrosanct, yet the situation where the
   general public has no say in the regime and the laws they are subjected
   to is usually called dictatorship, not "anarchy."

   At least Herbert is clear that his politics was a governmental system,
   unlike Rothbard who assumes a monopoly law but seems to think that this
   is not a government or a state. As David Wieck argued, this is
   illogical for according to Rothbard "all 'would have to' conform to the
   same legal code" and this can only be achieved by means of "the
   forceful action of adherents to the code against those who flout it"
   and so "in his system there would stand over against every individual
   the legal authority of all the others. An individual who did not
   recognise private property as legitimate would surely perceive this as
   a tyranny of law, a tyranny of the majority or of the most powerful --
   in short, a hydra-headed state. If the law code is itself unitary, then
   this multiple state might be said to have properly a single head -- the
   law . . . But it looks as though one might still call this 'a state,'
   under Rothbard's definition, by satisfying de facto one of his pair of
   sufficient conditions: 'It asserts and usually obtains a coerced
   monopoly of provision of defence service (police and courts) over a
   given territorial area' . . . Hobbes's individual sovereign would seem
   to have become many sovereigns -- with but one law, however, and in
   truth, therefore, a single sovereign in Hobbes's more important sense
   of the latter term. One might better, and less confusingly, call this a
   libertarian state than an anarchy." [Anarchist Justice, pp. 216-7]

   The obvious recipients of the coercion of the new state would be those
   who rejected the authority of their bosses and landlords, those who
   reject the Lockean property rights Rothbard and Herbert hold dear. In
   such cases, the rebels and any "defence agency" (like, say, a union)
   which defended them would be driven out of business as it violated the
   law of the land. How this is different from a state banning competing
   agencies is hard to determine. This is a "difficulty" argues Wieck,
   which "results from the attachment of a principle of private property,
   and of unrestricted accumulation of wealth, to the principle of
   individual liberty. This increases sharply the possibility that many
   reasonable people who respect their fellow men and women will find
   themselves outside the law because of dissent from a property
   interpretation of liberty." Similarly, there are the economic results
   of capitalism. "One can imagine," Wieck continues, "that those who lose
   out badly in the free competition of Rothbard's economic system,
   perhaps a considerable number, might regard the legal authority as an
   alien power, a state for them, based on violence, and might be quite
   unmoved by the fact that, just as under nineteenth century capitalism,
   a principle of liberty was the justification for it all." [Op. Cit., p.
   217 and pp. 217-8]

F.7.3 Can there be a "right-wing" anarchism?

   In a word, no. This can be seen from "anarcho"-capitalism itself as
   well as its attempts to co-opt the US individualist anarchists into its
   family tree.

   Hart mentions the individualist anarchists, calling Tucker's ideas
   "laissez faire liberalism." [Op. Cit., p. 87] However, Tucker called
   his ideas "socialism" and presented a left-wing critique of most
   aspects of liberalism, particularly its Lockean based private property
   rights. Tucker based much of his ideas on property on Proudhon, so if
   Hart dismisses the latter as a socialist then this must apply to Tucker
   as well. Given that he notes that there are "two main kinds of
   anarchist thought," namely "communist anarchism which denies the right
   of an individual to seek profit, charge rent or interest and to own
   property" and a "'right-wing' proprietary anarchism, which vigorously
   defends these rights" then Tucker, like Godwin, would have to be placed
   in the "left-wing" camp. ["Gustave de Molinari and the Anti-statist
   Liberal Tradition: Part II", Op. Cit., p. 427] Tucker, after all,
   argued that he aimed for the end of profit, interest and rent and
   attacked private property in land and housing beyond "occupancy and
   use." It is a shame that Hart was so ignorant of anarchism to ignore
   all the other forms of anarchism which, while anti-capitalist, were not
   communist.

   As has been seen, Hart's account of the history of "anti-state"
   liberalism is flawed. Godwin is included only by ignoring his views on
   property, views which in many ways reflects the later "socialist" (i.e.
   anarchist) analysis of Proudhon. He then discusses a few individuals
   who were alone in their opinions even within the extreme free market
   right and all of whom knew of anarchism and explicitly rejected that
   name for their respective ideologies. In fact, they preferred the term
   "government" or "state" to describe their systems which, on the face of
   it, would be hard to reconcile with the usual "anarcho"-capitalist
   definition of anarchism as being "no government" or simply
   "anti-statism." Hart's discussion of individualist anarchism is equally
   flawed, failing to discuss their economic views (just as well, as its
   links to "left-wing" anarchism would be obvious).

   However, the similarities of Molinari's views with what later became
   known as "anarcho"-capitalism are clear. Hart notes that with
   Molinari's death in 1912, "liberal anti-statism virtually disappeared
   until it was rediscovered by the economist Murray Rothbard in the late
   1950's" ["Gustave de Molinari and the Anti-statist Liberal Tradition:
   Part III", Op. Cit., p. 88] While this fringe is somewhat bigger than
   previously, the fact remains that the ideas expounded by Rothbard are
   just as alien to the anarchist tradition as Molinari's. It is a shame
   that Rothbard, like his predecessors, did not call his ideology
   something other than anarchism. Not only would it have been more
   accurate, it would also have lead to much less confusion and no need to
   write this section of the FAQ! It is a testament to their lack of
   common sense that Rothbard and other "anarcho"-capitalists failed to
   recognise that, given a long-existing socio-political theory and
   movement called anarchism, they could not possibly call themselves
   "anarchists" without conflating of their own views with those of the
   existing tradition. Yet rather than introducing a new term into
   political vocabulary (or using Molinari's terminology) they preferred
   to try fruitlessly to appropriate a term used by others. They seemed to
   have forgotten that political vocabulary and usage are path dependent.
   Hence we get subjected to articles which talk about the new "anarchism"
   while trying to disassociate "anarcho"-capitalism from the genuine
   anarchism found in media reports and history books. As it stands, the
   only reason why "anarcho"-capitalism is considered a form of
   "anarchism" by some is because one person (Rothbard) decided to steal
   the name of a well established and widespread political and social
   theory and movement in the 1950s and apply it to an ideology with
   little, if anything, in common with it.

   As Hart inadvertently shows, it is not a firm base to build a claim.
   That anyone can consider "anarcho"-capitalism as anarchist simply flows
   from a lack of knowledge about anarchism -- as numerous anarchists have
   argued. For example, "Rothbard's conjunction of anarchism with
   capitalism," according to David Wieck, "results in a conception that is
   entirely outside the mainstream of anarchist theoretical writings or
   social movements . . . this conjunction is a self-contradiction." He
   stressed that "the main traditions of anarchism are entirely different.
   These traditions, and theoretical writings associated with them,
   express the perspectives and the aspirations, and also, sometimes, the
   rage, of the oppressed people in human society: not only those
   economically oppressed, although the major anarchist movements have
   been mainly movements of workers and peasants, but also those oppressed
   by power in all those social dimensions . . . including of course that
   of political power expressed in the state." In other words, anarchism
   represents "a moral commitment" which Rothbard's position is
   "diametrically opposite" to. [Anarchist Justice, p. 215, p. 229 and p.
   234]

   It is a shame that some academics consider only the word Rothbard uses
   as relevant rather than the content and its relation to anarchist
   theory and history. If they did, they would soon realise that the
   expressed opposition of so many anarchists to "anarcho"-capitalism is
   something which cannot be ignored or dismissed. In other words, a
   "right-wing" anarchist cannot and does not exist, no matter how often
   sections of the right try to use that word to describe their ideology.

   The reason is simple. Anarchist economics and politics cannot be
   artificially separated. They are intrinsically linked. Godwin and
   Proudhon did not stop their analysis at the state. They extended it the
   social relationships produced by inequality of wealth, i.e. economic
   power as well as political power. To see why, we need only consult
   Rothbard's work. As noted in the [6]last section, for Rothbard the key
   issue with the "voluntary taxationists" was not who determined the
   "body of absolute law" but rather who enforced it. In his discussion,
   he argued that a democratic "defence agency" is at a disadvantage in
   his "free market" system. As he put it:

     "It would, in fact, be competing at a severe disadvantage, having
     been established on the principle of 'democratic voting.' Looked at
     as a market phenomenon, 'democratic voting' (one vote per person) is
     simply the method of the consumer 'co-operative.' Empirically, it
     has been demonstrated time and again that co-operatives cannot
     compete successfully against stock-owned companies, especially when
     both are equal before the law. There is no reason to believe that
     co-operatives for defence would be any more efficient. Hence, we may
     expect the old co-operative government to 'wither away' through loss
     of customers on the market, while joint-stock (i.e., corporate)
     defence agencies would become the prevailing market form." [Power
     and Market, p. 125]

   Notice how he assumes that both a co-operative and corporation would be
   "equal before the law." But who determines that law? Obviously not a
   democratically elected government, as the idea of "one person, one
   vote" in determining the common law all are subject to is
   "inefficient." Nor does he think, like the individualist anarchists,
   that the law would be judged by juries along with the facts. As we note
   in [7]section F.6.1, he rejected that in favour of it being determined
   by "Libertarian lawyers and jurists." Thus the law is unchangeable by
   ordinary people and enforced by private defence agencies hired to
   protect the liberty and property of the owning class. In the case of a
   capitalist economy, this means defending the power of landlords and
   capitalists against rebel tenants and workers.

   This means that Rothbard's "common Law Code" will be determined,
   interpreted, enforced and amended by corporations based on the will of
   the majority of shareholders, i.e. the rich. That hardly seems likely
   to produce equality before the law. As he argues in a footnote:

     "There is a strong a priori reason for believing that corporations
     will be superior to co-operatives in any given situation. For if
     each owner receives only one vote regardless of how much money he
     has invested in a project (and earnings are divided in the same
     way), there is no incentive to invest more than the next man; in
     fact, every incentive is the other way. This hampering of investment
     militates strongly against the co-operative form." [Op. Cit., p.
     125]

   So if the law is determined and interpreted by defence agencies and
   courts then it will be done so by those who have invested most in these
   companies. As it is unlikely that the rich will invest in defence firms
   which do not support their property rights, power, profits and
   definition of property, it is clear that agencies which favour the
   wealthy will survive on the market. The idea that market demand will
   counter this class rule seems unlikely, given Rothbard's own argument.
   In order to compete successfully you need more than demand, you need
   sources of investment. If co-operative defence agencies do form, they
   will be at a market disadvantage due to lack of investment. As argued
   in [8]section J.5.12, even though co-operatives are more efficient than
   capitalist firms lack of investment (caused by the lack of control by
   capitalists Rothbard notes) stops them replacing wage slavery. Thus
   capitalist wealth and power inhibits the spread of freedom in
   production. If we apply Rothbard's argument to his own system, we
   suggest that the market in "defence" will also stop the spread of more
   libertarian associations thanks to capitalist power and wealth. In
   other words, like any market, Rothbard's "defence" market will simply
   reflect the interests of the elite, not the masses.

   Moreover, we can expect any democratic defence agency (like a union) to
   support, say, striking workers or squatting tenants, to be crushed.
   This is because, as Rothbard stresses, all "defence" firms would be
   expected to apply the "common" law, as written by "Libertarian lawyers
   and jurists." If they did not they would quickly be labelled "outlaw"
   agencies and crushed by the others. Ironically, Tucker would join
   Bakunin and Kropotkin in an "anarchist" court accused to violating
   "anarchist" law by practising and advocating "occupancy and use" rather
   than the approved Rothbardian property rights. Even if these democratic
   "defence" agencies could survive and not be driven out of the market by
   a combination of lack of investment and violence due to their "outlaw"
   status, there is another problem. As we discussed in [9]section F.1,
   landlords and capitalists have a monopoly of decision making power over
   their property. As such, they can simply refuse to recognise any
   democratic agency as a legitimate defence association and use the same
   tactics perfected against unions to ensure that it does not gain a
   foothold in their domain.

   Clearly, then, a "right-wing" anarchism is impossible as any system
   based on capitalist property rights will simply be an oligarchy run by
   and for the wealthy. As Rothbard notes, any defence agency based on
   democratic principles will not survive in the "market" for defence
   simply because it does not allow the wealthy to control it and its
   decisions. Little wonder Proudhon argued that laissez-faire capitalism
   meant "the victory of the strong over the weak, of those who own
   property over those who own nothing." [quoted by Peter Marshall,
   Demanding the Impossible, p. 259]

References

   1. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF6.html
   2. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secB4.html
   3. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF6.html#secf61
   4. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF6.html#secf61
   5. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF1.html
   6. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF7.html#secf72
   7. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF6.html#secf61
   8. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secJ5.html#secj512
   9. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secF1.html
